Building BRICS
Brazil, Russia, India, and China met on June 16, 2009, in Yekaterinburg, Russia, to formally create a body aimed at coordinating global economic governance. A year later, the group was joined by South Africa, and the now-famous BRICS group was formed. The main driving force behind this joint effort was to counterbalance the Group of Seven (G7), including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada, and to promote a different vision for how the global economy should be managed.
BRICS expresses its main grievances around governance within institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In both, BRICS argues that the voices of emerging markets are not prioritized. The group has openly criticized the dominant role of the US dollar in global trade, as well as policies related to climate change and gender, which BRICS considers to be unfair.
As an international forum, the group initially wasn’t taken very seriously. Back in 2010, BRICS accounted for only around 18 percent of the global economy, and its bargaining power relative to the G7 was negligible. Add to that the fact that BRICS struggled to formalize concrete proposals and was often seen as merely complaining about what it opposed, rather than engaging in constructive dialogue and providing a vision. That’s part of why the Group of Twenty (G20) agenda has more often reflected G7 priorities rather than those of BRICS.
BRICS didn’t emerge out of nowhere. Its concerns are rooted in longstanding issues with representation in the main governing bodies of the IMF and the World Bank. At the time of the first summit, BRICS countries held only about 10 percent of IMF quotas, a share that did not reflect the true size and growing influence of their economies. BRICS—particularly China—has long advocated for a comprehensive review of IMF quotas based on the established formula, arguing that their economies have continued to outpace those of many advanced nations. However, these efforts have been consistently blocked by the “West,” as their relative influence—particularly in the case of the European Union more than the United States—would shrink significantly. Fifteen years later, the situation looks much different. The rise of BRICS is undeniable, and its membership is expanding—new members include Egypt, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, and possibly Saudi Arabia—making it a platform for nearly all emerging markets. But even just measuring the original BRICS nations by their share of global gross domestic product (GDP), energy resources, and population shows that the group has nearly taken over the West.
A close look at the rare earth reserves held by the G7 and BRICS reveals a staggering difference. Rare earth elements are essential to the modern economy because they are critical components in high-tech products such as smartphones, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and military systems. As the world shifts toward clean energy and digital innovation, demand for rare earths continues to grow, making them a cornerstone of economic competitiveness and national security. BRICS countries control the supply.
In fact, the only country maintaining the G7’s marginal more influence across many economic metrics is the United States. But with US President Donald Trump walking out of the Canadian G7 summit after being frustrated with his colleagues and boycotting this year’s G20 summit due to political differences with South Africa, BRICS has an opportunity in front it. How big an opportunity? Look at the data above—if the United States weren’t in the G7, the group’s share of global GDP would drop from 54 percent to 27 percent. Its share of oil production would drop from 28 percent to 7 percent.
The BRICS countries have gradually matured into a more cohesive and strategic bloc, moving beyond broad rhetoric to articulate a clearer vision for global economic reform—and causing increasing headaches for Western leaders. Through repeated summits and technical dialogues, they have developed a shared understanding of their collective interests, shaped by common experiences of underrepresentation in Western-led institutions. So, what did they come up with?
First, BRICS is advancing de-dollarization and introducing the concept of a common BRICS payment system to facilitate trade within the bloc and with aligned countries. With 57 percent of global foreign reserves and 54 percent of export invoicing, the US dollar continues to dominate global trade and serves as the world’s primary reserve currency, as demonstrated by the Dollar Dominance Monitor developed by Alisha Chhangani, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Second, the group is developing an independent settlement infrastructure through initiatives such as BRICS Pay (a blockchain-based system), BRICS Clear (a settlement platform), and BRICS Bridge (an alternative to the western payment systems). Third, BRICS is promoting alternatives to the IMF and World Bank by strengthening its New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, with a focus on expanding membership and increasing lending in local currencies.
Progressing from formulating proposals to implementing them is a long road—and that’s where BRICS continues to struggle. It doesn’t help that the US president is threatening an additional 10 percent tariff on every country aligning with the BRICS agenda. But never in the history of BRICS have its members enjoyed such economic heft. The group could use this momentum to assert greater influence at the G20 meetings in South Africa this November, especially considering the United States’ boycott.
This past weekend’s BRICS summit in Brazil could represent a pivotal moment for the group. BRICS could push its agenda forward and demonstrate real global leadership at the West’s expense. It seems that, yet again, they failed to deliver concrete progress—only reinforcing the perception that BRICS is more symbolic than effective. Most notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to skip the summit—as expected—significantly undermined the bloc’s credibility. His absence, along with that of other leaders, continues to raise serious questions about the bloc’s commitment to the very international order it claims to champion—and to BRICS as its most prominent platform for shaping that order.
Bart Piasecki is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.
This post is adapted from the GeoEconomics Center’s weekly Guide to the Global Economy newsletter. If you are interested in getting the newsletter, email SBusch@atlanticcouncil.org
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Image: BRICS summit or meeting concept. Row from flags of all members of BRICS list of countries. 3d illustration