This is the first in a series on the transition at the US Department of Homeland Security to President-elect Donald Trump’s second term.

In the end, it will come down to trust.

If the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in President Donald Trump’s second term can build and keep the trust of the overwhelming majority of Americans, then the country, the American people, and Trump will all be well served.

More than other cabinet departments, DHS needs to factor into its decisions how its actions affect the trust Americans have in it. DHS needs the support of the American people to succeed. DHS is the third-largest US government department, with more than 260,000 people. Its work is vital to the security and economic prosperity of the United States. DHS has more contact with the American people than any other federal department: everyone who uses computers, cell phones, and online networks; travels through airports; enters or leaves the country; is hit by a natural or man-made disaster; goes to a house of worship that uses a grant to pay for increased security; or visits a federal office building protected by DHS anywhere in the country—they all engage with what DHS does.

DHS requires cooperation from state and local governments on law enforcement and protecting the borders. It relies on voluntary cooperation and the sharing of information from state and local governments, and from the private sector, to protect computer networks and critical infrastructure. Security missions such as aviation and border security rely on Americans accepting what DHS does as necessary for their protection. People need to have confidence that the sensitive, personal information they provide to DHS is used appropriately. Public confidence in DHS cannot be commanded; it must be earned whenever DHS takes action.

While most of DHS has earned public trust since the department’s founding in 2003, the past two presidential terms have seen that trust fray significantly with different parts of the public. In the first Trump administration, an intentional policy of child separation at the border in 2018, misuse of DHS’s intelligence resources after the 2020 death of George Floyd, and the heavy-handed use of Customs and Border Protection’s elite Border Patrol Tactical Unit on the streets of Portland, Oregon, had the effect of energizing broad popular opposition to Trump administration homeland security policies.

In 2021, the Biden administration reversed many Trump immigration policies, but it failed to provide additional resources to quickly reject unfounded asylum claims. This led to more releases and more arrivals at the border. The surge of releases into the United States fueled the impeachment of Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas in February of this year (quickly acquitted in the Senate). A late 2023 bipartisan Senate compromise for additional resources and policy changes was blocked by Congress, at Trump’s request, in January 2024. The number of unauthorized migrants dropped in the summer of 2024, but by then it was too late.

According to polls, voters concluded that they did not trust Democrats with border security. Adding to this perception was the Secret Service’s failure in July to stop an attempted assassination of Trump, and controversies, many unjustified, over disaster aid to victims of hurricanes Helene and Milton. The administration’s performance on border security had become the second-most important issue in the presidential election that Trump won.

Mass deportations are coming

During his Republican Party convention speech in July, Trump promised that he would deliver “the largest deportation operation” in US history. Democrats may question the wisdom but for now they cannot question the mandate. Since his reelection, Trump has appointed Tom Homan, a former senior officer in the Border Patrol and one of Trump’s acting directors of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as border czar. Stephen Miller, Trump’s immigration adviser during his first term, has been named as deputy White House chief of staff, where he is expected to have substantial control of overall immigration and border policy. Trump also nominated South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem to be the next secretary of homeland security. In 2021, she sent South Dakota National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border.

By one estimate, Trump is trying to remove 11.7 million people from the United States. To give a sense of the effort required, the Trump administration deported 1.5 million people during his first term, a number the Biden administration will match by the end of its term. An additional 2.8 million people were expelled during the pandemic between March 2020 and May 2023. The previous recent high was five million deported or removed in President George W. Bush’s second term.

Trump has promised deportations will begin on “day one.” He is also certain to quickly revoke the parole that has allowed in tens of thousands from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Those awaiting a court date for their asylum claims are likely to see Trump administration efforts to shorten the legal process and deny most claims. Those without authorization to be in the United States face the choice between going home now or taking the risk of arrest and deportation if they stay.

Homan, one of the toughest and most highly skilled operators in the new Trump team, understands how he wants this to unfold. Initially, deportations will target migrants with criminal records, according to Vice President-elect JD Vance. The total number of such individuals is uncertain, but according to ICE, it is probably less than one million. This should have broad public support. They will also go after the 1.19 million people who have received “final orders of removal” from immigration judges, but it will take some effort to find many of them. Then they can target those whose parole was revoked or who have given DHS or the Department of Justice their current addresses.

Homan will need to quickly build up the resources and infrastructure to remove detained individuals as fast as they come in. Right now, there are not enough ICE agents, holding sites, contract jails, and aircraft or buses to remove people as fast as ICE can bring them into custody—especially if, as Trump and Miller have said, some state National Guard units also help detain people. Trump has already confirmed that he will declare a national emergency and use military assets to help with deportations. The infrastructure to do this at Trump’s scale does not exist and will need to be assembled, almost certainly with help from the Department of Defense. Until then, Homan can (1) limit the pace of arrests to the pace of deportations, which will frustrate Trump and Miller, or (2) get the money, people, and equipment to move more people out quickly. Republican control of both houses of Congress will make the latter possible, but Homan needs to have his reprogramming plan, and a supplemental funding request from Congress, ready in January.

Make no mistake, the price tag will be breathtaking. The January 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise asked for $20.3 billion. It is hard to see Homan’s plan as costing anything less than that, even in the first year. Trump has already made it clear that he will support this plan whatever it costs, and Republican control of both houses of Congress should allow him to get it.

What could go wrong?

There are three breaking points that could end public support for Trump’s deportation plans, and Homan has already shown he understands at least two of them. First, Homan knows that Americans will not accept mass detention camps, even though Miller described camps in Texas to podcaster Charlie Kirk in November 2023. Some in the Trump administration may want detention camps in the desert—in order to signal to migrants not to come to the United States. This could lead to a clash inside the Trump administration early in 2025.

The second potential breaking point, which Homan also seems to understand, is that the way to detain undocumented migrants is through targeted arrests, not roundups from people’s houses or children’s schools. Workplace enforcement actions would send a signal to businesses that use undocumented workers—and there are many fewer businesses that use undocumented workers than there are undocumented workers the Trump administration would want to arrest. Enforcing laws requiring hiring only those legally able to work in the United States could reduce the “pull” effect that draws potential workers from Central and South America to the US economy. But doing this in too heavy-handed a way will not be accepted by many Americans.

The third potential breaking point will occur after immigration advocates try to slow the deportation process through legal challenges and court injunctions. There are several existing legal settlements that give the courts the ability to slow or block certain procedural steps the Trump administration will likely try.

The Trump administration no doubt believes a Trump-friendly US Supreme Court will approve the measures they intend to take. But the White House needs to respect the rule of law and let the legal processes work out, even if it takes months, for a very important political reason. Many Americans are likely to accept the use of the law to deport people, but even more Americans may balk at the Trump administration breaking the law to do so.

Blowing through the rule of law would have severe consequences not just for immigration and border security but for other parts of the Trump agenda. The Trump administration should consider carefully the grave risks if it goes forward by ignoring the courts. With public trust in tatters, Trump’s opponents might then consider themselves justified in ignoring the law. That way lies anarchy.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

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Image: US President Donald Trump talks with US Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott as he tours a section of the U.S.-Mexico border wall in San Luis, Arizona, U.S., June 23, 2020. REUTERS/Carlos Barria