WARSAW AND WASHINGTON—The Trump administration can land a deal that US administrations have sought since the 1950s: One for an effective NATO alliance with greater European military contributions, something this administration has called “NATO 3.0.” But Washington risks blowing it up.
In the last few weeks, without adequate internal or ally consultations, the Trump administration has made a dizzying array of force posture decisions completely disconnected from a real-world assessment of the security threats facing the United States and NATO.
For those keeping track, the administration has announced a reduction in the brigades earmarked for Europe, from four to three, with possibly more reductions in store. It also canceled the deployment of a long-range fires battalion to Germany and outlined plans to pull out five thousand US troops from the country (seemingly more out of pique at the German chancellor’s criticism on Iran than strategic calculation). The administration also stopped a planned rotation of a US brigade to Poland.
Then late Thursday, US President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the United States would send an additional five thousand troops to Poland, without specifying where those troops would come from. This about-face comes on top of Trump’s complaints about Europe’s lack of support for the US in Iran and threats that the US might not show up for Europe’s NATO allies.
Meanwhile, Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and its campaign of sabotage and intimidation against European NATO allies. Russia’s position is vulnerable—it’s not doing well against Ukraine, and signs of its internal economic and political stresses are apparent. But instead of pressing its advantage against a major adversary, the US is sowing doubt and dismay among its friends.
What gives? Can the transatlantic alliance, which has done so much over decades to advance US and free world security, get back on track? And given uncertainty about US policy toward (and commitment to) NATO, what should US allies be doing?
That’s what senior officials and old friends of ours in Finland, Estonia, and Poland—countries particularly exposed to Russian pressure, serious about their own (and NATO’s) security, and close to the US—discussed with us in intense conversations over the past two weeks.
What Finns are saying
The Finns know a lot about dealing with Russian aggression. Finland’s national unity was forged, a senior Finnish official explained, in the Winter War of 1939-40 when it held off Soviet armies enough to maintain its independence. In a battle that may become precedent for Ukraine, Finland lost territory, but Finns kept their freedom. The memory of that resistance is strong enough even today to provide deep political backing for a tough, self-reliant military. The Finns joined NATO in 2023 but remain prepared to deal with Russian aggression: real “peace through strength.” And in 2023, Finland closed its land border with Russia after Helsinki found that Moscow was sending migrants to crossings as a pressure tactic. The land border remains closed today.
Finland’s leaders are concerned about what they see as unsteady and potentially even unreliable US policy, but they have reacted in a cool, practical fashion. On the one hand, Finnish President Alexander Stubb maintains solid and steady relations with Trump with a drama-free discipline that will surprise no one who has worked with Finns over the years. On the other hand, the Finns have worked to expand Europe’s diplomatic options. Stubb has called for the EU to develop its own channels to Russia to discuss issues including Ukraine. European channels to the Kremlin have a mixed history (just look to the Minsk process, which Russia undermined, delaying settlement and dodging increased Western pressure).
The Finns, however, have privately suggested that this time, a well-conceived European channel to Russia must start with a tough message that Europe will neither abandon Ukraine nor fall for Russian diversionary tactics. That message, the Finns noted, should make clear Europe’s determination and apply pressure to achieve actual progress, e.g., a true and lasting ceasefire, perhaps starting with a cessation of attacks on major civilian airports.
With respect to defense, senior Finns noted that their own military strength (with NATO, including US, backup) would be a credible deterrent to Russia. That fits well with the US push for Europe to do more on its own defense, but requires the US to be systematic, not haphazard, in planning its military presence in Europe, the Finns observed. For now, Moscow’s rhetorical threats and trolling are best handled with stony silence, which is easier to maintain, Finns noted, when the Russians are not capable of or actively building up a threatening presence on the east side of the border—which is the case at the moment.
What Estonians are saying
Estonia is smaller and more vulnerable. While Estonian officials say they also have seen no evidence of a Russian military buildup to their east, they recognized that one may come. In the meantime, they are more sensitive to Russian trolling and threats, and they’re puzzled (to say the least) by a lack of a US warning to Moscow not to threaten Estonia or other NATO allies bordering Russia. After the US announced it would postpone an armored brigade rotation to Poland, Estonians reacted with alarm, out of concern over the receding US presence in NATO’s eastern flank and over the haphazard, even dismissive, way in which it was announced.
Uneasy about the messages and decisions from Washington, Estonian national security leaders are thinking through short- and long-term options for their own security. In the short term, they noted, this means doing what they can with their friends in the Trump administration and US Congress. In the longer term, they acknowledged, a stronger Europe is critical. To sustain the needed military capacity, Europe needs to accelerate its economic growth, and Estonians cited the Draghi report on increasing Europe’s competitiveness as a blueprint. Having themselves transformed their economy from Soviet-era stagnation to a modern, high-tech system, Estonian enthusiasm about similar reforms across Europe is no surprise.
But the Estonians are worried about the gap that could develop should the US pull away from its NATO obligations without adequate planning, before Europe is ready to step up in its own defense. Their memory of Soviet occupation is even more bitter than the Finns’, as the Soviet Union completely occupied Estonia in 1940 and deported tens of thousands of Estonians to Siberia. Now, Estonia believes it should prepare to fight like hell from day one if Moscow attacks, using its technological skill to bring the war to Russia. The United Kingdom leads the NATO multinational brigade-strength unit in Estonia, and the Estonians were confident that the United Kingdom and other allies engaged in the brigade would also fight from the outset. Estonia seeks to be a hard target for Russia, the officials said, but they acknowledged that a less questionable US commitment would help solidify an effective deterrent to Moscow.
What Poles are saying
The Trump administration has termed Poland a “model ally” and with good reason: Poland is NATO’s leader in military spending as a share of gross domestic product, slated to hit 4.7 percent this year and continue to rise. Poland’s politics is fractious, but its strategic culture is coherent, and memories of wars and occupation by Russia remain strong. Poland’s military buildup, its commitment to NATO, and its alliance with the US enjoy broad political support. Given the size of Poland’s economy and the rate at which it is growing, this buildup is serious. Poland’s army may soon be the EU’s largest. Warsaw has been buying US planes, tanks, helicopters, missiles, air defense systems, and more, in deals worth tens of billions of dollars. Poland remains the principal base from which military support for Ukraine flows. Its centrist government actively works with the Trump administration and US Congress, and it is generally active in and outside of Washington, DC. In a meeting last September, Trump told Poland’s rightist president, Karol Nawrocki, that the US would maintain its troop presence in Poland.
Given this, Poles—who are already uneasy with Trump’s recent disparagement of NATO—were stunned by the US decision earlier in May to cancel the scheduled brigade rotation to Poland after it was already underway. It was a poorly coordinated decision, communicated neither to the Polish government nor to senior US military commanders in Europe in advance.
Polish officials and security experts were equally (though more privately) concerned about the implications of the US rhetorical disparagement of NATO and signs that more US forces could be pulled from Europe. Like other security-minded Europeans, Polish experts and officials were willing to support a transition to the Trump administration idea of a NATO 3.0—meaning more European military capability within NATO—if it were planned and methodically executed. Ill-prepared and unilateral US withdrawal was not what they signed up to, they stressed.
Polish leaders handled their concerns well: They kept their public statements moderate but went to work fast—sending senior officials to Washington and working the telephones either to reverse the decision on the brigade or at least get some context so that it made sense. Poland’s government and its allies on NATO’s eastern flank were hardly alone: Key members of the US Congress roasted defense officials over the brigade decision. Within the Trump administration, an unusual number of officials, including political appointees, started expressing their dismay (albeit in private) over both the tactics of the brigade decision and also its larger context.
Trump’s Truth Social announcement about sending five thousand troops to Poland triggered Polish relief, though it is not yet clear where the forces would come from. The brigade rotation that was postponed could be back on. Or, as some US sources suggested, forces could be moved from Germany or elsewhere in Europe.
Doubt has already seeped in
The latest announcement on Poland is welcome, but stories of additional US withdrawals from Europe continue to circulate and weigh on the Finns, Estonians, Poles, and others, including many in NATO’s headquarters who have been trying to steer the Alliance toward a soft landing rather than break with the Trump administration. On May 19, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexus Grynkewich tried to assuage some of the concern about the US presence in Europe by saying that force drawdowns would take place over several years, without a rigid timeline, and as European capabilities develop.
Trump’s announcement of five thousand additional troops to Poland improved the atmospherics at the NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Helsingborg, Sweden, held this week. There, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was quick to dismiss the impact of the earlier US force posture decisions on NATO’s ability to deter and defend. In his opening press conference, Rutte indicated as much when he said that the rotational forces involved in the US announcements “do not have an impact on NATO’s defense plans.”
But the newest announcement couldn’t stop the recent abrupt US troop announcements from generating concern among allies about the United States’ steadiness. More changes to the US posture are likely, with the United States considering a reduction in the number of troops that are pre-committed and available to NATO in a crisis.
Before these May announcements, the United States, at its best, had outlined a reasonable idea to rebalance NATO as Europe steps up (what most call NATO 3.0). In Sweden, Rutte emphasized once again that he supports this plan as long as it happens gradually and in a structured approach that results in a stronger Europe inside a stronger NATO.
But Washington’s unsteady behavior, only partly mitigated by the Trump announcement about more forces to Poland, has spread doubts among some of its best friends, including allies who sent troops to distant wars the US led in Iraq and Afghanistan because they believed in the Alliance. It is not hard to discern the fights within the administration between those who take NATO 3.0 seriously (and want to get there in an orderly fashion) and the neo-isolationist, “fortress America” group that evokes NATO 3.0 to abandon the Alliance that kept the peace since World War II and helped win the Cold War. To repurpose a well-known Polish poem, a successful alliance is like good health: You value it only when it is gone.