Allies and partners

This issue brief is part of the GeoTech Center’s “Atlantic Council Commission on Artificial Intelligence: US leadership in the age of AI” report, which offers an action-oriented roadmap for strengthening US domestic AI capacity, aligning with allies, and sustaining global leadership.

The United States, its allies, and partner countries are at an inflection point on AI. There is a need to build cross-border coalitions, interoperable standards, and shared public institutions that can promote innovation, align governance structures, and elevate democratic values at a moment when decades-old norms and alliances are fraying and there is increased economic competitiveness between countries. Trends of increasing geopolitical competition, interdependence, and technological change are intensifying while traditional mechanisms—and trust—in a rules-based order are eroding as the United States has retrenched in many areas of global engagement and areas of leadership established in the post-World War II era.

The United States remains central to the commercialization and governance of AI worldwide. But a series of domestic and international policymaking shifts now challenges that position, which is based on the country’s world-leading research and development, industrial expertise, and technical capacity.

The Trump administration’s AI Action Plan includes leading international AI diplomacy and security as a core pillar. The plan sets out priority actions to export the US AI tech stack to global partners, counter Chinese influence in international bodies, strengthen export controls, and coordinate on national security risks. Since the issuance of the plan, the administration’s attention within the international context has primarily focused on AI exports. At the 2026 India AI Impact Summit, Michael Kratsios, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, unveiled the details of the American AI Export Program, including: a national champions initiative that will integrate the leading AI companies of partner nations with the US AI stack to help build domestic tech industries; new financing programs managed through the World Bank, Export-Import Bank, and US International Development Corporation; and a new tech corps within the Peace Corps to provide import partners support in deploying AI for public services.

US officials have also promoted bilateral agreements to strengthen US industries’ position in the burgeoning global AI market, including via federal funds. Recent agreements include the AI Opportunity Partnership with India—focused on “pro-innovation regulation” and digital infrastructure—and the US–Japan Framework Agreement—focused, in part, on AI critical materials.

Longtime international partners, particularly those within the EU and other Western countries, have shifted their attention from creating new regulatory and legislative oversight. Non-US politicians and officials have embraced the need to jump-start their countries’ sluggish economies via the potential economic benefits and efficiencies associated with AI. In that regard, there is growing alignment between the US and non-US approaches to AI, including through proposals such as the EU’s so-called Digital Omnibus, which proposes a delay in the implementation of the bloc’s AI Act; the European Commission’s dual Apply AI Strategy and AI in Science Strategy; Canada’s AI Strategy taskforce; and Singapore’s AI National Strategy.

This alignment poses opportunities and challenges for the United States.

A growing consensus that AI advances must be harnessed for economic development provides scope for multinational and bilateral agreements to meet such policymaking objectives. Global AI governance efforts, particularly those related to the United Nations and the Group of Seven (G7), will continue, though a rush to regulate the emerging technology has so far abated. China, however, continues to pursue its own geopolitical interests via international governance structures.

On the other hand, many countries, including close US partners, are seeking to embed principles of “digital sovereignty” into the development of domestic AI industries. That includes efforts to use public procurement to support domestic companies rather than US competitors; restrict data access via localization principles; and impose additional controls that might restrict the ability of US firms to operate in countries from Brazil to Australia to Germany. Here, again, the issue of trust—not of citizens in their government but rather among partner countries—remains paramount to US competitiveness in AI.

Infrastructure buildout

Governments worldwide are expected to spend, collectively, tens of billions of dollars over the next five years on AI infrastructure, including high-performance computing centers and domestic cloud computing networks to underpin economic growth. This represents both an opportunity and a risk for US industrial players operating domestically and internationally. The current US administration has backed the export of the US AI stack as a mechanism to embed US industrial expertise, values, and norms at the center of how allies develop their indigenous AI industries. Some of these countries, however, have shown greater interest in decoupling themselves from potential reliance on world-leading US AI infrastructure. That includes potentially using government procurement contracts to preference local competitors to US companies as a means of supporting national enterprise. As of early 2026, this remains more a risk than a reality.

Governance and regulation

While countries are pulling back from specific AI regulation, many are still seeking greater ownership of how these systems are rolled out within their borders. That includes ongoing engagement with international bodies like the OECD, despite the recent pullback from the current US administration. This represents an opportunity for US industry, given many companies’ global footprints and long-term relationships with both non-US governments and commercial partners worldwide. Demonstrating strong governance structures is a competitive advantage at a time when non-US policymakers are balancing the need to show citizens, they are in control of the emerging technology and the economic imperative of harnessing AI for growth.

Digital sovereignty trends

This topic is still poorly defined, but its underlying principle, in which non-US policymakers are pursuing more agency over AI-enabling infrastructure and applications, has become more pronounced over the last twelve months. Data residency and sovereignty requirements are among the most important frictions in allied AI collaboration. Allied and partnered nations have imposed strict data localization laws. Data sovereignty trends might cause problems for US companies looking to bid for non-US contracts, particularly those associated with public institutions, as well as making joint AI development and collaboration more complex. US government and industry must balance two somewhat contradictory policy objectives: those from the current administration seeking to support US companies, at home and abroad, as part of its AI Action Plan; and those from non-US governments that are equally looking to jump-start national AI industries. However, significant differences remain among non-US countries, including those in more developed parts of the world with existing AI-focused expertise and those from the so-called Global Majority where AI infrastructure is sparse. In addition, as more non-US companies begin to accelerate AI adoption, industrial use cases that embed proprietary datasets within US infrastructure are raising questions around data governance and data location. Addressing concerns about control and security over often sensitive data will be critical as sectors across the globe navigate the integration of AI into novel use cases.

Chinese influence

Outside the Western world, Beijing is making a play for both economic and political partners via the prism of AI. Its companies and governance efforts represent a rival structure to those offered by the United States and its partners. Beijing has centered its pitch, primarily to Global Majority countries, via the provision of open-source technologies that stand in contrast to proprietary AI from the United States. China has also developed extensive connections within emerging economies through the promotion of likeminded, broader digital governance initiatives. That includes co-authoring submissions to the United Nations’ (UN) Global Digital Compact, the stated objective of which includes creating “a comprehensive global framework for digital cooperation and governance of artificial intelligence.”

Finding: The advantage of the US AI stack multiplies when considering “allied AI stacks.” Equipping allies and partners with solely “American-made” AI stacks is not an effective approach for transatlantic cooperation on AI. Looking at recent geopolitical tensions, non-US countries are reasonably concerned that an AI system that is fully designed and deployed with US-led technologies could increase their dependence on the United States and lead to a loss of agency. The fear of the United States shutting down any AI systems with a “kill switch to force any diplomatic agreement results in Europe’s and other partners’ growing inclination toward digital sovereignty. This drive has resulted in proposals such as the establishment of “AI Factories”, the Digital Omnibus to simplify the EU AI Act and create a single market, and the European Commission’s release of the Tech Sovereignty package that includes multiple AI and cloud components. An AI ecosystem consisting of both US and allied stacks is advantageous: it can multiply the United States’ comparative advantage, especially in areas that are the current weak spots, such as semiconductor fabrication, open-source AI models, high-bandwidth memory, and critical minerals.

• Recommendation: Strategically align with allies and partners on AI export frameworks. The AI Action Plan directs federal agencies to devise a plan for an “AI global alliance” to ensure export control alignment and policy levers across governments in adopting US-led AI protection systems. The administration should move forward to establish this construct and set up a global AI export framework centered on encouraging investments in a diverse set of frontier models and applications in the global marketplace among US allies and partners, with appropriate security controls to protect US interests. Importantly, these products should meet safety and security standards developed through an agreed-upon framework co-created by the United States, allies, and partners, and promoted in international standards development organizations. Such standards should be reinforced by provable technical controls to establish a verifiable trust architecture. The export framework should include supporting the allied AI stack as a throughline from the industrial layer up, including energy equipment, semiconductor fabrication, and advanced manufacturing.
• Recommendation: Leverage the Tech Prosperity Corps for global partnerships. The White House’s announcement of the Tech Prosperity Corps at the India AI Impact Summit was a welcome development. In parallel to the traditional US Peace Corps, the Tech Prosperity Corps is meant to export technical talent to deploy AI applications in public services in the developing world. Although the initiative states potential collaboration will include import partners, the emphasis remains on the US AI stack. The next step is to ensure the allied AI stacks developed through the frameworks recommended above are also fully embedded in the initiative, with substantive input from cross-border industry partners. Sending AI talent from both the United States and allied partners to the developing world can bolster buy-in for a global AI ecosystem that can effectively counter autocratic influence.
• Recommendation: Create diplomatic positions to champion US and allied AI stacks. The United States should establish an AI Attaché Initiative, designing attachés at priority US diplomatic missions to advocate for policies that will enable exports of the US and allied AI stacks to the world, increasing the coherence of the AI infrastructural building in the global AI ecosystem through US and allied support.
• Recommendation: Anchor allied AI cooperation in shared public interest institutions. The credibility of an allied AI stack depends on more than interoperable hardware and aligned export controls. It depends on shared institutions that allies trust to steward the technology in the public interest, such as research consortia, standards bodies, civil society networks, and cross-border fellowships. Taking such steps to strengthen these components of cooperation moves beyond building coalitions among allied governments to instil public trust across borders.

Finding: Strategic communication is key to successful alliances and partnerships.
Communication plays a vital role in successful foreign policy. While the United States has signaled a strong interest in incorporating partner countries’ leading AI companies into the American AI Export Program, in practice, allies and partners remain skeptical of US intent, particularly at a time when the US government has increasingly involved itself in territorial disputes and other geopolitical stand-offs.

• Recommendation: Reinforce US reliability. The United States should focus messaging not on US superiority but on US reliability as a partner of choice to provide safer and greater market access than adversaries like China, enabling more capable and robust AI models that are not subject to authoritarian government censorship. It should actively coordinate with allies and partners on contingency plans and provide better assurances to maintain the continuity of their infrastructure and services in response to geopolitical events.
• Recommendation: Build common purpose to counter Chinese influence. The United States must also reinforce the message of unity with allies and partners in countering Chinese influence and preserving cooperative and peaceful use of AI. The AI Action Plan highlights this objective but focuses on Chinese influence in international bodies, without elaborating on the United States’ vision for these bodies. Just as in 1968, when fifty-nine nuclear and non-nuclear states joined together to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under US leadership to prevent a nuclear war, the US government today has a responsibility to articulate a similar unifying purpose. It should reclaim the power of international organizations and, if necessary, prevent the global AI ecosystem from being influenced by autocratic regimes and harmful practices, including preventing non-state actors such as terrorists from abusing AI systems.

Finding: Interoperable data-sharing standards add a technical muscle to powering allied AI coordination. There is currently a lack of standards for secure data governance and coordination among allies and partners. This was highlighted in the recent meeting convened by the NATO Communication and Information Agency. As data are a critical piece in the architecture of AI, it is necessary to create an interoperable ecosystem for data governance, particularly for data used to train AI models. This includes the provision of agreed-upon frameworks and standards for data, which can effectively reduce administrative burden and increase trust and support US allies and partners in key domains that involve AI capabilities, particularly in national security, global health, humanitarian crises, and other areas that require international collaboration.

• Recommendation: Create a data governance ecosystem. The United States should co-create interoperable standards for data classification, evaluation, and sharing protocols with allies and partners. This can reduce friction in allied collaboration while increasing mutual trust. To address allies’ and partners’ legitimate concerns about stronger control over their data in certain use cases, such an ecosystem should facilitate privacy-preserving information sharing and verifiable technical controls over data access.

Finding: The US leadership in global AI safety and security is a crucial ingredient for AI leadership on the world stage. Without it, adversarial nations will fill the vacuum, seeking to export their own AI frameworks, standards, and technologies, which reflect values that run counter to democratic governance and individual rights. Concerns about AI safety and security risks are preoccupying allies and partners. For example, agentic AI has created new threats that produce harmful content and weaken system security with highly automated decision-making processes that risk undermining human control to a greater degree than previous AI models. Forging international approaches to manage shared AI risks and create updated security principles to keep pace with technological change is essential to ensuring the democratic values remain at the core of the global AI order.

• Recommendation: Build on existing AI safety and security frameworks. The United States should continue constructive conversations with allies and partners and accelerate agreements on existing frameworks that are beyond privacy concerns and extend into high-risk AI use cases, especially around national security use cases that might undermine domestic civil rights protections. The EU AI Act provisions related to high-risk AI systems are set to enter into force in August 2026, and the time is ripe for the United States to engage in these discussions and build consensus with allies early in the implementation phase. Additionally, the Trump administration has created the AI Agents Standards Initiative, under (NIST, which seeks to foster industrial-led standards and open protocols to ensure security, interoperability and adoption of agentic AI. The next course of action is to collaborate with allies and partners to expand this initiative at a global level by working with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and other international organizations to enhance multisectoral input and the consistency of global AI safety and security standards and a strong US presence in the standard-setting process.
• Recommendation: Create interoperable information-sharing and security-assurance ecosystems. Creating a multilateral system between the United States, allies, and partners for real-time information-sharing and shared security-assurance baselines around AI risks, vulnerabilities, and capabilities can help elevate mutual trust, address digital sovereignty concerns without defaulting to hard localization, and meaningfully tackle emerging global AI safety and security risks. These security baselines can include privacy-enhancing mechanisms such as encryption and access controls, auditability, and incident response. Current efforts, including the International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation, and Science, provide an excellent starting point. Countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, which regularly carry out advanced AI evaluation exercises, should share the results of these exercises with other countries. The next step is to create shared physical and digital mechanisms through which relevant findings can be accessed and analyzed, while generating proactive responses, all in real time. In addition, these networks should be expanded to include additional countries whose digital ministries are carrying out AI measurement work, and the United States should leverage other alliances such as the Five Eyes for similar information sharing. These information-sharing ecosystems can sustain long-term collaboration to mitigate AI safety and security risks to the global economy, security, and individual rights.

Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

Ryan Pan is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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