WASHINGTON—NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent White House meeting with US President Trump likely foreshadowed how discussions at the Alliance’s upcoming summit in Ankara will play out. Rutte spotlighted the progress made by allies on defense spending since the 2025 summit, while Trump focused on what he perceived as allies’ failure to support the recent US campaign against Iran.
The tension this meeting displayed is having real-world impacts on Alliance readiness. So far this year, the Trump administration has announced several US force posture adjustments in Europe, including the cancellation of a planned rotational deployment to Poland (later reversed) and the recall of the Stryker brigade based in Germany. These unexpected decisions have caused confusion among European allies and many US interagency personnel.
The Alliance faces an immediate need to ease tensions going into the Ankara summit, as well as a longer-term and more substantive challenge of strengthening its deterrence, especially along its eastern flank. To address both challenges, NATO needs a bold, consequential, and high-impact force posture commitment on the part of its member states. One such option is for European allies to agree to station full-strength combat brigades on an accelerated timeline in each of the Baltic states to deter possible Russian aggression in the near term.
An attractive deliverable and a stronger deterrent
At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, allies agreed “to deploy additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required.” This commitment is ongoing but has not yet been fully realized.
As Russia’s war on Ukraine settles into a war of attrition along the line of contact, the Kremlin will likely seek to reconstitute its forces and generate new formations. Assessing this environment, Nordic and Baltic intelligence and defense chiefs agree that Russian aggression toward a NATO nation in the next few years is a possibility. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s need to demonstrate battlefield success after failure in Ukraine, as well as his long-expressed ambition to “recover former territories” and “support oppressed Russian minorities,” make Russian aggression more likely. Particularly as the US commitment to the Article 5 mutual-defense pact is seen to be in question, urgent reinforcement of these threatened areas would represent both Alliance unity and European resolve to increase European allies’ share of the defense burden.
Much of this work is already underway. In Lithuania, Germany is standing up a tank brigade, scheduled to be operational by the end of 2027. In Latvia, Canada (as the framework nation) contributes a mechanized infantry battalion and the headquarters for Multinational Brigade Latvia, along with one mechanized infantry battalion from Sweden. The third maneuver battalion and supporting artillery and enablers are composite formations drawn from thirteen contributing nations. In Estonia, the United Kingdom, as the framework nation, currently provides one infantry battalion battle group, with France and Iceland as contributing nations.
While these are important and meaningful steps, the pace of deployment has been measured and deliberate. In Lithuania, equipment shortages and disputes over payment for housing and infrastructure threaten to delay full operational capability for the German tank brigade past 2027. In Latvia, the presence of so many smaller national contingents signals strong Alliance unity, but it also presents significant command-and-control and interoperability challenges. In Estonia, the lack of a full brigade (with needed enablers) so close to Russian national territory is a pressing concern.
Given recent and significant increases in defense spending in Europe, as well as the urgent need to demonstrate a stronger Alliance commitment to a skeptical US administration, an Ankara summit announcement of a firm commitment to rapidly strengthen NATO’s ground presence in the Baltic states would represent a high-profile deliverable and a stronger deterrent. This option can be implemented without crippling stress on the defense establishments of European allies, with relatively rapid action—within twelve to eighteen months—if the political will is there.
A concrete commitment
What would such an enhancement look like? First, these NATO brigades should be as complete as possible, with the allies possessing stronger militaries providing the bulk of the combat forces. This includes the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Sweden. Other contributing nations could provide additional support in the form of airlift, cyber defense, mine removal, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense. However, combat battalions—infantry, armor, and artillery—should not be multinational to ensure combat capability. Extensive infrastructure improvements or “home basing” with accompanying families are not required or desirable. Participating formations would serve six-month rotations, except for the brigade headquarters, which would serve one-year rotations for continuity.
Ideally, NATO brigades should be mechanized with at least one armor battalion per brigade. All formations should be fully manned, trained, and equipped. Each battalion battle group would include an air-defense battery, an engineer company, a logistical support company, and reconnaissance, drones, electronic warfare, signal, NBC, and medical platoons. Careful attention to interoperability training and, in particular, secure voice and data communications are required. Allied Land Command can serve as the certifying agency.
Adequate stocks of munitions, spare parts, fuel, food, water, and medical supplies are, of course, essential. For planning purposes, all classes of supply should be provided for up to six months of sustained combat. Combat forces should be provided without caveats. If committed to action, multinational formation commanders must have latitude to employ their forces without constantly checking with capitals. Host nation liaison elements should be embedded in each NATO brigade to ensure seamless integration with national defense plans. Air and naval support, as well as high altitude air and ballistic missile defense, space, and offensive cyber capabilities, must come from across the Alliance in accordance with approved plans.
Building on existing arrangements, a concrete commitment would see these three brigades in place and combat ready by the end of 2027, as promised. The brigades can deploy under field or “expeditionary” conditions now without waiting for the construction of family housing, day care facilities, and instrumented training ranges, for example. In Lithuania, personnel and equipment shortages for the German brigade can be addressed by pulling from across the Bundeswehr. In Latvia, the third maneuver battalion and artillery battalion for the Canadian-led brigade should be national, not composite, formations (perhaps from Spain and Italy). In Estonia, the British-led enhanced forward presence battalion battle group should be increased to brigade strength, under a UK brigade headquarters. Combat battalions could be provided by the United Kingdom, Finland, Poland, Denmark, or Norway.