Iran-backed militias in Iraq are celebrating their “victory” over the United States following the completion of the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. They are adjusting their posture for a new era in Iraq, signaling restraint, and continuing to pursue the completion of their state capture project. This “restraint” is designed to facilitate deeper entrenchment by easing US pressure on Baghdad while preserving the militias’ military capabilities.
A statement by Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi illustrates this posture. He ordered his fighters to halt “all military operations and mobile logistical activities,” but explicitly retained an exception for targeting hostile aircraft violating Iraqi airspace until government air defenses are fully established.
The withdrawal of US forces leaves fewer targets inside Iraq, making the announced halt relatively low-cost. Washington has threatened to impose sanctions on Iraqi oil revenues unless Baghdad works to curb the influence of the militias, and announcing a halt gives the government an argument against taking forceful measures. The militias have little incentive to invite financial restrictions that would deepen Iraq’s already severe economic problems and damage their own sources of funding and patronage. Tehran shares this interest in protecting Iraq’s economic viability. Under mounting sanctions, Iran increasingly depends on Iraq as an outlet through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force and its proxies can access hard currency and evade sanctions, giving both the militias and their Iranian patrons a reason to support the tactical pause.
A Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) bill provides a further incentive for this tactical restraint. On September 29, the cabinet approved and referred to parliament an eighteen-article organizational bill governing the PMF’s structure and leadership. Although the PMF already has legal recognition and state funding, the new measure would be dedicated legislation, strengthening its position as a separate military institution and increasing its claim on the national budget. For the militias within it, this could mean stronger legal protections, greater funding, and access to military infrastructure without effective state control. Halting attacks could help ease US scrutiny and the threat of sanctions, facilitating the PMF’s consolidation as a parallel army.
Al-Hamidawi explicitly advocated for this arrangement in a recent statement, calling for the “resistance” to remain a military force alongside the government’s armed forces. He described this as “a virtue and a good thing” and argued that many countries have more than one army or military organization.
Yet the militias within this parallel army show little sign of behaving as responsible, professional forces accountable to Baghdad. Instead, they increasingly act as proxies at the IRGC’s disposal. During the first months of the US–Israeli war against Iran, much of the PMF’s state-funded personnel, bases, and logistical infrastructure mobilized in support of Tehran’s war effort. Thirty-six PMF brigades—roughly half the force—were implicated in conducting attacks or providing material support to the groups carrying them out. PMF camps and ammunition depots supported the campaign against US troops in the region, while the Badr Organization, the largest militia within the PMF, used PMF trucking fleets to distribute Iranian weapons to attack units. PMF forces also deployed into Iran without Baghdad’s authorization, committing Iraqi military resources to a foreign war that the Iraqi state had not joined.
A halt by the established militias may not mean an end to attacks from Iraq. Smaller units directed by the Quds Force could continue operating while the larger factions deny responsibility and claim to honor the pause. This draws on the “special groups” model— Iranian-trained, armed, and funded Shia militant networks that operated outside Iraqi state control in the 2000s. Following Qasem Soleimani’s killing in January 2020, the Quds Force renewed its reliance on small, tightly controlled groups drawn from established Iraqi militias, selecting trusted, ideologically loyal fighters for direct Iranian command. Alongside this operational restructuring, militia networks expanded their use of “claim-only brands”—names and Telegram channels used to claim attacks conducted by existing factions without necessarily representing separate military units.
Calls for a renewed effort to reactivate this model are now explicit. On July 16, a group calling itself al-Akhyar min Ahl al-Iraq (“the Righteous Among the People of Iraq”) urged the reactivation of the “special groups” to complement the established resistance factions, calling on members to regroup without competing with those already operating.
Other names identify these operational cells. Units associated with names such as Ashab al-Kahf (“Companions of the Cave”) remain embedded within established militia systems, drawing on their facilities, logistics, and protection. The Quds Force trains these cells in surveillance, drone operations, and rocket and missile attacks; provides weapons and funding for their personnel; and retains ultimate command and control while delegating some supervision to the host factions. Small, carefully selected units offer Tehran a relatively economical force that is easier to manage and less vulnerable to infiltration. For the established militias, the separation between the host organization, the operational cell, and the name claiming an attack provides a layer of plausible deniability.
The Quds Force appears to be expanding this model across multiple factions, cultivating additional operational cells within established militia structures. The wider use of separate identities was visible during the spring, when Ashab al-Kahf, Jaish al-Ghadhab (“Army of Rage”), Rijal al-Ba’s al-Shadid (“Men of Mighty Valor”), and Saraya Awliya al-Dam (“Companies of the Guardians of Blood”) claimed operations alongside the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Their assessed affiliations vary: Ashab al-Kahf and Jaish al-Ghadhab are linked to Nujaba, Saraya Awliya al-Dam to Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, while Rijal al-Ba’s al-Shadid’s affiliation remains tentative.
Embedding Houthi personnel within Iraqi militia facilities creates another channel for regional operations, bringing foreign expertise into infrastructure controlled by established Iraqi factions such as Kataib Hezbollah. This arrangement has already occurred—the Houthis participated in the July attacks on Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory, working jointly with Iraqi armed groups and reportedly under IRGC supervision. Meanwhile, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq rejected Saudi accusations about the attack launched from Iraqi territory, and it pointed instead to Yemeni strikes, illustrating how cooperation on the ground can coexist with public efforts to distance established factions from responsibility.
Recruiting and training Saudi and Bahraini Shia militants offers a further avenue for expansion, building on Kataib Hezbollah’s longstanding support for militants from both countries. Its connections with the Bahraini group Saraya al-Ashtar show how Iraqi infrastructure can support operations claimed under a foreign group’s name. Similarly, Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq (“True Pledge Brigades”), closely linked to Kataib Hezbollah, has claimed attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates while presenting itself as Abna al-Jazira al-Arabiya (“Sons of the Arabian Peninsula”). These networks extend the use of Iraqi militia infrastructure to smaller Iraqi and foreign units operating under Quds Force command and control. In January 2024, a Kataib Hezbollah spokesman revealed plans for a more visible role for “resistance” groups in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and made clear that a US withdrawal from Iraq would not end its regional military mission.
Al-Hamidawi’s own words reinforce this theory. He denied reaching a disarmament agreement with the government and insisted that “the victor is the one who imposes his conditions on the enemy.” This follows his August call to retain, develop, and expand the “resistance” arsenal. His ultimate goal appears to be securing the militias’ position as a permanent, autonomous military force alongside the state, with access to state resources but without effective state control. Smaller, deniable operational units help advance this goal by preserving the militias’ ability to conduct attacks while shielding established factions from responsibility and the repercussions that could threaten their institutional gains. The public halt thus appears intended to protect, rather than reverse, the expansion of militia power, giving militias room to consolidate their position and shape the terms of Iraq’s next security order.
Hamdi Malik is the founder of Iraq Monitor and co-founder of the Militia Spotlight. He is an associate fellow at The Washington Institute. Follow him on X: @HamdiAMalik.
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Image: A member of Iraq's Iran-allied Popular Mobilization Forces stands in Baghdad's Tahrir Square, during a procession marking the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Photo by dpa via Reuters Connect.