WASHINGTON—Venezuela’s interim government and opposition are sitting down to negotiate democracy’s future. On August 1, representatives of both sides will begin formal conversations aimed at strengthening democratic institutions after months of anticipation for such talks following Nicolás Maduro’s removal in January.
The devastating earthquakes in Venezuela in June have underscored the urgency of strengthening governance and institutional capacity. The earthquakes resulted in over five thousand lives lost, many more missing, severe displacement, and an estimated $37 billion in damage, according to the United Nations. The tragic event has heightened the need for broad-based political agreements in order to provide the certainty needed to attract the investment critical to the country’s reconstruction.
Why the August meetings matter
Jorge Rodríguez, current president of the National Assembly and brother of interim leader Delcy Rodríguez, will represent the interim government side. Dinorah Figuera will lead the talks for the opposition. Figuera served as president of the 2015 National Assembly, the first and only opposition-controlled congress since the Chavismo era began in 1999. The United States recognizes it as the last legislature elected under free and fair elections.
Figuera had fled Venezuela in 2018 following threats and harassment. She returned to the country earlier this year, facilitated by the US State Department, and met with Jorge Rodríguez. That initial meeting appears to have catalyzed the formalization of the process announced on July 14
The talks aim to develop “a bilateral technical and political roadmap that enables us to address the fundamental issues to consolidate the path toward the recovery of democracy in Venezuela,” Figuera said last week. She also thanked the United States for supporting the dialogues and for humanitarian aid delivered to Venezuela following the recent earthquakes. On July 16, the US State Department issued a statement welcoming the two parties’ commitment to negotiations, and it referred to the discussions as a “joint agenda,” while also applauding government and opposition representatives for taking “an important next step in the political reconciliation process.”
Little else is publicly known about what this process entails or about what the official agenda will include. That said, Figuera has already identified several topics she aims to discuss with the government, including restoring democratic legitimacy to the country’s political institutions, naming a new electoral authority and a new supreme court, and guaranteeing civil and political rights and freedom of expression. She has also shared that both sides will contribute twelve delegates to this process to hash out specifics on these agenda items, and that the parties intend to reach milestone agreements in the next five months, before the end of the calendar year.
What role the US should play
Since Maduro was ousted in January, the Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized its three-stage plan in Venezuela—stabilization, recovery, and transition. The process that will begin on August 1 likely fits in with the second stage, and the announcement comes at a time when US officials have stressed the need for national reconciliation to move forward given the pivotal role it can play in Venezuela’s recovery. At the same time, US officials are leaving it up to the Venezuelan people to decide what that means. There is wisdom in this approach. Urging Venezuelans to lead this process is both appropriate and strategic, because any durable political transition will have to first be negotiated and accepted by the people who will have to live under it.
But Venezuelan ownership of these talks does not have to, and shouldn’t, mean US disengagement. Washington played an important role in facilitating Figuera’s return, and it now has an important opportunity to help the parties turn dialogue into concrete and lasting progress. At the same time, both the talks and their outcomes must also have broad-based support across the Venezuelan opposition, including with María Corina Machado and the Unitary Platform, which released the Panama Manifesto in May outlining a structured path for a democratic transition. Figuera and Machado come from different wings of the Venezuelan opposition. Figuera comes from the more moderate wing, which has repeatedly backed negotiations processes, while Machado rose to popularity as an outsider.
If done right, it represents a historic opportunity to convert a dramatic shift in Venezuela’s geopolitical alignment with Washington into a stable democratic order.
Skepticism toward negotiations in Venezuela is common in Washington, and this is understandable. Previous negotiation processes in Venezuela have often resulted in agreement frameworks that are met with selective implementation at best or noncompliance at worst. But that was under the Maduro regime and when the United States held limited sway. The talks that led up to the July 2024 stolen presidential election are a good example: Washington backed a negotiations process between the government and opposition that paved the way for a competitive presidential election, only for the ruling party to abandon it once it became clear that it would lose power in that election.
The circumstances today are fundamentally different. Maduro is sitting in a jail cell, the United States has demonstrated its ability to militarily intervene to advance security interests, and Rodríguez’s interim government has been willing to engage with the United States on select priorities with a recognition that the best hope of overseeing economic recovery depends on continued access to US markets and US investment. Venezuela’s interim government has signaled that it wants to cooperate and that it will need the continued, accelerated help of international partners to rebuild following the recent earthquakes. This leaves Washington with considerably more leverage over Caracas than it had during earlier negotiations. That leverage should be strategically employed.
As detailed in a recent Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center policy paper—the result of coordination with an array of Venezuelan and US stakeholders—Washington should feel secure enough in this leverage to expect and push for a better outcome in these negotiations. In fact, US officials should actively use this leverage to support the negotiations, working with both sides to develop a sequenced roadmap in which specific US measures to lift economic pressure on Venezuela are linked to mutually agreed milestones of institutional progress from Caracas.
In addition to laying out a path toward credible elections and naming new judicial and electoral authorities, Washington should also call for the release of the 368 political prisoners in the country, the restoration of the right of all political parties to participate in elections, and the end of press censorship. In doing so, the Trump administration should make clear that licenses for companies to do business in Venezuela will only be expanded if progress is made, with sanction snapbacks a possibility if the interim authorities stall on this phase of the United States’ three-phase plan.
Of course, any viable transition plan will also have to reduce the perceived costs of a transition to the interim leaders. This means the US should work to build shared equity in a transition from all parties. In theory, the fact that both the opposition and government are participating in this negotiation process with US support should serve as a basis for building buy-in from their respective coalitions. But again, it’s critical that the opposition coordinate so that a variety of interests are represented. Top Venezuelan government officials are unlikely to hand over the keys to the presidential palace without having a clear understanding of what the future holds for them.
In this context, a well thought-out and fair transitional justice system will be crucial, and the experience of other transition processes globally shows the value in involving civil society and victims in such discussions. Rather than proving an obstacle, their participation routinely helps ensure just reconciliation and secures greater public buy-in for the accord. Clarity on exactly what transitional justice mechanisms are in store could dissuade spoilers on either side from derailing a transition by giving all parties a stake in its development.