STOCKHOLM—Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s leadership, Germany is increasingly presenting itself as a Baltic Sea security actor, not just as a matter of geography but also as a result of Berlin’s strategic intent. In June 2025, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul called the Baltic a “key region for the security of Europe,” and during a recent visit to Latvia, he framed Germany’s security as “equivalent to that of the Baltics and the Baltic Sea region.”
This development coincides with the evolution of Germany’s Zeitenwende. Launched after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Zeitenwende (which translates to “historical turning point”) marked a historic break with Germany’s long-standing culture of military restraint and low defense spending. Merz’s ambition now is to translate the initiative into a sustained structural reorientation. His country’s new military strategy, announced on April 22, places a strong emphasis on the Russian threat and sets out a clear, three-phase plan to fulfill the chancellor’s pledge to make the Bundeswehr “the strongest conventional army in Europe.” This will be supported through significant increases in defense spending.
If realized, this “second phase” of Zeitenwende could anchor Germany’s role as a credible leader in the Baltic Sea region. But success ultimately hinges on whether Berlin can deliver on implementation.
Security concerns drive Germany’s engagement
The Baltic Sea region is characterized by tightly integrated economies and infrastructure, which help create a strong sense of mutual interdependence. The Nordic-Baltic states rely on Germany for trade and logistical access to continental Europe, while German industry depends on Nordic-Baltic resources and inputs. Together with energy and digital infrastructure systems connecting the region, these ties mean that any incident, whether accidental or deliberate, in the Baltic Sea would rapidly disrupt supply chains and impose significant regional costs. As a result, providing security in these waters has increasingly become a strategic priority for Berlin.
Beyond shared vulnerabilities, Germany’s deepening engagement with the region is supported by a convergence of threat perceptions. Prior to 2022, Germany did not share its Baltic Sea neighbors’ perceptions of Russia as an existential threat to itself or to NATO. Concerned about escalation risks, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel favored a policy of Wandel durch Handel (change by trade), reflecting a conviction that even after the annexation of Crimea, Russia could be handled through diplomacy and economic interdependence.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 dispelled any doubts about Moscow’s intentions and brought Berlin’s threat perception closer to that of Warsaw and the Nordic-Baltic capitals. In October 2025, German intelligence services assessed that Russia poses a direct threat to German security and that Germany must strengthen its defense capabilities accordingly. Merz made his own views know around the same time, when in September 2025 he affirmed that “Europe is not at war… but no longer at peace” with Russia. The country’s new military strategy accuses Moscow of preparing for confrontation with NATO while already engaging in a campaign of hybrid warfare against European countries.
Several recent incidents involving German-linked infrastructure have reinforced this newfound perception. The sabotage of the C-Lion1 submarine cable linking Finland and Germany, as well as instances of drone incursions over Munich Airport, indicate that Germany is not immune to Russia’s hybrid warfare.
Importantly, these developments have not just affected Germany’s rhetoric on Russia; they have also led Berlin to step up its engagement in the Baltic Sea region.
At sea, the German Navy has designated the Baltic Sea as one of its two priority theaters, and it seeks to play a more active role in securing Europe’s northern flank. Berlin’s growing concerns over subsea vulnerabilities have led to Germany’s participation in Baltic Sentry, a NATO operation aimed at protecting underwater critical infrastructure. Beyond plans for modernization and expansion, the German navy has also established a new tactical maritime headquarters—Commander Task Force Baltic—responsible for coordinating naval activities with NATO allies in the Baltic Sea.
On land, Germany’s presence is reaching unprecedented levels through the establishment of its first permanent overseas military base in Lithuania, expected to be fully operational in 2027. Having served as the framework nation for a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup since 2016, this presence shifted from rotational deployments to permanently stationed forces after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also expanded to brigade level, with the possibility to scale up to a division in wartime under NATO’s new Forward Land Forces concept.
Politically, Berlin is deepening bilateral relationships. Germany has participated in meetings of the Nordic-Baltic Eight since the summer of 2025 and has increasingly recognized the importance of cooperation with the Nordic-Baltic countries to strengthen European security. Still, this political alignment could be developed further. Germany already participates in regional formats with a focus on security such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Northern Group, and it could also become a member or associate of the United Kingdom–led Joint Expeditionary Force.
The path to credible leadership
Through its increasing engagement, Berlin is signaling large ambitions for German leadership in the Baltic Sea region. Whether these ambitions can be realized, however, remains closely tied to Zeitenwende and Berlin’s ability to implement its objectives.
The current coalition has proven capable of pushing Zeitenwende toward a more structured, durable, and operationally credible transformation. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius plans to raise annual defense spending to €162 billion by 2029, a 70 percent increase from 2025 levels. With defense expenditures now being exempted from the constitutional “debt brake,” the government secured a parliamentary majority in March 2025 to unlock a trillion-euro loan for defense and infrastructure spending. And in December, the Bundestag approved new defense procurement projects worth nearly €50 billion. Reports in late January that Germany plans to develop the first European-produced missile detection system further demonstrate that Berlin is serious about advancing high-end military capabilities.
Importantly, Merz has also pushed for stronger oversight of procurement decisions, responding to concerns that a disproportionate share of spending is being directed toward conventional weapons rather than defense start-ups working on emerging technologies, such as unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. This is a crucial step to ensure the German defense-industrial base is adapted to the demands of modern warfare.
What matters now is delivery. Germany’s arms industry must rapidly scale up production to meet the booming demand, but personnel shortfalls, industrial capacity, execution risks, and procurement delays could limit the realization of Zeitenwende’s objectives. Delivery also implies a willingness to use military power in an agile and bold manner, which poses a challenge for a country that has traditionally led by working through institutions and pursuing careful diplomacy.
To become a leading actor in the Baltic Sea, Germany must overcome this challenge by continuing to transform its strategic culture while consolidating a credible deterrence and defense posture toward Russia through deeper regional integration.