WASHINGTON—The first national security crisis of the Trump administration began before it had even taken office. In November 2024, repeated sightings of unknown aerial vehicles paralyzed New Jersey and other areas of the East Coast. The anxious speculation and government investigations that followed revealed that most sightings were drones, many flown by hobbyists. This scare in the air brought to the homeland the brutal lesson that had been learned from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East about how drones are transforming security. Cheap unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) leave Americans and our critical infrastructure vulnerable to surveillance, malicious acts, and even attack from a distance while operators remain relatively safe.
Over one million drones are operating in the United States, and the number is rising. These systems offer enormous benefits—supporting public safety, business, recreation, and so much else. But their risks are rising together with their numbers and capability. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) receives more than a hundred drone-sighting reports near airports every month that challenge aviation safety. The US Department of Homeland Security reported more than 27,000 UASs near the southern border in the second half of 2024, many used to smuggle drugs. Drones interfere with wildfire-fighting aircraft, violate temporary flight restrictions at major events, and create hazards even when operators are simply trying to get a closer look.
More troubling is drone activity around military bases and critical infrastructure. UASs were spotted over Langley Air Force Base in late 2023 and more recently over Barksdale Air Force Base, home to key nuclear command and control assets. Without clear attribution, the persistence and sophistication of these drones suggest malicious actors may be probing facilities crucial to US national security. If conflicts overseas reveal anything, it is that drone use is no longer limited by their capability, but only by how operators wish to use them and how they are regulated at home.
As the threat from drones has come into focus, it has captured the attention of senior US officials. Speaking at the Atlantic Council on Tuesday, Executive Director of the White House Task Force on the World Cup Andrew Giuliani explained what he told US lawmakers was essential for the matches: “We need counter drone coverage.” And the concern was not just about the World Cup, but also future college football and NFL games, and other large public events.
UASs are evolving to enable flight beyond visual line of sight, longer endurance, greater payload, and better sensors.
But the United States is behind. For years, only a handful of federal agencies were legally allowed to track or mitigate drones. That left the nation dependent on a small group of operators to protect everything from major public events to critical infrastructure. This is changing for the better. Congress took an important step by passing the Safer Skies Act in December, broadly expanding Counter-UAS (C-UAS) authority to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies. Now agencies responsible for the daily welfare of their communities can also begin to address harmful drone activity. US President Donald Trump also signed two executive orders in 2025 aimed at advancing efforts to integrate UASs safely into national airspace and protect critical infrastructure from harmful UAS impacts. These are positive actions, but Washington needs to act more aggressively to catch up with growing drone threats.
Start with achieving broad airspace awareness. The FAA requires drones over 250 grams (0.55 pounds) to be registered and to broadcast a radio signal, often via WiFi or Bluetooth, that identify the drone and its position. But enforcing these rules is nearly impossible at scale, and most of these radio signals are only detectable at short range, unless using advance detection systems. This leaves the majority of the country unaware of where drones are flying. Broader requirements are needed, such as expanding identification to cellular-based systems using existing 5G/LTE networks, which have a much greater range, and mandatory geofencing and altitude-limiting features built into drones to prevent the devices from being flown where they don’t belong. These may not stop malicious actors, but they will help authorities distinguish between compliant operators and those who warrant further scrutiny.
Interagency coordination also needs to improve. In a recent case, the US military used a laser to shoot down a threatening drone along the Mexican border, only to discover it was operated by US Customs and Border Protection. In another, Customs and Border Protection used a laser with Pentagon approval to shoot down a drone believed to be used by a drug cartel, prompting the FAA to halt flights at El Paso. The Pentagon has taken steps to unify military, federal, and interagency efforts against rapidly growing drone threats by creating Joint Interagency Task Force 401. It is a multi-agency structure appointed as the lead organization for countering small UASs both for battlefield applications and for security at home. The task force has a sweeping mandate, which includes not only operational coordination against UAS threats in the homeland, but also coordinating policy, procurement, training, and operational response across government agencies and fielding systems into a unified national defense architecture. These efforts need to be funded and implemented aggressively with full participation of agencies with C-UAS roles.
No C-UAS effort can be successful without trained and equipped law enforcement personnel across the country, and this needs to grow fast. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has begun training state and local law enforcement personnel at its new National Counter-Unmanned Training Center in Alabama, and federal agencies are developing a list of authorized C-UAS systems. But demand will far exceed current capacity. The FBI should expand training and authorize third-party training facilities to meet national needs.
Indeed, the federal government is wisely using the FIFA World Cup to speed C-UAS improvements. FEMA’s new $250 million grant program to fund C-UAS capability in World Cup host states and the National Capital Region, with another $250 million available across the United States next year, is a strong start. These programs should expand until C-UAS capability becomes a standard public safety tool nationwide.
As drone manufacturers and operators innovate, C-UAS technology needs to keep up. UASs are evolving to enable flight beyond visual line of sight, longer endurance, greater payload, and better sensors. Their navigation systems are becoming more autonomous, making drones harder to track and counter. C-UAS policies and technologies must evolve just as quickly.