“Tisza is flooding.” The slogan adopted by Péter Magyar’s party ahead of Hungary’s parliamentary elections—a play on the party’s rising polls and shared name with Hungary’s second-longest river—came true on Sunday with an electoral tsunami that swept out Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party after sixteen years in power. With his frequent antagonism toward the European Union (EU) and its support for Ukraine, as well as his increasingly authoritarian rule at home, Orbán had become a guiding star of far-right politics across Europe and beyond. Now that Tisza’s political wave has arrived, our experts wade through the results and what they mean for Hungary, Europe, and the transatlantic alliance.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Daniel Fried: A tale of how to overcome authoritarian nationalism
Jörn Fleck: Hungary will remain conservative but will be more constructive in the EU
Emerson T. Brooking: Europe has dodged a bullet
Andras Simonyi: How Magyar did it
Oleh Shamshur: Hungary-Ukraine relations have a new start, but don’t expect a full embrace
Will Mortenson: Orbán leaves Hungary weaker in political freedom and the rule of law
A tale of how to overcome authoritarian nationalism
Orbán’s defeat resulted from his poor performance at home. His posturing, which had been successful for many years, could not overcome voters’ objections to Hungary’s weak economy and blatant corruption. Hungarian society has repudiated Orbán and his authoritarianism, which included control of major media outlets and intimidation of the judiciary and state institutions.
The opposition Tisza party that has defeated Orbán’s Fidesz and obtained a two-thirds majority in parliament is led by the conservative, charismatic Péter Magyar, who left Fidesz only in 2024. Although a social conservative, Magyar put together a broad coalition including Hungarian liberals, a sort of pro-democracy coalition that carried the day.
Other than Orbán and his Fidesz party, losers in this election include the Kremlin, whose overt and covert support for Orbán—rightly regarded as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s best friend in Europe—has failed. This is not the first time that Kremlin election interference has failed in Central and Eastern Europe: It did so recently in Moldova and Romania, where pro-Western candidates overcame extensive Russian efforts to put Moscow’s thumb on the electoral scales.
The Trump administration and MAGA movement are also losers: In a break from the usual practice of avoiding overt favoritism in democratic elections, both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance visited Budapest during the election campaign, with Vance campaigning with Orbán. President Donald J. Trump even called in during one of those events. Orbán and his political allies had spent years and a lot of money cultivating support from perceived ideological allies in the United States, who seemed to regard Orbán and Fidesz as harbingers of a nationalist upsurge in Europe. That investment didn’t save Fidesz from an electoral debacle.
The biggest winners of the election are Hungarians, whose new government may be able to improve the economy, reverse corruption, and restore democratic institutions and the rule of law. Hungarian democrats right, left, and center have turned back an authoritarian cycle that many thought unstoppable.
Ukraine is another winner. Orbán had acted as a major break on European support for Ukraine, halting a major EU loan to Kyiv intended to compensate for US termination of most assistance to Ukraine.
The victory of Hungary’s pro-democracy coalition also counts as a victory for the free world. The resilience of Hungary’s democracy in the face of authoritarian governance will hearten democracy activists around the world. Hungary, once seen as a herald of authoritarian nationalism, seems now a tale of how to overcome it.
—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.
Hungary will remain conservative but will be more constructive in the EU
The decisive defeat of populist, pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party signals significant new openings not just for Hungary but for Europe as a whole. A Magyar-led government is widely expected to cast off its outcast role at the EU table. Most importantly, it will remove the Hungarian veto on the EU’s ninety-billion euro support package for Ukraine. Even if Hungary remains a conservative voice on issues from migration to enlargement, Budapest will return to a more constructive stance on other European issues. Hungarians widely rejected Orbán’s weaponization of relations with Brussels in the election campaign, hoping to become a normal member of the union. On election night, Magyar confirmed that he will heed that message as a member of the mainstream center-right political family at the EU level.
Moscow, the Trump administration, and Europe’s far-right populists have lost a Manchurian ally inside the EU with this election outcome. The lack of any significant impact of Vance’s and Rubio’s visits to boost Orbán’s electoral fortunes underlines that, even for Europe’s far right, support from the Trump movement may now be a burden rather than a benefit. It will be interesting to see how European populists adjust to the loss of Orbán as their ideological patron and ally. The Kremlin has lost more than just a useful disruptor and obstructionist in Europe, if recent leaks of the Orbán regime passing on internal information about EU deliberations and offering direct intervention in Moscow’s interests are true. What’s more, a Magyar-led government is unlikely to continue Budapest’s meddling role from Ukraine to the Western Balkans that often aligned with Russian interests.
Still, as for Magyar, the hard work only starts now for European leaders. The EU will have to exercise strategic restraint when embracing a Magyar-led government in Budapest. A release of eighteen billion euros in frozen EU funds that is too swift and lenient, without meaningful reforms in Hungary, could fuel a populist backlash across the bloc. Nor should the new government or Brussels underestimate the resistance of the Orbán system and its entrenched allies across government institutions. Magyar’s two-thirds majority for the new government should go some way toward alleviating these challenges.
What’s more, Orbán’s obstructionism on several important EU policies, from the loan to Ukraine and EU enlargement to Russia sanctions and energy security, merely highlighted more structural deficits in the union’s decision-making processes, especially on foreign and security policy. Whether an EU of twenty-seven member states can address these deficits is far from guaranteed. Ironically, those pushing for more qualified majority-based voting at the EU level may have just lost the single-biggest driver of such controversial reforms, namely Orbán himself.
—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Magyar will tend first to economic and political reforms—not rebuilding damaged foreign ties
After more than a year ahead of Orbán’s Fidesz in the polls, Magyar’s Tisza party will assume power in Hungary, ending the rule of Europe’s longest-serving leader. While Magyar’s victory marks an undoubtable inflection point in Hungary’s increasingly anti-EU, pro-Russia direction, it remains to be seen how quickly he will be able to right Hungary’s numerous ailments. Among his many challenges ahead, Magyar principally won on the basis of a stagnating economy and an overwhelming politicization of the state, which will be top of mind as Tisza enters office. Recent polling highlighted the government itself as Hungarians’ top concern, making it one of eleven such countries in 138 polled by Gallup.
With its supermajority, Tisza will have the power to amend the constitution, providing it the ability to unravel Orbán’s empire step by step. Hungarians’ second priority—the economy—will also require Magyar’s focus, especially to release roughly eighteen billion euros in frozen EU funds. With these monumental tasks ahead of him, rebuilding damaged relationships abroad—especially in Brussels and Kyiv—may not be top of mind for the incoming prime minister. While Magyar will undoubtedly prove to be more pro-EU than Orbán, his tempered position on Ukraine may disappoint Ukrainians hoping to shake one of their most significant blockages in the EU. Looking further, in light of Vance’s last-minute trip to Budapest in an attempt to bolster Orbán, Magyar will be redefining Hungary’s relationship with Washington at a moment where Trump holds a less-than-rosy view of Brussels and Europe more broadly.
Hungary’s new era may be bright, but with difficult relationships abroad in desperate need of repair on top of long-standing domestic issues, how dramatically and how quickly Magyar’s victory changes Hungary remains unclear.
—Emma Nix is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Europe has dodged a bullet
The most surprising part of Orbán’s defeat was the speed of it. A strongman who for sixteen years had hollowed out the Hungarian state and oppressed every corner of Hungarian civil society—who had literally rebuilt the electoral system to favor his ruling Fidesz party—acknowledged his loss with just 45 percent of votes tallied.
Europe has dodged a bullet. Russian intelligence interfered extensively on behalf of Orbán, using the tried and true tactics of astroturfing and social media manipulation with even less subtlety than usual. Even when news of this interference became public, the Orbán-controlled election commission refused to act. Meanwhile, the Trump administration and the Trump family were relentless in their defense of Orbán during the campaign, casting Hungary’s election as a civilizational battle for the heart of Europe. The stage was set, in the event of an uncertain outcome or fragile Tisza victory, for months of political chaos, orchestrated by both Russian propagandists and far-right American provocateurs.
The strength of Tisza’s electoral success, bolstered by an unprecedented 77 percent turnout, has helped Hungary avoid this potential crisis. But everyone should be clear-eyed about the challenges ahead. Moscow committed significant intelligence resources to keeping Orbán in power, and these efforts failed only because the election was a blowout. A sixteen-year-old regime will take time to dislodge. In this time, the forces that gathered to throw Hungary into chaos are very likely to try again.
—Emerson T. Brooking is director of strategy and resident senior fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.
How Magyar did it
BUDAPEST—Waiting for Magyar’s victory speech Sunday night at 9:00 p.m. in Hungary’s capital, tens of thousands gathered on the banks of the Danube, while people chanted “Ruszkik haza,” or “Russians, go home”—the slogan of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
A majority for Tisza was expected; the super-majority in parliament was not. However, the mood changed in the last couple days after the revelations—tapped phone calls—about the close and cozy relationships between Orbán and Putin and between Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Those revelations probably turned the vote in Magyar’s favor.
Magyar was able to appeal to both city and countryside, relentlessly campaigning. Orbán’s anti-Ukrainian, anti-Volodymyr Zelenskyy war-mongering strategy was a mistake. Vance’s campaign visit on April 7 did not move the needle.
The two-thirds super majority will end not just Orbán’s rule but also the Orbán system. Perhaps the most important immediate step will be restoring the independent media and the independence of the courts.
Magyar’s first overseas visits will likely be to Warsaw, Vienna, and Brussels. He will join the European Public Prosecutors Office. He has already spoken to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and French President Emmanuel Macron—which signals his European and transatlantic credentials.
—András Simonyi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and a former Hungarian ambassador to the United States and NATO.
Hungary-Ukraine relations have a new start, but don’t expect a full embrace
KYIV—From the Ukrainian point of view, Orbán’s astounding defeat has opened up a possibility for a new start in bilateral relations. Zelenskyy was prompt to congratulate Magyar, and the Ukrainian side has already made a proposal to organize a Zelenskyy-Magyar meeting to discuss a wide spectrum of problems—from developing border infrastructure to EU engagement. Ukraine’s expectations for the European Union related to the changing of the guard in Budapest are focused on unlocking the ninety-billion-euro credit held up by Hungary’s veto, the next package of sanctions against Russia, and the opening of formal accession negotiations for Ukraine.
However, I would caution against over-optimism. The Hungarian would-be prime minister tows his line rather carefully. He has already indicated that his government won’t block granting Ukraine the EU credit, but at the same time he made it clear that Hungary, as before, is not going to be a part of this exercise. He has characterized Russia as an aggressor and a threat to Europe, but he also made known his opposition to Hungary’s participation in military assistance to Ukraine. He can hardly be expected to be supportive in Ukraine’s movement to EU membership. In any case, he promised to put this question to a referendum in Hungary. His goal of diversifying energy sources for the time being co-exists with an intention to continue purchases of Russian oil.
The new Hungarian government will be a better partner than the old one to Ukraine—but hardly an enthusiastic supporter.
—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.
Orbán leaves Hungary weaker in political freedom and the rule of law
In 2009—the year before Viktor Orbán began his long tenure as prime minister—Hungary ranked twenty-third out of forty-three European countries on both political freedom and the rule of law in the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. For the past sixteen years Orbán has systematically eroded democracy by stacking courts with loyalists, erasing key political rights, and limiting the power of the legislature.
After the resounding defeat in Sunday’s election, the Hungary that Orbán is handing off to Peter Magyar has fallen to thirty-eighth and thirtieth in the two respective categories.
Magyar’s government has a strong mandate to make institutional change, as Tisza’s two-thirds majority should allow it to make constitutional amendments.
But reform is unlikely to be easy, as Poland’s example shows. Even after taking over from the illiberal Law and Justice–led government in 2023, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has still had legislation blocked by the sitting right-wing president. While the Hungarian president’s role is more ceremonial than the Polish president’s, Magyar may still face challenges from Fidesz-backed President Tamás Sulyok. Magyar’s new government will also want to resist actions that prioritize efficacy over a strict commitment to democratic process and the rule of law, as Tusk has been accused of doing.
Rebuilding democracy will not happen overnight, but by restoring judicial independence, protecting political rights, and reopening civic space in Hungarian politics, Magyar can most effectively reignite Hungarian progress on prosperity, which stagnated relative to the rest of Europe under Orbán.
—Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.
Central and Eastern Europe will navigate a more cohesive EU and a more competitive region
BUCHAREST—Magyar’s victory has immediate consequences for Central and Eastern Europe and broader implications for the transatlantic space. For years, Orbán positioned Hungary as a difficult partner inside the European Union—frequently using veto power, challenging EU norms, and complicating consensus on key decisions. This dynamic shaped not only EU governance, but also regional perceptions of credibility, indirectly benefiting countries such as Romania.
Now that Orbán is out, one of the most immediate effects of this political shift is functional. In the absence of Hungary’s habitual obstruction, progress on key European dossiers, such as support for Ukraine, negotiations on the next multiannual EU budget, and aspects of further integration, may become more predictable.
Hungary under Orbán has also been perceived as a channel through which external influence could enter the EU, including from Russia and, more recently, from Trump’s MAGA ecosystem. In this context, Hungary was often framed as a defender of conservative values and traditional European identity, serving as a reference point in transatlantic ideological debates. Orbán’s defeat may therefore reduce the visibility of this model and limit one avenue through which such narratives have circulated within Europe.
At the regional level, early diplomatic signals suggest a potential reset in tone. Romanian President Nicușor Dan welcomed the outcome as an opportunity to open a “new chapter” in bilateral relations, highlighting the importance of constructive dialogue and partnership.
More broadly, the shift in Budapest is likely to recalibrate both cooperation and competition across Central and Eastern Europe. A Hungary more aligned with EU norms could contribute to a more coordinated regional approach on strategic issues—including support for Ukraine, EU accession for the Republic of Moldova, and security along NATO’s eastern flank.
For the United States, a more cohesive regional grouping would represent a more effective partner in shaping EU-wide outcomes. Yet this development also changes how countries within the region are compared with one another. Romania, which was previously viewed as recovering ground after its annulled elections and relatively stable in contrast to Hungary’s previous trajectory under Orbán, may now face a more competitive environment—with countries contributing to regional security, Ukraine conflict support and reconstruction, and EU priorities. Bulgaria’s eighth election cycle in five years, with parliamentary elections on April 19, will also be an indication of whether the region continues to produce weak democratic governance. As Hungary potentially restores its standing in Brussels while retaining its administrative capacity and diplomatic agility, the competition for influence, investment, and strategic relevance in the region is likely to intensify.
—Alex Serban is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Romania Office.