A “spectacular military success.” That’s how Donald Trump, in an address from the White House, described the US military operation early on Sunday morning in the Middle East to bomb three nuclear sites in Iran—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. “Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated,” the US president declared, adding that “there will be either peace or there will be tragedy for Iran.” The US strikes came a little more than a week into Israel’s sweeping military campaign against Iranian nuclear and military targets.
Below, Atlantic Council experts assess the significance of the US strikes and forecast the fallout in Iran, regionally, and globally.
This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
William F. Wechsler: Trump made the right call. Will Khamenei do the same?
Matthew Kroenig: The US ended one of its most serious foreign policy threats
Jonathan Panikoff: The two potential paths Iran’s response could take
Daniel B. Shapiro: These strikes provide an off-ramp for Israel and Iran to end the war
Landon Derentz: The US strikes reflect a deeper transformation in the global energy landscape
Caroline Zier: Nobody should doubt that the US can strike targets mean to be unreachable
Alan Pino: Trump has sent a powerful signal to Russia and China
Danny Citrinowicz: A strike meant to end the military campaign against Iran could expand it
John Herbst: Trump is now in a stronger position to halt Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
Trump made the right call. Will Khamenei do the same?
Just over one week ago, when Israel began its campaign of strikes on Iran, I argued that “Iran cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon or to continue to blackmail the world with its capacity to break out and acquire such weapons.” I then added that “it would be more effective, both militarily and diplomatically, for the United States rather than Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear program.” And I ended by saying, “At times like these there is no substitute for Washington exercising decisive leadership, rather than waiting to be at the mercy of decisions made by others.” Trump has now clearly made this decision.
Tactically, there is no reason to doubt what Trump stated on Saturday night—that the strikes were a “spectacular success.” Strategically, while the risks are high and the final outcomes are far from certain, I believe Trump made the right call.
The exact nature of those risks and the potential for those outcomes now depend on decisions to be made in Tehran. The strategic choices for Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are clear. One option is for him to “drink from a poisoned chalice,” as his predecessor did to end the Iran-Iraq war, and negotiate directly and immediately with Trump to end the conflict. That would require, at minimum, an Iranian agreement to forever forgo any domestic enrichment, much less the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
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The US ended one of its most serious foreign policy threats
I’ve worked for more than two decades on the Iranian nuclear crisis, and I have long forecasted that this issue would and should end in a US strike on Iran’s nuclear program. That is what happened tonight.
Every president since George W. Bush has stated correctly that acquiescing to a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable. Others held out hope that this issue could be resolved at the negotiating table. But for more than two decades, Iran’s leaders have been unwilling to voluntarily give up their nuclear program. We were out of time. Experts estimated that Iran’s dash time to one bomb of weapons-grade uranium had shrunk to two to five days.
Others hoped that Israel would take care of the problem, but only the United States had the ability to destroy Iran’s deeply buried and hardened nuclear facilities.
Others fret about a wider regional war and even World War III. That won’t happen. Iran has few good retaliatory options, and it is afraid of a major war with the United States. Iran may launch token missile strikes, but expect this crisis to quickly de-escalate, like Trump’s strikes on Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020.
Others worry that Iran will be enraged and redouble its efforts to rebuild a bomb. With what? Their nuclear facilities are a smoking pile of rubble. They probably won’t rebuild. They just spent billions of dollars and decades only to invite sanctions and a devastating war with the most powerful country in the world. Why hit replay on that tape?
If Iran rebuilds, we can hit them again.
Iran’s nuclear program has been one of the most serious threats to US foreign policy for more than two decades. It no longer exists. This may be the biggest US foreign policy accomplishment since the end of the Cold War.
—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.
The two potential paths Iran’s response could take
It’s now Iran’s move, and Tehran has two pathways. It can choose to undertake a strike in which it attacks US bases in the region but with the intention of having a limited impact. Doing so would enable the Iranian regime to claim that it retaliated, defended its country, and stood up to the United States, which in turn might prompt the resumption of diplomatic engagement.
The president’s speech this evening is more likely to be viewed by the Iranian regime as another threat rather than as an opening for diplomacy. Iran is unlikely to believe it can simply capitulate to the United States—given that hardliners in the Iranian regime might view such a decision as inappropriate. Hopefully, Washington is also working through backchannels to provide Iran a face-saving diplomatic off-ramp for Tehran. Without something to be able to claim a reason for a lesser response, hardliners in the Iranian regime may ultimately win the day, which could lead to a much more dangerous outcome.
The other possible pathway is that the Iranian regime determines the US strikes—and continued threats Trump levied at Iran during his speech—compel the regime to undertake a significant attack against US personnel and interests. That would potentially prompt an escalatory spiral of attacks and counterattacks, which could lead to a regional war.
Iran’s military capabilities are degraded but far from extinguished. And if Iran worries that the regime is at risk either from the United States or Israel—or that if it doesn’t respond strongly enough, then it will lose the backing of those who generally support it—it could take this latter path. In doing so, it could seek to not only to leverage proxies in the Middle East to attack US interests and personnel, but also potentially undertake asymmetric attacks and terrorist attacks against global Israeli, Jewish, or US targets.
The other question that remains unanswered: Is Iran’s nuclear program truly destroyed? If it has been, then no further strikes will be required against sites related to Iran’s nuclear program, as the president seems to prefer. But if it turns out the strikes were not completely effective, that Iran moved portions of its nuclear weapons program, or that it has secret nuclear sites, then it is unlikely this will be the end of these strikes as Trump has sought.
The president made a decision this weekend that will create a new Middle East and potentially a better one—but it all depends on how Iran responds.
—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.
These strikes provide an off-ramp for Israel and Iran to end the war
Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities was likely necessary to close its path to nuclear weapons. In addition to the need to assess the outcome of the strikes, the United States will need to message clearly to Iran that if Tehran and its proxies retaliate against US forces in the region, they will face an overwhelming response. Trump began that messaging in his remarks following the strikes, but it will need to be reiterated in many channels, and with the support of the United States’ allies and partners, in the days ahead. The goal is to get into a de-escalatory cycle as quickly as possible.
These strikes also provide an off-ramp to end the war between Israel and Iran that has been ongoing over the last eight days. Vigorous and immediate diplomacy, with the support of regional partners like Oman and Qatar, will be required to get both sides to determine that this war has reached its endpoint. Once hostilities stop, a renewed diplomatic effort should commence to hold out sanctions relief for Iran if it commits to not reviving its nuclear program, ending its support of terrorist proxies, placing clear limits on its ballistic missile program. The Iranian leadership has had its weakness exposed; it may view such concessions as adding to that impression, but it may also be its only path to rescue the regime from collapse. The Iranian people will have to decide whether the regime, which has brought little but ruin on Iran, has reached its moment of truth. That should remain an internal process, not dictated by outsiders.
There is also a chance to leverage this pivotal moment, when Iran is at its weakest, to secure a cease-fire and hostage deal in Gaza that brings the war to an end, repatriates all remaining hostages, removes Hamas from power by sending remaining leaders and fighters into exile, and brings relief and reconstruction—supported by key Arab states—to Palestinians in Gaza who want to live in peace alongside Israel. It is also a moment to press forward on reviving efforts to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
There is risk in this moment, which must be managed. But out of the tragedy of October 7, there are also opportunities for Israel, the Gulf states, Syria, Lebanon, Palestinians, and US partners to lean in on a more peaceful and integrated region, far less menaced by Iran and its terrorist proxies.
—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.
The US strikes reflect a deeper transformation in the global energy landscape
Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities is a sharp reminder that US leadership still carries weight. That strength, when backed by strong market stability, can reshape the strategic map without triggering global panic. This wasn’t a move made out of desperation or crisis. It was a calculated decision made possible by a foundation of geopolitical foresight, energy abundance, and a posture of control rather than provocation.
Unlike previous conflicts in the region, this moment has not unsettled markets or threatened supply. For now, the Strait of Hormuz remains open, critical infrastructure is untouched, and the global energy system remains resilient and adequately supplied. That outcome is no accident. The United States targeted Iran’s weapons program—not its conventional oil and gas infrastructure—deliberately signaling both strength and restraint. It is this kind of calibrated response, grounded in energy security and strategic clarity, that reinforces US credibility without inviting chaos.
This approach reflects a deeper transformation in the global energy landscape, with the United States playing a central role alongside its allies. Strong domestic production and expanded export capacity contribute to overall energy security. But equally important is the regional context: the absence of antagonism from Gulf Arab partners, coupled with the swift Saudi recovery from the 2019 Abqaiq attacks, has created a new baseline of resilience in Middle East energy markets. These developments lower the geopolitical risk premium and have given policymakers space to act decisively without destabilizing the global economy.
This strike goes beyond the immediate aim of halting a nuclear threat. It underscores a new strategic era in which the United States, supported by a more stable and cooperative Gulf region, is no longer bound by the energy vulnerabilities of past decades. From the Abraham Accords to this latest action, the United States is not merely reacting—it is shaping outcomes. The choice to escalate now rests with Tehran. But the signal from Washington is unmistakable: the United States knows how to respond —precisely, proportionally, and from a position of strength.
—Landon Derentz as the vice president for energy and infrastructure and the senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.
Nobody should doubt that the US can strike targets meant to be unreachable
We are now in uncharted territory.
The complex operation early Sunday morning in the Middle East is a powerful reminder of the unrivaled capabilities of the US military. Regardless of what happens next in the region, the men and women who conducted the operation deserve high praise.
In a deeply interconnected world, other adversaries are taking notes tonight and recalibrating their own assessments of how Trump may be willing to employ the US military in the future. If there is a silver lining from the uncertainty and spiraling crisis in the Middle East, then it may be this: Nobody should doubt that the US military can strike targets that were designed to be unreachable. But in Moscow and Beijing, they may also be quietly celebrating the increased probability that the United States becomes more entangled in the Middle East, moving from its role of preventing regional conflict and defending Israel to a cobelligerent in a war with unclear off-ramps.
Above all, we cannot forget that the US service members, US diplomats, and their families who are stationed and deployed around the region are at even greater risk tonight than any moment since October 7, 2023. At Tehran’s urging or unilaterally, Iran-backed militia groups may resume attacks on US forces in Iraq, Syria, or Jordan with very little notice. Iran is militarily degraded, with conventional forces and a nuclear program hopefully set back substantially. But Tehran retains a wide range of asymmetric tools; it will both retaliate in the near term and attempt to rebuild its nuclear program and conventional capabilities over time.
—Caroline Zier is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She has over fifteen years of experience in national security and defense at the Department of Defense, most recently serving as the deputy chief of staff to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
Trump has sent a powerful signal to Russia and China
The apparently successful US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan deprive Tehran of any nuclear leverage in talks with the United States, at least for now. They also confront the Iranian regime with the choice of suing for peace or maintaining a defiant stance and threatening retaliation. The latter options hold high risk for Iran. Trump said in his speech tonight that the United States will strike back with overwhelming force if Iran tries to attack US personnel or facilities, possibly threatening Iranian government and economic targets and further weakening the regime.
It is unclear whether Iran seeks to retaliate against the United States immediately, other than in a token way, given the possibility of a massive US response. The regime in Tehran seems to still believe its best option is to refuse to capitulate on its determination to have a nuclear program, accuse the United States of unprovoked aggression, and gamble that Iran has the resilience to survive further attacks.
The regime in Tehran has staked a good part of its identity on retaining and advancing its nuclear enterprise and probably feels it would lose tremendous face with its own people if it agreed to Washington’s conditions for having a civil nuclear program. Tehran probably believes that pressure from the Gulf states, the Europeans, and the broader international community, all of whom have expressed concerns about the potential for a regional war, will build quickly on Washington to bring an end to US and Israeli attacks.
Whether Iran comes to the table or not, Trump has sent a powerful signal to Iran’s backers, Russia and China, with the strikes on Iran’s nuclear facility that his desire to avoid getting involved in new wars does not prevent him from using force when he believes that US core interests are involved.
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.
It will take more time and intelligence to know whether the strike ended Iran’s nuclear program
The White House has said that the strike decapitated Iran’s nuclear program, and the initial press reports indicate that a significant amount of munitions were used by the United States at key Iranian nuclear sites. Our military and intelligence professionals should be commended for pulling off an impressive mission. We will likely need more intelligence and on-the-ground assessments to determine if and how these strikes were truly successful in stopping Iran’s nuclear capability. The scope of the damage will also affect how Iran reacts next and whether Tehran will look to use asymmetric options such as launching cyberattacks or activating sleeper cells or militias. Iran has consistently attacked US forces in various forms for decade—recall the tragic loss of four US service members in 2024 in Jordan from a drone sent by an Iranian-backed militia—so protection of US troops and civilians in the region and around the world should be at the forefront of Trump’s mind right now.
For its part, Russia has warned against a US attack and has cited concerns over uncontrolled regional escalation. Trump reportedly rejected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offers to mediate the situation diplomatically. After today’s attacks, Moscow is certainly worried about the impact on the Iranian regime’s stability. In recent years, Moscow has intensified its relationship with Tehran, which has supported Russia’s war against Ukraine via the provision of Shahed drones that have wrought horrific damage against Ukrainian troops and civilians. With the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and with Tehran on its heels, Russia’s influence in the Middle East is more tenuous than ever. Putin now has a tough needle to thread with the United States, Iran, Israel, and complex interests in the Gulf. In the end, it’s not likely that Putin will do much to save Iran, and we should not expect him to return the favor by actively arming or assisting Tehran militarily.
—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she was the US principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the US Department of Defense.
A strike meant to end the military campaign against Iran could expand it
The unprecedented US attack on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan was intended to bring Iran back to the negotiating table on terms favorable to the United States. But despite this attack, it is very doubtful that Iran will submit to the United States’ conditions, which emphasize banning uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.
Trump hopes that this attack will end the military campaign against Iran. But it raises the likelihood that the campaign will expand, depending on the Iranian response. Netanyahu hopes that the latest attack will lead to significant US involvement in achieving the goal of overthrowing the Iranian regime, and that US involvement will not end at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Netanyahu’s problem is that if Trump does not broaden the operation, and Iran doesn’t agree to comply with the administration’s dictates, Israel could slide into a war of attrition with Iran, with the United States standing by and refusing to join Netanyahu’s ambitions to expand the campaign.
—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group.
Trump is now in a stronger position to halt Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
The impact of Trump’s attack on Fordow and two other nuclear facilities in Iran, following Israel’s daring strikes against Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities, is not limited to the Middle East. The attacks are already having significant repercussions—negative, positive, and uncertain—on the course of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine.
The most visible impact has been a shift in attention. The media and Washington’s political class are turning away from the Russian war and Putin’s rejection of Trump’s sound peace proposals. Compared to coverage of Iranian ballistic missiles falling on Israel, there is not nearly as much attention paid to the nightly Russian bombardment of Ukrainian cities, which on June 17 led to the death of thirty civilians in Kyiv.
The devastating US blow to Iran’s nuclear program makes clear that Trump understands the need for strong action when American interests are on the line. He has now acted on that understanding in the Middle East. The same could and should apply in eastern Europe. This does not require US military action—just increasing economic pressure on Russia and sending military supplies to Ukraine. In Trump world, opponents of that sound policy are now weaker.
Trump now is in a much stronger position in relation to Putin than he was before the attack on Fordow. Russia has done nothing beyond offer words to defend its ally Iran. If the United States starts to exert the pressure on Russia that Trump has promised for Putin’s blocking of peace, he would take a large step toward halting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.
Further reading
Thu, Jun 19, 2025
If diplomacy and Israel’s efforts fall short, Trump should bomb Fordow to end the war
New Atlanticist By Jonathan Panikoff
At the end of the current war, Iran will have a viable nuclear program, or it won’t. The future of the Middle East will be driven by the answer.
Sat, Jun 14, 2025
Israel’s Iran strike provides a historic chance for Middle East realignment
Inflection Points By Frederick Kempe
History will remember this moment less for the Israeli strikes themselves and more for what follows.
Mon, Jun 16, 2025
Twenty questions (and expert answers) on the Israel-Iran war
MENASource By
The escalation between Israel and Iran has raised many important questions about a region already facing crises on multiple fronts.
Image: US President Donald Trump delivers an address to the nation accompanied by US Vice President JD Vance, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S. June 21, 2025, following U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. REUTERS/Carlos Barria/Pool