WASHINGTON—Last December, the US State Department announced its flagship artificial intelligence (AI) supply-chain initiative, Pax Silica, with eleven nation-state signatories. Spearheaded by US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg, the initiative aims to build a coalition of trusted partners to compete with China on the supply chains that make AI possible. It’s not the first attempt, but it is novel: The question is, will it work?
The initiative’s name carries a certain irony. The Latin “pax” denotes a treaty or compact, but it translates literally to “peace.” With a modifier (à la Pax Romana or Pax Americana), it means stability and peace under a dominant power. “Pax Silica,” therefore, means peace underpinned by the dominance or centrality of technology. Of course, the centrality of technology, particularly AI, to global economic and political futures has been anything but stabilizing.
Is Pax Silica positioned to deliver the shared peace and prosperity it promises?
The evolution of US supply-chain coalitions
US international AI supply-chain initiatives can be understood through the dual mandate that has long governed US export controls: to protect national security interests and to promote foreign policy objectives. This framework has produced two distinct but overlapping tracks. The “protect” track has advanced over most of the past decade, beginning with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, enacted under the first Trump administration, which closed gaps in controls over AI and advanced semiconductors. It then accelerated through the Biden administration’s October 2022 export controls on advanced chips and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, coordinated with the Netherlands and Japan. And it culminated in January 2025 with the AI Diffusion Framework, which formalized a three-tier global licensing architecture for AI compute (from which the second Trump administration subsequently withdrew). The Biden administration also extended this protection-focused approach into capital flows with the Treasury Department’s 2023 Outbound Investment Program, which prohibits or requires notification for transactions that threaten national security.
In parallel, the “promote” track has sought to build trusted technology ecosystems abroad. In 2018, the first Trump administration’s Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership promoted open information and communications technology infrastructure in emerging markets. In 2022, the Biden administration launched the Minerals Security Partnership and used the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, as well as aspects of the CHIPS and Science Act, to build allied semiconductor supply-chain coalitions. Together, these initiatives define the scope of US AI supply-chain policy as spanning the full technology stack, from critical mineral extraction and semiconductor fabrication to compute infrastructure, logistics, and governance standards. The United States implements this policy through a combination of restrictions, coalition-building, and strategic investment across domestic and allied market partners.
What sets Pax Silica apart
Pax Silica has three features that set it apart from earlier efforts.
First, while previous initiatives delineated an inner circle for each link of the supply chain, Pax Silica’s membership appears more deliberately geared toward capabilities. Pax Silica is less wedded than the Biden administration’s policies were to the idea of fire-walling access to frontier AI capabilities, and more inclined toward transactionalism. At least three members have made funding commitments through their respective sovereign wealth funds. Some members, such as Japan and South Korea, bring semiconductor manufacturing expertise. Australia houses critical mineral reserves. Israel and the United Kingdom bring specific niches in chip design. India has engineering talent and growing mineral processing capacity. Singapore is a critical connectivity node in the Indo-Pacific and the regional base for many US tech companies. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar bring energy and abundant sovereign capital. Sweden’s presence stems from its 5G equipment manufacturing capabilities. If new members are brought in, it would likely be because they fill a particular capability gap. The Netherlands, home to chip lithography giant ASML, which attended the Pax Silica summit, is a logical addition but has opted to remain a nonsignatory partner, despite continued overtures from the United States. Taiwan is also a nonsignatory partner.
Second, instead of treating each layer of the AI stack as a separate element of diplomatic outreach, Pax Silica brings everything under a single umbrella. Energy infrastructure, critical minerals extraction and processing, advanced manufacturing for semiconductors, AI computational infrastructure, and networks are all covered by this one initiative.
With previous efforts, the animating logic for each layer was straightforward. But this approach led to diplomatic disagreement with countries that were preferred partners in some areas and relegated to second-best in others: For instance, the UAE, India, and Singapore, which found themselves in Tier 2 of the AI Diffusion Rule, took issue with the framing that they had to be kept at least a generation behind the frontier. Pax Silica gives a nod to the American AI Export Program managed by the Commerce Department, which implements the AI Action Plan’s proposal for full-stack AI export packages, but it does not complement it to its logical extent. Pax Silica signatories will get “concierge” services to support their acquisition of US AI products. But while some industry responses to the initial request for information for the AI Export Program recommended allowing trusted foreign vendors to participate in consortium proposals, non-US entities appear to be ineligible to participate, which makes it less compelling for foreign partners. At the India AI Impact Summit in New Delhi in February, Office of Science and Technology Policy Director Michael Kratsios announced the National Champions Initiative, saying it aims “to integrate partner nation companies with the American AI stack.” But the Commerce Department guidance released in March makes no mention of this initiative or how it will interact with the American AI Export Program.
Third, Pax Silica is explicitly framed around building an economic order, not just denying China. Pax Silica seeks to establish a durable economic order that underwrites an AI-driven era of prosperity across partner countries. This is a different proposition from in effect saying, “Don’t do business with Beijing.” However, as the initiative finds its feet, it may settle on a different stance, as views on China within the “tech right” vary significantly; some see China as a business opportunity, others as a competitor, and some see Beijing as the United States’ greatest adversary. There is also a range of views within the Trump administration. How the initiative addresses the China question going forward is likely to affect the willingness of some allies and partners to engage with it.
What’s missing from the initiative
Pax Silica attempts to distinguish itself from its predecessors, but to succeed in its larger goals, it should commit fully to its message. Three additional steps are needed.
1. Incentives for in-country minerals processing
The current Pax Silica model is selective and efficient, focusing on nations with key production, finance, and supply-chain capabilities. However, its members remain structurally dependent on nations outside of its bounds for upstream minerals. Australia and India alone cannot fulfill Pax Silica’s critical mineral needs. Excluding these nations from the coalition leaves a vacuum that adversaries and competitors can fill. The United States has announced plans to build a preferential trade bloc for critical minerals, but by treating it as a line of effort separate from—rather than integrated with—its AI supply-chain efforts, it risks repeating the mistakes of previous initiatives. The coalition’s mineral dependency problem cannot be solved by signing memorandums of understanding with mineral-producing countries while continuing to extract raw materials and process them elsewhere. To address this shortcoming, Pax Silica should establish a minerals processing fund (under its consortium model) that builds in-country refining and processing capacity, creating domestic value chains in mineral-producing nations and reducing reliance on China.
2. A human capital strategy
Furthermore, Pax Silica’s supply-chain ambitions will stall without the human capital to execute them. Measures such as skilled worker mobility, mutual recognition of credentials, and jointly funded workforce training for the United States and its partners are essential for alleviating shortages of clean-room engineers, power-plant operators, and semiconductor-materials scientists. The United States should negotiate a multilateral skilled worker mobility agreement among Pax Silica signatories that allows talent to move easily within the coalition, while creating pathways for skills transfer and training.
3. Standards that support market readiness
Finally, an innovation-first coalition still needs standards. Pax Silica offers concierge services to countries looking to buy US AI products, but making those products export-ready for a different regulatory market is another matter. In late February, Helberg affirmed the need for AI exports that support sovereign AI ambitions. Pax Silica can serve as a vehicle for a de facto global AI regulatory zone, making the coalition’s governance architecture as strong as its supply-chain architecture.
