Full transcript of the first keynote address by Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency, at the 2010 Atlantic Council Transatlantic Missile Defense Conference.







Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

FREDERICK KEMPE:  Thank you, thank you very much all of you for your patience and we’ll get started now.  Good morning and welcome to the Atlantic Council, I’m Fred Kempe.  I am president and CEO.  It is great to kick off what has become something of an annual tradition.  This is the third annual conference on missile defense, although it was not quite planned as an annual conference when it got started.  We seek to promote a vigorous bipartisan, and as always, trans-Atlantic discussion and debate on this subject. 

I’ve been following missile defense back from my days of covering the Reagan administration as a Wall Street Journal reporter when we called it Star Wars, and ever since then, the science and the politics of all of this has been intriguing and fast-moving.  And many questions haven’t changed entirely. 

How does one come to terms with Russia?  A very different Russia here, of course, and one, one wants to cooperate with on this missile defense – but how does one do that?  How does one come to terms with allies and what are the interests?  And those seem to change overtime, as well.  And then of course, how does one come to terms with the costs?   So many of the questions are very clear to us; the answers less clear.  Just over one year ago, the Atlantic Council hosted the first major conference on a trans-Atlantic missile defense in the aftermath of the Obama administration’s announcement of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe, which, as you know, replaced the original idea of a third site.

We’re hosting today’s conference just two days before the joint NATO foreign and defense ministerial in Brussels and just over one month before NATO heads of state and government meet in Lisbon, Portugal for what alliance officials hope will be a historic summit.  On the agenda, of course, are the issues of NATO strategic concept, command-structure reform and Afghanistan.  And of course, another major item on the agenda will be trans-Atlantic missile defense. 

So we are hosting this conference because trans-Atlantic missile defense has become an increasingly relevant issue for NATO, an important way for the alliance to maintain solidarity and collective security as the ballistic missile threat grows in the Middle East.  Another reason we are holding this conference is to get an update on the status of missile defense one year following the announcement of the phased adaptive approach.  We wanted to get a sense of the progress the administration has made in the implementation policy and better understand the diplomatic, operational, technical and budgetary issues. 

So to discuss these issues we have got a great lineup of speakers and panelists, and I can see from just looking around the room that there are a great number of experts there around the table as well here.  I would like to thank in advance Boyko Noev, Edgar Buckley, Bruno Gruselle and Simon Lunn on our Europe panel for making the trip across the Atlantic.  I would particularly like to thank John Miller and Chris Lombardi of Raytheon for their longstanding support of the council’s work in this area and of the council in general. 

Without further ado, I would like to introduce our first speaker today, Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, director of the Missile Defense Agency, who has been with us for each of the three installments of this conference, so he is no stranger to the Atlantic council.  He first talked to us in 2007 when he was deputy director of MDA.  Gen. O’Reilly also spoke at last year’s missile defense conference to brief on the architecture of the phased adaptive approach. 

He served as the director of the Missile Defense Agency since 2008.  His directorship of MDA caps off a long and distinguished career in the U.S. military, including service in both command and staff officer positions and a variety of operational positions, including the 1st Calvary Division, 3rd Support Command, Germany, and as well is serving – and this, to me, is interesting point considering what we’re discussing today, assistant professor of physics at the United States Military Academy, of which he is a graduate. 

General, it is always a pleasure to have you with us and to hear your remarks, so thank you for being with us.  After his remarks there will be a moderated discussion, which will be led by Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Ian Brzezinski.  Ian joined the council from his position as a principal at Booz Allen Hamilton.  Prior to that, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe NATO policy for the George W.  Bush administration and before that had served seven years on the staff of the United States Senate.  Ian is still relatively new to the council.  He started with us earlier this summer, but he is off to a flying start. 

General, I would say it is less a phased adaptive approach and more an absolute targeted missile interceptor.  And I would like to thank Ian for his leadership in helping to arrange this conference and for all the work he’s done with the council so far this year.  Gen. O’Reilly the floor is yours.  (Applause.)

LT. GEN. PATRICK O’REILLY:  Thank you, thank you.  Well, my first challenge this morning – I see I have two of them – is, one, the screen is over here and I’m not sure everyone can see.  Is there any way to bring that forward a little bit?  I don’t think the folks on this side of the room are going to be able to see what I was – yeah, I think that would help a little bit.  Thank you.

MR.    :  Can you go to the podium, please? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I’ve got a mike, so no, I won’t – (laughter).  I want to make sure we can see the charts.  Second is, the threat is unpredictable, but what is even more unpredictable is Washington, D.C., traffic, so I am sorry I am a little late this morning.  Okay, first chart.  All right, are we going to do it from up here? 

MR.    :  (Off mike.) 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  Okay, good.  What I first want to talk about is, in the introduction it was mentioned that the missile defense is a lot of science and politics.  Let me clarify, because I think it is important what the major rules and functions are of the U.S. government in implementing the phase adaptive approach and missile defense in general. 

For the development of capability and the acquisition of capability, that’s what my agency does, the Missile Defense Agency does for United States.  For establishing the size of that capability, the quantities, if you will, the inventories, that is the joint staff that works for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In the area of establishing the operational architectures and the plans to execute the phase adaptive approach, in this case in Europe, it is EUCOM that does that.  And finally, for the diplomatic agreements and arrangements, that is obviously the Department of State. 

So there’s four major players here in implementing the phase adaptive approach.  And I’ll talk about that first one, the development and acquisition of the capability.  First of all, there is a fundamental of missile defense I want to go over.  I say it in every brief because it is so true.  To have an effective missile defense, you need more than one layer.  We break out the layers of missile defense by the threat ranges. 

Short-range missiles, they are highly inside the earth’s atmosphere and most of their flight and their intercepts occur – it is a different type of missile system than the upper tier, which is right above the earth’s atmosphere.  The two are not interchangeable, but they do work together. 

So we have Patriot units for years and we have – the SM-2 Navy system that is part of Aegis is our lower-tier interceptor system.  Then the upper tier is the Aegis, the newest version of the Aegis missiles, that intercept above the earth’s atmosphere, and the THAAD system which intersect at the upper part of the earth’s atmosphere into outer space.  That is what we call the upper tier, and the phased adaptive approach is focused on that upper tier, what’s shown in yellow up there.  Those are mainly effective against medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from ranges of 1,000 kilometers up to 5,500 kilometers.  And then the upper ring up there is intercontinental ballistic missiles ranges, and that’s our highest tier. 

So we have, and have been developing for over 25 years, three layers of missile defense.  Again, the phase adaptive approach is focused on that middle layer there.  Well, what about the lower layer?  The lower layer is local defense, point defense.  It can defend part of a city, but it’s a smaller area and it defends against air breathers, cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles.  That is where NATO Active Layer Theater Missile Defense program has been focused for quite some time on developing and integrating that capability in NATO.
We look for the phase adaptive approach at integrating that upper tier with the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme in the middle of this decade so that the two systems work together.  But it also lays out the point that the allies, our NATO allies, can then determine how they want to contribute to that lower tier of defense.  We have the upper layer and they can effectively deploy the lower layer for an effective defense.  But that is critical, seeing it in those three layers. 

The phase adaptive approach, let me just remind you, is, first of all, phase one by 2011.  And the key on this chart is the word “by”, because a lot of folks are thinking that on these years, these exact dates, something is going to be deployed.  We have a deployment plan as far as building capability and having it ready for deployment by these different dates here.  By 2011, we will have our initial capability against short-range missiles, medium range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. 

The missile defense capabilities against those three ranges exist today in the Aegis system, which is at sea.  It’s already deployed.  What hasn’t happened is a test where we have forward-based radars, which we proposed in the first phase of the phase adaptive approach there, that (TPS-E2 ?) radar in the center, working with the ship against an intermediate-range ballistic missile, over 3,000 kilometers.  That will occur next summer.  That is our key test in order to validate that all of these capabilities work together in order to have your initial substantiation of capability for the phase adaptive approach.  And our command-and-control system, it has been under development for over a decade.  It’s what links those two together. 

By phase two, 2015, we will then introduce Aegis Ashore, which we have started the contracts over the last year, and I’ll go into some detail of what’s occurred.  But in Aegis Ashore it is the same capability you have at sea except it’s land-based, obviously, and it allows a permanent presence there.  It can be moved in about four or five months.  It is not a mobile system, but at the same time it, again, takes a few months in order to establish and have it operating. 

We have an upgrade to the Aegis system that will occur by 2015, and that’s a newer missile.  The new missile, the SM-3 1B, has the same kinematic, or the same range, as the current missile, the 1A, but it has greater discrimination capability onboard.  We also have the THAAD system.  We’ll have five systems deployed by then for world-wide deployment, and, as I said in my opening comments, that the joint chiefs will make that determination of when and what the allocation is according to the combatant commander’s plans. 

And then we have an upgrade of the C2BMC, which allows us to operate more than one forward-based radar in one theater.  Those capabilities have all been under development for at least seven, eight, nine years in some cases, but in phase three, we start adding some new capability, a new start for development.  Aegis Ashore?  It’s just an upgraded software from what’s already been there, but it also – we will tie in the latest software for Aegis in the SM-3 2A missile. 

Now, the 2A missile, again, was not started by PAA.  That work was started with the Japanese in 2006.  We’ve been developing it and plan to finish our cooperative development program by 2015, and that was a 2006 agreement, so it’s nothing new there.  But it will be deployable by 2018, and it doubles the range that you can protect over the earlier versions of Aegis. 

Also, we have the Precision Tracking Space System.  That decision was made, or at least those reviews occurred, in 2007 – again, prior to the PAA, but it adds a significant capability for large raid sizes.  And if the PAA helped in focusing the analysis for the Department of Defense, it was on not so much range of threats, but raid sizes, being able to engage over 50 missiles at once, way over by this point in time, track hundreds of missiles at one time.  That was the analysis that has been occurring over the past year, and as you can see, PTSS, that satellite system, will have a significant contribution there.
Also, airborne infrared.  Over the past year we’ve done a lot of study in that work.  We may not go with the infrared, even though it is in its title, sensor because we are looking at advanced sensors and they can help us do discrimination and handle, again, very large raid sizes on unattended air vehicles or remotely piloted vehicles. 

Again, we will be upgrading the C2BMC.  At that point, the timeline coincides with the plans for the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence upper tier.  That’s been in the plans for years with NATO.  The opportunity there is to make those two systems not only interoperable, but interactive with each other.  So that again, you have that ring that I showed previously, the effective upper- and lower-tier defense system. 

 Phase four, now that is a new start that came out of the phase adaptive approach.  The primary reason we were focusing phase four was to have another intercept opportunity of missiles being launched from a threat or potential adversary.  We want to intercept those missiles as soon as possible after they have been launched.  It makes it very difficult to deploy countermeasures in that area. 

Also, debris management, trying to get it as close or, if possible, on the countries that are trying to launch.  But you need a higher speed interceptor and you also need a mobile launch system that can be at the right place at the right time. 

So over the past year, we’ve been doing analysis and have now determined a sufficient definition of the SM32B, was the missile, or the next generation Aegis missile.  It will be capable of being adaptable right to the Aegis Ashore without any upgrades to Aegis Ashore.  And it will give you the capability to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles very early in their flight.  If you miss with that early attempt, then you have another opportunity to hit with the upper tier.  If you miss with that, you have another opportunity with the lower tier. 

As you can see, it is a very basic fundamentals of missile defense.  The more shot opportunities, the higher probability of intercept, and you get way high into the upper 90s with that type of doctrine.  And finally, it does have capability, because this missile is heading towards or trying to intercept any missile early in its flight for ICBM capability.  So to the interceptor it doesn’t matter, it sees a missile being launched, if it’s within a couple thousand miles of the launch location from where the interceptor has been launched, it has a very good opportunity to intercept ICBMs too. 

So that is the phase adaptive approach.  These capabilities that I just described I think are best termed not in terms of timelines – we will meet our timelines, we are on schedule for our timelines – but more of their capability, the initial capability against SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs next year.  Robust capability, and what we define by robust is, again, multiple shot opportunities against the same threat by independent systems against SRBMs and MRBMs by 2015, robust capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 2018, and then early-intercept capability and capability against ICBMs by 2020 from the region in which those ICBMs are being launched. 

The next chart.  I guess I can’t – there.  I will just touch on this very lightly, but there has been a significant amount of work done over the past couple of years to integrate our activities as we develop our capabilities.  This chart here, and I know we will provide them for the website, does indicate that we are, over the next decade, not only increasing our capability for regional defense, which is R.D. up there, as I just described, but also, we’re adding in capability for U.S. homeland defense. 

Number one, the homeland defense system gets the benefit of the forward-based radars and the architecture of the command and control that I just described for the phase adaptive approach.  But also, it – we have just finished our 30th interceptor being placed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and we have significant upgrades and we are adding an early warning radar in Thule, Greenland.  It is operational now. 

In the next phase, by 2015, Clear Radar – it’s another early-warning radar in Alaska – will be up and operational.  Again, adding to our network of sensors for homeland defense and, as you can see, then, we’re moving on to the space systems, as I was referring to, by 2018. 

What’s key, though, are those colored bars at the top.  Previously, the Missile Defense Agency would establish tests and run tests to make sure everything is working together, and then we would take it down and run another test.  What we have done is, we are creating a series of hardware in the loop, they are called – it’s the actual processors, the actual software, the actual interfaces with the soldiers, sailors and airmen from multiple countries will be working together in a continuous laboratory and field environment up at the top. 

So once we establish the phase adaptive approach capability for a certain phase, it will literally be up and operating for years so that the aerospace companies that are working with us, the commands that are working with us, the countries that are working with us – they have a laboratory environment to continually test and develop and perfect operational tactics, command-and-control tactics, things such as that.  This is the environment which will have significant payoff for us. 

I will just touch real quickly – I was actually here a year ago this week giving this presentation, and I would like to touch on what’s happened in the last year.  First of all, with Aegis, we have converted two more ships over.  We have delivered over 100 Aegis Block-1A missiles now in the past year to reach that point.  Next year, we have about 20 more and then we have that mission that I was talking about next spring that integrates the forward-based radar with Aegis intercepting an intermediate-range ballistic missile using the command-and-control system that we will deploy for phase one of the phase adaptive approach.  That is a critical test. 

THAAD – we will have the first battery accepted by the U.S. Army, and the Army will operate and control it and own it.  The second battery has already been delivered and it is in training and testing.  We will also have multiple simultaneous tests.  As you will notice, our test program gets more and more aggressive against two targets, a short range and a medium-range target in the air at the same time out in the Pacific with THAAD. 

In sensors, we’ve actually finished the sensor that we were using for testing, the forward-based radar that was going to go to Europe.  We completed that work, the testing, a year early, so it is already in refurbishment getting ready for deployment next year in southeastern Europe.  The C2BMC, we have testing going on with that. 

And finally, combatant commands.  We have been supporting EUCOM extensively for the past year on a technical basis as they develop their plans for deploying the early phases of the phase adaptive approach.  And it goes through the traditional deliberate planning process that the U.S. has for approval of our operational commands in a combat-and-commanders theater.  And that is occurring right now.  It’s on a timeline that typically, we’d complete it sometime in the spring.  So that effort has been going on. 

And for homeland defense, as I said, the Thule radar has been up and operating and we are going to begin work on the deployment of the (TPS-E2 ?) – it’s in southeastern Europe – because it does contribute to homeland defense. 

This is the part of the phase adaptive approach which was also part of the third site, the previous.  If you go back and look at the presentations for the past six years, there’s always been that radar in southeastern Europe, and for homeland defense it can conduct early tracks coming out of the Middle East and gives us a significant benefit, and therefore, we still retain it in this phase adaptive approach.  In phase two, the work that’s going to be deployed by 2015, we’ve actually executed the software in several tests on the new ship operating software for tests this past summer. 

As we test our missile systems, we also are operating the next generation on a separate ship, and that work has gone on very well.  Aegis Ashore, we have it under contract now with Lockheed Martin.  It is developing the first couple sites.  And the SM3-1B interceptor is getting ready for its first intercept mission this fiscal year, in FY ’11.  THAAD, we continue to, again, integrate and test THAAD working with Patriot so that the intercept at the upper tier doesn’t interfere with intercept attempts at the lower tier.  We go through that repeatedly in our flight testing. 

C2BMC, as you can see, we have the communications suites for Aegis Ashore, they are being developed now.  And homeland defense, as I said, the Clear Radar in Alaska is being upgraded.  Over the past year, for phase three, we have made a significant modification to the software based on the analysis of the phase adaptive approach.  We’re increasing the number of interceptors that an Aegis ship can simultaneously engage, the number of interceptors that we can launch, by a factor of six. 

That is a tremendous increase in military capability.  The reason we do that is, we have the ability and we’ve shown, again through testing last year, how we integrate the sensor network that is out there, that is so important, into the ship’s fire-control system. 

You may recall a few years ago we intercepted a satellite using an Aegis system, the SM3-1A.  The way we did it was, we passed data to the ship before the ship even saw the satellite.  It had already launched.  That’s the type of dependency and integration with these sensor nets.  This is the capability you gain from that, an order of six times the number of missiles you can simultaneously launch when you use a sensor network rather than the ship’s radar trying to do everything itself. 

And so that change has happened with Lockheed Martin and they are off working on those software changes.  We have significant testing that has been going on with ABIR, the Airborne Infrared, the UAVs.  They’ve been doing a very good job tracking missiles very accurately way over 1,000 kilometers.  So the capability that is on the Predator today is a tremendous capability, and we’re looking to advance it even greater to complement, supplement, augment the sensors on the ground.  And again, we have upgrades that shows how we’re fusing together our tracks. 

Finally, phase four.  Over the past year, even though it is 10 years away, we went through extensive analysis over the past year looking at trade studies for the capability that we want on this missile, and the request for proposal went out two weeks ago.  It was sent out to our industry to start bidding on this missile system, and it will be – three companies will be chosen for the next two-and-a-half years.  Based on their concepts and designs, there will be a down-select to one company that will finish the development.  That down-select will occur in the 2013 timeframe. 

The missile has been sized.  It is about a 27-inch missile.  It has been reviewed by the Navy for compatibility for both at sea and on shore, and everything works out very well with that.  And so this is the concept of the missile as you see it.  It has hardening, the reliability, all of the other things we’ve learned over the years, lessons learned, that a missile should have.  All of that has been put in the request book for proposal, and that was the significant step we’ve taken this year in that area, is determining exactly what the government’s requirements would be. 

Finally, I would like to close by – we have an extensive number of tests that are going to continue on flight testing, but more importantly, frankly, ground testing and exercises and war games with the different – with NATO and the different military organizations and military forces that we’ve been dealing with for a very long time.  This is just an extension of it. 

But we have also added in to our planning, and our budgets and our program designs, operational tests.  These operational tests will coincide with the time frames of the phase adaptive approach.  They’re a significant demonstration of capability.  The ground rule is, it’s not new capability, or at least in these tests it won’t be the first time we’ve ever demonstrated these capabilities, because we do that in the tests leading up to it. 

But it will be tests that are completely run by soldiers, sailors and airmen.  The Missile Defense Agency doesn’t operate these tests.  The operational test agencies of our Air Force, Army and Navy overseen by the director of operational tests and evaluation for the department of defense will run these tests.  The first one occurs in next fiscal year, FY ’12, where we launch two medium-range ballistic missiles at the same time. 

We have an Aegis ship out there, but it only has one interceptor on board.  We have a THAAD unit in the back.  That has four interceptors on board.  THAAD is not sure which one Aegis is going to hit, or is he just going to be successful.  We’re trying to set up realistic scenarios that way.  THAAD will then engage.  If THAAD misses, we have Patriot down underneath it, ready with live ordinates to intercept.  And on top of that we also have a Patriot shot, a lower-tiered shot, short range, that is going to occur underneath the other two medium-range ballistic missiles, all being launched at the same time out in the Pacific missile range in Hawaii. 

Then, in 2015, we have a test where we are simultaneously launching short-range ballistic missile, medium range, two intermediate-range ballistic missiles and an ICBM all at the same time with the systems that you see there, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, Aegis Ashore from Hawaii, which is where we have our test space for Aegis Ashore, THAAD and Patriot and Aegis At Sea – all of these engaging at the same time. 

So as you can see, we are moving increasingly quickly to operational scenarios demonstrated by the commands themselves, and these are basically the final test where operational assessments are made, and again, they align with the phase adaptive approach.  At that point I’d like to open it up to any questions.  Thank you.  (Applause.)

IAN BRZEZINSKI:  Thank you for such a comprehensive update on the phase adaptive approach.  It’s interesting for those of us who are interested, particularly the trans-Atlantic dimension, to see how this vision has become so robust.  And I would add that I think you have almost set yourself up because you have provided us a remarkable calendar by which this community can track progress in the evolution of the phased adaptive approach over its four phases. 

And I would add that we are going to take his offer and take him up on his offer and put his slides up on the Atlantic Council website, acus.org, after this seminar today.  We will also have transcripts available for this discussion and others.  One thing that Fred mentioned was the timeliness of this briefing.  We have a NATO ministerial coming up this week, we have the NATO summit coming up in November, in which trans-Atlantic defense will probably be one of the major deliverables. 

And for those of us who see the relevance in trans-Atlantic security and see it as an increasingly important global player for U.S. interest, missile defense is a key element of NATO’s new future.  One thing that struck me about your briefing – and you did mention the linkages to NATO missile defense, you’d mentioned the linkup with ALBMD, Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence and the coordination with the command-and-control center. 

But to be a little bit pointed, a layman like myself looks at that, and I see largely U.S. efforts.  I see a U.S. network of ships, a U.S. network of bases.  What is the European contribution to trans-Atlantic missile defense as the PAA evolves?  Is this really trans-Atlantic missile defense or is this an American umbrella? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  As I said in my opening comments, to be effective, you really need layers of defense.  And so where we are in our development, we have the capability to deploy that middle tier, that upper tier of defense, not only for NATO but primarily, if you laid out – the basic requirement is, we have a requirement to protect our deployed soldiers and their families and our sailors and airmen overseas.  And to do that, we would have the upper tier umbrella anyway to provide that, and then our lower tier systems, our Patriots and so forth, our Aegis protect our lower tier. 

The position we are in, though, is, the basic capability that I just described to, provides U.S. protection, but it also offers significant protection for the rest of NATO.  Now, this is a contribution.  What NATO would need to provide is, number one, their own systems that they currently have and the willingness to integrate their systems with our systems for the mutual benefit of both. 

Any missile defense system operating autonomously has a certain amount of defended area.  If you integrate it with sensors that are geographically dispersed, you can in some cases triple the area that’s covered without expending any more funds just by the fact that you are willing to link together and go through the development of linking the systems together. 

So ours is a contribution to NATO, as we’ve always done, of our capability, but we are designing it in a way that it will benefit not only us but any country country’s contributions.  So the decisions by each individual country of what they are going to protect, that is their decision, and I know they’re all making their own independent decisions on what capability they are going to procure for that.  But no matter what they procure, when they integrate it to the U.S. capabilities that we’ve deployed over there, they will have a more robust capability just by the fact of working with us and integrating it. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Let me push you on that point before I turn to our audience.  What specific systems are you, as the U.S. government, encouraging the Europeans to prepare as part of the evolution of trans-Atlantic missile defense that will link into the PAA?  I know, of course, we are looking for territory to place our SM-3 on the ground in southeastern Europe and Poland and perhaps a radar in Turkey, but are we looking for a French missile defense inceptor?  Are we looking for a German radar?  Are we looking for Europeans to contribute either financially or in terms of specific systems to this network that we are establishing for trans-Atlantic defense?

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  To provide effective defense over in Europe, what you really need is the willingness to integrate.  We are not asking for them to buy additional systems that they already are not planning on procuring, but there is a significant capability that is being developed in Europe, satellite systems and other plans for the future. 

If we integrate those together, not only do you have greater coverage, but again, a metric that has come out, a key point, is the raid sizes.  How many missiles can you simultaneously defend against? 

Sensors is a significant contribution.  The location of the sensors – different geographic location of the sensors – is a significant contribution to the U.S. system. 

So there is a tremendous opportunity for marginal benefit to be added by every single asset.  Every single asset, every additional node adds to survivability, communication nodes, not only just sensors, but shooters, as you said.  The French have the SAMP/T, and there are other systems out there.  Patriot is out there.  Aegis is owned by several countries.  All of these, the important thing is to maximize their effectiveness. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Edgar – and before you go, Edgar, if I could ask if you  briefly identify who you are, who you are affiliated with, and please keep your comment or question to no more than a minute.  Thank you. 

Q:  Okay, thank you very much, Ian.  I am Edgar Buckley.  I’m with Thales and Thales Raytheon systems.  I used to be in NATO.  General, thank you very much for your remarks, absolutely splendid description of the progress which is being made.  My concern is how this going to link into what is going on in NATO. 

Now, the point you didn’t mention was that the ALTBMD system is designed to integrate with the existing integrated air-defense system of NATO.  So what NATO is planning to provide is not an air-defense system and a missile defense system; it’s an air-and-missile defense system.  And you also mentioned that the allies would contribute the lower tier, but I think in your remarks you just made now, you recognize that they can also contribute at the upper tier as well, which they are planning to do. 

The question is, how does this all fit together with the U.S. system, which has got its own C2BMC3, whereas the ALTBMD system has its own BMC3, which is being put on contract soon?  All of these things, I don’t think it is impossible, but it needs to be worked out. 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  It has been worked out over the last several years.  A key step was two-and-a-half years ago the NATO test bed for their command-and-control system in Hague was hard-linked to our command-and-control system development laboratory in Colorado Springs. 

Since then, we’ve had numerous tests.  And just as I mentioned before, the importance of having these existing laboratories that are not up for a limited time but a permanent time, that also includes – and that is two-and-a-half years ago, we started the hard-linking and we do have it today, between the developmental efforts for ALTBMD and their contribution, or, their C2 BMC – command-and-control battle management communication – with our system.  So we are doing that today and we’ll continue to do it. 

Critical to the very beginning of all of this is both programs, the U.S. and the ALTBMD program, were using NATO protocols and all their software and all their communications.  So I think the issue is not a technical issue as much as a decisions – military and organizational decisions to pursue to greater increasing levels of integration in our testing and development.  But the links are there and we’ve been very successful.

We conduct war games and exercises now, simultaneous in both locations – in Europe and Colorado Springs – passing the stimulants back and forth; making both systems think we are working together under attack.  That’s what is necessary for long-term development and that’s already in place. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Okay.  Simon?

Q:  Yeah, Simon Lunn from the NATO assembly – formerly from the NATO assembly.  Another layman’s question:  The secretary-general obviously has put his – put a lot of support behind this concept and I think there are a lot of hopes for Lisbon Summit.  But the cost is obviously a very worrying factor for all governments at the moment.  And we have this figure of two hundred million – I think it is – that the secretary-general quotes. 

Could you elaborate what exactly that covers and what it – more appropriately, what it does not cover?  Because that is a very convincing argument when it’s broken down and a divided amongst the countries, but there’s a lot of hesitation about the numbers and what those costs actually cover and what else we might be asked to buy down the road. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  If I could add on to Simon’s question is, when you look at the four phases, what are the rough order of magnitude of U.S. investment that’s going to be required in this because that might be an interesting justification to what we are asking the Europeans in terms of cost?

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I think first of all, to answer your question, you have to take into account these are mobile assets.  The way we develop a military capability across the board for – across the entire spectrum the capability in the U.S. is no different from missile defense than our standard traditional practices of, we do not have the capability to provide combat capability simultaneously around the world in multiple theaters at the same time.  So what we have is a framework of command-and-control that exists in different theaters.  That’s what we’re discussing here.

And then we have a pool of capability.  And the size of that pool of capability, the inventory and so forth, is currently a study that the Joint Chiefs are going through – the Joint Staff providing them.  That will determine the ultimate procurement development capability. 

My developmental budget and test budget is on the order of about 7 billion a year over the next decade to deliver all of this capability, which goes beyond just the PAA.  So it would determine what the actual combatant commander’s requests are, what’s his plans, then how does the Joint Chiefs allocate inventory towards those plans capability, and then what’s the cost of that capability? 

That, I couldn’t answer today.  But what I could answer is the focus we’ve had on building the framework so that you can surge capability into this region.  You can have standing capability.  But what is really key when you’re looking at hundreds of missiles in the air at once, and the threat indicates that in countries – if you just took the United States, Russia and China and all of NATO off the table, there are still over 6,000 ballistic missiles and over a thousand launchers in the other countries of the world today. 

Many countries in the Middle East have over a hundred launchers today.  So they can simultaneously launch a hundred missiles of varying ranges.  Most of them are short range but the greatest growth is in medium and intermediate range.  So the point I am saying is, you have to have a framework so you can surge the interceptor capability with the command-and-control. 

The numbers that I’ve seen – now, first of all, the Missile Defense Agency doesn’t develop this.  We support and we have personnel that are on – that are chairing the committees that determine these numbers for NATO and are personnel that are in the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme.  So we have a lot of visibility to it.

And I think the numbers that have ranged 2 hundred million or less euros are focused on what is the decision of the fidelity of this interoperability?  In other words, how – what particular functions do you want?  Do you just want the system to pass a radar track to another system or do you want it to tell these two systems that are both trying to shoot a missile at the same time, you don’t shoot, you shoot, you’ve got more inventory?  You know, to add command logic. 

So the number is not a fixed number.  Everything I’ve looked at today – it’s a determination by NATO on what capability do they want to have?  But if you had a very robust capability – a command-and-control fully integrated into our upper tier – the numbers I’ve seen are less than 2 hundred million euros; somewhere around there.  But I’ve seen it much lower, too – again, depending on what the NATO committee determines is their desired requirement. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  The gentleman in the green. 

Q:  Thank you.  Mike Ellman (ph) with the International Institute of Strategic Studies.  You talked a lot about the integration of the different components that the U.S. and NATO might deploy.  Could you talk a little bit about any activities or effort you have in trying to integrate, possibly, the Russian capabilities within the PPA – maybe the S3, four or 500 sensors that the Russians have – and if you have any type of such effort?  Do you have a specific bureaucratic organization within MDA whose sole responsibility or primary responsibility is to promote and look at cooperation with your Russia?  Thank you. 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  We do not have a specific organization that does that.  It’s my agency at large.  When I’ve been asked to – and I have, as I recall, at least five times engaged with the Russians over the past two-and-a-half years on ideas and proposals of how we can cooperate together. 

But it ranges across my agency from, early, my advanced technology group looking at directed energy systems and so forth which the Russians are very good at with the physics and so forth.  There’s a lot of contribution there.  I’ve proposed those based on them.  We’ve gone to our flight-test group; proposed how we could have a greater understanding of our capabilities and how we can work together through cooperative flight testing.

My sensors group and my command-and-control and systems engineering has been most engaged because we have shown how we can benefit from integrating their sensor systems with our sensor system not only for observing activity in the Middle East, for example, with some of their radars to the south to very precisely track their tests and so forth, but also to, again, increase the number of simultaneously launched missiles that could be tracked to both systems. 

So there’s not a dedicated group.  It significantly has been looked at across my agency.  I have been personally engaged in this myself at the request of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in these discussions. 

The discussion right now, there is cooperative work.  I’m sure that our speaker from the Department of State will probably mention that.  That has been going on at this time.  We’re prepared to go much further.  But it’s discussions that have been with the Russians today. 

I have been to Moscow to show capability of the PAA all the way through phase four so they clearly understand its limits.  It’s a very good capability against a threat within a couple of thousand kilometers from – it’s not a very good capability if you’re trying to defeat a threat that is deep inside Russia, as an example. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Gen. O’Reilly, let me just push you a little bit more on NATO – on U.S./Russia, NATO/Russia missile defense cooperation.  Most of us understand pretty well the political benefits of engaging Russia on missile defense, but from an operator’s perspective, has the last decade of missile defense cooperation with Russia either bilaterally or through NATO really yielded anything useful?  Has it really been a two-way street in which these meetings have brought insights, angles, capabilities that perhaps the United States did not have before? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I think it’s given us significant information about the Russian capability and, them, information about us; what the possibilities are.  For example, I have been to Russian early warning radar site – the transmitter receiver in Karbala, Azerbaijan, for example.

We saw the significant benefit of integrating that capability or using that sensor for the purpose, as I said, to monitor activity in the Middle East in areas of ballistic missiles and the proliferation of ballistic missiles.  Tremendous asset, there.  That’s a key capability. 

I know in earlier engagement between – earlier in Bosnia and other areas where we were working together in the last decade, in the early part, it was very good to have the understandings of how our command-and-control systems work together.  We’ve had a Russian/NATO/U.S. theater ballistic missile defense exercises where we had a great understanding of how we execute our command-and-control. 

So I think there are tangible benefits but, if anything, we’ve seen – it’s indicated to us the potential of how we can grow even further and benefit mutually from both a – not only political – geopolitical point of view, as you said, but also from an actual capability.
MR. BRZEZINSKI:  (David ?)?

MR.    :  (Off mike.)

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Gentleman right there in the shadow. 

Q:  Hiding in the shadows, Jerry Agee (ph) with MBDA.  General, thank you very much for your comments on C2 BMC.  You were very eloquent about that and how to integrate your C2 BMC with ALTBMD. 

But as I understand PAA and the slides, what you’re building with the Aegis system and ground-based Aegis is a mobile system that can be moved and deployed where ever the threat is greatest to the U.S.

If those assets are moved out of Europe to meet a threat halfway around the world, what does that leave Europe with to defend itself other than with the C2 BMC capability with ALTBMD attached? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  Well, first of all, I don’t accept your premise of your discussion.  We have a lot of assets that are mobile in Europe, have been there for over 50 years because of our commitment to NATO and I don’t think that’s going to change. 

So because we have capability that can protect the U.S., we also have a deployment of capability in NATO that needs – besides the aero defense that’s been there for sixty years, we also need missile defense. 

So I see this as just adding another layer of defense and capability that we contribute to NATO.  So the particulars about missile defense I don’t think change that basic calculus of why we are in NATO and why we have a forward presence there. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  To follow on that point, you’d mentioned two capabilities, which I thought was very interesting:  a command-and-control capability which seems it will be kind of fixed.  There will be the KAOC in Rammstein; there may be other elements; but based in Europe, 24/7, operating. 

And then you mentioned also that there would be a pool of capabilities that the United States is developing and that these will be – include mobile assets, which led me to infer – perhaps, generated this question is that these mobile assets, these SM-3s, these Aegis ships, may be short of surging around the world according to the crisis, so if something popped up in North Korea, as was the case, I guess, a year ago when Aegis ships were pulled into that theater, not denuding but lowering Aegis capabilities elsewhere. 

Is that the model that is going to be the basis for PAA?  Will Europeans be expected to understand that these capabilities will surge in and out according to the threat situation in theater and elsewhere in the world? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I think there is a minimum capability that – and again, what I’m speaking here is not unique to missile defense.  Missile defense in the past has been seen to have some exceptional rules or considerations.  It doesn’t.  Missile defense capability, once it’s been deployed and accepted by our services – Army, Navy, Air Force – which it is as we speak, especially over the next year.

As they accept these capabilities, they operate and they deploy it by our traditional deployment process, deliberate planning process, force allocation process that our Joint Chiefs operate.  But in every case, we have a forward-deployed capability that the combatant commander determines and the Joint Chiefs approves.  Needs to be forward.  And that, I believe, is on the order of what you’ve seen in these discussions here about the phase adaptive approach. 

But then there’s ability to augment.  So it is not the point that you’re going to find Aegis Ashore is gone and so forth.  I think it is more what conditional quick capability can you bring in besides the capability that is resident?  And that decision is made by the combatant commander. 

We have moved very far with the Romanians on selecting sites and so forth and getting to the point where they’re looking at making final determinations on where the Aegis Ashore site will be there.  That is the concept – is that site will stay there.  It could be moved in five months, but so could any of our capabilities – air bases, anything. 

So I don’t think missile defense is unique at all.  It’s a standard military processes for deploying capability.  So let me clarify:  The pool that I am referring to is an additional pool that you can augment because we have to be reactive to the threat that the combatant commander sees out there.  And that’s a pretty standard military practice.  So we want to have a global pool that we can use and also have forward-based initial capability just like we do with aircraft today.  Some stationed in Europe; some is back here. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Gentleman in the gray suit and blue tie?

Q:  Thank you very much.  I am – (inaudible).  I’m working with Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris.  And I have a question that actually follows on, on the questions of deployment. 

As you know, General, most of the capabilities that are developed in Europe –

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Could you speak up a little bit?

Q:  Sorry.  Most of the capabilities that are developed in Europe for force protection, that’s the same PT for France and (MIDAS ?) for Germany, et cetera, et cetera.  How do you see the PAA capabilities to interact with these theater missile defense protection in the future if Europe is – or, NATO is going to deploy on an outside theater?  Thank you. 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  From a technical point of view, integrating with an upper tier and more expansive network of sensors and command-and-control allows the capability that’s being procured today to track missiles earlier, have a fire control solution which is the information necessary to launch an interceptor sooner, and it can launch sooner.  So it expands the protected area on the ground and gives more opportunities for intercept.  It depends on the individual systems but none of this happens unless you are linked together. 

So the key decision is one of deciding to link to our command-and-control system.  ALTBMD already does.  We’re linking to our upper one.  But if you want to know from a technical point of view, the basic physics of it is you can launch your interceptors sooner against targets and engage them earlier. 


MR. KEMPE:  Fred Kempe from the Atlantic Council.  Can you talk about how much of this depends on a continuing Iranian threat?  Obviously, we want that to go away.  If that goes away in one form or another – political or otherwise – does the need for this system change, and do plans then change?

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I can tell you that the concern that the United States has is aimed at the proliferation of ballistic missiles; not only their proliferation in numbers but their sophistication; not just in their capability but in the simplicity of what it takes to launch a ballistic missile. 

I’ve operated some of these systems without any training; just using the manuals that are provided – that are sold in English.  We have the Internet to now order – to take down grid coordinates.  The systems being developed today – and it is not state of the art.  It’s basic systems now.  You enter in grid coordinates and the system does all the calculations. 

The trend of moving to solid rocket motors is very disconcerting because now you don’t have to have a specialty in understanding how to fuel the missile.  You can just buy a missile, park it somewhere, pull it out, enter in grid coordinates, GPS it; knows where it is on the ground; does the calculations.  It launches. 

So the concern is not just nation-state.  The concern is the asymmetric that it could be any nonstate actor that possesses these.  As I’ve said, there’s over a thousand launchers other than the major countries we know of today and over 6000 missiles.  The estimate is that number grows every five years by at least 1500 missiles.  And the rate is increasing and the accuracy of these missiles is increasing.  So I think it’s not just concerns about nation-states.  It’s concerns about proliferation and it’s concerns about the simplicity and the advancement of these systems now. 

So with that, I don’t see a path for the threat and the need for these systems to go away, unfortunately, if they are within the range of a system of a threat missile. 


Q:  Well, thank you, General.  Boyko Noev from Bulgaria.  Thank you very much for this exceptional presentation.  Actually, most of the answers that I wanted, you gave to Fred’s question. 

One more question.  We’re talking about intercepting fast delivery systems, right?  This is what the missile is.  Are these the only potential delivery systems that the missile defense is capable of defeating or there may be other systems which we don’t see today which, however, the system will be capable of dealing with?  Probably slower-moving drones, et cetera, et cetera.  Thank you.

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  We have within NATO the air defense network, which is established for slower-moving systems, as you say – the air breathers.  Cruise missiles, remotely piloted vehicles and aircraft.  And it’s been in existence for over 60 years.  This is an augmentation to that capability.  It does not replace it.  It complements it.

You have to have integrated air and missile defense systems and networks in order for an effective defense.  So we’re not proposing that missile defense be uniquely deployed.  It must be integrated with the air and missile defense system to have assurance of the type of protection that we’ve grown to expect.

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  Gen. O’Reilly, let me throw the last question at you – and hopefully, it’s – well, it’s probably a layman’s question but it might be a little bit loaded.  What does an Aegis Ashore look like?  What kind of facility is going to be built in Romania or in Poland?  How many personnel will be there?  What will it look like? 

And then related to that, the administration is supposed to roll out its global posture review shortly.  And I’m wondering, to what degree has the phased adaptive approach been integrated into that review?

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  I really will defer the global posture review to OSD policy and others who are working that.  I will say it’s compatible.  Because as you can see, we’re providing tools to not only our military but our allies’ militaries in order to have enhanced capability against the threat of – the growing threat of proliferation of missiles.

The specific question about Aegis Ashore – actually, in my presentation, you saw a deckhouse.  That is our latest concept.  And after a year of study, we’re handing it over to industry; been working with it.

But if you look at the front end of an Aegis ship today – the deckhouse – it’s designed with particular attributes so that the SPY-1 radar is up above the ground and it’s looking up and it’s out of the way of any interference on the ground.  And so you need a radar – you need a structure that has that size – about five stories tall.

And since you have that structure for the communications systems and the radar, then you’ve now got a lot of office space underneath it.  And at that point, you can put in the command-and-control systems and so forth – the fire control system. 

Our intent and our commitment is to build the Aegis Ashore system so that it is identical to a sailor as if he’s at sea.  When he gets inside the combat – they call it combat information center.  When he’s in there in Aegis Ashore or on a ship, he cannot tell the difference; from the workstations and the way it operates; the layouts and so forth.  That was done to minimize cost of the logistics of the training base and so forth and add operational flexibility.

So the number of sailors that typically watches is a few.  I won’t get into the specifics here.  But it’s not a large number on any one shift and it would be the same routine, the same operations, the same training that you would for Aegis at sea, and that’s done by intent. 

So you’ll see a deckhouse.  I would like it to be painted green but I believe the Navy will probably keep it gray.  (Laughter.)  A decision was made this year that the Navy will man it – the U.S. Navy will man it onshore.  I believe that’s the largest U.S. weapons system ever to be manned by the Navy on the ground. 

But it gives us a tremendous amount of logistical, personnel and other flexibility by having the ability to move the contingent of sailors from sea to shore without any special training or anything.  And there’ll be an associated building with it.  And then a short distance away, a couple hundred meters, will be the launchers so that you meet all the safety and hazard requirements. 

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  How many is that?  Is that a couple hundred personnel?  A thousand personnel? 

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  Actually, I said that the actual operation is a minimal number.  Then it gets into the base operations and the logistics operation.  And that’s a decision the Navy hasn’t firmed up yet.  But it’s not several hundred.  It would be less than that.  But the exact number, the Navy is still determining right now based on its concept of operations.

MR. BRZEZINSKI:  General, I thank you very much for your time and insight, a very impressive briefing and your forthrightness in the Q&A.  We hope we’ll do this next year and we hope you’ll be willing as well to join us.  So let’s give a hand to Gen. O’Reilly.  (Applause.)

LT. GEN. O’REILLY:  Thank you. 


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