A visual guide to the new US tariff wall
The Trump administration’s latest iteration of the tariff wall is unlike those that came before. Rather than a blanket duty, it’s a patchwork of Section 232 national security tariffs, Section 301 tariffs, exemptions, carveouts, and deals. Now, the administration has added yet another layer with tariffs resulting from a Section 301 investigation under the Trade Act of 1974 tied to forced labor import prohibitions.
The result is a fragmented and uneven tariff landscape that creates advantages for India, setbacks for Brazil, uncertainty for Europe, and a whole lot of confusion for the rest of the world.
To make sense of this new tariff regime, we’ve broken it down into eight charts that show how much tariffs have changed, who they affect the most, and what that could mean for the future of US trade relationships.
1.
In sharp contrast to the poster board that US President Donald Trump unveiled on “Liberation Day,” his administration’s new tariff regime comes with a four-hundred-page notice of action. The notice details blanket exemptions, country-specific exemptions, and special provisions. The overlapping exemptions result in significantly different—and in most cases much lower—effective tariff rates across partners, despite the same announced rate.
2.
Most Latin American countries will face an effective additional tariff rate of less than 3 percent. That’s because more than 60 percent of their imports are exempt from the Section 301 forced labor tariffs, and they are not subject to the second Section 301 investigation regarding manufacturing overcapacity.
This outcome aligns with the Trump administration’s “Donroe” doctrine, which seeks to strengthen ties with—and expand US influence over—the Western Hemisphere. But the strategy may prove shortsighted. Without close supervision, lower tariffs may provide a backdoor for lower-cost Chinese imports rather than strengthen US economic leverage.
3.
In Asia, USTR faced a difficult balancing act. Many countries with documented forced labor risks in their supply chains—Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cambodia, for instance—also secured deals with the US under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). To honor those agreements, the Trump administration kept their headline tariff rates at the 10 percent level. However, it also applied fewer exemptions to account for forced labor concerns. The result: Asian economies now face some of the highest effective tariffs despite receiving the lower headline rate.
This structure means the actual rate is more aligned with traditional forced labor concerns—and therefore easier to defend—than the announced rate might suggest.
4.
In last year’s Turnberry deal, Washington and Brussels agreed on a tariff ceiling of 15 percent for most EU exports. This cap—taking into account the most-favored-nation rate—seems to hold under the current Section 301 regime. But with potential additional Section 301 tariffs, the US administration is edging dangerously close to exceeding it, putting the agreement at risk. After threatening another Section 301 investigation into the EU’s treatment of US tech firms two weeks ago, this could further erode European trust.
5.
The headline tariff on Brazilian imports has drawn a lot of attention, but the data tells a more complicated story. On paper, Brazil faces a cumulative 37.5 percent tariff: 12.5 percent from the forced labor Section 301 investigation and 25 percent from a separate Section 301 investigation. But exemptions significantly reduce the tariff burden.
In practice, the effective Section 301 tariff rate is closer to 16.4 percent—still high, but well below China’s rate. That’s because, beyond the announced 12.5 percent rate, Chinese imports also face Section 301 tariffs dating back to 2018—and they receive far fewer exemptions, resulting in an effective rate of 22.8 percent.
6.
China will be the ultimate test of the US administration’s new tariff regime.
By announcing a 12.5 percent tariff on Chinese imports, Washington is increasing the effective tariff rate by 6.4 percentage points. Since Beijing has signaled that it will tolerate no more than a 20 percent total tariff rate, that leaves the US with just 7.5 percentage points of negotiating space, with the results of the second Section 301 investigation into industrial excess capacity still pending.
Meanwhile, China continues to hold a strong hand. With a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus in 2025—and other major trading partners, including the European Union, Japan, and Vietnam, also expected to face additional tariffs—the prospect of another 7.5 percentage point increase is unlikely to be much of a deterrent. The US negotiating position with China has therefore weakened.
7.
India has gone from having one of the highest effective tariff rates to one of the lowest—down from a rate of 50 percent under IEEPA to an additional effective tariff rate of just 3.6 percent. Much of this reversal is due to New Delhi doubling down on negotiations with the US after the Supreme Court struck down IEEPA tariffs—and even updating its trade policy to ban imports made with forced labor to align with the corresponding Section 301 investigation.
Yet India’s reprieve could be short-lived. It remains subject to the industrial excess capacity investigation and could also face steep “secondary tariffs” under the proposed Russia sanctions bill. Whether the US administration maintains India’s relatively low tariff rate remains to be seen.
8.
The patchwork of Section 232 national security tariffs, Section 301 tariffs, and a series of bilateral trade deals marks only the first phase of the new post-IEEPA tariff wall. The next phase will be set in motion by the pending Section 301 investigation into industrial excess capacity, which targets many of the largest suppliers to the US market and covers more than 75 percent of total imports.
The investigation’s outcome will determine not only how much higher tariffs climb but also which countries ultimately take the biggest hit. In that sense, the real test of the Trump administration’s post-IEEPA tariff strategy is still to come.
Madeline Chalecki is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, where she leads the center’s work on trade policy, tariffs, and supply chains, including the Trump Tariff Tracker.
Further reading
Wed, Jun 3, 2026
Can Section 301 effectively replace IEEPA? That is the $166 billion question
Econographics By Madeline Chalecki
Citing forced labor concerns, the Trump administration has proposed new tariffs on imports from sixty economies—a first step toward rebuilding its tariff wall. Still, the outcome is far from certain.
Tue, Jun 30, 2026
The five stages of a USMCA shakeup
EconoGraphics By Madeline Chalecki
While the agreement may survive at the end of negotiations, years of uncertainty, tariffs, and prolonged talks could reshape North American trade.
Wed, Jul 22, 2026
The US just threatened new tariffs on Canada. Here’s why they may not work.
Econographics By Madeline Chalecki
The latest escalation in the US-Canadian tariff standoff highlights the limits of using trade restrictions as a negotiating tool—and the risks of getting trapped in a cycle of retaliation.