The recent reconciliation between Turkey and Egypt, marked by substantial agreements, illustrates the potential for cooperation and the underlying tensions in the Horn of Africa, which could reshape the region’s geopolitical landscape. In particular, the past ten months have witnessed two significant events in the interaction between the two countries. The first was the signing of a joint declaration in February, in which Turkey and Egypt agreed to cooperate in various fields, including defense and security. The second took place in Cairo in August, where Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a defense agreement with Egypt. Shortly after the agreement, Egypt sent its first military assistance and a few officers to Somalia. Egypt’s increased political and military footprint in Somalia opens up a new scenario shared with Turkey. While the two countries’ strategic interests appear to converge, there are signs of potential future confrontation.

Turkish-Egyptian relations in the post-Islamist era

The improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations indicates a gradual strategic alignment resulting from practical assessments by the respective political leaderships. Three main factors have influenced the gradual normalization process between Egypt and Turkey. Two factors resulted from practical assessments within the two countries, while the third was more influenced by international dynamics. After the 2019 local elections, Turkey’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic. Nationalism has gradually replaced its former Islamist character. In addition, Ankara revised its stance on equidistance between the West and Russia. Until 2021, balancing relations with the “West and the Rest” through greater strategic autonomy had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, Ankara increased its presence in various regional and international crises, positioning itself as a possible broker. On the other hand, the cooling of relations with traditional Western partners had an economic impact. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan appeared to set out with a goal to significantly improve relations with the West while maintaining Turkey’s strategic autonomy in multiple scenarios. After normalizing relations with former rivals such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (2020–22), Turkey has reengaged with neighbors such as Syria, Greece, and Egypt over the last two years. Ankara sees improving regional relations as crucial to boosting economic growth and domestic stability. Egypt is an important market for Turkish goods and a country with which to discuss various issues, including the Horn of Africa. Therefore, Turkey decided to partially sacrifice its relations with Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to revive bilateral relations with Cairo. After Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2014, Turkey hosted many Muslim Brotherhood members who set up media networks to criticize the Egyptian government. Cairo expressed dissatisfaction, citing Turkey’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood as an obstacle to improving bilateral relations. For this reason, cooling ties with the Muslim Brotherhood was a Turkish signal to el-Sisi.

From Egypt’s perspective, restoring relations with Ankara is seen as a driver for improving the country’s economic conditions. Egypt’s political leadership views Turkey as an important regional trading partner, with particular interest in the defense and agricultural sectors. Egypt has actively sought to expand its security cooperation. With this aim, Cairo has intensified its defense cooperation with Russia. However, Turkish defense products are increasingly seen as a viable alternative. Since 2023, Egyptian delegates have met several times with Haluk Görgün, the head of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, to finalize supply agreements. Besides Turkish-made drones, Cairo has expressed strong interest in various advanced defense products, including the TRLG-230 missile; mini smart munitions such as MAM-C, MAM-L, and MAM-T; and the L-UMTAS anti-tank missile system. Indeed, an agreement with Ankara is seen as less politically problematic than with Russia or China, as it raises fewer concerns among Egypt’s Western allies, especially the United States. Furthermore, Turkey has been an investor in sectors such as textiles, construction materials, and agribusiness. Egypt looks favorably on any Turkish investment in these sectors. The conflict in Ukraine and other regional crises have put additional pressure on Egypt’s public finances. Egyptian leaders are seeking both short-term and long-term solutions to avoid the uncontrolled price increases and inflation that can lead to instability. Turkish entrepreneurs, many of whom have a long history of working in Egypt, are seen as a valuable resource for increasing industrial investment in Egypt.

Converging interests amid regional shifts

In addition to domestic factors, two regional developments have helped bring Turkey and Egypt closer. The first was Israel’s military action against Hamas in response to the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. Both Turkey and Egypt have had to navigate their positions carefully. While the Turkish and Egyptian public are strongly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, Ankara and Cairo’s longstanding institutional ties with Israel, particularly in the areas of intelligence and security, have created some ambiguity. Turkish President  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and el-Sisi’s strong condemnations of Israeli actions in Gaza, backed up by regular public statements, have collided with their general political and diplomatic inertia. This inconsistent approach has not only irritated the domestic population but also caused friction, at least verbally, with Israel. In an attempt to break out of this ambiguity, Turkey and Egypt have jointly called for a ceasefire and the delivery of substantial humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people. But their position appears weak. One consequence of the Gaza conflict has been increased insecurity in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks on commercial maritime shipping. If free transit through the Red Sea is not restored in the coming months, the impact on the Egyptian economy could be devastating. Indeed, a significant portion of Egypt’s revenue comes from the transit of ships through the Suez Canal. Consequently, a reduction in traffic means a reduction in revenue.

The second regional development that has led to a convergence of interests between Turkey and Egypt is the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland. The agreement between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa has intensified the rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt. If implemented, this agreement will facilitate trade between Ethiopia and the port of Berbera. There are also plans for Ethiopia to establish its naval headquarters on Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognizing the country’s independence and providing shares in state-owned companies. Egypt and Turkey view the MoU as a negative development for the region, but for different reasons. Turkey, which has strong ties with Ethiopia, finds the agreement troubling because of the potential recognition of Somaliland. Ankara has been actively involved in Somalia’s state-building efforts for many years. From the Turkish perspective, preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity is considered essential for the country’s future stability. Turkey’s intransigence is driven primarily by domestic political considerations. Indeed, the Kurdish issue forces Ankara to oppose any claims of independence, including those of Somaliland. Conversely, Egypt’s main concern is Ethiopia’s potential access to the Red Sea. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt, previously confined to the Nile basin, has recently widened. With the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia gains leverage over Egypt and the ability to supply cheap energy to other energy-hungry countries in the region, thereby increasing its influence. As a result, Cairo has had to adjust its approach and enlarge the scope of the struggle. El-Sisi has strengthened ties with many regional states to create a united front against Ethiopia. Cairo has engaged in shuttle diplomacy, including high-level visits to leaders in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have included Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly’s participation in the inauguration of Somalia’s Mohamud. Cairo also conducts anti-Ethiopian lobbying in regional and continental organizations. Therefore, Egypt’s foreign policy in the region has gradually focused on the Red Sea. Egypt has traditionally viewed the sea between Suez and Aden as an Egyptian lake and has, therefore, sought to expand its footprint in a region that it considers part of its sphere of influence. Although Egypt’s inability to address the Houthi threat has exposed the weakness of the Egyptian Navy, it remains the most advanced and well-equipped in the region.

Amid tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu sought support, and Egypt saw an opportunity to establish a presence in the region. Egypt quickly provided diplomatic support to Somalia, while Turkey, maintaining a delicate balance with Ethiopia, intervened on Somalia’s side by signing a defense cooperation agreement. As a result, Turkey and Egypt found themselves on the same side after the Addis-Hargeisa MoU. Both countries reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, differences in their motives emerged when Egypt opposed Ankara’s call for diplomatic mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia and adopted a rigid stance. Egypt’s decision to sign a security and defense cooperation agreement with Somalia could exacerbate existing differences with Turkey. Mohamud’s visit to Cairo last August set the stage for unprecedented cooperation between Egypt and Somalia. Shortly thereafter, Egypt sent its first consignment of small arms and light weapons, armored vehicles, and a few officers, with plans to increase the deployment to ten thousand troops in the coming months. Egypt’s initiative clashed with Turkey’s plans. Ankara’s attempts to mediate differences between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu over the port deal signed with Somaliland were unsuccessful due to Somalia’s stubbornness. Egyptian support contributed to the Somali delegation’s uncompromising stance during the August meetings in Ankara. There are still many concerns about Egypt’s decision to send troops to Somalia. One major concern is whether Egypt has the capacity and effectiveness to maintain a presence in such a volatile environment. In addition, Egypt’s eagerness to lead the African Union’s upcoming peacekeeping mission may clash with the fact that Egyptian troops lack operational expertise. There is also concern about Turkey’s relationship with the Egyptian troops on the ground. The Turkish government has remained relatively quiet about Egypt’s decision to send troops but is beginning to show its disapproval of Cairo’s actions. Some Turkish officials believe that Egypt’s involvement has hampered mediation attempts between Ethiopia and Somalia. From a Turkish perspective, Cairo’s actions could escalate tensions with Ethiopia and destabilize Somalia’s political landscape, posing a greater risk to Turkish political and economic investments.

Regional rivalries and divergent agendas: Challenges to Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement

The trend in Turkish-Egyptian relations in recent months has been toward rapid normalization. However, rapprochement does not mean overcoming differences on all hot-button issues. On some regional issues, such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries remain distant and have contradictory positions. In light of the above, Turkey and Egypt’s political maneuvering in the Red Sea region could pose a new challenge to the full normalization of relations. Initially, both states presented a united front in their support for Somalia, albeit with different underlying agendas. Egypt used the opportunity to open a new front in its rivalry with Ethiopia. Turkey needed to maintain its commitment to the Somali nation-building process. Nevertheless, a divergence emerged when Egypt decided to increase its military presence in Somalia. It is therefore no coincidence that Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s openness to de-escalation, enshrined in the Ankara Declaration, coincided with Egypt’s difficulties in maintaining its commitment to Mogadishu. Although the Turkish-sponsored negotiations do not solve the Somali-Ethiopian problems, they serve as a means for both actors to stall and possibly rethink their strategies. Undoubtedly, the Turkish diplomatic line has so far had the upper hand over Egyptian intransigence. Although not evident at present, two other major regional actors—Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are likely to influence future developments. The two historic regional allies are increasingly at odds over several issues, including Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Riyadh could intervene to support Egyptian efforts to thwart Emirati economic and political initiatives (especially the Addis Ababa-Berbera Corridor). This situation could bring Turkey closer to the UAE, with which it has long cooperated in Ethiopia. Many future developments will depend on several factors, including the stance of the Trump 2.0 administration, the policy choices of the new government in Somaliland, and the growing internal tensions in Somalia between Mogadishu and the federal states (e.g. Jubaland), all of which will create a delicate phase in the region. Under these circumstances, the Horn of Africa is likely to witness a rupture between Egypt and Turkey, but also a resurgence of regional competitive dynamics. In sum, the shifting dynamics between Turkey and Egypt underscore the complex nature of regional politics in the Horn of Africa. As both countries pursue their interests while dealing with external pressures, their interactions will affect not only their bilateral relationship but also the broader geopolitical stability of the region.

Federico Donelli is an assistant professor of international relations in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Trieste, Italy. He is also a senior research associate at the Istituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale in Milan and a nonresident fellow at the Orion Policy Institute in Washington, DC. He is a consultant on political and security issues for various governments, private companies, and international organizations.

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

Image: A Somali girl walks down a road at sunset in an IDP camp near the town of Jowhar. Photo: Flickr