It’s just the beginning. Early on Friday morning in the Middle East, Israeli jets carried out dozens of strikes against nuclear and military sites in Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it “a targeted military operation to roll back the Iranian threat to Israel’s very survival,” adding that the operation would continue “for as many days at it takes to remove this threat.” Israel’s closest ally was quick to distance itself from the strike, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that the United States was “not involved.” As reports of the damage rolled in, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, was listed among those killed in the strikes, according to Iranian state media.
Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? Below, Atlantic Council experts shed light on what happened and what to expect next.
This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Jonathan Panikoff: Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future
Daniel B. Shapiro: Iran has never looked weaker
Shalom Lipner: Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States
Landon Derentz: Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason
Matt Kroenig: An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate
Richard LeBaron: The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want
Diana Rayes: Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict
R. Clarke Cooper: Iran apparently was given two choices
Daniel E. Mouton: This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions
Kirsten Fontenrose: Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?
Mark N. Katz: Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue
Perrihan Al-Riffai: This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy
Ellen Wald: Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza?
Ariel Ezrahi: Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war
Nicholas Blanford: Hezbollah is likely to express restraint
Sarah Zaaimi: Jerusalem prepares for the long haul
Thomas Warrick: It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan
Rachel Whitlark: Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program
Emily Milliken: Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis
Joze Pelayo: Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response
Yaseen Rashed: Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine
Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future
The questions after Israel’s sweeping strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear sites outnumber the answers. In particular, there are four key questions whose answers will help determine the trajectory of the Middle East and perhaps beyond—not only over the coming weeks, but potentially for the coming years:
1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?
Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.
But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.
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—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.
Iran has never looked weaker
Israel’s stunning, multifaceted strike against Iranian nuclear, ballistic missile, and regime leadership targets has thrown much into chaos: Iran’s ability to project power, Trump’s nuclear diplomacy, and US-Israel regional coordination.
Israel’s strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and its key regional ally, the Assad regime in Syria, lie in ruins. Iran’s own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 produced little damage, while Iran suffered significantly from Israel’s October response.
Now, with that taboo also in the dustbin of history, Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system. Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.
But the story does not end here. Israel pledges additional attacks, but Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities. The United States will surely assist Israel with defense against any Iranian retaliation. But Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian enrichment appears dead. More likely, the US president will be faced with a decision on whether to use the United States’ unique capabilities to destroy Tehran’s underground nuclear facilities and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The decision will split his advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings, that Netanyahu is attempting to drag him into war.
The repercussions on trust and coordination in the US-Israel relationship could be long lasting, with implications for future rounds of conflict with Iran, negotiations on the next US-Israel military assistance agreement, and the wind-down to the war in Gaza. An ‘America first’ president, and an ‘Israel first’ prime minister, who have each made fateful decisions with minimal consultation or taking each other’s interests into account, will coexist uneasily for as many more months and years as they both serve.
—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.
Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States
JERUSALEM—Years of speculation over the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities ended at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Israel time) on Friday when first reports of explosions in Tehran began to circulate.
The timing of the Israeli operation—which was authorized after Israel’s leadership concluded that the Islamic Republic was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability—took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected. Trump’s declaration on Thursday that “I don’t want to say [an attack] is imminent,” together with expectations that Israel would stand down until (at least) after this weekend’s planned US-Iran talks in Oman, narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.
Israel’s initial targets have covered a wide spectrum, including, reportedly, multiple nuclear and other installations, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s intent is not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, but also to undermine its potential to inflict retaliatory harm on Israel and defend against subsequent waves of Israel’s offensive.
The degree of Israeli coordination with the Trump administration will be pivotal to how this crisis unfolds. Rubio’s cryptic statement that “Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense” does not clarify the extent of US (dis)agreement with that determination, or exactly what prior warning Israel may have supplied to the White House. Notwithstanding, and despite Rubio’s clarification that “we are not involved in strikes against Iran,” Iranian threats to exact a heavy price from both Israel and the United States will thrust the latter into the eye of the storm. Forthcoming decisions by the White House on the contours of US engagement will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to persist with this campaign.
—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.
Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason
The Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may be reverberating across global energy markets, but the tremors are far more restrained than the stakes might have suggested. Brent crude rose more than 10 percent, yet the per-barrel price remains below eighty dollars, well short of crisis levels. The moment underscores how strategic foresight in energy policy can shape the contours of geopolitical risk in the world’s most volatile corridors.
While headlines are focused on missiles and centrifuges, a quieter story lies in the market conditions that made such a strike politically viable. Israel’s actions benefited from the political leeway made possible by Trump’s efforts to “bring down the cost of oil.” It’s not to say the strike wouldn’t have happened otherwise, but—as shown during Trump’s first term—when energy markets can shield consumers from the worst effects of a supply disruption, policymakers have far greater latitude to escalate.
In 2018, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose “maximum pressure” was rooted in a belief that oil markets could absorb the shock. Internal White House analysis forecasted only modest price increases, with US production gains and global spare capacity acting as a buffer. Crucially, while the Strait of Hormuz has long symbolized energy risk, it was—and remains—unlikely to be closed. Iran needs the revenue. This gave the Trump administration confidence to confront Iran without fear of major energy disruption.
Israel’s strike today reinforces that view, operating in an energy environment shaped by the same strategic logic. Oil doesn’t need to stay cheap forever—just long enough to change the geopolitical equation. Trump’s push to keep prices low may have done more than remake global energy flows—it may have helped lay the groundwork for a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
—Landon Derentz is senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council and director for Middle Eastern and African affairs at the US Department of Energy.
An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate
As I wrote more than a decade ago, this was inevitable.
There were only three possible outcomes in the decades-long battle over Tehran’s nuclear aspirations: allow Iran to go nuclear, negotiate a permanent deal, or military action. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A permanent deal is highly unlikely—as former US President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal proved. So, military action is the only viable option left.
There are three key facilities for Iran’s nuclear opponents to destroy: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. A US strike would have been more effective as it could have meaningfully degraded all of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, while Israel can destroy the above-ground facilities. The underground facilities are difficult, but don’t count Israel out. No one would have predicted it could take out Hezbollah with walkie talkies last year. Did Israel conduct commando raids or other creative attacks on the underground facilities? If so, this will meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program.
As for the question of likely retaliation—Iran has few good options. Its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are degraded, and Israel’s Iron Dome can demonstrably defend against missile and drone attacks. Iran is also afraid of a wider war, though those fears are misguided. This will de-escalate quickly, like Trump’s strike on Qassem Soleimani during his first term. The key questions are: What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it?
—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.
The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want
Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was in direct defiance of Trump’s call for caution and negotiation. The United States has been seeking a negotiated solution—one that was not supported by Netanyahu’s government.
The question now is not whether, but how, the United States will be dragged into a war it doesn’t want, and that Gulf states fear. Iranian retaliation directly against Israel will not translate into non-involvement from Washington, as Israel will then be drawn into a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation—requiring US military supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover.
So far, there is no evidence that Gulf states looked the other way as Israel used their airspace for the attacks, and this won’t be very difficult to confirm or deny.
Then the question becomes how to protect US troops in the region and how to come to the aid of Guif friends. Given the Trump administration’s close ties to the Gulf, as well as Trump’s personal admiration for certain Gulf leaders, the region will expect the US administration to provide any help they request.
—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel.
Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict
Just as corners of the Middle East were experiencing some semblance of stability, such as in parts of Syria and Lebanon, this latest escalation has the potential to reverse the region’s recent fragile gains. Beyond the immediate political and military consequences, the most profound impacts will be felt by civilians, particularly those already in humanitarian crises.
A prolonged disruption in regional commerce and air travel, alongside rising fuel and food prices, will hit displaced populations, host communities, and those living under the poverty line the hardest. In Syria, where around 90 percent of the population lives in poverty, any shock to commodity prices or aid delivery will be devastating. In Lebanon and Jordan, already overstretched in hosting among the world’s highest refugee populations, the economic fallout may further strain public services and deepen social tensions.
Meanwhile, the risk of environmental damage or public health crises from military action, including oil spills, water contamination, or infrastructure damage, could pose grave risks to civilians in both the Gulf and Iran. These are not theoretical concerns—they are real threats to food security, access to care, and basic human dignity for millions.
The United States has a responsibility to act in ways that reduce harm, avoid a full-scale regional war, and protect civilian lives. That means using its leverage not to escalate but to contain the conflict, pressing all parties, including allies, to prioritize diplomacy over devastation. Failure to do so will not only ignite another war in the region, but it will also exacerbate existing circumstances for fragile communities across the region.
—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Iran apparently was given two choices
The Israeli preemptive strike is likely to disrupt Iran’s immediate capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, it remains uncertain whether such an action will effectively deter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions.
The Iranian regime appears to have been given two choices: abandon its nuclear aspirations or face a lack of intervention from the Trump administration if Israel decided to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.
Israel may have advocated for an earlier attack window, while the United States likely attempted to apply diplomatic measures. When diplomacy failed, the United States understandably announced an ordered departure for US embassy staff in Baghdad, while other US diplomatic posts in the region were placed on stand-by for ordered departure.
Regardless of when the Trump administration became aware that the Israeli strike was imminent, questions remain: Will this unilateral action by Israel sufficiently deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions? How might the regime in Tehran respond? And how will the United States and the Gulf states seek to contain further conflict in the region?
What is immediately clear is that economic and security conditions in the Middle East have become more volatile.
—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.
This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions
The start of what is likely to be a multi-day series of Israeli strikes across Iran is an unprecedented exchange in a long history of attacks between the regional rivals. Most importantly, Israel is going alone against Iran. In previous instances, the United States and Israel maintained regular communication and a coordinated defense posture. This coordination was spectacularly successful in the defense of Israel—including in both April and October 2024, which saw unbelievably low casualties and damage in light of the hundreds of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired against Israel.
This time is different. Trump’s pursuit of Iran nuclear negotiations has created skepticism in Israel. The unilateral nature of US negotiations and the removal of the Trump administration’s pro-Israel proponents, such as former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and former Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Morgan Ortagus, could have only escalated this tension with Israel. These moves came alongside Trump’s avoidance of an Israel stop during his recent visit to the Middle East, as well as Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit in April, where he left empty handed on both tariff relief and Iran.
The beginning of unilateral Israeli strikes is a sign that the country feels that it must take action to ensure its own security. Regardless of what led Israel to take this step, it is likely to further exacerbate any preexisting tensions between Israel and the United States.
Finally, Iran will now feel obligated to respond. Depending on the degree of damage that Israel has inflicted, Iran may respond in a way that broadens the conflict and creates collateral damage elsewhere in the region. How this will end is an unknown, but as has been the case in the past, a speedier ending is likely to depend on the United States.
—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.
Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?
Among the many lessons to be drawn from this operation is one about the importance of speaking truth to power. The IRGC makes a practice of minimizing its vulnerabilities in reports to senior leadership. Leaked IRGC documents from the past several years revealed overstatements of capability and omissions of setbacks, perhaps intended to deflect questions about the bang for the buck in their budget. Recently the IRGC was reassuring political leadership that its air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike. This may have contributed to Tehran’s decision to refrain from making a deal with the United States before Trump’s two-month timeline elapsed. This resulted in Israel’s assessment that diplomacy has failed and strikes were necessary. The generals behind those white lies were the first targets.
But now comes the expected retaliation. And the big question is: Will the states in the Middle East participate in Israel’s defense as before? As nuclear talks went nowhere, both Iran and the United States wanted to know, leading to tug-of-war diplomacy in the Arab world.
The United States wants Arab states to turn on missile and drone detection and mitigation systems and look out for munitions launched from Iran toward Israel, while Iran wants Arab states to consider looking the other way if it stages retaliatory strikes that cross Arab airspace. Arab states have a logical reason to rebuff Iran’s request. Munitions flown into a country’s airspace without coordination with its capital are violations of sovereignty and a threat to its people and infrastructure. Taking them down is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored. Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.
—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.
Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue
Just as on previous occasions when Israeli forces attacked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself, Moscow does not seem willing to defend its ally in Tehran. The Russian statement issued Friday was critical of Israel but gave no indication that Russia will take concrete actions against it or in support of Iran. Instead, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all parties to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. Most remarkably, the last sentence of the statement noted that “we would like to remind you of the US’s readiness to hold another round of negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” In other words, Moscow itself seems to be calling on the Trump administration to resolve the situation instead of promoting Russia for the lead role in this.
Moscow’s less than fulsome support (so far) for Iran must be causing renewed doubts in Tehran about what Iran is getting from Moscow in return for Iranian support to its war against Ukraine. On the other hand, there is nobody else Iran can turn to who would give it greater support in responding to Israel. Despite Iran’s threats about targeting American forces in the Gulf region, working with the Trump administration may be Iran’s best hope for restraining Israel. The Russian Foreign Ministry itself seems to be suggesting this.
—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.
This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy
Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites—resulting in the death of senior IRGC commanders—sparked immediate volatility in global energy markets. Brent crude jumped up as much as 14 percent intraday, briefly peaking at $78.50 before settling around $75, marking the sharpest spike since early 2022. While previous shocks during the Israel-Gaza war faded due to resilient oil infrastructure and global oversupply, this escalation is different: an oil exporter is now under direct attack.
Markets are pricing in a heightened geopolitical risk premium, especially amid Iran’s threat to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries nearly 20 percent of global crude. If Iran’s oil infrastructure is damaged or tanker routes are disrupted, Brent could surge to $120–$130 per barrel. Though OPEC+ could ease some pressure, market uncertainty remains high.
At the same time, US tariff policies are weighing on global demand. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 0.5 percent drop in global growth in 2025 due to ongoing trade tensions. This could counteract some of the supply-driven price spikes. However, if the United States joins the conflict—especially if nuclear talks collapse—the risk of sustained stagflation rises, threatening an already fragile global economy.
—Perrihan Al-Riffai is a nonresident senior fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.
Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk
As Israeli jets attacked targets across Iran early Friday morning in the Middle East, oil futures started rising. Oil benchmarks initially rose 6 percent, then 9 percent and up to 11 percent as the scope of the attacks widened. Oil prices generally spike in response to any conflict in the Middle East, even when neither of the parties involved are major oil suppliers. In this case, Iran is a significant oil supplier, Israel is not.
The reality is that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (about 20 percent of global seaborne oil shipments) is not materially at risk after Israel’s strikes, and it is unlikely to come under threat from Iran. That’s because of a few reasons: One, Israel isn’t targeting Iran’s oil production and export sites, so Iran derives no net benefit if it prevents Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari or Bahraini oil from leaving the Persian Gulf. Two, should Tehran attempt to block Arab oil exports, its own oil exports would, in turn, be blocked. Iran can only benefit from stopping others from exporting if Tehran has no capacity to export oil itself. And three, Iran can’t stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for any significant amount of time because sea traffic can be rerouted around Iranian waters if necessary.
China, which purchases most of Iran’s crude oil, does not want to see the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf impeded. While China doesn’t have the naval capacity in the Persian Gulf to ensure this, it has become such a significant trading partner of Iran’s, that Iran cannot afford to see its trade with China disrupted. China is Iran’s largest customer and a significant customer of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. China will use the full weight of its economic power to ensure that oil from all Persian Gulf exporters to Asia is not disrupted.
Due to the severity of this attack, and the paradigm shift in diplomatic and nuclear relations that will result, oil prices may not retreat as quickly as they have after previous attacks. Much depends on when, how and against whom Iran retaliates. Regardless, it is important to remember that this is not the oil market of the 1990s and early 2000s. The market is well supplied from a variety of producers, with plenty of spare capacity should the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) choose to employ it. The United States is not beholden to foreign oil producers and its foreign policy should reflect that.
—Ellen Wald, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting. She is the author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power,” a book on the history and strategy of Aramco and Saudi Arabia.
How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza?
The large-scale and devastating Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran have opened a new chapter in the post-October 7 Middle East world. In addition to the kinetic damage that they have caused, the strikes are a clear indication that Tehran was proceeding with acquiring enough technology and materials to procure a nuclear weapon, which would have changed the entirety of the Middle East’s security and geopolitical architecture.
Critically, there is the question of how these strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas and factions that are supported by the IRGC. Will Israel assassinate the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership in Tehran, along with other terror operatives? Will the attacks distract from Gaza, or provide the Israeli military with an opportunity to expand its assault on the Strip without international scrutiny?
Another dimension of the Iranian ladder of escalation is what happens in the West Bank, which is under the fragile control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli military occupation. Does the IRGC have assets in the West Bank that it can activate to sow some chaos against the PA, in hopes of starting skirmishes with the Israel Defense Forces? Are there assets inside Israel who could engage in a targeted terror attack?
Regardless of the rhetoric, and while this is a serious escalation, it is unlikely, at least for now, that the wave of Israeli airstrikes will result in a massive, global, or even regional war like many have been warning for years. This is due to the fact that Arab countries, the United States, and even Israel want to be measured and deploy strategies to avoid a regional conflagration that leads to massive death and destruction.
—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse.
Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war
The Iranian regime is a group of dead men walking. Iran’s reign of terror both internally and externally has been a destructive and destabilizing force since the Islamic Revolution, supporting terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Diplomatic efforts over the years to stall Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons have not been a resounding success so far. Hence the recent Israeli attack does not come as a surprise.
That said, millions of Israelis distrust Netanyahu’s motivations and actions, whether as a peacetime or especially as a wartime prime minister. The Gaza war is a case in point. He appears to be prime minister bent on saving his own skin, aka saving his extreme right coalition to avoid facing trial for corruption and being held accountable for his government’s failure in connection with the October 7 attacks. He has done so at the clear expense of his country’s national security and democracy, as there is consensus among Israel’s security top brass and indeed the country that as prime minister Netanyahu needs to take responsibility. Netanyahu’s relations with Trump, the European Union, and most of the Middle East are at an all-time low, and there is unprecedented polarization within Israel stemming from Netanyahu’s divisive and inciting policies. This is not encouraging, to say the least, in this situation.
One only hopes that the United States, working with its sensible Middle Eastern allies such as the United Arab Emirates, will help to bring a sensible outcome to this explosive time.
—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.
Hezbollah is likely to express restraint
With Israel launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities and related assets, many eyes are turning toward Lebanon to see if Hezbollah will respond on behalf of its patron. For now, however, Hezbollah is likely to adopt a policy of restraint, and the Iranians may not call upon its proxy to strike back.
Until the recent fourteen-month war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese group was seen as a vital component of Iran’s deterrence architecture against the possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear program and on the regime itself. However, even before the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel, there were no guarantees that if Iran was struck by Israel, the United States, or a combination of the two that Tehran would call upon Hezbollah to respond with a punishing barrage of precision-guided missiles against targets across Israel.
That decision—whether or not to trigger a Hezbollah response—would have likely been based on the scale of the damage in Iran, and whether it posed an existential threat to the regime. If the Iranians calculated that the attack was survivable, then a Hezbollah response would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Instead, Hezbollah would be held in reserve for the day the Iranians really needed it. That same calculus applies now, but with the added factor that Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so degraded by the recent war that it no longer poses the same level of threat toward Israel. In addition, there is a strong sentiment of anger and frustration within the rank and file against Iran for, as they perceive it, letting Hezbollah down during the recent war by refusing to allow it to employ the full gamut of its military might to inflict real pain on the Israeli home front.
That mood of resentment may have been on subtle display during the recent visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who reportedly held a frosty meeting with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem, and was accompanied by two relatively junior party lawmakers while paying his respects to the tomb of late Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
For now, domestic calculations will likely help stay Hezbollah’s hand. However, that restraint could falter if the Israeli strikes against Iran continue and pose a direct threat to the regime.
—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.
Jerusalem prepares for the long haul
JERUSALEM—Despite the early signs of an imminent strike, with US regional embassies and military facilities evacuating a number of their staff, our plane landed in busy and bustling Ben Gurion airport undeterred by the news of a potential pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and leadership.
Just hours ago, senior experts and a US official at a Jerusalem dinner seemed optimistic that nothing out of the ordinary would occur and that the week’s developments represented a mere tactical escalation amid important nuclear talks. Analysts familiar with Israeli politics jokingly noted that if anything serious were to happen between Iran and Israel, it would need to be after next week due to Netanyahu’s son’s upcoming wedding. We later came to understand that the United States might have overestimated its capacity to deter their Israeli counterparts.
At 3:00 a.m. the peaceful Jerusalem ancient city walls were suddenly disturbed by piercing alarms calling everyone to take shelter in the nearest safe space. Our security team informed us that Israel had initiated a unilateral strike on Iran and that the United States was given a heads up about the events of the night. Sources reported that the Israeli war cabinet was gathering to discuss a Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, and were surprised to discover that it was a briefing on the attacks. Some of them were sworn in writing to secrecy.
As we stand now, the mood in Israel is dug in for a long-haul operation to disable the capabilities of what they call the “head of the octopus,” after cutting many of its tentacles in Gaza, Beirut, and Damascus last year. Israel called thousands of its reservists back to duty, and Jerusalem is preparing for a potentially consequential retaliation from Tehran, as initial reports reveal substantial losses among the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.
The Mullah regime’s response might not come immediately, as we witnessed with the 2024 events. Tehran will have to rally its defense systems after being drastically diminished, and now also face a crisis of leadership amid tonight’s high-level targets.
The United States, however, clearly tried to distance itself from the attacks and focused on prioritizing the safety and security of US facilities and personnel in the Middle East, although signaling a deadlock in US-Iranian nuclear talks. President Donald Trump is faced today with a crucial dilemma of either further decoupling from Israel and confirming US isolationism, or seizing a moment of weakness among Iran and its proxies by supporting Israeli ambitions to annihilate an enemy at the source.
—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for communications, overseeing strategic communications, editorial agenda, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts.
It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan
Israel’s strikes against Iranian command, nuclear, and military sites were not a warning shot. They were intended to start a change as decisive against the Iranian regime as Israel’s 2024 campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Importantly, Israel has no postwar plan for Iran beyond ending an existential nuclear threat. Israel should have thought this through months ago, but it really needs to think now about its post-war strategy. Regime change will not happen after an aerial campaign, no matter how effective. However much the IRGC was weakened by Israel’s strikes, including the reported death of senior IRGC military leaders, Tehran is still strong and coherent enough to prevent a popular “color” revolution. Regime change efforts from the United States and others elsewhere in the world should be a cautionary example of how hard this would be.
Israel is going to have to sustain a homeland defense strategy and keep striking nuclear, missile, and drone facilities in Iran. It also needs to develop, or work with the United States to develop, a workable strategy that gets Iran to end its nuclear threat to Israel. This will not be easy, and it will involve serious tradeoffs by Israel’s leaders, including how to end the war in Gaza on terms that will keep Hamas from coming back into power while giving the Palestinians a path toward reconstruction, dignity, and peace.
The best thing the United States can do now is to redouble its efforts to get a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Such a peace will require greater contributions by the United States, Arab allies, and Israel than anyone has been willing to make until now.
—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.
Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program
Early reporting suggests that the ongoing Israeli attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, has multiple, complementary goals. Israel appears to be aiming to cripple Iranian nuclear capacity and degrade Iranian retaliatory capabilities. To achieve these ends, Israel is conducting a combined air and intelligence operation to target nuclear installations, ballistic missile and air-defense sites, and key personnel in both the nuclear and military command structures.
We can understand this multipronged effort as targeting multiple threats to Israel’s security. First, successive Israeli prime ministers have described an Iranian adversary armed with nuclear weapons as an existential threat to Israel. As Netanyahu described in a video statement as the attacks were underway, the operation targeted both the Natanz enrichment facility (among others) and leading Iranian nuclear scientists. Targeting both the facilities and the key scientists should degrade and delay Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Israel also sought to limit Iranian retaliatory capabilities by attacking ballistic missile and drone installations, as well as key individuals in the military command structure, including General Hossein Salami, the chief of the IRGC, and Gholam Ali Rashid, the deputy commander of the Iranian armed forces. There may be a third, larger goal beyond degrading Iran’s nuclear and retaliatory capacity: regime decapitation. Indeed, beyond targeting the nuclear infrastructure, the expansive attacks against the military forces and the IRGC could be suggestive of a larger regime-level goal.
Especially as events continue to unfold, it is difficult to determine operational success. Nevertheless, we can expect Israeli leaders to define success as delaying Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or advance to nuclear weapons, which Israel is likely to have achieved through damaging and destroying critical nuclear infrastructure and killing senior scientists. Further, to the extent that an eventual Iranian retaliation is limited because of Israel’s attack on key military sites and personnel or blunted by Israel’s own defenses, such developments may signify another layer of success. Of course, it is difficult to know exactly what an Iranian attack might have looked like had Israel not targeted key military facilities during this strike and earlier attacks on Iranian air defenses in 2024.
—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis
Israeli strikes on Iran risk provoking a response from Yemen’s Houthi rebels and potentially upending last month’s bilateral cease-fire agreement between the United States and the Houthis. While the Trump administration made it clear that the strike was a unilateral action by Israel, the Houthis could perceive the United States as complicit, as the rebels often conflate Israeli and US actions in their public messaging. Adding to those concerns, earlier this week a Houthi source threatened to retaliate if the United States or Israel struck Iran, following reports that American nonessential personnel and family members were being evacuated throughout the Middle East.
Moreover, the Houthis have been playing a more prominent role in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” since the October 7 attacks, particularly as other proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah faced leadership losses and setbacks. For the group, renewed confrontation could be an opportunity to reinforce its position within Iran’s network of allies and proxies and claim a major propaganda win—even if it means the end of the cease-fire with the United States.
While the Trump administration’s “Operation Rough Rider” imposed meaningful damage on the group, the Houthis have proven their resilience and ability to adapt in the face of continued strikes. They may also calculate that the Trump administration’s decision to pursue a cease-fire is a sign of limited appetite to re-engage in Yemen, especially given that “Operation Rough Rider” cost more than one billion dollars in a month and failed to degrade the Houthis, who have continued strikes on Israeli territory.
—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response
Gulf States—mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have no appetite for a regional war that involves Iran and would rather not be put in a place to choose between Israel and Iran. Their economic visions hinge on regional stability and on striking a balance to protect their interests, both economic and political. While their emerging role as mediators has enhanced their geopolitical role and diplomatic leverage, that role—now at risk—depends on stability for trust-building purposes when dealing with an actor like Iran.
Under the Trump administration, Gulf states have taken the front seat in driving the new regional order. However, Israel’s strikes, following the IAEA’s strongest rebuke in twenty years and Iran’s announcement of a third uranium site, seem to have temporarily disrupted the Gulf capitals’ preferred approach for diplomacy and placed them now in the crossfire for retaliation.
The Trump administration must rally its Gulf allies for an emergency meeting to coordinate a response aimed at preserving any diplomatic gains made so far. Oman, as a trusted intermediary, could be in a good place to lower the temperature and lobby Tehran against attacking Gulf capitals and US assets in the region—especially since Washington had no role in the attack. While this escalation carries serious risks, Israel’s attacks seem to have focused on the IRGC, which is responsible for continuously pursuing a destabilizing influence across the Levant and the Gulf and targeting US service members—making the IRGC a legitimate target. However, failure to deescalate would risk a broader regional conflict, the collapse of the Gulf-led peace process, the destabilization of global energy markets, and further disruption of key navigation routes in the Red Sea.
—Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine
Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran demonstrates a continued invocation of its Begin Doctrine—its long-standing policy of pre-emptively striking nuclear facilities and weapons of mass destruction. Named after Israel’s former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine was first created in 1981 during Operation Opera when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a targeted attack.
Similar to Netanyahu today, Begin carried out the strike without US approval. Many feared an escalation if former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were to retaliate, however, at the time, Saddam was already embroiled in a war with Iran and could not afford to respond.
Israel applied the doctrine again in 2007 when it covertly destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in an operation it did not publicly acknowledge until 2018. Responding to the strike, then-President Bashar al-Assad denied the existence of the site entirely to avoid domestic and regional pressure to retaliate.
Now, for the third time, Israel appears to be invoking the doctrine, this time against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, again without Washington. But unlike prior episodes, Iran is expected to retaliate, and likely with far greater intensity than previous strikes in April and October 2024—especially if Iran’s regional proxies join its retaliation to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.
All eyes now turn to Muscat, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is still scheduled to meet with Iranian negotiators this weekend in what could be the final round of nuclear talks. The outlook for any deal appears bleak following the strikes. Should negotiations collapse, the region could face an escalation unlike anything seen in decades.
—Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.
Further reading
Mon, Apr 28, 2025
Why Israel will resist any US-Iran nuclear deal
MENASource By Danny Citrinowicz
Negotiations between the United States and Iran have displayed a significant divide between Washington and it’s ally Israel.
Thu, Apr 10, 2025
Iran is at an unprecedented crossroads over its nuclear program
MENASource By Alex Plitsas
The Middle East is experiencing a rare re-alignment that puts Iran in an unprecedently vulnerable position.
Wed, Nov 20, 2024
2025 will be a decisive year for Iran’s nuclear program
IranSource By Danny Citrinowicz
Diplomatic deadlines and regional factors will force Iran to decide soon whether to strike a deal or seek a nuclear weapon. Either choice will have major ripple effects.
Image: Firefighters work at the scene of a damaged building in the aftermath of Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters.