The Egyptian-Turkish summit in Ankara on September 4, 2024, marked the culmination of more than three years of efforts to normalize relations between the two countries. This followed a strategic shift by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who abandoned his policy of supporting political Islam to gain influence in Arab countries after the Arab Spring uprisings. Erdoğan’s turnaround was driven by regional, international, and local changes within Turkey.

Different political and economic considerations prompted Erdoğan to accelerate Turkey’s reconciliation with the Arab countries with which he had been at odds largely due to his support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish reconciliation began with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and progressed more quickly than with Egypt, driven by Turkey’s urgent need for Gulf capital and investments.

Despite previous political tensions and a breakdown of diplomatic relations, Egypt and Turkey have maintained growing economic ties. In 2013, the total volume of trade between the two countries reached $5 billion, more than double what it was in early 2010. After a decade of political estrangement, this figure increased to nearly $7 billion in 2023 (excluding gas). The two governments aim to raise this to $15 billion within three years. Meanwhile, the market value of Turkish investments in Egypt is nearing $3 billion.

Perhaps the only economic activity negatively impacted by the political hostility between the two countries was maritime shipping, specifically the suspension of the Mediterranean shipping that facilitated shuttle sea voyages. These voyages transported land transport trucks loaded with Turkish and European goods en route to the Gulf, using a shipping method known as roll-on/roll-off (RORO). Due to Egyptian security concerns, the RORO line between Egypt and Turkey has been suspended since 2013. As a result, Turkey redirected the line to the Israeli port of Haifa and, from there, to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf cities. However, this line is now expected to be halted as part of the trade boycott imposed by Erdoğan against Israel over the Gaza war. An agreement could be reached between Egypt and Turkey to resume their maritime line.

As the global order shifts from US unipolar hegemony to multipolar competition, the importance and influence of the largest regional powers, including Egypt and Turkey, are increasing across many regional issues. Given Egypt and Turkey’s shared interest in supporting the Palestinian cause, there is significant potential for enhanced cooperation that could not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also play a pivotal role in advancing lasting regional reconciliation. Turkey, in particular, is interested in coordinating with Egypt on the war in Gaza, as both countries agree on the importance of ending the conflict, securing Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and ensuring sufficient aid reaches the Palestinians. However, Turkey lacks Egypt’s channels of dialogue with Israel and its geographical proximity.

Since coming to power, and until 2010, Erdoğan maintained a balanced policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He leveraged Turkey’s close trade and military relations with Israel and the United States to play the role of an acceptable mediator in this conflict, whether on the Syrian or Palestinian fronts. Turkish-Israeli relations have fluctuated between periods of normalization and strain since the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. However, they have grown increasingly strained with each confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, the most recent being the war raging in the Gaza Strip since October 7, 2023.

Erdoğan declared his full support for Hamas in this war, describing it as a resistance movement against the Israeli military occupation and rejecting the Israeli claim that it is a terrorist organization. He has continued to host some of Hamas’s leaders on Turkish territory. Turkey offered to be one of the guarantors of any agreement to stop the war, along with Egypt and Qatar. However, Israel refused to accept any direct Turkish role in the negotiations, insisting that mediators be limited to the United States, Egypt, and Qatar.

Erdoğan attempted to mediate between the two factions at the onset of the war for domestic political reasons. The Turkish public generally supports the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Additionally, Erdogan’s close ties to Hamas’s political wing allow him to leverage these connections to mediate with its leaders, as he has done in the past. 

Turkey needs to coordinate with Egypt to facilitate the passage of Turkish aid supplies to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the war. Erdoğan requested that his trip to Egypt in February 2024 include a visit to the Rafah crossing. This did not come to pass. At that time, the area adjacent to the crossing on the Palestinian side was witnessing military operations between the Israeli army and Hamas.

Egypt was only able to arrange a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to the Rafah crossing last August during his visit to Egypt to prepare the grounds for the Egyptian-Turkish summit in Ankara. Although the crossing had been closed for about two months, footage of the Turkish minister’s visit topped all the news bulletins on Turkish state television broadcaster TRT.

Turkey also seeks to benefit from Egypt’s mediating role by influencing negotiations based on its presumed ability to leverage Hamas. In fact, during the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey was somewhat successful in negotiating between Israel and the Palestinians, first during the Oslo peace process and later in the 2008 Ankara talks. However, this leverage has since diminished due to Erdogan’s vocal support for Hamas and the Palestinian cause, which has undermined Turkey’s ability to meaningfully impact the conflict. 

Meanwhile, Israel has called for sanctions against Turkey in international financial forums over its decision to impose trade restrictions on Israel. Israel raised similar demands against Qatar at the beginning of the war. Qatari officials, however, responded that their hosting of Hamas leaders and members since 2007 was done at the joint request of the United States and Israel and with the knowledge and approval of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had approved the entry of all Qatari cash aid to Hamas leaders until the beginning of the current war.

At the international level, Egypt and Turkey agree on condemning the Israeli occupation’s violations in the West Bank and Gaza as breaches of international charters, resolutions, and laws. They also advocate for holding Israeli officials accountable for these violations before international courts. Representatives from both countries pleaded in support of the Palestinian position before the International Court of Justice regarding its July 2024 advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israeli policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem.

Both Egypt and Turkey have politically supported South Africa’s lawsuit before the International Court of Justice against Israel for violating the Genocide Convention during the war in Gaza. Turkey, along with fourteen other countries, joined in the lawsuit before the court, while Egypt announced that it is still studying the decision to join in light of its obligations under the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

Erdoğan called on Islamic countries to form an alliance against Israeli expansion in the Palestinian territories but also against Israeli aggression against Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Egypt has consistently condemned the expansion of the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories.

With Egypt’s 110 million people and Turkey’s 90 million, the two nations represent nearly half of the Middle East’s population. Their armed forces are also the strongest in the region. Clearly, the opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, both regionally and bilaterally, far outweigh the areas of competition or potential conflict. The Ankara Summit offers hope for a new phase of close relations between the two countries, building on shared interests while avoiding past mistakes. Together, Turkey and Egypt can work to support ongoing efforts to end the war in Gaza, de-escalate regional tensions, and resume Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

Abderahman Salaheldin is a former Egyptian ambassador to Turkey.

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

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