WASHINGTON—The Trump administration’s dealmaking blitz with Belarus has secured the release of hundreds of detainees. By trading targeted sanctions relief for the release of political prisoners in Belarus, the White House has helped free more than five hundred people from unjust captivity. A similar deal with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus would produce major rewards, with much less risk.
To pursue this “grand deal” in Azerbaijan, the Trump administration should work with Congress to propose ending a ban on arms sales to Baku in exchange for the release of unjustly detained individuals—some with US ties—sitting in the country’s jails. This is a rare moment for a bipartisan win-win and a relatively cost-free way to upgrade US relations with a key strategic energy and transport partner that borders both Iran and Russia. With proper timing, Armenia, too, could be supportive, if the release includes at least some Armenians currently held in Azerbaijan.
What to do with Section 907
The Trump administration should engage Congress to resolve Baku’s number one concern on Capitol Hill: the repeal of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act that bans US arms sales to Azerbaijan. Congress originally adopted the measure in 1992 to punish Azerbaijan’s treatment of Armenians in Karabakh and its blockade of Armenia. In 2001, the US Senate passed an amendment that allowed the White House to waive Section 907 restrictions. Almost every year since, both Republican and Democratic presidents have indeed waived Section 907. This renders the text inconsequential to the United States, but it is highly symbolic to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government, which views it as an impediment to closer relations with Washington.
Furthermore, the relationships between Washington, Baku, and Yerevan are changing. Armenia and Azerbaijan received unprecedented US attention when Vice President JD Vance became the highest-level US official to visit the countries in February, following the tripartite leader-level summit in Washington, DC in August 2025. In Yerevan, the vice president announced billions of dollars in nuclear energy support, talked up a major US-funded supercomputing project, and slipped in a tacit endorsement of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Vance’s Baku visit saw an agreement for the United States to work with Azerbaijan in a range of areas, but no concrete agreement.
The timing of any deal is essential, and the next few months represent a unique opportunity. Armenia holds parliamentary elections on June 7, and Pashinyan may face a strong test in his reelection bid from pro-Russia parties skeptical of his efforts toward peace with Azerbaijan. The Kremlin is conducting an extensive fake news operation to undermine Pashinyan’s campaign. Officials and experts in Baku rightly see Pashinyan as their best chance to finally agree to a formal peace deal and may be inclined to furtively support his candidacy. What better way to defang Pashinyan’s pro-Russia detractors and maintain pathways to peace than to release high-profile Armenian prisoners ahead of the election?
Additionally, Azerbaijan has found more support on the Republican side of the aisle in the United States and may want to move on the issue now while Congress is in GOP hands.
That’s also why, with US midterm elections just six months away, the Trump administration may find it advantageous to push forward, as unified Republican control potentially makes it easier for the Trump administration to work with Congress to repeal Section 907. While passing any legislation is a difficult task on gridlocked Capitol Hill, Azerbaijan could offer something in exchange that both parties and the White House would value highly: the release of prisoners that officials, senators, and experts all consider unjustly detained. This group should include anti-corruption advocate Gubad Ibadoghlu, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America journalists, and some Armenian detainees. The impact of freeing unjustly detained people would be far more valuable to the United States than maintaining a statute that is rendered moot almost every year.
Such a trade would present fewer potential downsides to US interests than recent engagement with Belarus. US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale has pursued a blunt sanctions-relief-for-prisoner-releases policy, a high-risk game that some worry could make it easier for Russia to evade US export controls and sanctions. Those fears haven’t yet been borne out, but with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka still beholden to his Kremlin patron and aiding Moscow’s aggression, the United States risks undermining its own efforts to limit Russia’s ability to continue its war on Ukraine.
The stakes in Azerbaijan are thankfully much lower. The United States would not be dropping sanctions, merely giving itself the option to continue to provide security assistance to Baku. US military aid today is negligible: Since 2002, the United States has delivered approximately eighty million dollars’ worth of defense assistance to Azerbaijan in total. Vance did promise new aid on his February visit: an unspecified number of maritime patrol boats to better secure the country’s ports. These are tiny amounts of nonlethal security assistance made possible because the United States waives Section 907 every year.
That figure could increase if Section 907 were repealed and Washington and Baku began arranging multiyear security assistance packages. Even so, that aid would likely still focus on nonlethal border security. Azerbaijan already acquires offensive capabilities from Turkey and Israel, at lower prices than US firms and stocks can offer. With Iran and Russia’s restive southern regions persistently unstable, Azerbaijan needs early-warning and border security capabilities more than it needs lethal capabilities.
The only thing the United States stands to lose by repealing Section 907 is leverage. US President Donald Trump can use that leverage by building on his administration’s success in freeing political prisoners in Belarus to simultaneously promote peace in the South Caucasus. Aliyev may even be more open to dealing than Lukashenka has been. Compared to Belarus, whose pro-democracy movement currently functions in exile but remains a powerful diplomatic force, the Azerbaijani government faces a much more muted opposition and could release detainees without fearing any real threat to its authority.
How to sequence the agreement
The full “grand deal” should therefore be structured as follows. In the run-up to the Armenian parliamentary election in June, Azerbaijan should free some of the Armenians it captured in 2023 in Karabakh as a gesture of good faith toward a deal. Washington and Baku then would work to agree to repeal Section 907 in exchange for the release of Azerbaijani detainees and additional Armenian prisoners. This would require the White House to work with Congress to secure the repeal ahead of the planned release, but with renewed faith in Azerbaijan’s seriousness about the deal.
This proposed deal has something for everyone. Baku gets a two-for-one: It retains a true partner for peace negotiations in Pashinyan and resolves its main issue in front of the United States. Team Trump gets to free unjust detainees and bolster the president’s peacemaking image at essentially no cost. Congressional Republicans get the president a foreign policy win, while Democrats can tout their role in notching a rare human rights victory; both mollify the ever-active Armenian diaspora by securing the release of Karabakh Armenians. Yerevan gets citizens back and a steadier track toward normalization with its neighbors. This arrangement must include a clear warning to Baku that the benefits it receives are contingent on maintaining the hard-won peace.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have made major progress in the last several months to normalize relations, most recently boosting energy trade ties and agreeing to joint border demarcation. With some more nudging from the United States, Baku and Yerevan can take another step toward a final peace deal by freeing detainees. Crucially, all parties get to come out with a foreign policy win at almost no cost.