While China and Russia often tout a “no-limits partnership” aimed at countering the United States and its allies, the Sino-Russian relationship does appear to have some significant limits. This is most immediately apparent in the energy sector. As Europe phases out Russian gas imports in response to the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is looking to Beijing to offset the pressure. But China refuses to bail out the Kremlin on anything but its own terms.
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek on August 31 hoping to discuss the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline with his Chinese counterpart. This energy infrastructure project is designed to transport up to 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Russia’s Arctic region to China. If completed, it would double existing pipeline capacity connecting the two countries and help Moscow mitigate the economic blow of losing access to more lucrative European markets.
Despite Putin’s efforts to gain Xi’s approval for the new project at the SCO summit, the Russian leader was once again left empty-handed. The pipeline remains stalled, with Beijing demanding low gas prices similar to Russia’s heavily subsidized domestic rate. If Moscow agrees, this would leave Russia struggling to break even. Putin’s evident inability to secure Xi’s backing for the strategically crucial pipeline is strengthening international perceptions that the invasion of Ukraine has reduced Russia to the status of China’s junior partner.
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Russia’s weakened negotiating position has long been public knowledge. The Wall Street Journal reported that prior to a Beijing summit in May 2026, Chinese officials rejected Moscow’s pipeline proposals and asked the Russian delegation not to press the issue, despite the fact that Putin had been publicly signaling an imminent deal. On that occasion, the Russian leader left Beijing having signed 42 agreements and joint declarations, but the prized pipeline was not one of them. Putin’s recent rebuff in Bishkek has now cast further doubt on the “legally binding pipeline memorandum” between China and Russia that was trumpeted by the Kremlin in September 2025.
Beijing appears to be in no hurry and is content to wait as Russia’s economic and geopolitical leverage continues to deteriorate. Moreover, China has multiple gas supply options including Australia, Qatar, Malaysia, Turkmenistan, and others. Beijing even resumed LNG purchases from the United States after Trump and Xi met in May 2026, further undercutting any urgency to accommodate Moscow.
In contrast, Russia lacks any credible alternatives. A number of countries including India have surged their consumption of Russian fossil fuel exports since 2022, but China remains the only buyer big enough to compensate for the loss of Russia’s European gas markets. Even at its full 50 billion cubic meter capacity, the proposed pipeline would replace only about one-third of the gas Russia previously sold to Europe. Meanwhile, the European market looks to be closing for good, with the EU committed to ending all categories of Russian gas imports within the next few years. In other words, Russia needs a pipeline deal considerably more than China, and Beijing knows it.
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The deadlock in gas pipeline negotiations highlights the increasingly uneven nature of relations between Moscow and Beijing. While both share a desire to undermine the current Western-led international order and promote a “multipolar world,” the two countries would probably be best described as pragmatic partners rather than strategic allies.
As Putin doubles down on his war against Ukraine and expands Russia’s aggression against Europe, Moscow is increasingly ceding influence elsewhere, as evidenced by China’s growing ability to define the terms of any bilateral cooperation. This is a source of mounting concern among some members of the Russian elite. Kremlin officials are publicly adamant that efforts to isolate Russia have failed, but the breakdown in relations with the West since 2022 has clearly narrowed Putin’s foreign policy flexibility and heightened his dependency on China.
While Beijing refuses to compromise over gas prices, the Chinese are also making inroads into Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence in Central Asia, where China has now surpassed Russia as the region’s largest direct foreign investor. That would normally be regarded by the Kremlin as a red flag, but Putin has chosen not to raise any public objections. Moscow’s reluctance to make waves speaks volumes about the changing power dynamics shaping the China-Russia relationship.
Ties between China and Russia will likely be on the agenda this week as US President Donald Trump hosts Chinese leader Xi Jinping at a state dinner in Washington, DC. Trump has recently signed off on a landmark US sanctions package creating new tariff tools to target the key clients of Russian energy exports, adding extra impetus to talks with China. There have also been suggestions from the Kremlin that Trump and Xi may hold a trilateral meeting with Putin at the next Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which is set to take place in November.
These meetings are unlikely to signal in any major shifts in China’s relationship with Russia. On the contrary, Beijing can be expected to demonstrate continued support for Moscow, while at the same time seeking to limit any exposure to the growing risks posed by new US economic tools. Nevertheless, there is no disguising the fact that the relationship between Russia and China is no longer a partnership of equals. This change in status highlights how Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has diminished Moscow’s global standing.
Zahar Hryniv is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
Further reading
Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. August 31, 2026. (Sputnik/Kristina Solovyova/Pool via REUTERS.)