At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this past Saturday, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth spoke about the “most consequential region in the world.” He was not talking about the Middle East, where the US-Iran conflict, now in its fourth month, has settled into a brittle ceasefire, as the Strait of Hormuz’s closure continues to rattle the global economy. He was talking instead about the Pacific—and, in the process, reviving a long-running and wider debate about whether the United States should “pivot” its attention away from the Middle East and toward the Indo-Pacific.
The US role in the world is, of course, more complicated than focusing exclusively on one region or the other. So, we asked three of our leading experts to assess where things go from here and how the United States should position itself in the world following the Iran war.
Grand strategy: Don’t “pivot” now
Contrary to those who argue that the United States can and should pivot to Asia, this conflict shows that the Middle East will likely remain an important theater for US grand strategy for years to come.
Since World War II, Washington has prioritized three theaters in its grand strategy and military force posture: Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. US strategists viewed these as the three regions with the greatest concentrations of wealth and danger whose security and stability mattered for the well-being of average Americans.
In recent years, however, some strategists have argued that the United States is over-indexed on Europe and the Middle East and that it should “pivot to Asia” instead. So-called prioritizers have made this argument most starkly. They argue that Washington should focus on Asia—the fastest-growing, most dynamic region—and allow capable allies in Europe and the Middle East to step up and police their own regions. They further argue that US energy dominance makes the United States less dependent on Middle Eastern energy than in the past. They maintain that while a nuclear-armed Iran would be a problem, it is one that can be contained, and that preparing a military to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is a much more challenging and important task.
Operation Epic Fury calls many of these assumptions into question. While some strategists might argue that a nuclear-armed Iran can be contained, elected leaders of the United States from George W. Bush to Trump have consistently disagreed. Trump has argued repeatedly that military action is necessary to ensure Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. And while energy independence provides many benefits, it does not insulate the US economy from disruptions to Middle Eastern energy supplies. The energy market is global, and disruptions to supply anywhere result in price spikes in the United States. We see this today as Americans pay nearly $4.50 at the pump, on average, for a gallon of regular unleaded gasoline. Moreover, while US allies and partners such as Israel are highly capable, they are not a one-for-one replacement of the United States. When the time came, only the Pentagon had the capabilities needed to destroy Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities and severely degrade its conventional military.
Some hope that Operation Epic Fury will lance the boil of the Middle East once and for all, allowing the United States to finally prioritize the Indo-Pacific in its strategy. Indeed, it is still possible that the Islamic Republic could fall, bringing to power a pro-Western government that is more cooperative internationally and respects the human rights of its own people. This would be a welcome and transformational development for the region.
To successfully address these challenges, as I’ve argued at length before, both Washington and its allies will need to do more. First, Washington will need to greatly increase defense spending and revitalize its defense industrial base. Trump’s requested $1.5 trillion defense budget is right on target. Second, Washington will need to lead its allies as they step up to contribute to defenses in all three regions. This will only work with active US leadership.
—Matthew Kroenig is vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence community during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations.
East Asia: Build stockpiles and share conflict lessons with allies
As the Iran war has played out, many commentators have argued that the movement of US forces to the Middle East, along with the expenditure of limited stocks of key munitions—already a topic of concern—is compromising deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. A related take emphasizes the concerns of Indo-Pacific ally countries who were not consulted before the United States initiated a conflict that has had huge ramifications for them, so many of their people now reportedly see Washington as unpredictable, even unreliable. It is easy to see the downsides.
But the glass may be half full. First, it is unlikely that Operation Epic Fury will create a window of opportunity for US adversaries that causes deterrence to fail in the Indo-Pacific. As the analysis of the Atlantic Council’s own Brian Kerg notes, China’s military is not ready to seize Taiwan and will still need years to be ready to do so. Chinese President Xi Jinping has just purged his top military leadership and is still in the relatively early stages of what appears to be a massive buildup of his nuclear forces. He seems—for now—to be seeking to drive the wedge deeper in Taiwan’s contentious domestic politics rather than gamble on a military attack that could simply galvanize a unified response. Similarly, although I continue to assess that deterrence is crumbling on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s heavy commitments to the Russian war against Ukraine and its own ongoing force development suggest Pyongyang is also not quite ready to start a war, either.
Further, this conflict may be the catalyst for some long-overdue actions necessary to strengthen deterrence in East Asia. Whether one thinks Operation Epic Fury was a mistake or a necessary evil, the broader strategic view should be to consider how to enhance Indo-Pacific stability and deterrence in the aftermath so that today’s war in the Middle East can help the United States prevent or win the next war in East Asia. The United States could start with four approaches:
First, given the centrality of nuclear issues for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and the importance of assuring Seoul it does not need to unilaterally develop nuclear weapons, Washington should remain steadfast in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons as a precondition for any end to the conflict.
Second, the massive and largely effective use of anti-missile and anti-drone interceptors in the Middle East has proven the value of such capabilities but also intensified the shortfalls in supplies of interceptors. The United States must undertake transformational, expensive, risky, politically controversial, and creative approaches to building interceptor stockpiles—including integrating with and relying on allies and partners to an unprecedented degree. Meanwhile, the Pentagon should quickly field energy weapons, rapid-firing guns, and other more logistically feasible counter-missile and counter-drone capabilities to overcome the “magazine depth” problem.
Third, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and ensuing disruption of tanker shipments out of the Gulf should catalyze new efforts for the US to help ensure energy security for US friends and allies in East Asia, including with US liquefied natural gas and assistance with the rapid expansion of safe nuclear power.
Fourth, the United States should undertake a comprehensive effort, even before the conflict ends, to share and highlight to Indo-Pacific friends and allies the military lessons learned from the conflict. This should include US personnel and equipment coming straight from the war zone for temporary or permanent duty at Indo-Pacific bases—ideally meeting their families there. The remarkable performance of US military forces in Operation Epic Fury should not go unnoticed or unheralded in the Indo-Pacific because the battles happened far away or because the strategic political goals have proven elusive. Meanwhile, while pundits speculate about what China’s military may be learning from watching US operations, US-allied militaries in the Indo-Pacific should be gaining the confidence that comes from learning directly from the best, most battle-experienced warfighters in the modern world.
—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served at the headquarters of Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea for twelve years, including five years as the director of its Strategy Division.
Middle East: Constrain Iran, restrain Israel, and reinforce Gulf ties
Once more, the siren song promising an easy fix to Middle East instability has lured US leaders into a war that will end without satisfying anyone. With that realization, Washington should quickly shift to managing the threats posed by Iran, preventing a restart of the war, and refocusing on US strategic interests.
The first order of business is constraining Iran from rebuilding its nuclear program, missile capabilities, and still-lethal Lebanese and Iraqi proxies and Houthi partners. Although degraded, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–dominated regime will seek to rebuild each while extorting its threat to Strait of Hormuz shipping.
A strong nuclear deal should be the anchor. But one that constrains today’s advanced Iranian nuclear program is a long shot, and limits on Iran’s missile arsenal and proxy support are even longer odds. As such, ongoing, extensive naval patrols and interdiction efforts will be necessary, requiring US partners and allies.
It will also require a modus vivendi with China and Russia, including sticks. Trump can work directly with Xi to produce common ground on preventing a return to war, but Trump also should lay markers for interdicting Chinese vessels supplying dual-use items, sanctioning involved Chinese firms, and unleashing Israel if Iran rebuilds its missile forces or nuclear program. Instead of rewarding Russia with an invitation to the Group of Twenty, the US must reimpose oil and gas sanctions and step up pressure to end Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Second, Washington must work harder to restrain Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “total victory” bluster, backed by territorial seizures in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria; visions of regime change in Iran; and refusal to stem the explosion of settlements and violence in the West Bank make the expansion of the Abraham Accords more distant than ever—no matter Trump’s cajoling of regional leaders. The administration was right to force Israel into a ceasefire in Lebanon, but the necessary road ahead for both Lebanon and Gaza will be long and hard. Israel’s imperative to constrain Iranian threats hangs over everything; clear red lines for Israeli covert and kinetic activities, without enabling Iranian malfeasance, are necessary.
Third, the US should develop a regional policy addressing the geopolitical realignment underway in the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates is deepening relations with both Israel and the US, and its exit from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries benefits Washington. But the growing UAE-Saudi rift poses a clear danger to regional cooperation and threatens to widen conflicts as far afield as the Horn of Africa.
Finally, it is imperative to remedy the war benefits accruing to Russia and China from friction between the US and its allies, diminished US military stockpiles, and distraction from adversary management. Repairing allied relations must top the to-do list, including restoring prewar defense postures, stepping up joint defense production, and reengaging diplomatically—for example, scheduling a trilateral meeting with Seoul and Tokyo and a Quad leaders meeting.
Last year, Trump declared his vision for a “golden age” in the Middle East. The biggest obstacle is the administration’s lack of strategy and limited capacity to develop and implement one. The complexity of this watershed moment will require a major change in approach: unshackling the United States’ foreign policy bureaucracy, restoring deliberative policy formulation, and putting all hands on deck.
—Beth Sanner is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project advisory committee and a former US deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration.