Experts react: Democrats just swept the US midterms. Here’s what it means for the world.

The North Wing (Senate Wing) of the US Capitol following the US midterm elections in Washington, DC, US, November 4, 2026. REUTERS/Eric Lee

The blue tsunami will reach far beyond the United States. In Tuesday’s midterm elections, Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress by wide margins, ushering in divided government over the final two years of President Donald Trump’s term in office. Below, our experts assess the global implications of the sweep on issues ranging from energy and the economy to US foreign policy.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: The midterm losses could delay, but not prevent, another Iran escalation

Landon Derentz: Trump may double down on energy policy

Josh Lipsky: Markets are unsure what to make of the Democratic sweep

Torrey Taussig: The power of the purse will be the route to shaping US NATO policy

John E. Herbst: The administration will face a higher cost for Putin-friendly policies

Graham Brookie: Public trust is driving politics—and perhaps now policy—on AI

Kenton Thibaut: US-China AI safety talks could be back on the agenda

Jörn Fleck: Democrats could extract some concessions on Ukraine, but don’t expect a sea-change on Europe

Tressa Guenov: Congress will double down on defense and intelligence oversight

Thomas Warrick: It’s time for bipartisan progress on immigration policy

Leslie Shedd: Expect tougher scrutiny of Israel and Iran, and potentially more support for Ukraine

Jason Marczak: Venezuela oil deals and military operations will come under scrutiny 

Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, Taussig was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

The power of the purse will be the route to shaping US NATO policy

As long as Trump is in office, questions and concerns about US engagement in NATO will remain. It was not Congress, but rather the president, who created a transatlantic crisis by repeatedly threatening to annex Greenland, make Canada the fifty-first state, and withhold protection from NATO allies that do not spend enough on defense. It was also the administration, not Congress, that bypassed all efforts to build European support for (or even awareness of) its war with Iran. The administration took not only Europeans but also Congress by surprise when it canceled troop deployments to Europe earlier this year. Now that Democrats control the legislative branch, many on both sides of the Atlantic will be looking to see if the party can wrestle some degree of control away from the executive branch in foreign and security policy.

Democrats who favor a robust US presence in Europe and a strong commitment to NATO are starting from a solid foundation. Despite the administration’s unwieldy approach toward allies, support for NATO in Congress already crosses party lines—and to meaningful effect. In the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Republican majorities passed multiyear security assistance for Ukraine, as well as limits on the administration’s ability to enact troop cuts in Europe, and required the US military commander of European Command to retain the supreme allied commander Europe role in NATO.

Despite this already strong bipartisan support for NATO, Democratic control of Congress will still have a recalibrating effect on transatlantic security. Come January 2027, Democrats will chair every committee and subcommittee in the House and Senate, including the appropriations committees and those important for European security and foreign policy (the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Armed Services Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee). Democrats will decide which bills get hearings, control investigations, and oversee about two-thirds of committee staff and budgets. We will see the effects of this shift in the 2027 NDAA negotiations and hearings regarding US force posture in Europe. While Trump maintains broad executive privileges in the foreign policy arena, Democrats will start paving the way for a new approach to working with US allies.

John Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The administration will face a higher cost for Putin-friendly policies

The strong Democratic Party win in the midterms poses new impediments to Trump’s latest moves regarding Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. For nearly a month, the administration’s policy has moved substantially in favor of the Kremlin, despite major US interests to the contrary.

The list of favors to Russian President Vladimir Putin include the deal on the sale of Russian diesel fuel to the US, a violation of US sanctions policy; the neutering of the Lindsay Graham sanctions bill, passed by large majorities in both the House and the Senate and signed by Trump just a few weeks earlier; the shutting off of vital intel to Ukraine coming from the Starlink and Starshield satellite systems; and favorable consideration of Putin’s proposal for a Xi-Trump-Putin trilateral on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit later this month.

Even before the midterms, these gifts to a Kremlin uninterested in a compromise peace sparked major criticism across the political spectrum, including from Republicans in Congress and major media generally supportive of Trump, such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post. Several Republicans in the House and Senate even said publicly that if the Kremlin coddling did not cease, they would block Trump’s agenda for the lame-duck congressional session after the midterms. That criticism surprised the administration and may have had something to do, first, with the refusal of any official to accept responsibility for the intel shutdown and, second and more importantly, the restoration of the service a few days ago.

The midterm results only add to the problems Trump will face if his deference to Putin—a figure more than 80 percent of Americans view negatively—continue. Before the Tuesday vote, the Democrats were expected to take the House, but they did better by also taking the Senate. This means that Team Trump may face investigations of its turn toward Moscow from both houses. These inquiries will likely take up such problematic questions as to why the White House chose to ignore its own intelligence community and downplay the military intelligence Moscow gave Iran in order for Iranian forces to effectively target US bases and soldiers in the Middle East.

All of this means that the administration will face a much higher cost for a Kremlin-friendly policy than it had before. That is no assurance that it will revert to an actual “peace through strength” policy when dealing with Moscow. But Russian war bloggers have been mourning the election results because they believe Trump will no longer be able to help Putin.

Graham Brookie is the Atlantic Council’s vice president for technology programs and strategy, as well as the senior director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab. He previously served in various positions at the White House and National Security Council.

Public trust is driving politics—and perhaps now policy—on AI

For the United States to compete effectively in the age of AI, the country must address the significant trust deficit the American public has toward the technology. This was a key finding of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on AI earlier this year, which brought together bipartisan members of Congress, industry leaders, and civil society experts.

The deep anxiety Americans feel about the technology and skepticism of the titans building it were on full display throughout the midterm elections and in the results. For example, an NBC News exit poll found 56 percent of voters said AI and associated infrastructure were a “crucial or major factor” in their vote for Congress. There is little reason to believe these concerns won’t remain on full display in the next Congress and at the state level in California, Texas, Ohio, and elsewhere.

Despite the significant Democratic gains in the election, AI skepticism transcended partisan lines, with many Republican candidates—from Michigan to Texas—advocating for slowing down the AI infrastructure buildout or increasing the regulation of the tech sector. Likewise, there are an increasing number of bipartisan policy proposals on AI safety in the current Congress—such as the FRONTIER ACT or the AI Kill Switch Act—which will likely reemerge in some form in the next Congress.

The bottom line is that, despite the increasing use and integration of AI in daily life around the country, polling as recent as last month shows that 75 percent of Americans view AI with fear or concern rather than excitement, especially when it comes to affordability, employment, education, the environment, safety and security, and many other issues. These concerns are especially prevalent among young people.

The election comes one week after one of the largest tech-driven sell-offs wiped out nearly one trillion dollars in market value due to subpar earnings reports across the AI industry. Much of that sell-off was driven by shaky confidence in whether the record borrowing and spending fueling the AI industry will translate into sustainable revenue, even as the infrastructure buildout takes time and has become a political flashpoint. Either way, the US economy is extremely dependent on whether the huge bets being placed on AI will pan out. Taken together, we’re likely in for continued market and policy adjustments related to AI.

AI is here to stay as a general-purpose technology, but it is also increasingly a determinant of geopolitical competition. As AI development outpaces institutions’ ability to manage it, we’re past due for a coherent national dialogue on AI’s impact and what US leadership in AI should look like. That debate will be on full display in the coming Congress.

Kenton Thibaut is senior resident China fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

US-China AI safety talks could be back on the agenda

Democratic control of Congress could strengthen political support for US-China coordination on AI safety, particularly around frontier-model risks, incident reporting, and crisis communications. The election comes at a consequential moment: During their September 2026 summit, Trump and Xi agreed to establish a bilateral AI dialogue and a communication channel for AI-related incidents, with follow-up talks scheduled for November.

Congressional Democrats have already articulated a more ambitious agenda for bilateral engagement: In September, representatives Gregory Meeks, Ami Bera, and Sara Jacobs, along with twenty-six of their colleagues, urged the administration to pursue shared AI safety standards, establish crisis communications mechanisms, address the proliferation of advanced capabilities, and facilitate exchanges between American and Chinese AI researchers. A separate initiative led by Senator Chris Van Hollen and sixteen Democratic colleagues went further, calling for a formal agreement on frontier AI testing, oversight, human control, and verification. The senators also proposed considering a mutual pause in frontier AI development, highlighting growing congressional interest in managing the risks of an accelerating technological competition.

With control of both chambers, Democrats could use committee hearings, appropriations, and legislation to press the administration to operationalize the new dialogue. Potential priorities could include defining which AI incidents trigger bilateral notifications, establishing protocols for information sharing, and supporting technical exchanges on model evaluations and catastrophic risks.

There is some bipartisan support for this approach. In September, members of the bipartisan Problem Solvers Caucus also called for US-China coordination on AI testing and incident reporting. Growing public backlash against current AI policy—including data center buildouts, permissive AI self-regulation, and growing concerns about the impacts of AI on employment—could also add momentum to renewed engagement on AI.

However, significant constraints remain. The executive branch controls diplomatic negotiations, while disagreements over semiconductor restrictions, technology access, and verification complicate cooperation. Democratic lawmakers also differ significantly on how far bilateral commitments should extend, with more national-security-oriented Democrats expressing greater skepticism about such a process.

The election’s most immediate effect may be to make implementation of the existing AI safety dialogue a more prominent congressional priority. Whether this develops into formal agreements will depend on the administration’s willingness to negotiate and Beijing’s readiness to accept reciprocal safeguards—a tall order, considering that Beijing has previously rejected Washington’s efforts to frame AI safety talks around US-defined priorities.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Democrats could extract some concessions on Ukraine, but don’t expect a sea-change on Europe

Europe can expect the Democrats in the next Congress to signal a more constructive US reengagement in transatlantic relations, on Ukraine, and even on trade issues. But European decisionmakers are right to have tempered expectations about how much a Democratic Congress will translate into substantial US policy changes on what matters most to the continent: support for Ukraine, US commitments to European security, and greater stability in trade and tariff policies.

Even with a strong majority in both chambers of Congress, Democrats will struggle to impose meaningful limits on Trump’s conduct of foreign policy, given his constitutional powers and willingness to push the envelope. Democrats may put him and Republicans on the record with messaging bills on items such as the Russian diesel deal and waived Russia sanctions. They can put supplemental funding for Ukraine on the agenda and leverage must-pass legislation such as the NDAA to try to extract concessions on Ukraine support or US security and troop commitments in Europe related to the administration’s ongoing force posture review. The new majority will also try to claw back trade and tariff powers that Congress has ceded to the executive branch in Trump’s second term. But Trump has stated a willingness to use his veto, and hard limits on the president’s power are unlikely.

Much will also depend on where congressional Republicans go politically in response to the midterm rout. The remaining Reaganite hawks in the Senate may not continue to mute their opposition to the president’s dealings with Moscow and Beijing or his pressure on Kyiv and allied European capitals. Large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress may make it easier to assemble the two-thirds majorities needed to override a presidential veto. Republican hawks will have more leverage to confront the White House, even if they will have to pick their battles.

Complicating matters, Europe will have to navigate two poles of power in Washington. Europe will, on the one hand, confront a Democratic Congress that wants to drive a reengagement agenda with European allies but will not be able to deliver significant policy changes on key areas of concern, at least not on its own. And on the other hand, Brussels and national capitals must be prepared to counter continued disruption from the president on trade and Ukraine, while avoiding antagonizing him with overly partisan approaches.

NATO and EU countries will continue to confront a mercurial US president who may double down on foreign policy as he is likely to come under significant pressure at home from congressional investigations, budget fights, and political gridlock under divided government. Unshackled from having to face voters at the ballot box again, Trump may shift into deal-making overdrive to cement his legacy. In doing so, he will lean into the instincts that have defined his foreign policy Weltanschauung—one of sphere-of-influence arrangements among supposedly great powers, personalized leader-to-leader dealings, and hard power realism. Trump’s deal-making mode carries both risks and opportunities for Europe and its adversaries.

Moscow and Beijing will now have to contend with a more boxed-in Trump administration. Trump’s instincts may still be to look for deals with Putin and Xi. So Europeans should assess which opportunities and deals they can shape, from Ukraine to European security and trade, even if these may turn out to be more tactical than strategic, as broader initiatives with this White House may remain elusive. But Europe simply cannot afford to fatalistically write off the next two years given the president’s powers and what is at stake for the continent in US foreign and defense policy.

Tressa Guenov is the senior director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. She previously served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Congress will double down on defense and intelligence oversight

Democratic leaders in the House and Senate will need to focus immediately on essential foreign policy issues such as Iran and Ukraine, but equally important will be the possibility of renewed oversight of core defense and intelligence issues. Expect Democrats to press on issues such as the Pentagon’s force posture plans around the globe and getting numbers on critical munitions stockpiles and associated defense production issues. Democrats are also likely to look into reports of inappropriate business practices within the department and seek out accountability on recent military actions against targets in the Caribbean and Iran. Trump’s programmatic priorities such as Golden Dome, and broader issues of personnel readiness, promotions, and recruitment, are also likely to be on the agenda.

On intelligence issues, we may see a revived bipartisan core of members who will want baseline information on how layoffs and retirements have affected US collection capacity, where AI offers expanded risks and opportunities, and how adversaries may be working together in new ways against US interests and those of the international community.

These fundamental issues won’t be easy to address. They will require urgent bipartisan attention and rapid coordination across several committees before the new Congress is even sworn in this January. Much more work lies ahead.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the Department of Homeland Security.

It’s time for bipartisan progress on immigration policy 

Opinion polls have consistently made clear that the American people want an immigration system that is both just and fair, and they are prepared to vote against those who fail to deliver on that objective. Concerns about the US immigration system helped elect Trump president in 2016. Trump’s child-separation policy helped elect Joe Biden president in 2020. Chaos at the border helped elect Trump president in 2024. Cruelty in Trump’s immigration enforcement over the past two years helped create last night’s electoral triumph for Democrats. 

Trump’s border adviser Tom Homan had it right two years ago: If Trump had focused on deporting only those unauthorized migrants with criminal records, he might have kept the support of the majority of Americans on this issue. Instead, Trump’s immigration policy appears to have lost the trust of the American people. As of early Wednesday morning, Democrats are expected to win in every single congressional district along the US-Mexico border, including in formerly deep-red (now looking purple) Texas.  

With their new power, expect congressional Democrats to start investigations into the Trump administration’s immigration detention system.  

The lesson Republicans and Democrats should learn is that only a bipartisan approach on border security and immigration will get the lasting support of the American people. The United States needs a solution along the lines of the 2023–2024 bipartisan Senate compromise or the bipartisan Dignity Act. The 120th Congress should update the 2024 compromise legislation, reallocate existing appropriations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to other priorities, mandate a major shift in detention and asylum policy, and send it to the White House attached to whatever Trump considers must-pass legislation. Even if bipartisan immigration reform does not pass in 2027, it will help set the agenda for 2028. 

Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former senior adviser to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Expect tougher scrutiny of Israel and Iran, and potentially more support for Ukraine

Last night’s resounding loss for the Republican Party will have some immediate impacts on foreign policy. First, the new Congress will be without a slew of experienced Republican national security voices, who either lost last night, retired, or passed away. Senators Susan Collins (ME), Thom Tillis (NC), John Cornyn (TX), Lindsey Graham (SC), and Mitch McConnell (KY), and representatives Mike Lawler (NY), Michael McCaul (TX), Ann Wagner (MO), Don Bacon (NE), and Brian Fitzpatrick (PA) have been advocates for American strength and strong alliances, including with Ukraine. That is a significant loss of expertise and experience for the Republican conferences in both chambers that will take years to rebuild.

Israel is also facing a brand-new world this morning—one with a Congress far less supportive of its causes and far more likely to cut military aid. The Israeli government and its supporters in the United States would be wise to begin immediate outreach to Democrats open to mending fences and attempt to rebuild support. Trump himself announced Tuesday that he would cut off four billion dollars in annual aid to Israel, but he will need Congress to agree, since it is actually responsible for appropriating that money. He now likely has a Congress that will.

On the war in Iran, which drove many voters to turn on Republicans, the next Congress is likely to prioritize legislation to halt, or at least significantly curtail, US military action. Still, it is unclear what that would look like beyond a resolution of disapproval, because Iran has been unwilling to have any reasonable discussions to end the conflict.

The new Congress also injects a measure of uncertainty into Ukraine policy. While Democrats have been generally solid in supporting Ukraine militarily and financially during the conflict, voters sent a resounding message in this election to focus on domestic policy and affordability. It’s unclear whether this new crop of Democrats will be interested in sending money and weapons overseas—regardless of the destination. In good news for Ukraine, the likely chairs of national security committees—particularly Representative Adam Smith (D-WA) at House Armed Services and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) at Senate Foreign Relations—have a strong record of support. They will be powerful allies for Ukraine in the new Congress, as Kyiv fights for access to much-needed weapons.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Venezuela oil deals and military operations will come under scrutiny

Latin America policy wasn’t on the ballot yesterday, and Democrats are expected to focus on affordability and other pocketbook issues. But the Democratic-controlled House and Senate, especially with more seats flipped than expected, are likely to bring hearings, oversight, and investigations into some of Trump’s marquee policies in Latin America in at least three priority areas. 

Top of that list will be Venezuela. There, investigations could stretch from looking at who benefits from oil agreements to how revenues are managed and the legal authority for those arrangements, as well as greater scrutiny of the extent to which a pathway to a democratic transition is taking shape. Senator Tim Kaine, a potential new chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, may push the administration on the exact timing and plan for an election.   

Expect possible involvement from the House Foreign Affairs and Oversight committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations, Banking, and Finance committees. Democrats have long been asking for more information on these issues, including in a September letter from Representative Gregory Meeks and Representative Robert Garcia to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Attorney General Todd Blanche requesting more information on the management of Venezuelan oil revenue and the September oil deal announced by Trump.  

But it won’t only be about Venezuela. Representative Adam Smith, in line to chair the House Armed Services Committee, has stated that, with enough backing, he would push to investigate the boat strikes and the overall military campaigns that the United States has deployed across the region since the Trump administration took office. Hearings could include the legal basis for US actions, the costs, and the casualties. Global tariffs will also be on the congressional agenda, with the implications for countries like Mexico, Washington’s largest trading partner, likely to receive greater attention. 

Hearings and investigations are not the only tools available to Congress. Ahead of elections in 2028, both parties will be pressed to show concrete results through legislation—and hopefully through bipartisan alignment—on the issues that will define the continued expansion of the US presence in the hemisphere. 

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