By Damon Wilson
The obvious result is that Moscow gains leverage over any recalcitrant neighbor by pounding home the message that permanent dismemberment is the cost of soliciting NATO membership and, as Moscow has made clear since last year, the European Union as well. In turn, Moscow succeeds in making its neighbors undesirable partners as Europeans perceive them as carrying the baggage of regional, ethnic disputes which are unwelcome in the EU. Western reluctance to embrace nations with territorial disputes only incentivizes Russia to make its stationing of forces in that nation permanent.
This is the manipulated cycle of negativity that keeps nations of the former Soviet Union tethered to Putin‚Äôs authoritarian kleptocracy.
Unfortunately, Putin has concluded from recent history that Russia can not only get away with this strategy, but that it is effective. And now we are watching it unfold in Ukraine, centered on Crimea.
Consider what it is like to live in Putin‚Äôs neighborhood. Russia finances the separatist regime in the Transnistria region of Moldova and ensures its viability through the stationing of Russian forces. Russia fully occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008 and now recognizes both Georgian territories as independent states ‚Äď despite the fact that South Ossetia is nearly depopulated with the blatant exception of the influx of Russian forces. And even Armenia and Azerbaijan, who fought a war over Nagorno-Karabakh. find their conflict suits the Kremlin just fine, providing the Kremlin leverage over both.
In Europe‚Äôs East, only Belarus, does not suffer the indignance of having territory occupied by Russia. And Belarus enjoys this unique status because its authoritarian kleptocrat Aleksandr Lukashenka has made Belarus anathema to the rest of Europe.
Since the mobilization of Russian forces in the Western and Central military districts last week, Putin has been testing. He is probing with each escalatory step he takes. This is a repeat of the lead up to war in 2008, when the US and European governments saw all the ominous signs, but had begun to expect outrageous Russian behavior as normal, without believing that Russia would ever resort to war. We were wrong.
If Putin concludes he can get away with it, he may not only move to wrest Crimea from Ukrainian control, but perhaps all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and then he may aim for another prize, toppling the new reform-minded government in Kyiv.
That‚Äôs why US and European actions, or inaction, in the next 24-48 hours may be decisive in Putin‚Äôs calculations.
Damon Wilson is executive vice president of the Atlantic Council and a former National Security Council senior director for European affairs.