On September 29, Austrians will select their next parliament, and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is currently leading in the polls. With questions remaining about whether or not the FPÖ can enter government and how that might impact Austria’s policy approach, Europe Center experts analyze the key stories to watch ahead of the vote.
What’s the state of play?
The parties in the current government coalition, the Christian-democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Greens, are projected to lose seats in the Nationalrat, Austria’s parliamentary chamber. Together, they reach only 34 percent in the polls.
According to recent data by the Austrian Institut für Demoskopie und Datenanalyse, the far-right FPÖ is leading the race at 27 percent of the vote, closely followed by the ÖVP with 25 percent, well within the margin of error. Even if it pulls out a tight victory, the ÖVP will interpret the result as a historic loss. The party received 37 percent in the 2019 national parliamentary elections—12 percentage points higher than where it is now. This performance can likely be attributed to high inflation soon after Chancellor Karl Nehammer took the reins of the ÖVP in 2021 from Sebastian Kurz, the wunderkind chancellor who resigned due to corruption scandals afflicting him and his inner circle.
Left-wing parties are also performing poorly. The Social Democrats (SPÖ), traditionally powerful in Austrian politics, are polling at the same level (21 percent) as their electoral loss in 2019. The Greens, currently in a tense government with the ÖVP, are polling at 8 percent, about 5 percentage points lower than in 2019 and about the same as the liberal NEOS party. Some Green voters presumably migrated to protest parties, such as the satirical Beer Party and a revived Communist Party, neither of which will likely reach the 4 percent threshold for parliamentary representation.
—Thomas Goldstein is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Who leads the far-right FPÖ?
Herbert Kickl leads the FPÖ as chairman, having taken over party leadership in 2021. Kickl has been a major figure in the FPÖ for decades, serving as a key advisor and strategist to former FPÖ leaders. However, for much of this time he was primarily a behind-the-scenes actor rather than a leading figure. That changed during the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition government that was in power from 2017-2019, in which Kickl was the interior minister. As interior minister he was responsible for migration policy, which helped him fashion a more public profile.
When Kickl took over the FPÖ in 2021, the party was struggling after a scandal rocked the party’s leadership in 2019 and collapsed the government. Kickl has brought the FPÖ back to political strength with increasingly uncompromising and radical positioning. Under Kickl the party has embraced the concept of “remigration” in immigration policy. Kickl is also known for his aggressive rhetoric and has not shied away from explosive language. He has made liberal use of the term Volkskanzler (people’s chancellor), which is associated with Adolf Hitler and the early Nazi period.
—Ian Cameron is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
What are the expectations for the FPÖ?
Those familiar with German politics may draw parallels between the FPÖ and Alternative for Germany (AfD), but there are some distinct differences. Notably, the FPÖ is a normalized political force in Austria that dates to 1956, vacillating across the political right until settling on a populist platform since 1986. The party has served in the federal government twice: from 2000-2002 after winning the parliamentary elections, and again from 2017-2019 when Kurz, tilting the ÖVP to the right, refused another grand coalition with the SPÖ. The FPÖ has had limited success in acquiring provincial leadership posts as well.
However, normalization does not bring predictability: the FPÖ has never led a federal government. Even as the victor in 2000, it became the junior partner to the ÖVP under the threat of European Union (EU) sanctions in response to the fact that the FPÖ was founded by former Nazis. The party has also proven unstable in government, as exemplified by the 2019 ‘Ibizagate’ scandal that brought down Kurz’s first coalition, in which former FPÖ leader and Vice Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache thought he was soliciting campaign finance favors from the niece of a Russian oligarch. If the FPÖ can form and lead a coalition, expect hardline immigration policy and pushback on EU-level initiatives.
—Thomas Goldstein
What issues are driving support for the FPÖ?
For FPÖ voters the most important issue in the election is immigration, but for the majority of Austrians that isn’t the case. Immigration is indeed a major topic in Austrian politics, and polling showed it was the most important issue during the European elections. However, for the vote on September 29, “health” and “work” both beat out immigration. Voters also want stability and for the government to last its full five-year term.
Another high-priority issue for Austrians is inflation and the cost of living. The average inflation rate in Austria for the post year has been 4.2 percent, and last September it was still at 6 percent. The FPÖ has adopted a surprisingly liberal economic platform for the election that rejects all tax increases, embraces lower social security payments, and promotes a pro-business stance. In fact, the center-right ÖVP has accused the FPÖ of essentially copying its economic platform to attract disillusioned ÖVP voters.
—Ian Cameron
How likely is it that the FPÖ wins the election and leads the next Austrian government?
In the last few months, the ÖVP has run a strong comeback campaign against the FPÖ, but the FPÖ has maintained a lead for the entirety of the election and is likely to emerge as the strongest party. That will likely be cold comfort for the FPÖ though, because the other major parties refuse to enter a government led by Kickl.
It is possible that the ÖVP and FPÖ could coalesce if Kickl were to forgo a claim to the chancellorship. Kickl seems unlikely to accept that, essentially leaving the FPÖ locked out of government. However, forming a coalition without the FPÖ leader could prove tricky. The ÖVP and the SPÖ are projected to narrowly miss the required number of seats to form a two-party coalition. This means that the most likely outcome will be a three-party coalition directed at keeping Kickl’s FPÖ out of power. The only two options for that seem to be coalitions of the ÖVP, SPÖ, and Greens or the ÖVP, SPÖ, and NEOS, and it remains unclear how stable those coalitions would be in the longer term, especially as Austria has never had a three-party coalition before.
—Ian Cameron
How might the outcome impact European policymaking?
If given the mantle of government leadership, the FPÖ will likely mirror Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Euroskeptic style and be a spoiler alongside Slovakia. In late June 2024, the FPÖ co-created the Patriots for Europe alliance in the European Parliament alongside Orbán’s Fidesz party. Statements from FPÖ officials also underline a Kremlin-friendly tone. Harald Vilimsky, the FPÖ delegation leader in Brussels, advocated that neutral Austria immediately cease its contributions to the European Peace Facility and other forms of aid to Ukraine. Petra Steger, another member of the European Parliament, criticized EU-coordinated sanctions on Russian gas as selling out Austrian sovereignty. Kickl has suggested using Austria’s EU Council veto to stall Ukraine’s EU ascension negotiations.
Moreover, the FPÖ may clash with Austria’s new European Commissioner-designate, Magnus Brunner, who hails from the center-right ÖVP. Tasked with the migration portfolio, Brunner may be pushed by FPÖ to represent a more hardline position.
Austria’s neutrality is a sensitive political theme that will underpin either a FPÖ-led government or an unprecedented three-party coalition: only 42 percent of Austrians believe that Ukraine should continue fighting to recapture occupied territory. Of all surveyed Austrians, 37 percent believe in an immediate ceasefire, even if it benefits Russia, including 63 percent of FPÖ voters.
—Thomas Goldstein
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