Presented by

Please join the Global Tech Security Commission (GTSC) – a joint partnership between the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue – on November 30 at 1:00pm for a virtual panel discussion on China’s whole-of-nation approach to achieve self-reliance in technology as a means of competing with the West. Read the issue brief of the same name that will be the primary topic of discussion!

On October 7, the Biden administration announced a new rule to control exports of advanced-computing semiconductor chips to China. As the United States works to cut off technology and capital flows to China, Beijing’s desire to achieve technological self-sufficiency is greater than ever. In response to shocks from the US-China trade war and the economic impact ranging from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese Politburo unveiled the new “dual circulation” strategy at a Central Financial and Economic Commission meeting in 2020 to increase the country’s self-reliance to better guard against global volatility and competition with the west.

Beijing is committed to becoming a state-led and self-sufficient techno-superpower. In doing so, the Chinese government is consolidating its influence in both the domestic market and overseas markets where Chinese firms are active, while simultaneously mobilizing public, private, and public-private investment vehicles to support these tech ambitions. What lessons should the United States take away from these trends, and how should foreign businesses prepare themselves as they decide whether to expand or exit the Chinese market?

A conversation with

Ngor Luong
Nonresident Fellow, Global China Hub
Atlantic Council

Alexander Brown
Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies

Gerard DiPippo
Senior Fellow, Economics Program
Center for Strategic & International Studies

Moderated by

Opening remarks by

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its fifteen other programs and centers.