Washington has issued its own verdict. On Friday, the Trump administration imposed sweeping sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), extending a yearslong campaign beyond individual judges and prosecutors to the tribunal itself. The new sanctions threaten to disrupt the court’s access to essential banking, insurance, and technology services. What’s behind the US decision? And can the ICC continue to operate? Our experts weigh in below.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
- Gissou Nia: Sanctioning the ICC could paralyze justice
- Matthew Kroenig: The ICC has always been a fraught concept
- Mark Klamberg: ICC supporters must act to protect it
- Lize de Kruijf: Can the EU blocking statute keep the ICC operational?
- Celeste Kmiotek: Who’s afraid of the ICC?

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. A human rights lawyer, she started her career in The Hague, where she worked on war crimes and crimes against humanity trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court.
Sanctioning the ICC could paralyze justice
Today’s announcement from the US Department of State that the International Criminal Court has been sanctioned as an entity is a complete inversion of the intended use of sanctions.
The sanctions designation places the ICC on the US Department of the Treasury’s financial blacklist and represents a measure normally used against global militant networks, drug cartels, and transnational gangs—not the lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats investigating and prosecuting them. The designation cuts the court off from the global financial system and, without aggressive countermeasures from supporting countries, will grind the court’s daily work to a halt.
This risks depriving thousands of survivors and victims of the world’s most serious crimes—including murder, rape, torture, and mass starvation—of one of their last remaining paths to much-needed justice. The ICC is a court of last resort, meaning that it only steps in when a country is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute crimes committed within its borders or by its nationals.
While US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claims that the sanctions are intended to prevent US service members from being charged by the court, the reality is that US personnel are not the subject of any current investigation, nor have they ever been a primary focus. In the past year alone, the court has convicted a Sudanese militia chief for crimes in Darfur, unsealed arrest warrants against top Taliban leaders in Afghanistan for crimes against humanity including gender persecution, confirmed charges against Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony, prepared for the trial of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte for widespread extrajudicial killings in a sweeping “war on drugs,” begun proceedings against a suspect accused of crimes against prison detainees in Libya, convicted a Central African Republic rebel leader for crimes against humanity, and more. This activity covers a range of global crimes—and none of these cases involves US perpetrators.
A June 2026 statement from the ICC presidency described the body as “one of the most significant achievements of human civilisation.” The claim—coming from one of the court’s formal organs—could seem hyperbolic. But there is truth in those words. It is almost inconceivable in today’s polarized world that delegations from 120 countries could vote “yes” to establish an institution and voluntarily submit themselves to an accountability framework beyond their domestic justice systems for the greater good. The threatened destruction of what took decades to build should steel the determination of the court’s supporters to take the bold actions needed to save it.

Matthew Kroenig is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a former US defense and intelligence official.
The ICC has always been a fraught concept
The ICC has always been fraught strategically and geopolitically.
The strategic vision was to deter and hold accountable tyrants engaged in grievous crimes. This is a noble goal. In practice, it may have had the opposite effect, incentivizing dictators engaged in civil wars, for example, to employ any means necessary to cling to power. A defeated Napoleon received an island exile; today’s defeated dictators are hauled off to The Hague.
Geopolitically, the court has wrongly pursued powerful democracies engaged in legal wars consistent with the law of armed conflict, including US soldiers in Afghanistan and Israeli leaders in Gaza.
Washington has never been a fan of and never signed the Rome Statute that established the ICC. Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton threatened sanctions in President Donald Trump’s first term, and Rubio is doubling down in the second.
Multilateral institutions cannot survive without the backing of powerful states. The ICC may learn this lesson soon.

Mark Klamberg is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.
ICC supporters must act to protect it
The latest US sanctions against the ICC are fundamentally more serious than previous measures. Until now, sanctions have targeted individual representatives; the new sanctions target the court as an entity. In concrete terms, this means it will become more difficult—or even impossible—for the court to pay its employees, settle bills, and rely on essential services. The court had already anticipated this risk and taken some precautionary measures. Last year, it decided to replace Microsoft Office with a European software alternative, amid mounting concerns about dependence on US technology.
These sanctions appear to come in direct response to the ICC’s decision to issue arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. However, this case is just one among many that the court is currently pursuing. The ICC is simultaneously investigating the situation in Ukraine, where it has issued an arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as ongoing cases related to Sudan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Venezuela, and the Philippines. This range of situations illustrates that the court’s mandate extends across vastly different geopolitical contexts, applying the same legal standards regardless of the power or alliances of the states involved—a fact that underscores, rather than undermines, its claim to impartiality.
Supporters of the ICC, such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada, should consider using their blocking statutes to help companies withstand the risks of continuing to do business with the ICC. In short, blocking statutes contain provisions designed to counter the effects of foreign sanctions and trade restrictions. They not only prohibit persons and companies within their jurisdictions from complying with specified foreign sanctions, but also allow individuals and companies to recover damages through legal action for losses caused by the extraterritorial application of these foreign sanctions—as is the case under the EU blocking statute.
More fundamentally, the US should reconsider its current adversarial stance toward the ICC. Since the Nuremberg trials, the US has played a key role in advancing international justice. There may be legitimate disagreement over individual decisions, but the court operates on core principles of judicial independence, complementarity, and fair-trial guarantees—principles the US itself has long championed.

Lize de Kruijf is an assistant director within the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative
Can the EU blocking statute keep the ICC operational?
As the threat of US sanctions against the ICC has grown, the EU blocking statute has frequently been floated as a way to protect the court and allow it to continue its work. The statute essentially nullifies the effect of designated foreign sanctions within the EU. Adding the ICC sanctions to the blocking statute would mean that EU persons and entities would be prohibited from complying with them, and US court rulings enforcing them would be unenforceable in the EU.
The Netherlands—which hosts the ICC in The Hague and is legally bound by its Headquarters Agreement to ensure the court’s continued operation—has so far prioritized working behind the scenes, seeking a resolution with Washington. However, in an interview during this year’s UN General Assembly, Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen stated that the Netherlands “will do everything it can to protect the court” and that it had asked the European Commission to prepare to activate a blocking statute in case sanctions were imposed on the entire ICC. Given the EU’s strong support for the court, activation of the blocking statute is a real possibility.
However, even with the blocking statute, keeping the court operational may still prove challenging. Banks will risk losing access to the US financial system, a risk that large Dutch banks with international operations, in particular, may be unwilling to take. The statute also does not offer compensation for companies that lose US business as a result of complying with it. Their only recourse is to sue whoever caused the harm.
The private sector’s tolerance for sanctions risk is typically very low. AXA, the France-based health insurance provider for the ICC, for example, recently cut ties with the ICC amid the growing threat of sanctions. As a result, there is a risk that companies may seek exemptions from the statute or quietly wind down their business with the court instead.

Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
Who’s afraid of the ICC?
The preamble of the ICC’s Rome Statute states that, in agreeing to establish the ICC, state parties were:
“Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.”
The ICC’s mandate is and always has been strictly tailored to address only these situations. Its jurisdiction is principally limited to four categories of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression. There are preconditions for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction: Generally, either the state on whose territory the conduct occurred or the state of which the accused is a national must be a party to the Rome Statute or have otherwise accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction.
The ICC’s authority narrows again through conditions governing the opening of investigations and the selection of cases. For example, it is a “court of last resort,” generally admitting cases only when a state is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute. The Office of the Prosecutor only prosecutes those alleged to be “most responsible” for a given crime. The system is then undergirded by procedural safeguards, such as the requirement that a Pre-Trial Chamber review the Office of the Prosecutor’s applications before issuing arrest warrants.
In short, only an extremely select group of people have reason to fear ICC prosecution. In the twenty-four years since its establishment, there have been sixty-eight arrest warrants, twenty-three detentions, and fifteen convictions. In stark contrast, as of 2023, 10,900 victims had participated in court proceedings, 2,500 had received court-ordered reparations, and over 130,000 survivors were supported by the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims. In other words, a person is far more likely to interact with the ICC as a victim than as a defendant.
The Trump administration’s apparent fear of the ICC is telling. These sanctions and the broader campaign against the ICC appeal to the legal concept of “sovereignty,” even as the US repeatedly carries out actions that seem to violate international law.
