On September 2, the US military struck an alleged narco-trafficking vessel in the waters near Venezuela. The strike was part of the Trump administration’s larger efforts to take on the illicit drug trade in the region. Much of the commentary since the strike has explained that the action was in many ways inconsistent with the United States’ longstanding approach of handling such encounters as enforcement engagements and not as military matters. But it’s worth looking in more detail to understand why that had been the case.
The US military can and should have been more involved in confronting narcotics trafficking in the hemisphere, but for a variety of reasons resisted doing so since the 1980s. To be sure, the US Coast Guard, a military force, has been deployed in this space for decades, and US collection assets have provided critical assistance to law enforcement for years. But the Department of Defense consistently opposed the use of its assets in interdicting drugs. Why is that?
Drawing in part on my time as US ambassador to Colombia from 2014 to 2019, there are at least four reasons why the Defense Department shied away from the mission in the past.
First, the Defense Department has argued that it faces competing priorities. Traffickers use a variety of methods to move their product, but the safest and cheapest method for them is maritime, by go-fast boats or semisubmersibles. As such, interdiction requires US Navy assets, vessels, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft. The Navy has consistently viewed its presence in East Asia to confront Chinese actions as a higher priority, and it retains its responsibilities in Europe and the Middle East. The counternarcotics mission didn’t rate.
Second, the US force is constructed for military operations, not law enforcement. It is true that attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and other sophisticated hardware are not particularly useful in going after the dispersed threat of maritime narcotics trafficking. However, as noted below, US Navy vessels have other capabilities that can help set up law enforcement endgames.
Third, US military leadership is reluctant to take on a new mission that is likely never to end. It is not wrong to be concerned about this. As successful as the United States was in Colombia, narcotics production and trafficking never ended, so the mission remained.
Fourth, any force, military or police, that takes on organized crime must be aware of the possibility of corruption. Over the years, this threat has affected both US and Colombian law enforcement communities.
But when US forces are intelligently deployed, excellent results can be achieved. In 2016, in response to my request, the US Navy briefly deployed the USS Lassen, a guided missile destroyer, to the eastern Pacific drug transit zone. The Lassen has unique capabilities—it’s fast, has state-of-the-art sensors and communications capabilities, and is equipped with two Seahawk helicopters. In just two weeks, it interdicted forty tons of cocaine, representing 10 percent of total interdictions that year.
One would think that this would have convinced the Department of Defense to repeat the exercise, but in my remaining three years in Colombia, it did not send another gray hull to the region to conduct counternarcotics activities. Even when, a few years later, Colombia designed and led a unique multinational maritime interdiction effort called Operation Orion, I was unable to convince the Pentagon to send any US Navy vessels to support this effort. (It’s important to note that the US Coast Guard, under the able leadership of Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, did step up in support of Operation Orion.)
The Defense Department missed an opportunity then, and it is capable of supporting interdiction today. Done in a manner consistent with the law, and in support of law enforcement activities, US military assets can play a useful role in protecting the homeland from narcotics trafficking.
Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and he served as US ambassador to Colombia from 2014 to 2019.
Further reading
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Why are US warships heading toward Venezuela?
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Three Aegis guided-missile destroyers and several other US warships are headed to the waters near Venezuela. Two Atlantic Council experts explain why and what to expect next.
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An ‘America first’ approach to Venezuela is taking shape
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US tariff threats against countries importing Venezuelan oil seem geared toward extracting concessions from strongman leader Nicolás Maduro.
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How the US and Colombia can tackle crime, migration, and fallout from Venezuela’s crisis
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Despite differences in priorities and political approaches, opportunities exist for the US and Colombia to coordinate policy that promotes stability in Venezuela and the broader region.
Image: Boatswain’s Mate 1st Class Jonathon Tippit, assigned to the Freedom-variant littoral combat ship USS St. Louis (LCS 19), signals an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 50 “Valkyries” during vertical replenishment drills on the flight deck in the Atlantic Ocean, Aug. 6, 2025. U.S. Navy assets are deployed under U.S Northern Command’s maritime homeland defense authorities with a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment embarked to enable maritime interdiction missions to prevent the flow of illegal drugs or other illegal activity. U.S. Northern Command is working together with the Department of Homeland Security to augment U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the southern border with additional military forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Matthew Tener)
