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JENNA BEN-YEHUDA: Hello, everyone, and thank you for joining us. Good afternoon. I’m Jenna Ben-Yehuda, executive vice president here at the Atlantic Council. And I’m really delighted to be introducing the governor of the Banque de France, François de Villeroy—Villeroy de Galhau.
This event is also being livestreamed, of course, and co-hosted with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, led by Jörn Fleck, and is part of the Atlantic Council’s extensive programming for the World Bank-IMF 2026 Spring Meetings. Twice a year, our GeoEconomics Center brings together finance ministers and central bank governors from around the world to discuss their countries’ economic outlook and how they engage with the Bretton Woods institutions. In just a few short years, thanks to our Bretton Woods 2.0 Program and the leadership of our vice president and chair for international economics, Josh Lipsky, our IMF-World Bank Week programming has become an important forum for discussion that sheds light and not heat to the geoeconomic debates of the day.
When we last hosted the governor a year ago, the world’s economic leaders had come to Washington with many questions regarding President Trump’s liberation day tariffs, and we also had questions for them. This was just days after an unprecedented sale of dollar-denominated assets, including both stocks and bonds, and we wanted to know whether this diversification away from the dollar would be sustained. The governor gave us one of the clearest answers. He said that while bad news for the US was bad news for all, last April also provided an opportunity for a European moment when capital might continue to flee to the EU’s more predictable shores. And during this session, we will ask the governor whether he thinks Europe has managed to seize this opportunity over the last twelve months.
But today we convene amidst new uncertainties. The global economy faces the fallout of the conflict in the Middle East and Europe, and the continued weaponization of supply chains and chokepoints. And this can truly be considered our geoeconomic era, and we are honored that the governor has chosen our GeoEconomics Center for the second time to make his keynote speech in Washington.
And while you are always welcome back, Mr. Governor, I should say that this will be your last keynote speech here in Washington in your current post. And during your eleven-year tenure, you have steadied the French economy through multiple crises. You’ve also always brought a real—just truly a realism and honesty, and a strong European conviction and vision to the table in the ECB’s Governing Council. And that praise doesn’t just come from us; that was a quote from President Christine Lagarde herself.
So thank you, Mr. Governor. We wish you the very best in your next role in French civil society and are honored to host you here today. After your remarks, you will join Charles Lichfield here, our director of economic foresight and analysis at the GeoEconomics Center and our C. Boyden Gray senior fellow, for a fireside chat. Merci.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Thank you very much, Jenna, for your kind words. Thank you to the Atlantic Council for welcoming me again one year after.
You reminded us of what I said one year ago, that bad news for the US are bad news—or bad news for Europe are bad news for the other side of the Atlantic as well. Today I will express it more positively, perhaps, but the challenge remains the same, why the transatlantic partnership is still of mutual interest. And if I had been here some years ago, I would have stated the obvious, but really today it’s worth to explain why I have this deep conviction.
Back in April last year, we already found ourselves in an exceptionally uncertain environment. One year on, and with this new conflict in Iran, two observations stand out for me. First, the economy has held up better than expected, including in Europe. But, second, despite these tensions, we need each other, and we need predictability. And I will try to explain what I mean with predictability.
But let me explain why the economy and trade have held up better than expected, because despite rising trade barriers—you mentioned them—policy uncertainty, and geopolitical tensions, the world economy proved more resilient than feared one year ago. Global growth reached 3.4 percent last year, compared to a 2.8 percent forecast by the IMF in April 2025. The euro area itself experienced a positive growth of 1.5 percent with an inflation of 2.1 percent as an average last year. This constitutes a good starting position for 2026.
On this side of the Atlantic, the sharp slowdown in US growth that was feared a year ago—remember, some analysts were even hinting at a recession—has fortunately not materialized. Why so? And it’s worth taking a bit of time to try to understand. US growth has been driven by the AI investment boom, notably in datacenters and technology equipment, but also on the demand side by a sizeable wealth effect from dynamic equity markets and still-supportive fiscal policy. This has supported domestic consumption, but unevenly. You are aware of these figures, calculated by the Dallas Fed. The top 20 percent richest households in terms of income make close to 60 percent of aggregate consumption, the so-called K-shape economy.
Surprisingly, although the 2025 tariffs pushed the average US import tariff close to 17 percent—a record high, up 13 percentage points since January last year—the trade impact also proved less severe than initially feared. World trade volumes in goods and services rose by 5.1 percent last year. This resilience was supported by frontloading ahead of tariffs, by the expansion of AI-related trade, and by sustained consumer demand. European trade also proved resilient. Imports of euro area goods still increased by more than 1 percent last year, while exports declined by only 0.5 percent.
But this good news—and good news there are—should not hide the essential point: The counterfactual without tariffs would have been better. And this is my first slide. According to the last IMF WEO, published yesterday, US trade policy reduced global GDP growth by roughly 0.6 GDP points last year if we count the direct tariffs effect—first column—but also the rise of uncertainty, second column. And both uncertainty and tariffs come at a cost, starting with the US economy itself. US tariffs were borne primarily by the US economy. A 10 percent increase in tariffs translated into roughly a nine-point-ten percent—so 95 percent of the effect was a rise in US import prices with American firms, and then American consumers already bearing around one-third of the burden.
The outlook—to stay with the economic landscape, the outlook remains deeply uncertain. Our environment has an extraordinary level of uncertainty, and there are various measures. You see it on this slide. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East adds upwards pressure on inflation and downward pressure on growth worldwide.
In the same IMF WEO, the reference forecast for global GDP growth was revised downward by 0.2 percent to 3.1 percent for global growth this year and global inflation was revised upward by 0.6 percent—percentage point to 4.4 percent as a whole this year. We know, however, that the exact scenario remains highly dependent on the magnitude and the duration of the conflict, and thus of the lasting—on the lasting success of the announced ceasefire.
This is also true on the European side. Our ECB macroeconomic projections published last month explicitly rely on three alternative scenarios ranging from baseline to severe, and all point to the same conclusion: lower growth and higher inflation. But let me stress one important and positive nuance: Today’s macroeconomic environment is very different from that of 2022. The euro area is no longer facing the post-pandemic imbalances we were facing then. Inflation has fallen sharply, supply bottlenecks have disappeared, and monetary policy is no longer constrained by the unconventional commitments made at that time.
And this brings me to my second observation: The lesson of the past year is that we need each other and we need predictability. And let me here speak candidly, as friends must speak especially when there are tensions. We need each other because the world we face is one of common shocks and common risks. Whether we like it or not, global shocks hitting interdependent economies indeed call for well-coordinated policy responses.
This shock is common from the outset. Yes, the US is a net oil exporter and Europe a net importer, but there is one single global oil price. Gasoline prices and inflation expectations increase on both sides of the Atlantic and still more here. And confidence effects and financial markets dynamics are global by nature.
Second, US European allies sometimes get it right. They simply get it right when they say that energy transition is the best way out of the oil and Middle East dependency. Decarbonized energy power has expanded in Europe since 2022, and this is good news. And wholesale electricity prices have decreased in Europe by about 70 percent. And more broadly, when Europeans stress that might alone—might without right—can be misleading, it’s sometimes worth listening to them.
Third, we need each other because, due to trade and financial integration, a couple of structural issues binds our economic interests together: global imbalances and financial stability.
Let me stress what we call global imbalances. They are widening after years of narrowing. Last year, as a percentage of global GDP the US current account deficit reached minus-0.9 percent, while China’s surplus rose to plus-0.6 percent of global GDP. These figures point to domestic challenges that no self-centered expedient—name it protectionism—can address, and these domestic challenges need to be addressed together—too little consumption in China, too much fiscal deficit in the US, and too little productive investment in Europe. This also applies to our dependencies on critical raw materials, including rare earths. Economic security requires coordination rather than fragmentation.
Let me add some words about the other common issue we have, which is financial stability. The rapid growth of private credit, sovereign debt, elevated AI-related valuations, and the rise of crypto assets are creating new faultlines in the financial system. Therefore, under its Group of Seven presidency this year, France will contribute to addressing these common challenges in coordination with the US Group of Twenty presidency, to the extent possible. Financial stability also includes combating financial crime through better-enforced anti-money-laundering standards, but also fostering cross-border payments, implementing Basel III—can I say on that that having now a US proposal is welcome, but it should not mean banking deregulation—and also on our common agenda better monitoring so-called NBFIs, nonbank financial [institutions]
We need each other, but we need predictability, because interdependence alone does not create trust. Our economies now need predictability, and this would be the most powerful engine for global growth.
On the US side, beyond the best possible resolution of the Iran conflict, this predictability calls for a soft landing on trade; and on the European side for an acceleration on growth and innovation. Let me elaborate briefly on these two side.
The recent US Supreme Court decision on the IEEPA tariffs reminds us that American checks and balances might well be alive. But by invalidating the 2025 tariffs, it has also reopened legal uncertainty with possible substitution under other statutes, unsettled trade agreements, and uneven effects across trade partners, including Europe. How could it be, my friends, that the main relative winner of a new trade regime could be China and the main relative losers could be US allies like the EU, the UK, or Japan? We now need a soft landing on US trade with a return to a more predictable environment.
Let me come to the European side. To build a more balanced transatlantic partnership, we also need a stronger Europe and a quicker one. With the Letta and Draghi reports we have a compelling blueprint, and we have started implementing it. Let me—this will be my last slide—remind you of our three imperatives, three I’s.
First, integrate more the single market. This is about size, with, notably, with the creation of an optional twenty-eighth regime by 2028. Second I: Invest better. And this is financial muscle, the Savings and Investments Union, aimed at fostering equity and innovation financing. And so we will deliver on three key priorities: AI, energy transition, and defense. And third I: Innovate faster. And for that, dare to simplify. We have started this journey, but we must still accelerate our speed and beef up implementation.
Let me conclude. This is a decisive moment for the transatlantic partnership. We should have no illusions; in a world of common shocks and common risks, Europe and America will either win together or fall together. I am fond of this old quotation by Benjamin Franklin, as he warned 250 years ago at the signing of the Declaration of Independence. I quote, “We must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.” His warning still resonates today. Our responsibilities remain shared; so must our resolve.
Thank you for your attention.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Well, thank you, Monsieur Governor. You always have an eye to history in your speeches, which is very refreshing for us. It is, indeed, the 250th anniversary, and accent notwithstanding, I am also quite interested in this period of history and excited about the celebrations to come.
So we have a little bit of time to go through questions.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: You are all aware that Benjamin Franklin is almost as famous in Paris as he is in the US.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: The two of us are well-placed to know that. So there will be a possibility to ask you questions, via the iPad in front of me, but first, I have the privilege of asking you some myself. I had the opportunity to look at your slides in preparing for this interview. And I thought about how to organize the questions. And I have a feeling that this global imbalances focus is often put to the wayside in interviews, whereas it is the big Group of Seven focus in this presidency. So I thought we’d start with that. But I will be coming back to the dynamism of the European economy.
And on imbalances, I would also point our viewers to the very good report by your deputy governor, which also has an eye on history. So Madame Bénassy-Quéré had a very, very interesting report that came out earlier this year, which showed some of the historical dynamics around this. But the question I want to ask you is, France wants to come up with a sort of—not just a diagnosis, but a bit of a roadmap this year. And the somewhat controversial question I’d ask you is whether Europe might just be alone in trying to deal with this problem. So it’s absolutely the case that Europe is doing more on the savings and investment union. Germany, which used to be seen as a, quote/unquote, “problem” on global imbalances, is now spending much more. And so that is less of a problem. But on the US side, the deficit will remain, I think, quite large. And on the Chinese side, they’re not going to change their economic model. So what do you think this roadmap can achieve?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Can I first answer with a slide, Charles, if I may. Among the Group of Seven countries, France is probably the one which is closest to a current account balance. So we think this puts us in a good position to make progress. But that said, we don’t pretend to solve all issues this year, obviously. If we could already come to a shared diagnosis, and second to a direction of travel, it would be a significant progress. I think there is a feeling around the table that, in order to foster global growth, we must adjust and solve part of these global imbalances. You were kind enough to quote Agnés Bénassy-Quéré blog, which explains why in history, and not only today, these global imbalances were detrimental for global growth and created financial risk. So they are not sustainable in the long run.
Let me go a bit further. Not in this country, not in Europe, but in China. And probably it’s also China’s long-term interest to rebalance its growth, to have a less export-driven model and more internal consumption model. I don’t say it’s obvious to achieve this shift, but I think there is a growing awareness on the Chinese side that in order to have a sustainable growth, it must be a different engine. Here, obviously, the debate about the fiscal deficit is a bit more difficult. But again, it would become an interest. It’s not the idea to point to such or such countries and saying, you are responsible for these global imbalances. But frankly, we know that protectionism is not the solution to these global imbalances. I stress it last year here. The first and foremost effect of protectionism would be to have a slower growth everywhere, including in this country. So it’s a lose-lose solution.
It’s worth, really, to invest a bit more intellectually in a shared diagnosis, and, again, a direction of travel, to try to find a better solution and a more effective one to reduce global imbalances. So we created an economist group shared by Hélène Rey, a prominent French and British economist. She teaches at LBS. She will be the next chief economist of the BIS, as BIS chair. We just choose Hélène as the next BIS chief economist. And there are three other economists. An American one, Gita Gopinath, a Chinese one, German one, Axel Weber, who was here—
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Just today in this building.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Yes. I met him coming in. So we created the best conditions. And I think it’s really worth to invest a bit.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Well, thank you. So important focus on coordination instead of fragmentation. And we wish you good luck during your presidency. But important to, obviously, stress that this will—there will be some continuity with next year’s presidencies, US Group of Seven and UK Group of Twenty.
So you mentioned the growth dynamics, which are a little bit more impressive and dynamic in this country than they are in Europe. So the source of some of the uncertainty may be the US, as your slide showed. But the growth is still much more impressive here than it is in Europe. And I’d suggest, when you said in your speech that the US should listen to its allies and sometimes allies are right, I would agree with that. But what I would say is that what really impresses the US is impressive growth. And where do you think Europe is on achieving that? What’s holding Europe back?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: No, believe me, the Europeans are listening to the US, and the lessons of the US economy, without any doubt. They even sometimes lack a bit of self-confidence in their own assets, but they are all looking at the US receipts for growth. When I said that in an alliance we should listen to each other, I think some useful lessons for the Europeans, they are not always wrong. Be it on the geopolitical front or on the energy transition. That said, we have to take lessons from the US in the other direction. And a dialogue is not a black-and-white story. We should listen to each other. I hope it’s obvious for everybody in this room. I stress it because it’s not obvious on the public stage at present. You have the impression that either you are 100 percent right or you are 100 percent wrong. This is not how real life works.
What we have to learn from the US on the economic front is the importance of innovation, productivity, and private investment. Can I elaborate a bit on that? And this is a story about the so-called savings and investment union. It’s not the fact that Europe lacks private savings. It’s exactly the contrary. The level of private savings in Europe is higher than in the US. It’s about 15 percent of disposable income of households, while it is about 10 percent in the US. But this savings is not allocated rightly, and it’s not enough invested in equity and venture capital. If you look at corporate equity, you probably know less about this figure. Corporate equity compared to GDP is about 80 to 90 percent in Europe, while it is more than double, 220 percent, in the US. And if you have more equity you are more innovative as a company, because you are more ready to take risks.
And if I turn to the other side, because we speak of savings and investment union. Now I turn to investment. I will perhaps surprise you, Charles, but the level of investment as a whole, compared to GDP, is about the same on both sides of the Atlantic. But there is a significant difference in what we call productive investment, if I forget about real estate and some public infrastructures. And here, there is a difference of about 3 percent of GDP. So Europe has to accelerate on productive investment. And there is a clear link between the financing sides, what I said about equity, and the investment side. We know what we have to do there. And we have also to—as I said, to integrate more the single market. The twenty-eighth regime will be a fantastic opportunity for European innovators and entrepreneurs, because they can deploy the innovation at the European scale. So we should go quicker, but the road is rather clear on that. And we take US lessons, obviously.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Thank you. I just wanted to push a little bit more on that topic, especially given we’ve now listened to two of your speeches on this stage. And we’re always happy to have you at the Atlantic Council, of course. But in your speech last year, you did talk about this European moment, provided Europe could seize the opportunity. So I thought I’d take this opportunity, one year later, to ask you what your assessment is of whether Europe has taken the opportunity. We’ve already had an opportunity to look at, you know, what’s been done on the Draghi report, the three I’s, et cetera. But I think there are still many more things that could happen.
And you made a very interesting speech in September to the GEG, the Groupe d’Études Géopolitiques, on the lack of a deadline. You wanted Europe and the EU institutions to seize the moment and actually say, we do have a deadline. We need to become more sovereign, because of obvious challenges. And you think that has been lacking. So maybe you could tell us a little bit more about what the sensitivities have meant, that there isn’t a sense of a deadline?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Charles, can I first thank you warmly, to read all my speeches with such care? And you are right.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: I have a great team that helps me, so.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: No, no, no. No, no. And I will be consistent. We are on this journey. And so there is this famous image of the glass being half empty or half full. If you look at the degree of implementation of the Draghi report, and measured by independent institutions, the last figure is that about 40 percent of the Draghi recommendations have been either fully or partially implemented. I would like it to be higher, but 40 percent is not zero. And I mentioned the twenty-eighth regime. We could mention several other example of the saving and investment union. We could mention simplification. Believe me, Europe is on its way. So the wake-up call has been listened to.
I would like still some acceleration. So, the commission to be bolder. And, as I proposed, has to have a global, a general calendar referring—I’m sorry, this is a bit old European history—but referring to Jacques Delors and the single market. You are too young for that, but I’m unfortunately older. When Jacques Delors arrived in Brussels, it was the so-called Euro-sclerosis. And he accelerated, with the single market project and with a clear deadline. Probably everybody forgot about what is exactly the content of the single market, but everybody remembers the calendar. First of January 1993. And there is another famous example, first of January 1999, For the single currency, the euro itself. And we delivered.
So I would like Europeans to have a deadline. I don’t know if it’s 2028 or first of January 2029, but during this US administration, to build what I call economic and financial sovereignty, after the monetary sovereignty, which was a huge success with the euro.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Thank you very much. I have two more brief questions, but I do encourage our audience, both here and online, to submit questions. AskAC.org. That’s AskAC.org. And then I will be able to read those questions to the governor.
My second-to-last question is on European payments model, digital payments, harnessing new technologies. Your president, President Macron, spoke of this recently and said it was an essential part of Europe’s sovereignty. Just before your speech to us we also had Piero Cipollone of the ECB who was talking about this. So a lot of interest from US payment companies who came and were asking, what’s the problem? So maybe you could give us a French take on why you think, or what your president thinks—but we’re interested in your opinion too—why Europe needs its own sovereign payments model. And if I could push you a little bit on the technology side of it. So what wholesale platforms is your institution working on to make sure that not just consumers have access to European payment systems, but then on the big, regulated capital flows what is Europe doing?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Let me start with the technology. I’m a great believer in technological innovation. And in particular, in tokenization. I guess the audience is familiar with the word, and Piero Cipollone explained it, but the idea of tokenization is that, thanks to blockchain, you can put together payment and delivery. And you have a single transaction, which creates trust. It seems obvious, but payment versus delivery has been a nightmare in payments for not only decades, centuries. So I really believe it will bring something.
It changed the technology. Does not change the philosophy of money and of payments. If you allow me one minute of philosophy. If I look at the history of money, it has always been a public-private partnership. You have a public anchor, which is central bank currency. At present, banknotes. And you have private solutions, think of your credit cards, et cetera. In the world of tokenization, we will still need these two floors. A public floor, and this is what we call central bank digital currency, and private solutions. About the public level, we are—we lie ahead, as ECB, on tokenized CBDC in euro. On the wholesale side, it will be the so-called Pontes project, which probably Piero Cipollone explained. By next summer, we will be the first central bank to offer such a CBDC, and on the retail side, what we call digital euro, a bit later, probably 2028 or 2029.
But this has to be combined with private solutions—stablecoins for the wholesale, probably in euro or tokenized deposit; and for the broad public, for retail, what we call wear-all or pan-European solutions. There are international solutions, but we cannot be in a situation where we are fully dependent of non-European solutions, be it on the private and the public part. So this is a sense of the strategy. And I see with great interest the development of stablecoins in this country. And I think it’s a very innovative technology. There is a question on the US side about the public anchor. I think it could be a missing link, what I call the CBDC on wholesale. It could be a question for the dollar itself.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: I understand. And how do you think things are evolving, timing-wise?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: I think we have—here we have a clear calendar on the European side. So it will be completed on the wholesale side, I would say, by 2028, and on the retail side perhaps by 2029.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Thank you very much. So, audience, you’re being shy for now, so I really do encourage you to submit questions. It’s AskAC.org. Looking forward to hearing from you.
And my final question, I suppose it would be remiss of me not to ask this one, so asking one independent central banker about another independent central banker. But the news is that President Trump this morning suggested that he might fire Fed Chair Jerome Powell if he doesn’t leave in May. Now, the conditions for this are quite interesting because his successor has been nominated by President Trump, but the hearings haven’t started yet. So that is why there is a suggestion that Jerome Powell may stay on. And yet, President Trump has threatened to fire him. So I was wondering if you had a message to your fellow independent central banker.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: I don’t comment on political declarations, including the last one. But may I stress once more that independence is a common treasure on both sides of the Atlantic, especially when we face such uncertain times and such inflationary threats. Should I remind a very simple truth? First, that independence has not been decided by central bankers themselves. It’s a democratic decision by US Congress, by the European Treaty in our side. And it has been decided by democracy for a very simple reason. It’s not a theoretical choice. It’s a practical reality that independence of central banks is more efficient to have low inflation and to have low interest rates, because it increases the credibility of the central bank.
Can I remind of a recent episode of the inflationary surge we had after the Russian war in Ukraine? So, 2022-2023. Remember, all the debate at that time said it would be impossible to have so-called immaculate disinflation. That we would have central bankers on both sides of the Atlantic to raise rates so high that it would kill growth and even provoke a recession. We did not. And it was very different from the 1970s. Remember the 1970s, after the two oil shocks, especially in this country? At that time, Paul Volcker had to raise rates as high as more than 20 percent. The Fed had to go to 5 percent, or a bit more. And we had to go with the ECB only to 4 percent, without provoking a recession. The huge difference is credibility. So independence is a common treasure. Not of central bankers, but of our economies and our fellow citizens.
Can I add, on a personal note, that Chair Powell is an admirable example of integrity and independence and competence.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: So thank you for engaging with that question. And now, finally, we have a flurry of questions from the audience, and they’re all very good. So we’ll run through them very quickly, and then you have to move on, Mr. Governor, and we thank you for your time.
There is a cluster of questions around geopolitics impacting the work of central banks. We had the opportunity to discuss that in the green room, actually, that your expertise at the central bank, the Banque de France, is monetary policy, looking at inflation, looking at employment. And yet, geopolitics impacts all of these decisions. Disturbs them, perhaps. And you have to raise rates when you may not want to. But how has it been in your eleven years engaging with a geopolitical environment that’s become more fraught, with more surprises, more shocks? And how have you integrated that into your decisions? And you can speak, obviously, as the Banque de France, but also as a member of the board of the ECB.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Our resilience improved, without any doubt. I wouldn’t have expected so many shocks during the last eleven years, especially during the last six ones. Because if you look, there was Ukraine—there was COVID, then Ukraine, then inflation, then, if I look at my own country, snap elections, and then the protectionist wave, and now the Iran conflict. But we manage them, more or less. And so our aim remains, more than ever, to provide monetary stability and financial stability. And we managed so far to go through this shock without a new financial crisis. So I think we delivered according to our mandate.
If I can add one thing, what we probably had to change in the last eleven years, and I think it will come still more, is to explain still better to our fellow citizens what monetary policy is about. You know, there was this old image with Alan Greenspan and others of monetary policy not being communicated, being a bit black box. It’s over. And I think monetary policy, which is better explained, is better understood, and still more efficient. So, but we are not at the end of this journey.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Do you have a TikTok account?
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: I don’t, but I have a LinkedIn.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: OK. Video seems to be the best way—
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: It could come one day, but it’s not that obvious to communicate monetary policy on TikTok. And I think very few central bankers have it.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: I think there are a few. We’ll check. So one final question, if you don’t mind, on the euro and its enlargement. So there are countries that are waiting to join the euro. Recently you have actually added a member of the eurozone. We’ve had an opportunity to discuss that actually this week at the Atlantic Council. This was a conversation led by my colleague Martin Mühleisen. But I’m just curious how you feel the euro will expand over the next few years. Notice, I’m not asking you the sort of big geopolitical euro questions, which we belabored before and we talked about last year. Simply countries joining the euro, what the rationality is at this point, in 2026, compared to 1999 and 2002? I mean, what is the conversation with the countries that are considering joining? And I noticed that some which ruled it out previously are reconsidering.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: It’s up to each country to decide. But can I quote simple maths? We started at eleven. Remember that Greece was not in the immediate first circle. We are now twenty-one, after Croatia and Bulgaria joined in the most recent years. And no country ever left, including Greece. Let me stress it. It was very painful for Greece, but Greece decided to stay in the euro. And it’s an impressive success story at present. And the political support for the euro in each of these countries increased significantly. And this is important in times where there are doubts about long-term projects, about economic reforms, about European integration.
Can I remind you of one thing in my home country? The euro started with a referendum, a popular referendum, September 1992. And this referendum was won by the closest possible majority, 51 percent. Now there is a support of French citizens of more than three-quarters wanting to keep the euro. There is support from all major political parties, from far left to far right. And if I look at Europe as a whole, the support by European citizens is more than 80 percent. So we succeeded.
Can I stress one last good news? And for me, this is really the good news of the week, which is the Hungarian vote on Sunday. I will not comment on the political side. This is not up to me. But you probably noticed that one of the first commitment of the prime minister to be, Peter Magyar, was to say, as early as Monday, that Hungary would apply for the euro by 2030. And there is broad support by Hungarian citizens. So the euro is attractive.
And, believe me, I was one of the many small workers of the euro at the start of the 1990s. I was in Maastricht thirty-five years ago. And many people doubted that it would last. It’s stronger than ever. So I think the attractiveness is simply linked to this historical success.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Governor.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: And imagine one minute a Europe in the present shock without the euro? It would be much more difficult. So it’s a protection.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: Well, thank you. And thank you for your time. We wish you good luck as you move on from your current role.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Thank you.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: And after eleven years it will be quite a change, but the role you’ll be taking up in French civil society will be very interesting. We hope you will stay in touch and still come to visit us at the Atlantic Council.
And thank you to all of you for coming and for tuning in. This is only day three of the spring meetings 2026. And there are many more exciting things coming later today, on Thursday, on Friday. So please do stay tuned. Please download our app. So we are trying to communicate with video and modernize at the Atlantic Council, too. And the app has been extremely successful. So thank you again. Merci, monsieur le governor.
FRANÇOIS VILLEROY DE GALHAU: Merci.
CHARLES LICHFIELD: See you soon. Thank you.
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Image: Banque de France Governor François Villeroy de Galhau spoke at an Atlantic Council event on the sidelines of the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings on April 15, 2026.
