WASHINGTON—On June 30, Chinese scholars gathered at Jinan University and argued that Batanes, the Philippines’ northernmost province, was a natural extension of Taiwan. They also challenged the validity of the Philippine-Japanese discussions over their exclusive economic zones. Days later, China’s state-run Global Times amplified the argument, quoting scholars who called for regular Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrols and stronger countermeasures around the province. Both the Philippine Department of National Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs rejected these claims as baseless.
This episode quickly fell out of the news cycle, but it is worth revisiting. Beijing has repeatedly used historical narratives to lay the intellectual and political groundwork for claims that can later justify gray zone operations, coercive presence, and more expansive assertions of sovereignty. It would be unwise to wait for that process to play out in Batanes. The United States, the Philippines, and regional partners should instead begin a campaign of visible investment in the province through ports, fuel storage, cold chain facilities, power generation, communications infrastructure, and transportation infrastructure. The objectives should be to increase economic development and to make Batanes unmistakably integrated into the Philippine economy and the wider Western Pacific. Taking this approach will likely result in three strategic benefits: stronger local incomes, greater resilience against coercion, and a more durable allied presence around the Bashi Channel.
Beijing ran this script in Japan first
The claims against Batanes follow a pattern that is already well documented elsewhere in the region. In May 2013, the People’s Daily published an article by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, arguing that the status of Japan’s Ryukyu islands, including Okinawa, could be reopened. This gave Beijing room to question Japanese sovereignty without formally making a claim itself. This issue resurfaced in 2023, when Xi emphasized the historical ties between Fujian and the Ryukyus, after which Chinese outlets revived arguments about the islands’ unresolved historical status. This happened alongside a much more intense and visible CCG presence around the Senkaku Islands, operating in the surrounding contiguous zone on 352 days in 2023, the highest number recorded at that time.
The Batanes narrative has moved unusually quickly from academic argument to state-media amplification and calls for potential operational measures. However, CCG activity around Batanes itself predated the June 2026 symposium. In August 2025, CCG vessels were monitored east, west, and north of Batanes. The point is not that the symposium directly caused the patrols, but rather that narratives and their amplification provided a political frame for operational patterns that have already emerged and may soon increase.
A similar distinction between the narrative and physical presence is visible in the Philippines’ experience at Scarborough Shoal. Following the 2012 standoff and the withdrawal of Philippine government vessels, China established and has since maintained effective control over access to the atoll. In contrast, a small Philippine military detachment aboard the deliberately grounded Sierra Madre tank landing ship has maintained its position at the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999, despite sustained pressure from the CCG and maritime militia. Philippine military deployments have been critical in securing the Second Thomas Shoal. Yet on larger islands where civilians live, presence must also mean infrastructure that allows people, goods, fuel, communications, and government services to remain in place over time.
Thankfully, Batanes is far more connected to the Philippines than Scarborough ever was. But it is still geographically and economically isolated, vulnerable, and neglected in ways policymakers should not ignore. In October 2023, the Philippines established a permanent navy detachment on Mavulis, which appears as Y’Ami Island on Google Maps. Nonetheless, there is no Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) site (a Philippine base where US rotational forces are permitted) in Batanes. The nearest allied facilities are across the Luzon Strait in Cagayan. These contests are shaped not only by legal claims and military capability, but by whether the Philippine government is physically, economically, and politically present before Chinese gray-zone operations start.
Hard infrastructure is how Manila and Washington demonstrate resilience
The case for allied infrastructure investment in Batanes is often framed as a security argument. However, that framing misses a more important point: the first beneficiaries of the project are not generals, diplomats, or defense planners, but rather Ivatan families who have been trying to build stable lives in one of the most remote provinces in the country. While a larger US role carries risks, Beijing is likely to continue expanding its military and coast guard presence regardless of what the Philippines and the United States do. The more important question is whether allied investments deliver visible civilian benefits and retain Ivatan support.
There are three returns. First, better infrastructure would protect livelihoods from the basic vulnerabilities created by Batanes’ geography. Batanes’ 18,937 residents, based on the 2024 Census of Population, live across the three inhabited islands covering roughly 209 square kilometers and depend heavily on Basco Port and other transportation links connecting the province to the rest of the country. All the islands run on diesel generation under the National Power Corporation’s missionary electrification program, meaning that fuel, generation, and storage costs feed directly into the price of imported goods. This same geographic isolation makes disaster recovery harder, as seen after Super Typhoon Meranti struck Batanes in September 2016, where relief operations faced greater difficulty moving supplies and people.
As such, investments in fisheries, cold storage, power, and port infrastructure would generate several returns at once. More reliable power and cold-storage capacity would reduce spoilage, allowing fishers to preserve a larger share of their landed catch, and make it easier to sell to Luzon at market prices. Improved runway and cargo infrastructure would also make it easier to move goods into and out of the province.
Second, stronger infrastructure would make Batanes harder for China to economically and narratively coerce. Influence operations work best when local populations and economies are fragile and hold legitimate grievances that outside actors can exploit. On paper, Batanes is an economically vibrant province: it ranked third among Philippine provinces in per capita gross domestic product in 2023, its economy grew 14.5 percent that year, and poverty incidence among families was 3.3 percent in 2023. However, as an island economy, Batanes’s prosperity remains dependent on reliable transportation, steady energy inputs, and functioning infrastructure. All of these are potential pressure points Beijing can exploit.
The Philippines has faced this kind of economic pressure before. During the Scarborough Shoal Crisis, China tightened inspections of Philippine bananas, while Chinese tourism to the Philippines was disrupted. In other words, coercion does not require a blockade; it can work by making tourists, insurers, shippers, and investors hesitate. A province with stronger infrastructure, abundant fuel reserves, and reliable power can absorb some of these pressures for longer.
Finally, investing in civilian infrastructure would strengthen allied logistics during a protracted military operation. In the Bashi Channel, infrastructure built primarily for civilian use can help sustain allied operations. Mavulis lies closer to Taiwan than to mainland Luzon, a geographic fact already recognized by the alliance in its planning and exercises: Naval Base Camilo Osias and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan were added as EDCA sites; Balikatan 2024 included military and infrastructure operations in Batanes, and US Marines deployed the NMESIS anti-ship missile system on Batan Island in Batanes during Balikatan 2025. During Kamandag 10 in 2026, US Marines also conducted surface-transportation operations in the Luzon Strait, shoulder-to-shoulder with their Armed Forces of the Philippines counterparts.
Despite these improvements, the province still lacks the civilian backbone needed to sustain a long-term presence, such as a deeper Basco port, improved road networks, greater fuel storage capacity, upgraded runways, and stronger communications infrastructure. These would allow both the government and civilians to move supplies, evacuate residents, and receive outside support during a crisis. Japan can also take a stronger role, building on Tokyo’s first Official Security Assistance package to the Philippines, which provided coastal radar systems to the Philippine Navy.
The path forward
What determines what Batanes becomes is not another publication or symposium by Chinese academia, but whether Ivatans can find economic opportunity without leaving their province, local fishers can bring their catch to the market, and communities can remain resilient during a crisis. US and allied investment can help shape these outcomes directly.
The tools to do so already exist: The Luzon Economic Corridor, launched at the April 2024 trilateral summit, as well as the US International Development Finance Corporation and the US Trade and Development Agency can support financing for port, power, and cold-chain projects or fund feasibility studies. The Japan International Cooperation Agency and Asian Development Bank are also major development-finance partners in the Philippines. Japan’s Official Security Assistance program already funds coastal radar systems for the Philippine Navy, and the Japan–Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement, signed on July 8, 2024, and in force since September 11, 2025, establishes procedures and legal status for Japanese and Philippine forces conducting cooperative activities in each other’s territory.
Sovereignty debates are already unfolding elsewhere in the region, and Batanes is likely to face Chinese information and narrative pressure. While narratives matter, what decides the outcome is whether the province is prosperous and connected. Investments in port capacity, fuel storage, and grid reliability may not be glamorous, but they lower the cost of producing everything else in the province, making it possible for other economic activity to increase household incomes and change lives.