At the NATO Summit in The Hague earlier this year, allies made two historic commitments: to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035 and to launch the Rapid Adoption Action Plan (RAAP), pledging to field new capabilities within two years through streamlined acquisition and nontraditional suppliers.
These commitments only matter when they are delivered. NATO’s strength is measured not by communiqués, but by visible capabilities that deter and defend.
The war in Ukraine drives urgency. Russia’s use of long-range fires, drone swarms, and advanced air defenses has reshaped the air domain. For NATO, Ukraine is not a distant conflict but a preview of its own eastern flank—and a test of whether the Alliance can adapt quickly. We saw this play out just recently, when NATO fighters shot down Russian drones that had entered Polish airspace, marking a rare engagement of allied air defenses. NATO also cannot assume US airborne enablers will always be available.
That reality exposes NATO’s most acute gap: its airborne command and control (C2) enterprise.
A stopgap, not a solution
The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) program is NATO’s blueprint to replace the E-3 AWACS fleet with a multi-domain “system of systems” for a resilient C2 architecture. The Concept Stage, running through December 2025, will define this architecture and procurement approach.
But that vision remains years away. To bridge the gap, NATO launched an initial Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (iAFSC) initiative with six E-7A aircraft—modern, proven, but too few to meet Alliance-wide demand. High costs, delivery delays, and shallow depth render this iAFSC at best a stopgap, not a solution. Without complementary systems, NATO risks overstretch and doubts about its adaptability. Airborne C2 is a visible symbol of credibility; shortfalls are quickly noticed by allies and adversaries.
Operational requirements and gaps
NATO’s shortfalls in its airborne C2 are immediate and growing:
- Survivability and distribution: Large, high-value platforms such as the E-7 are vulnerable to advanced surface-to-air missiles and long-range fires. As former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip M. Breedlove emphasized, quality and ready capacity matter now—not in the 2030s— because demand is global and persistent. Senior air leaders also cautioned there can be “no sanctuaries” in modern air warfare; adversaries can strike deep into theater, threatening operations. Distributed C2 nodes are essential to avoid a single point of failure.
- Coverage, persistence, and quantity: Six E-7s cannot cover simultaneous crises. As senior commanders note, quantity has a quality all its own. Exercises show demand outstrips availability, leaving gaps. Programs such as Alliance Ground Surveillance illustrate the risk: narrow scope and small fleets cannot meet Alliance needs. Complementary airborne platforms are required for layered, theater-wide persistence.
- Integration across domains: The E-7 is optimized for Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) but not designed to fuse tactical and strategic data across domains. Russia’s failures in Ukraine show that without effective AEW, wars devolve into attrition. NATO must link the F-35, Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD), and the future space-based Airborne Moving Target Indicator into a layered C2 architecture. Modular, rapidly fieldable aircraft can accelerate this shift, while AFSC matures.
- Timeliness: E-7 deliveries run into the mid-2030s, while the E-3 fleet rapidly ages out. Space-based solutions remain years away. Retiring E-3s also erode airborne battle manager training capacity—these specialists are indispensable, and expertise cannot be surged in a crisis. Without near-term solutions, NATO risks shrinking to a “minimum viable fleet” before replacements arrive and losing a generation of battle managers.
- Emerging threats: Adversaries employ drone swarms, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles to saturate defenses and strike command nodes. Managing hundreds of tracks demands a distributed C2 system able to survive forward. Without it, NATO risks ceding the initiative.
These gaps are increasingly visible to allies and adversaries. Failing to address them risks deterrence and credibility. NATO cannot wait for a perfect solution—it must begin layering survivable, proven capabilities now.
How a layered architecture changes the fight
NATO’s AFSC vision requires a layered C2 architecture. Space-based sensors provide wide-area surveillance, the E-7 delivers theater-level battle management, and smaller, survivable platforms operate closer to contested airspace—integrating data from fighters, IAMD, and ground sensors into actionable C2. This design would ensure resilience: if one node is lost, others remain in the fight. Just as important, it lets NATO operate inside threat rings where larger aircraft cannot safely go, denying adversaries sanctuaries.
NATO does not need next-decade technologies to close today’s gaps. Business jet–class Airborne Early Warning and Control systems; multi-mission intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft; and even unmanned concepts already operate in allied fleets today. These systems are combat-proven, globally supported, and available in multiple mission configurations. Most importantly, they can be scaled within RAAP’s two-year target—demonstrating that credible capability is achievable now, not just in the 2030s. When NATO fighters and Italian Conformal Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft intercepted Russian drones that violated Polish airspace last week, it highlighted the value of affordable, flexible platforms forward-based in Europe. They provide both persistence for day-to-day security tasks and resilience in high-end conflict.
Senior commanders warn against retiring legacy capacity before replacements are in place. With the retirement of E-3s accelerating and E-7 deliveries stretching into the 2030s, NATO cannot afford a gap. Fielding complementary, mid-sized platforms ensures depth now while buying time for AFSC to mature.
One advantage of mid-sized platforms is their resilience and agility. Smaller platforms have a reduced radar cross-section, can operate from short runways, and are compatible with NATO’s Agile Combat Employment concept. This makes them harder to target, easier to disperse, and better suited to survive inside contested environments compared to larger, high-value aircraft.
A second advantage is their cost and scale. Operating at less than half the cost of larger aircraft, these platforms allow NATO to field larger fleets and sustain persistent coverage across multiple theaters. Lower operating costs also mean they can be employed more flexibly—whether for exercises, day-to-day surveillance tasks, or during crisis surges—without exhausting limited budgets.
Finally, they offer integration and growth potential. These aircraft are already proven in allied service, interoperable with NATO datalinks and fifth-generation fighters like the F-35. Their modular design allows them to expand roles over time, shifting from airborne early warning to electronic attack, signals intelligence, or IAMD as operational demands evolve. This adaptability ensures that NATO is not locked into a single-use system but is investing in platforms that can grow with the threat environment.
Fielding such a visible, affordable, and survivable layer not only strengthens NATO’s C2 architecture, it demonstrates to allies, publics, and adversaries alike that RAAP’s promises are real and immediate.
The risk of delay
Ukraine shows how fast threats adapt—Russia is refining strike and air defense systems now, not in 2035. NATO cannot assume uninterrupted US support, nor afford gaps in its own airborne command and control.
The Alliance must act now: field modular, multi-mission platforms under AFSC, integrate them with E-7 and space assets, and deploy them rapidly in training and operations.
Doing so would close NATO’s most pressing C2 gaps. Delay risks a decade of dangerous vulnerability in the domain that decides modern wars—and a failure of NATO’s own promises.
Lieutenant General David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, he was the deputy chief of staff for capability development at NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.
Further reading
Thu, Jun 5, 2025
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As NATO members gather in the Hague amid uncertainty about US commitment to the continent and concerns about Russia’s military rebuilding, what can European nations do to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats from Moscow?
Wed, Jul 23, 2025
To meet NATO’s 5 percent benchmark, allies need more industrial capacity. Here’s how they can build it.
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Fri, Jul 11, 2025
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Image: A NATO E-3 Sentry approaches a KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing during an aerial refueling mission over Spain, July 2, 2025. (US Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Aidan Martínez)
