WASHINGTON—Earlier this week, I shared the five issues that I would be watching to assess whether US President Donald Trump’s trip to China delivered for the United States. Overall, Trump appears to have sidestepped the biggest trap—Beijing’s attempt to box Washington in on Taiwan—but underperformed on everything else. One of the only outcomes of note was China lifting an import ban on US beef, which it has already apparently reversed, or at least scaled down.
The biggest issue
In the first bilateral meeting on the first day of Trump’s visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a blunt Taiwan warning. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout of the exchange, Xi called Taiwan the “most important issue in China-US relations.” He then warned Trump to “exercise extra caution,” stating that “otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.” The timing is important: Beijing is trying to convince the Trump administration to delay or cancel a pending US arms sale to Taiwan. Congress has approved two packages: an $11 billion package, which the White House approved in December, and a $14 billion package, which is still awaiting the green light from the White House. Beijing wants to convince Trump that approving the second package will derail US-China relations and the deliverables he was seeking via this summit.
The United States committed to providing Taiwan with the arms it needs for its own defense back in 1979. That was foundational to the US “One China” policy. When Washington shifted its official diplomatic relationship from Taiwan to Beijing in 1979, it committed to provide Taiwan with “such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” This promise is enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
Beijing knows this. But Chinese leaders view these arms sales as a major irritant. If Taiwan did not receive US defense support, then it would be much easier for China to take the island by force. Hence Xi’s attempt to lobby Trump for inaction on the pending $14 billion package.
Thus far, the Trump administration does not appear to have taken the bait. There are no indications that the US president made any statements of appeasement in Beijing or suggested that he would weaken long-standing support for Taiwan in exchange for trade deals or other Chinese promises. (If Trump had, Beijing would be trumpeting them everywhere.)
Instead, Trump told reporters on the plane home, “On Taiwan, he feels very strongly, I made no commitment either way.” That is far from a worst-case outcome. Meanwhile, on the sidelines in Beijing, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with NBC that “US policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged as of today.” Now we watch to see if this sticks.
The biggest misstep
On other issues, the outcomes were underwhelming. Thus far, the only real announcement coming out of this summit is China temporarily lifting import bans on US beef. That was an expected deliverable, but China’s customs authorities have already reversed that move or reduced its scope. It may be that customs authorities moved too quickly—acting on an announcement they expected but that Chinese leaders did not actually green-light.
Overall, the US president’s biggest misstep was in his overall approach to China. At every step along the way, Trump portrayed the United States as desperately needing Beijing’s favor. That is not a good look. It signals to Chinese officials that they should play hardball. And that is exactly what they did in sending the United States delegation home with—thus far—no wins to announce.
In the run-up to the trip, Trump claimed Xi would welcome him with “a big, fat hug” upon his arrival in Beijing. He rolled in with a delegation of American business leaders, which portrayed Washington as overly eager to sign deals that were not yet ready for prime time, as evidenced by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent having to fly to South Korea for a last-minute prep meeting with his Chinese counterpart the day before Trump landed in Beijing. And throughout the trip, Trump issued public statements claiming China had signed on to deliverables that Beijing was not announcing. Those moves gave off a whiff of desperation that Beijing jumped on.
From Air Force One on the way home, Trump touted a long list of supposed new agreements with China, including Chinese commitments to buy US soybeans and Boeing airplanes. But thus far, there are no receipts: China is not acknowledging any of these deals. Instead, in the most definitive readout from the Chinese side thus far, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the two sides are “continuing to implement all the consensus reached in earlier consultations, agreeing to establish a Board of Trade Council and a Board of Investment, addressing each other’s concerns over market access for agricultural products, and advancing the expansion of two-way trade under a reciprocal tariff-reduction framework.” Instead of concrete information on specific deals, Wang stated that “the working teams of the two sides are still negotiating the relevant details.” In other words, Trump is coming home empty handed, at least thus far.
But Beijing also remains empty handed so far on the concessions it was hoping for around Taiwan, and that is far from a worst-case US outcome.
For each of the deals Trump has mentioned, Beijing has its own asks, and many of them—such as a desire for the US to reduce its support for Taiwan—are highly problematic. Over the coming days and weeks, both sides will grapple to land more concrete outcomes. Xi is now set to visit the United States next fall, so this week’s meeting was one in a series of engagements.
As the Trump team looks toward the remainder of 2025, they should assess what is working well and what calls for a shift in strategy. Trump approached this summit as an opportunity to engage Xi one-on-one, two strongmen making strong deals. But Washington’s real leverage is its network of allies and partners. Those nations have been shoved aside. This summer is a critical opportunity to bring them back into the fold.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative is working with allies to negotiate a plurilateral trade agreement on critical minerals. Its aim is to launch an allies-only club, one that would bolster their supply chains and reduce China’s stranglehold in this sector. If the Trump team can fast-track that effort and make real progress over the coming months, it would enjoy a more favorable balance of power at the September summit. Even if Trump administration officials are not returning from Beijing with major deals in hand, they are returning with lessons—should they choose to apply them.