For Saudi Arabia, the surprise mutual defense pact signed last week with Pakistan during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Riyadh is a double deterrence tool.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) “states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”, and “aims to develop aspects of defense cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression.”

Although no further content has been made public, the pact “encompasses all military means,” from armed forces and nuclear cooperation to intelligence sharing. Islamabad openly stated that it “will make available” its nuclear program to Riyadh if needed. This agreement is also designed to support Saudi defense autonomy in the long-term: defense industry collaboration, technology transfer, military co-production, capacity-building and training are also part of the pact.

The agreement strengthens Riyadh’s defense with respect to Iran and its partners, and vis-à-vis Israel. Signed in the wake of Tel Aviv’s shocking attack on Qatar earlier this month, the announcement’s timing is a warning message to discourage Tel Aviv from considering further attacks on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. However, the pact is the outcome of a long-negotiated agreement primarily aimed, in Riyadh’s perspective, at reshaping the Gulf security equation.

Washington’s response over Israel’s unprecedented strike on one of its most key allies in the Gulf put on display for Saudi Arabia that Gulf security can no longer be assured by a single external security provider. US President Donald Trump’s administration, in fact, reaffirmed its support to the Israeli government, only providing verbal reassurances to Doha and the GCC states. Looking at Gulf-Asia ties, the pact may have implications on the Saudi-India partnership, which has been on the rise in recent years, since it may complicate efforts to deepen the Saudi-India economic partnership, slowing the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Furthermore, the mutual defense pact introduces a new security layer in the Gulf that could be replicated by other actors, triggering further mutual defense agreements between Gulf and Asian powers, likely the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India.

The landmark pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan highlights Saudi Arabia’s evolving calculus with respect to its special relationship with the United States. In Riyadh’s multi-aligned policy, signing a mutual defense deal with Pakistan is complementary, not alternative, to Washington’s security guarantees—even though Islamabad is an ally of China.

Three emerging dyamics are challenging established balances for Saudi: the waning of US deterrence, Israel’s unrestrained military strategy, and the persistency of the Iranian menace. These factors are all pushing Riyadh, and the wider GCC to step up national defense through multiple deterrence strategies.

The mutual defense agreement: Upgrading historical Saudi-Pakistani cooperation

The agreement develops from the historical security and defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, from the “Treaty of Friendship” signed in 1951 to the 1982 Organization Agreement that allowed Pakistani troops to station in the Kingdom for training, inked three years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Regarding the Saudi-Pakistan relationship, both parties have incentives to cooperate: Saudi Arabia is the leader of the Islamic world, a major economic power, and close to become Islamabad’s largest external financier with over $6 billion in loans and deposits; Pakistan, meanwhile, possesses nuclear weapons and larger armed forces personnel.

Deterring Israel, Iran, and the Houthis

The Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement is the clearest sign of the evolution of Saudi relations with the United States and, more broadly, between GCC states and Washington.

For Riyadh, the mutual pact isn’t aimed at replacing the United States, but it instead fits into Saudi efforts to diversify defense providers and security guarantees: Washington is still Saudi Arabia’s first weapons supplier. Likewise, the tight defense cooperation level achieved by Riyadh and Washington—from joint ventures in defense industry to training—makes it very difficult for the Kingdom to replace it. However, Saudi diversification efforts have quickly turned into urgency due to the weakening of US deterrence in the Gulf: Washington’s external defense hasn’t prevented Qatar to be targeted twice in three months, first by Iran in June, and then by Israel in September. For For Saudi Arabia, there is an increasing threat perception over Trump’s “unwavering support” to Israel’s escalating regional military actions since the launch of the war in Gaza. Therefore, Saudi Arabia needs to deter now both Washington’s enemies—namely, Iran—and its friends—namely, Israel—since the security of the GCC states is “indivisible.”

In Riyadh’s perception, Gulf security also includes Yemen. Saudi Arabia started to doubt the endurance of US regional deterrence in 2015, when the Iranian-backed Houthis came to power in Sanaa, then developing drones and long-range missile capabilities able to strike the Saudi territory, especially in 2019-2022, before a truce was brokered. The apparent Iranian attack against Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities, for which the Houthis claimed credit to disguise Tehran’s role, occurred in September 2019, further undermined Saudi trust in the US security provision. For Saudi Arabia, security threats coming from Yemen can’t be de-coupled from considerations on Gulf security, given also the Houthis’ military partnership with Tehran.

In 2015, Riyadh tried to convince Pakistan to join the Arab Coalition against the Houthis, but Islamabad refused. In 2025, before the announcement of the mutual defense pact, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan strengthened naval cooperation, with a focus on training and defense coordination. With the Houthis’ multi-domain threat still active, Saudi mutual defense pact with Islamabad can also serve to deter and counter pro-Iranian attacks from a broader area ranging from the Gulf to the Red Sea.

Risks for the Saudi-India partnership

Saudi Arabia’s mutual defense pact with Pakistan is not likely to change Iran’s confidence re-building efforts with the GCC states—though it could slow Saudi’s rising economic partnership with India due to New Delhi’s historical tensions with Pakistan.

India stated it will “study” the pact’s “implications for national security,” but whatever consideration regarding India’s possible reaction to the mutual defense deal hasn’t prevented Saudi Arabia from signing the Pakistan agreement. Likely, this means the Saudis are confident enough on the possibility to upgrade defense relations with Pakistan without risking too much the important partnership with India, starting from the IMEC, since investments in and from the Gulf are pivotal in India’s “Look West” policy. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and India deepened defense cooperation in April, creating a ministerial committee and drafting an annual collaboration plan as a result of their first army-to-army talks: this means that top-level military communication channels exist and can help to overcome political hurdles.

After Israel’s strike in Qatar, Tehran is trying to rebuild political dialogue with the GCC states to break regional isolation, so the Saudi-Pakistani pact is not going to affect Iran’s strategy. For instance, Ali Larijani, the chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh this month. In this context, Iran doesn’t have alternative options to de-escalate tensions with its Arab neighbors, so Tehran is trying to capitalize on growing Arab unity against Israel to portray itself as a constructive player in the Gulf.

In the Middle East and wider Asia, the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact can boost established alliances, or even generate new ones. More mutual defense pacts could follow, also in the Gulf. In such a context, the UAE and India could have an interest, for instance, in exploring a mutual defense pact, although any evidence has emerged so far. Both are Washington’s Major Defense Partners, have a free trade agreement, and are the most dynamic participants to the IMEC project.

A possible UAE-India mutual defense pact would not, in the perspective of the GCC states, counter-align the Saudi-Pakistan one, since all the Arab capitals of the Gulf are interested in strengthening national security vis-à-vis external threats, and considers GCC states’ security as “indivisible”. Rather, it would be a further defense tool aimed at strengthening Gulf security through multiple deterrence. Similarly, the UAE and France renewed in 2009 a defense cooperation agreement, with Paris reportedly adding a “secret clause” allowing the use of any military means to support the UAE as the French permanent military base in Abu Dhabi opened. Although the Emirati-French agreement isn’t about mutual defense (entailing support only from Paris’ side), it didn’t provoke backlashes, as it was perceived by the other Gulf monarchies as a contribute to GCC states’ collective security.

By transforming its defense alliance with Islamabad in a mutual pact, Saudi Arabia is likely to accelerate alignments and reshuffles in the Middle East and beyond. Aimed at deterring Iran, its allies and Israel, the Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense pact mirrors the evolution of Saudi-US relations, adding a new variable to the Gulf security equation.

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert on Yemen and the GCC states, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, and an adjunct professor at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations, Milan).

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Image: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 17, 2025. Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY.