WASHINGTON—On Monday, the Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of mainly Shia-dominated parties, nominated businessman Ali al-Zaidi to become Iraq’s next prime minister, ending a lengthy negotiation process that included a dramatic intervention by US President Donald Trump in late January opposing Nouri al-Maliki’s bid for a third term.
As Al-Zaidi takes office in the coming weeks, he will face a daunting set of challenges: Iran-backed militias that operate beyond the reach of the state, a fragile economy dependent on oil, a bloated state payroll, deteriorating regional and international relations, and a fragmented and corrupt political system that often obstructs even modest progress. Perhaps just as importantly, al-Zaidi must contend with a growing crisis of legitimacy in the very system that brought him to power and the backing of a coalition that is increasingly unstable.
Who is Ali al-Zaidi?
Al-Zaidi is a wealthy businessman and attorney. While he has a limited public profile, he is prominent among business and political circles and has maintained relations across Iraq’s political spectrum. Notably, al-Zaidi’s Al-Janoob Islamic Bank was one of several Iraqi banks banned in 2024 by the Iraqi Central Bank, on the advice of the US Treasury, from dealing in US dollars. At the time, this decision reflected US concerns about alleged money-laundering and financing of Iraqi militias. Still today, however, the cloud over al-Zaidi’s bank has prompted public questions about why the United States would accept his candidacy.
It is possible that the United States is prioritizing seating a new prime minister over more delay, perhaps reflecting a belief that a new Iraqi government can be pressed to take action against the militias. At the same time, Trump’s phone call with al-Zaidi on April 30, which included an invitation to the White House, offers a strong signal of US support for the Iraqi prime minister–designate.
A broken process
Al-Zaidi emerged as the consensus candidate after persistent gridlock within the Framework since the November 2025 elections. He has no previous political or government experience, a first for the office. But owing to his good relations with key Framework leaders, he proved one of the only candidates who did not trigger a veto from current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, or Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zidan.
For the Coordination Framework, the fact that al-Zaidi lacks a political base of his own is a bonus, reflecting the view that the prime minister should be an implementer of Framework policy rather than an independent actor. Al-Zaidi’s boosters point to his youth, ambition, and thriving business as proof of his political acumen and his ability to succeed in this role. Yet, al-Zaidi’s selection prompted questions among the Iraqi public, with some pointing not only to his lack of political experience, but also the opaque selection process, which was divorced from the electoral system. For the most cynical, the selection of a businessman with extensive government contracts reinforced the belief that Iraqi politics is an elaborate patronage network.
Although al-Sudani’s coalition won the most seats in parliament, he faced opposition throughout the negotiations. As a matter of practice, there is little connection between electoral outcomes and the selection of Iraq’s prime minister. Instead of a process driven by votes, the twelve Shia political leaders within the Framework, which includes two US-designated terrorist leaders and political leaders without any seats in parliament, choose the prime minister. Since November, dozens of candidates were proposed within the Framework, including al-Sudani and al-Maliki. But none emerged as the top pick until al-Zaidi.
A broken framework
Though the Framework has tried to maintain a veneer of unity throughout the process, the struggle to agree on a candidate exposed the deep divisions among its principals. Those divisions are unlikely to be mended by the selection of al-Zaidi. Three Framework leaders—Humam Hammoudi, (US-designated terrorist) Abu Ala al-Walai, and Haider al-Abadi—reportedly did not support al-Zaidi’s selection, and there remain significant differences between the competing factions.
The Framework itself was initially formed in 2021 as a coalition of Shia leaders opposed to fellow Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. As al-Sadr has retreated from the political process, including a boycott of the 2025 parliamentary elections, the group has been riven by competing agendas and personal political rivalries. With the leaders of the Framework running on separate lists in the parliamentary elections and often competing for the same voters and positions, it is unsurprising that their interests are not aligned. However, maintaining the unity of the Framework has become a priority for Iran in Iraq, using its consensus-based approach as a political force-multiplier.
A new start?
Al-Zaidi now has thirty days to appoint a cabinet, a process managed through horse-trading between most political parties that will join the government. His premiership is likely to bring continuity in policy, as al-Zaidi remains backed by the same coalition that brought al-Sudani to power.
Al-Zaidi faces potentially insurmountable obstacles: a gaping budget deficit due to the halting of oil exports and a US administration ready to use escalating pressure to compel stronger action to disarm and demobilize Iraq’s militias. Should al-Zaidi fail to resolve these challenges, he will face significant public discontent and the potential rupture of the relationship with the United States.