A Colombia-Venezuela agenda for recovery, security, and economic growth

Colombia and Venezuela are bound by deep historical, social, and economic ties, but also by shared security and migration challenges. The 2,200-kilometer border facilitates flows of people and goods, as well as illicit activities that increasingly destabilize both countries.

In recent years, Colombia has absorbed the bulk of Venezuela’s political and economic fallout, hosting millions of migrants while leading efforts to confront transnational criminal organizations that operate along the border, often with tacit support from Venezuelan security forces. President Abelardo de la Espriella’s administration has identified Colombia’s role in Venezuela’s future as an important foreign policy focus. Speaking at the Atlantic Council before taking office, Colombia’s new Vice President José Manuel Restrepo highlighted that Colombia could be a strategic partner for the United States in supporting Venezuela’s democratic transition and economic recovery, including by helping mobilize investment and providing basic goods and services.

The major earthquakes that struck Venezuela and Colombia less than two months apart are likely to slow progress on that agenda as both countries face urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. On June 24, two earthquakes of magnitudes 7.2 and 7.5 struck Venezuela, with Caracas and La Guaira among the hardest-hit areas. On August 10, a 7.4-magnitude earthquake with its epicenter near San José del Palmar in Chocó caused widespread damage across western Colombia, including the departments of Valle del Cauca, Risaralda, and Caldas.

Across both countries, needs extend from shelter, food, health care, safe water, and sanitation to child protection, psychosocial support, and repairs to damaged homes, hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure. International partners have already begun supporting these efforts in both countries, and sustained assistance will be critical. Colombia is positioned to advance reconstruction faster given its established disaster-response institutions. As conditions at home stabilize, its capabilities could also allow Colombia to support Venezuela’s recovery through technical expertise, goods and services, and private-sector participation.

As disaster response and recovery advance in both countries, attention can gradually shift toward building a broader bilateral agenda. The fourth session of the US–Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition, held shortly after de la Espriella’s election, explored areas where Colombia and Venezuela could cooperate over time. Opportunities include pilot security coordination aimed at reducing the territorial control and operational capacity of illegal groups operating on both sides of the border while strengthening protection for border communities affected by conflict, as well as trade facilitation, agribusiness, and energy projects that could support livelihoods and economic activity in border regions.

Advancing this agenda would require both sustained US support and parallel progress in Venezuela toward rebuilding the rule of law and institutional capabilities, including an independent judiciary and electoral system, guarantees for political and civil freedoms, reform of security forces, and more predictable rules for contracts and investment.

Colombia and Venezuela after the earthquakes

The June 24 earthquakes in Venezuela have caused over six thousand deaths, while thousands remain missing and tens of thousands were displaced. The country already had 7.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance at the start of 2026, and UNICEF estimates that 1.8 million people in affected areas, including 680,000 children, now require support. The United Nations  Office for Disaster Risk estimates $37 billion in damage to housing and infrastructure, with 47 percent in residential buildings and the remaining in roads, water and electricity systems, health facilities, schools, and other public assets.

A post-disaster needs assessment is underway with support from the UN, World Bank, European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF). The United Nations Development Programme is also working with the ministries responsible for public works, housing, transportation, and water on sector plans and debris management.

Humanitarian organizations continue to give support alongside those efforts. The Venezuelan Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) continue to provide primary health care, psychosocial support, water, and other assistance. The IFRC has launched an emergency appeal to support 300,000 people over two years. International and local NGOs are also providing shelter, food, child support, and psychosocial assistance.

The scale of the damage will take years and require financing well beyond current available levels. The World Bank estimates that, at current levels of public and private investment, reconstruction in Venezuela will remain incomplete over the next decade. Mobilizing private capital could help meet part of the remaining needs, but legal uncertainty and weak judicial safeguards continue to limit investment.

In Colombia, nearly 300 people have died and more than 186,000 people have been affected following the August 10 earthquake. Government assessments have identified nearly 27,000 homes destroyed and more than 127,000 damaged, while preliminary economic losses are estimated at 30 trillion Colombian pesos, or $9.6 billion.

Damage has been reported across major cities including Cali, Pereira, and Manizales, as well as rural municipalities across Colombia, affecting more than 25,800 families. The response is particularly difficult in areas where access, public services, and state capacity were already limited before the disaster including rural municipalities in Valle del Cauca and Chocó. In Chocó, most of the department depends on river and air transport, and communities near the epicenter remain difficult to reach. Landslides and damaged roads, together with disrupted communications, have complicated the delivery of assistance. The department is particularly vulnerable as over 30.8 percent of the population live in multidimensional poverty, compared with 9.9 percent nationally.

Colombia is responding through its existing National System for Disaster Risk Management, with the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGDR) coordinating national agencies and affected local governments. De la Espriella has also declared an economic emergency, which allows the government to issue decrees with force of law without approval from Congress. As part of these decisions, the government has already announced a reconstruction fund to channel national and international contributions to hospitals, schools, housing, roads, and airports. Other measures include rental subsidies for families that lost their homes, temporary waivers for utility payments, tax and financial relief, and support for merchants and small businesses. As Colombian Foreign Minister Omar Bula highlighted at an Atlantic Council event on August 18, “We’re moving from saving lives to stabilizing communities and from stabilization toward reconstruction.”

Civil society organizations and private companies have mobilized support alongside public agencies through donation drives, food distribution, health brigades, medical supplies, and support for transportation of humanitarian assistance. International partners, including foreign governments and multilateral institutions, have also begun mobilizing resources for emergency relief and damage assessments. The government also has access to a $200 million World Bank contingent credit line that can provide liquidity after a major disaster.

Sustaining that international support will be important as both countries address humanitarian needs and the much larger costs of reconstruction. In Venezuela, priorities include keeping children in school through temporary learning spaces, learning materials, and teacher support; helping families who cannot return home through rental or repair assistance; restoring health and water services; and preparing projects that multilateral banks and private investors can help finance. In Colombia, continued assistance can also advance these priorities across all affected areas, including in remote communities where the state has historically faced limitations maintaining an institutional presence and providing basic services. Colombia’s established disaster-response institutions may allow reconstruction to move more quickly than in Venezuela. As conditions stabilize, its public agencies and Colombian companies could then support needs in Venezuela through technical expertise, goods, and services. Cooperating on this priority would also help establish channels for cooperation in other areas.

Building a broader Colombia–Venezuela agenda as recovery advances

Once both countries have room to look beyond disaster response, the focus can gradually shift toward areas where Colombia and Venezuela share economic and security interests.

Bilateral trade reached $1.13 billion by the end of 2024, with Colombian exports accounting for nearly $1 billion. Colombia primarily sells manufactured goods and food products to Venezuela, while Venezuela supplies industrial inputs such as iron, fertilizers, and batteries.

Before the June earthquakes, there was growing optimism around Venezuela’s economic potential, especially as international investors responded positively to early signs of the restoration of rule of law in the country, such as the Hydrocarbons Law Amendment enacted in January 2026, which among other reforms expanded legal routes for dispute resolution. At the same time, there is an expectation for new laws to be accompanied by other fundamental changes in the Venezuelan government, such as reforms that restore the independence of the legislative and judicial branches and strengthen institutionality, as these steps are critical to sustained foreign investment. Prior to the earthquakes, the Colombian–Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce projected growth of more than 10 percent in 2026 and sustained double-digit growth over the next five years, based on new hydrocarbons and mining legislation, partial easing of US sanctions on energy and mining, and growing foreign investment. However, the effects of the earthquakes will likely delay those outcomes.

For Venezuela, closer cooperation with Colombia could help meet demand for goods and services that its domestic economy is not equipped to provide in the short term, while supporting the long-term recovery of key industries. Venezuela could provide a market for Colombia’s companies and, over time, could become a source of its natural gas if greater legal certainty and institutionality allows investment to advance. This is particularly relevant as Colombia’s proven gas reserves have declined in recent years and are now equivalent to only 5.9 years of production. Increased trade could also create formal jobs and strengthen livelihoods in border communities.

While the porous Colombia–Venezuela border has economic potential, it also remains a major sanctuary and transit corridor for transnational criminal organizations. The National Liberation Army (ELN) has become the dominant armed actor along much of the border, financing operations through drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, and smuggling—while consolidating territorial control over border communities like Catatumbo, where violence and displacement have intensified. The Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia recorded more than 78,000 displaced people in the region 2025 alone.

Dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—although weakened in some areas by internal fragmentation, military pressure, and competition with the ELN— continue operating in border areas. Other criminal organizations, including the Gulf Clan (EGC) and Tren de Aragua, also exploit the border for human trafficking, fuel smuggling, and other illicit activities. Their presence also exposes communities to extortion and forced recruitment and can restrict access to basic services. Together, these groups also discourage investment, a key barrier to Venezuela’s economic recovery. Security cooperation is therefore essential to the bilateral relationship and would be most effective if extended beyond military operations to include civilian protection and legitimate economic opportunities for affected communities.

Strengthening the Colombia–Venezuela relationship will require not only recovering from the earthquakes but overcoming significant political and institutional constraints in Venezuela. Questions remain about the legal and regulatory conditions for investment, the capacity of Venezuelan institutions to implement projects, and the influence of criminal networks within parts of the security apparatus.

The US-backed negotiations launched in early August between Venezuela’s interim government and an opposition delegation can help address some of these constraints. The first cycle of negotiations concluded with a preliminary agreement to initiate a new application process for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court, which signals a start to the necessary political reforms for restoring Venezuela’s governance institutions. Further progress will require strengthening the National Electoral Council, restoring guarantees of political participation, and establishing conditions for credible and legitimate elections. Venezuela will also need a meaningful overhaul of its security sector including a functioning and transparent state security system that does not collaborate with armed clandestine syndicates like colectivos, or target citizens that express political dissent.  

To advance these goals, the United States could further push for reforms of the security forces, including new leadership, independent oversight bodies, and divorcing paramilitary, nonstate actors from the formal military and police institutions. Colombia can complement this support by joining other partners in encouraging measurable progress on judicial independence, civil and political rights, security sector accountability, and the legal and regulatory predictability needed for investment.  

Progress in these areas would create more room for Colombia and Venezuela to cooperate on the following four priorities:

1. Establish phased border security cooperation in priority corridors.

Initial cooperation could focus on reducing illegal armed groups’ ability to operate freely across the shared border and preventing them from returning to areas recovered by the state. Doing so would involve maintaining a security presence to protect communities while improving educational opportunities, basic health services, and access to water and electricity.

Rather than pursuing a broad military alliance, the two governments —with US technical support—could establish coordination and information sharing protocols for selected corridors. A starting point could be the La Guajira–Zulia and Norte de Santander–Táchira corridors, where formal crossings, roads, and the presence of customs and security institutions make coordination more feasible than in other parts of the border.

Colombia and Venezuela could prioritize establishing vetted liaison channels and secure information sharing protocols to exchange intelligence on illegal armed groups’ movements, financing, and networks. Through this approach, each government would remain responsible for law-enforcement operations within its own territory while coordinating when groups cross the border or seek refuge on the other side. This is particularly relevant because within days of taking office, the new Colombian administration launched operations against the ELN and joined the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition, singing its willingness to intensify pressure against transnational criminal organizations. These operations could produce a “balloon effect,” whereby criminal groups relocate and expand into areas outside the initial target zones. As security operations intensify in Colombia, Venezuela can play a critical role in ensuring that these groups are not simply displaced across the border and allowed to regroup or consolidate their presence elsewhere.

The greatest challenge will be rebuilding institutional trust, as Colombia has long raised concerns that Venezuelan territory provides a permissive environment for illegal armed groups. US support through the Pentagon and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs could be focused on personnel training, anti-corruption safeguards, and secure communication systems. If the Guajira–Zulia and Norte de Santander–Táchira pilots demonstrate results, cooperation could be expanded to other parts of the border. Each pilot could include consultations with community leaders and humanitarian organizations to ensure that both countries also address the main protection concerns in each corridor, and that operations are sequenced with efforts to maintain state control and strengthen livelihoods in areas recovered from armed groups.

Over time, if these initial coordination mechanisms prove effective, Colombia and Venezuela could consider expanding them into a broader bilateral counter-drug agenda. This would require agreement on priorities, institutional counterparts, and information-sharing mechanisms, and safeguards for cooperation on joint investigations, interdiction, illicit finance and asset tracing, and precursor chemical controls.

2. Strengthen priority trade and logistics corridors along the border.

Colombian Foreign Minister Omar Bula has said that the De la Espriella administration will prioritize the economic potential of the relationship with Venezuela. The appointment of businessman Jorge Jaller as ambassador in Caracas reinforced that focus and suggested that trade and investment will be central to Colombia’s engagement in Venezuela.

To build on recent progress and expand cross-border trade, efforts could be aimed at improving two trade and logistics corridors: the Maracaibo–Paraguachón–Maicao corridor, with connections to Colombia’s Caribbean ports; and the Norte de Santander–Táchira corridor. These routes already have formal border crossings and serve as established commercial routes. Improving their infrastructure and streamlining their operations could facilitate trade, help integrate supply chains, and create opportunities for investment on both sides of the border.

As a first step, the Colombian embassy in Caracas could consider leading a review of the cooperation completed to date through the Colombia–Venezuela Commission of Neighborhood and Integration and its technical groups on commerce, transportation, and economic integration. Based on this assessment, the embassy could then work with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (MinCIT), the Ministry of Transportation, Venezuelan counterparts, and relevant US agencies to develop a plan for each corridor. These plans should establish protocols to streamline and secure the movement of goods, reduce delays at border crossings, improve cargo inspections, and address sanitary and phytosanitary barriers. The plans might also benefit from identifying priority infrastructure that would contribute to expanding trade, including logistics centers, cold-storage facilities, and distribution centers.

Coordinated support between the US State Department, US Commercial Service, and the US Trade and Development Agency, could assist with roadmap design and help connect investment opportunities with US companies.

3. Reactivate the Antonio Ricaurte gas pipeline and enable Colombian participation in Venezuela’s energy recovery.

Colombia is positioned to support efforts to revitalize Venezuela’s energy sector. This would be important not only for Venezuela’s economic recovery but also for strengthening energy security in Colombia and border communities and supporting US efforts to mobilize responsible investment in Venezuela.

The reactivation of the Antonio Ricaurte gas pipeline could be an initial opportunity for cooperation. The pipeline, which has been inactive since 2015, could provide Colombia with access to competitively priced natural gas while generating revenue for Venezuela. Reactivating it would require cooperation between Colombia’s majority state-owned energy company Ecopetrol and PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company. The Colombian government could continue supporting Ecopetrol’s request for licensing from the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to engage with PDVSA.

If the authorization is granted, Colombia can engage the US Department of Energy and multilateral development banks to support the technical assessments, financing arrangements, and operational standards required to reactivate the pipeline. The Pentagon could also work with Colombia’s Ministry of Defense to develop measures to protect the infrastructure from illegal armed groups.

Venezuela’s oil sector also presents opportunities for Colombian engagement. Colombian firms with experience in engineering, drilling, maintenance, asset management, and workforce training could play an important role in the sector’s recovery. However, existing US licenses do not provide a pathway for Colombian projects to work directly with PDVSA. The Colombian government could therefore work with the US Departments of the Treasury and State to identify whether a licensing mechanism could allow Colombian firms to participate in authorized projects. To support this process, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and MinCIT, in coordination with the Colombian Oil and Gas Association, could identify firms with the necessary technical capacity and compliance standards to support their OFAC licensing petitions.

4. Develop agriculture and livestock value chains in priority border regions.

Border regions have unique and complementary potential in agricultural and livestock production. Developing these sectors could strengthen food security, create formal employment, and support crop substitution efforts.

A pilot could focus on the cross-border area linking Catatumbo in Colombia’s Norte de Santander with Venezuela’s Táchira and Zulia. The region has potential in products including cacao, coffee, tropical fruits, oil palm, and livestock. If the area is prioritized as a pilot security initiative, an accompanying economic-development component would also be key for stabilization.

With technical and financial support from the US Department of Agriculture and the US Trade and Development Agency, both Colombia and Venezuela could map existing production capabilities for priority crops and identify opportunities to expand production. These assessments would help determine what is needed to strengthen each value chain, including technical assistance for small producers and investments in roads, irrigation systems, storage, processing facilities, and other supporting infrastructure. The process would benefit from the participation of producer associations, binational chambers of commerce, farmers associations, and subnational leaders in identifying and designing these opportunities.

Once the Catatumbo needs are identified and advanced, the two governments could replicate the model in the Arauca–Apure region, building on its cattle ranching and dairy industries. In both areas, Venezuela will also need support to strengthen its sanitary and phytosanitary protocols, particularly its capacity to detect, monitor and report animal diseases and plant pests. This is especially important because although Venezuela’s last reported outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease was in 2013, the country has yet to meet the conditions for recognition by the World Organisation for Animal Health as free from the disease. Colombian and US institutions could provide technical assistance on disease and pest surveillance, certification, and reporting.

Conclusion

The earthquakes in Colombia and Venezuela have created major humanitarian and reconstruction needs in both countries. Sustained international support will remain important as Venezuela moves through a long reconstruction process and Colombia advances its response and recovery. As immediate pressures ease, Colombia and Venezuela will have more room to explore opportunities for economic and security cooperation.

Colombia is well positioned to become a key partner in US efforts to support Venezuela’s recovery and institutional strengthening. Its proximity, complementary industries and supply chains, experienced companies, and knowledge of the border can help it play an important role in supplying goods and services and helping restore key sectors of the Venezuelan economy. The United States can play a central role in supporting a Colombia–Venezuela agenda by mobilizing technical and financial tools, and helping ensure that cooperation advances through transparent, accountable, and results-oriented channels. If implemented correctly, this agenda can help lay the groundwork for longer-term cooperation among Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States on shared economic and security priorities.

At a moment of renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere and Colombia’s ongoing electoral cycle, the Atlantic Council launched the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition to help update and modernize the bilateral agenda and put forward recommendations for renewed cooperation across security, economic, and governance priorities. This coalition is the successor of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force originally established in 2017 under bipartisan US Senate leadership.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Image: People cross from Venezuela to Colombia via the Francisco de Paula Santander International Bridge, days after the US struck Venezuela and captured its President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, in Cucuta, Colombia, January 7, 2026. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez