WASHINGTON—In August 2025, three Navy amphibious ships of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) embarked with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) from Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Over the next several months, the teams aboard those vessels conducted a remarkable sequence of missions—from humanitarian relief in Jamaica and embassy reinforcement in Haiti to counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean.
The unit’s performance across such different and important tasks, and in such quick succession, underscores a critical reality: an ARG/MEU is among the most versatile tools in the US military arsenal.
But this crucial capability is often stranded at home—not because of a lack of demand, but because of reduced readiness of amphibious ships that keeps these forces ashore, precisely when they are most needed overseas. This spring, three ARG/MEU teams were deployed at the same time to support global operational needs, but that was more than have been ready to deploy in recent years. The United States would benefit from having more amphibious ships at the ready to ensure three or more ARG/MEU teams can be at sea at all times.
Modern crises demand a multi-domain force
The ARG/MEU is a uniquely flexible multi-tool formation, well suited for many of today’s mission sets. Deployed aboard large-deck amphibious ships, Marines bring integrated aviation and logistics capabilities that allow rapid response at operational scale. Designed to react quickly, often within hours, these forces can conduct a range of tasks. For example, they can launch amphibious assaults; seize islands, ports, or airfields; and conduct reconnaissance. They can also carry out noncombatant evacuation operations, deliver humanitarian assistance, and enable special operations forces.
Recent deployments, including the Tripoli and Boxer ARG/MEU teams that have been sent to the Middle East as part of Operation Epic Fury, highlight their utility in contested maritime environments. Amphibious forces can secure key terrain along chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, protect shipping lanes, and provide additional sensing and strike capability, particularly when combined with F-35B aircraft.
The ARG/MEU teams provide exceptional operational value to a combatant commander with their flexible task-organized composition of air, ground, and logistics elements and integrated command and control. The ARG/MEU teams can operate for thirty days without needing to resupply, expanding where they can be sent. A typical ARG/MEU is made up of three ships: a Landing Helicopter Dock/Assault (LHD/A), a Dock Landing Ship (LSD) and an Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) ship. Almost all of these ships have specialized at-sea launching bays for smaller watercraft, such as air cushioned landing craft (LCAC), new Amphibious Combat Vehicles, and other special operations transport craft that can rapidly maneuver in shallow waters where the larger ships cannot. The ships also have flight decks for the AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom rotary wing platforms and the heavy-lift CH-53K, among the most powerful helicopters in the US military. In addition, the flight decks support tilt-rotor and fixed wing aircraft such as MV-22 Ospreys and F-35B Lightning aircraft with advanced aviation strike and sensing capabilities.
Putting these air, sea, logistics and command-and-control functions together provides an extremely capable force that can maneuver against an enemy by land, sea, and air simultaneously, creating multiple dilemmas for the adversary and advantages for US troops. This combination also creates an ideal force for responding to a crisis or conflict in the littorals.
The US military’s goal is three ARG/MEUs afloat and ready at all times: one from the West Coast that deploys to the Pacific, one from the East Coast that deploys to the Atlantic, and one permanently forward based out of Japan that covers the West Pacific and South China Sea. The standard for a ready ARG/MEU force is a fully capable Marine Corps MEU aboard a three-ship ARG. The US military works to maintain ready ARG/MEU teams at all times by ensuring that there are other ARG/MEU teams in various preparation phases. This allows for routine ship maintenance and training cycles for those vessels that are not currently deployed. Altogether, this effort is referred to as the “3.0” ARG/MEU, with three teams always being available for tasking while others are preparing.
But in recent years, limited ship availability has regularly prevented the ARG/MEU teams from leaving home stations. Instead of the necessary 3.0 cycle, the Navy has only been able to generate ships for two ARGs at a time—generally, one based overseas and one from the continental United States. This falls short of historical operational demand for ARG/MEU capabilities around the world.
Ship shortages have strategic consequences
Today, the United States faces persistent competition with multiple adversaries and a need for quick responses to international crises, such as the Iran war. Amphibious forces are critical to US security, and not only as crisis-response tools; they are important instruments of deterrence. When they are unavailable, the United States loses an important layer of forward presence—one that adversaries can exploit below the threshold of open conflict.
To work, the Navy’s 3.0 model requires at least thirty-one amphibious ships—including ten larger big-deck vessels and twenty-one LPD/LSD-type ships—all maintained at no less than 80 percent readiness. But even this baseline is increasingly difficult to meet—and, as Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith has indicated, demand would justify a more frequent deployment cycle if capacity existed. As Smith noted in March 2025, “I have the Marines, and I have the squadrons, and I have the battalions and the batteries … I just don’t have the amphibs.” And the actual need may be as many as forty amphibious ships, which Lt. Gen. Jay Bargeron, deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations, underscored recently.
Although the Navy nominally fields thirty-one amphibious ships, effective readiness is significantly lower—under 50 percent by some estimates—due to chronic maintenance delays and overall fleet age. Many amphibious vessels are now twenty-five to thirty years old, with some approaching four decades of service. Extended deployments, unpredictable tasking, and deferred—and therefore more time-consuming and costly—repairs further compound the problem. Future platforms, including the USS Bougainville and USS Fallujah, are reportedly delayed due to industrial capacity and funding constraints.
Demand for the ARG/MEU is likely only to grow over the next decade. In February, John C. Phelan, then secretary of the Navy, noted that continuing to rely on temporary solutions will only increase costs and delay progress over the long term.
In the short term, the United States is currently managing a war in Iran, but it does so while the threat of conflict remains in the Western Pacific. Both scenarios demand the most from US naval fleets, and naval readiness is critical to success in both arenas. The ARG/MEU teams bring a tremendous capability: a big deck for aviation operations, plus the contingent of around a thousand Marines for ground and littoral attack options. These forces can mitigate potential gaps in carrier coverage while also remaining flexible enough to provide other unique options that a carrier cannot offer.
Another pressing reason for naval readiness includes the Force Design initiative the Marine Corps is implementing, which requires additional maritime mobility. With the Navy already hard-pressed to provide ready amphibious ships for the MEUs, the Corps’ new Marine Littoral Regiments will also need platforms such as the proposed Landing Ship Medium to maneuver. The 2020 USS Bonhomme Richard fire and subsequent plan for decommissioning did not help the Navy’s amphibious readiness situation.
The bottom line is that US forces need ARG/MEU teams at the ready. No other capability can fill what they can do. To enable the Marine Corps to meet the United States’ military needs, the Navy’s amphibious ship maintenance plan needs to be fully funded, and the amphibious ship building plan needs to be stabilized with funding and labor incentives.