The ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 ushered in a period of profound political instability in Sudan, disrupting the momentum of Turkish-Sudanese relations that had flourished during the al-Bashir era. In response, Turkey adopted a cautious stance, recalibrating its ties with Sudan through economic investments and soft power initiatives. Meanwhile, regional rivals—the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—expanded their influence and deepened their footholds in Sudan’s evolving political landscape. The outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, further convinced Ankara to preserve its cautious stance, carefully balancing between the warring parties, engaging in mediations and humanitarian relief while persevering economic ties.

However, with Turkey and Egypt normalizing their relations, the potential for alignment in Sudan has emerged. For Ankara, this rapprochement presents an opportunity for a more emboldened role in Sudan’s ongoing civil war by cooperating with Cairo, changing its cautious stance into a proactive one. Yet, this prospective shift is fraught with challenges as both nations navigate entrenched rivalries and divergent interests that continue to shape the broader geopolitical environment.

Turkey’s controversial Sudan policy during the Bashir era

Beginning in the mid-2000s, as a part of its Africa strategy, Turkey pivoted toward a conflict-ridden Sudan that was internationally isolated due to human rights abuses in Darfur and its terror support. Despite the fact that increasing interest in deepening relations with al-Bashir was criticized harshly domestically and internationally, Ankara attributed importance to its relations with Sudan, particularly in the strategic Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğa visited Sudan in 2006 and again in 2017, culminating in twelve agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation, including establishing a High-Level Strategic Cooperation mechanism.

Turkey’s deepening engagement in Sudan exacerbated regional geopolitical competition, particularly against the Egyptian-Gulf axis. Turkey and Qatar’s involvement in Sudan, particularly through their support for the Muslim Brotherhood, raised concerns in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Egypt perceived Turkey’s actions as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood’s network, an ideological rival to Cairo, exacerbating already strained relations between Cairo and Khartoum.

Ankara’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Red Sea port city of Suakin challenged the strategic interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the region. In 2017, Turkey and Sudan signed an agreement to rehabilitate Suakin Island, a strategically significant site near key maritime routes linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. The project aimed to restore Ottoman-era buildings, develop tourism infrastructure, and potentially create logistical ports. Later, the two engaged in talks for military training centers planned to be established by Turkey in Sudan during the visit paid by Minister of National Defence Hulusi Akar, who was accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Yaşar Güler in 2018. This raised alarms in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Turkey’s cautious Sudan policy after the fall of Bashir

Following al-Bashir’s fall, Turkey adopted a cautious approach toward Sudan’s transitional government, which decided to reassess its agreements with Turkey and recalibrate its foreign policy, forging closer ties with Gulf states and distancing itself from Ankara to avoid further entanglement in regional power struggles. Ankara initiated several diplomatic engagements with the Sudanese leaders to bridge the gaps. In August 2019, then-Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu attended the signing of the Constitutional Declaration in Khartoum, and Erdoğan met Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok during the UN General Assembly.

When the war erupted between the SAF and RSF, Turkey chose not to side with either of them. Instead, Ankara avoided becoming embroiled in Sudan’s internal power struggles and showed an interest in a mediation role. Erdoğan engaged both the president of the Sovereign Council of Sudan and commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as well as RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, urging dialogue and offering to host negotiations. Ankara showed its interest in mediating through its intelligence diplomacy, led by Hakan Fidan, then-chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization and current minister of foreign affairs. As these efforts fell short, Turkey tilted toward Sudan’s Sovereign Council, particularly al-Burhan, who visited Turkey twice amid the conflict.

Ankara has prioritized expanding economic relations with Sudan. Turkey’s exports to Sudan grew by 22.25 percent in 2020, making Sudan the sixth largest export partner in Africa, worth over $300 million. In 2021, the two countries set a $2 billion target in the next five years. Also, al-Burhan visited the Presidency of Defense Industries in Ankara, showing the SAF’s interest in Turkish military equipment.

However, Turkey’s commercial projects in Sudan have been facing setbacks. The construction of Khartoum’s new international airport by Turkish firm Summa was suspended in 2019, with negotiations ongoing but no timeline established. The Turkish company MV Karadeniz Powership Rauf Bey left Sudan in 2022 due to unpaid debts, highlighting the financial challenges. Similarly, initiatives in energy and mining, including agreements by Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and other Turkish firms, stalled since 2019. Ankara has been focusing on convincing Sudanese authorities to revive the agreements signed on mining, energy, and infrastructure. For instance, the director of the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration of Turkey, commonly known as MTA, visited Khartoum in 2022 to convince the Sudanese energy minister to reconsider the agreements signed before.

Despite all these challenges, Turkey’s strategic use of its soft powers, blended with humanitarian engagement and medical diplomacy, allows Ankara to remain relevant in Sudan’s complex political landscape. During the COVID-19 pandemic and severe floods in 2020 and 2021, agencies like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) provided critical assistance, maintaining Turkey’s ties in Sudan. Also, the large hospital Turkey built in Nyala, near Khartoum, plays a crucial role in treating patients affected by the conflict.

Cairo-Ankara thaw: Strategic implications for Sudan

Enhanced relations with Egypt may help Turkey overcome these challenges in Sudan. To begin with, Ankara probably expects that the recent rapprochement with Cairo, following the UAE and Saudi Arabia, would encourage the new Sudanese government to become more receptive to cooperation with Ankara as the regional rivalry has eased. Yet, significant challenges remain for resuming the stalled cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere. Ankara’s key priorities include reactivating stalled projects in energy, mining, and strategic infrastructure to boost economic ties. However, despite an upward trend in trade, many agreements remain stagnant due to not only the Sudanese Sovereign Council’s hesitation to reengage with Ankara but also Sudan’s financial constraints and the protracted conflict, which hampers large-scale investment opportunities.

The thaw between Turkey and Egypt opens avenues for strategic alignment in Sudan. Egypt, driven by concerns over Nile water security and geopolitical interests, seeks a stable government in Khartoum that aligns with its interests. Similarly, Turkey, with its significant investments in Sudan, favors a stable environment to safeguard its economic activities.

Ankara is likely to view supporting Cairo’s mediation in Sudan as strategically advantageous, particularly given Turkey’s previous unsuccessful attempts at mediation. Egypt has actively pursued diplomatic efforts, including hosting a summit of Sudan’s neighboring countries in July 2023 to establish a conflict resolution framework. However, initiatives led by Gulf partners, such as the US-Saudi-facilitated Jeddah platform, the Manama talks in January 2024, and the recent Geneva talks, have overshadowed Egypt’s role, highlighting the challenge of maintaining influence amid competing mediation efforts. A strategic partnership between Cairo and Ankara could enhance their effectiveness but would require careful navigation to avoid direct competition with the Gulf states.

As Iran tries to gain ground in Sudan, which will help Tehran to expand its influence in Africa and the Red Sea region, Ankara may use this to navigate complex regional dynamics unfolding in Sudan between the Gulf powers and Egypt. Reports suggest that, on the one hand, Iran supplied drones to the SAF, aiding them in reversing the gains of the RSF; on the other hand, it is arming both warring parties with its anti-tank missiles. Having renormalized diplomatic relations with Sudan after eight years of severed ties, Iran’s involvement may tip the regional power dynamics. Cairo and Ankara may find it in their interest to collaborate in Sudan to shift the balance of power in the war in favor of the SAF, helping it sit at the negotiating table from a stronger position and counterbalancing Iran.

If Cairo and Ankara can achieve such a strategic partnership and yield results, this could also have implications for Libya. Ankara is wary of the possible spillover impact of Sudan’s conflict on Libya, considering the close ties between Libyan National Army (LNA) chief Khalifa Haftar and Hemedti. As the battle for control over oil resources, on the one hand, and the revenues generated from oil, on the other, resurfaces in Libya amidst the CBL crisis, the military offensives of the LNA in Ghadames, and mobilization of Tripoli forces, Ankara will likely seek ways to contain the risk of conflict and preserve the fragile stability in Libya.

However, aligning too closely with Cairo will also pose some challenges for Ankara, particularly in managing its relationship with Ethiopia, a key regional partner with substantial Turkish investments, arms deals, and security cooperation. Ethiopia has already been embroiled in disputes with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Their tension is increasingly reverberating in the wider geopolitics as Somalia and Egypt allied following the port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland.  As Ankara deepens ties with Cairo, balancing this relationship with its strategic interests in Ethiopia will be crucial, potentially limiting the extent of Turkey’s alignment with Egypt in Sudan.

In conclusion, while the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement offers potential for coordinated action in Sudan, entrenched regional rivalries, conflicting strategic interests, and the involvement of external actors will impact the depth and sustainability of this cooperation. Navigating these challenges will require careful diplomacy and a recalibration of both countries’ regional strategies.

Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar is an IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. Her research interests include Turkish foreign policy, North Africa, Tunisia, Libya, democratization, authoritarianism, civil wars, the Arab Spring, and regional and interstate conflicts. 

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

Image: Sudanese refugees sit with their babies at the hospital in camp Iridimi, eastern Chad July 2, 2004. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that even more refugees could flee fighting in Sudan's troubled Darfur region into Chad as heavy rains begin, further worsening the humanitarian situation. REUTERS/Radu Sigheti RSS/DL