In June, Denmark unveiled new fully autonomous sailboats designed for scientific data collection and surveillance of the Baltic and North seas. These boats, known as Voyagers, are the latest dual-use technologies in an increasingly long line of maritime autonomous vehicles (MAVs) used by Arctic states.
As the Arctic melts, attention is increasingly turning to the region as an emerging theater for geopolitical competition and confrontation. Arctic states are vying for control over militarily strategic locations, trade routes, fishing rights, and mineral reserves in the region. In an increasingly accessible and contested Arctic, MAVs will provide an attractive means for states to stake their claim to the region.
These vehicles can discreetly patrol vast segments of the ocean surface and previously unreachable areas of the seabed. They can do jobs that are too mundane or repetitive for humans, allowing states to collect otherwise costly or difficult-to-acquire data. However, as their advanced sensors can be used for foreign surveillance and deep-sea exploration, MAVs could complicate threat perceptions and significantly reshape the battle for dominance in the Arctic.
Strategic security planning for the Arctic has long highlighted the importance of presence in the region. As the Department of Homeland Security reports in its 2021 Arctic strategy, “In the Arctic, presence equates to influence.” Given its relative harshness and remoteness, only countries whose proximity to the region allowed them to build research labs, establish military bases, and plant flags there could assert influence in the Arctic.
MAVs are creating a new world for geopolitical competition and influence in the Arctic.
But as states make advances in their technological capability and operational technical knowledge, it has become easier for countries that are not geographically close to the Arctic to exert regional influence there. For instance, China has declared itself as a “near-Arctic state” and claimed to have certain rights to influence over the region. To underscore its intentions, in 2023, China began to deploy MAVs similar to those deployed by the United States and Denmark to surveil the Arctic and conduct research there.
As states incorporate MAVs into both their civilian and security missions, international norms governing the Arctic have been unable to match the pace of technological innovation. The proliferation of MAVs necessitates a redefinition of territorial security as well as new strategic and analytical lenses to address security concerns while maintaining cooperative frameworks in the region. To address the growing uncertainties surrounding MAVs, the international community should robustly promote and protect norms of collaboration and cooperation. In practice, this looks like ensuring there are a variety of stakeholders at the negotiating table, fostering trust between states active in the region, and maintaining compliance with international law. However, this is simpler in theory than in practice.
Today’s Arctic governance models are less hierarchical than those of most other regions. Because there is no comprehensive treaty covering the Arctic, many stakeholders have created a fairly progressive governance model that relies on nonhierarchical relationships. The three major international organizations that oversee multilateral governance of the Arctic—the Arctic Council, the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea treaty—boast diverse membership. Various stakeholders, including states, companies, indigenous communities, militaries, scientists, and conservancies, have a seat at the table.
But this inclusive governance model has been slow to address international legal concerns. For example, it took the IMO twenty-four years to begin the process and execute the creation of the Polar Code. Further, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been growing concerns that Moscow’s involvement in these organizations is in bad faith. Finally, industry stakeholders have had a limited role in the Arctic’s governance model. All three of these issues make it difficult for the international community to address the concerns arising from the growing use of MAVs.
One of the few new frameworks that is set to be written, signed, and ratified by the international community is the Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Code, spearheaded by the IMO. Currently, the MASS Code hasn’t been introduced widely but it is set to be finalized and adopted by May 2026. By 2032, it is expected to become a binding agreement. The IMO is hoping to eventually use the MASS Code as the basis for developing a set of regulations for autonomous shipping boats and ships such as Denmark’s Voyagers. However, the MASS Code does not apply to underwater vehicles and it has yet to determine a clear definition for the term “autonomous.”
While the MASS Code is a step in the right direction, states operating in the Arctic require a broader set of regulations regarding MAVs. The lack of a proper definition for “autonomous,” the use of MAVs for exploration and surveillance, and shifting norms regarding sovereignty and security in the region should prompt further action from the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council should facilitate negotiations for a multilateral, nonbinding, and consensus-based agreement that applies to all council members and affiliates.
Of course, a nonbinding agreement invites difficult questions about the appropriate response if a member of the Arctic Council, which includes Russia, disregards the arrangement. Even so, such a regulatory framework could allow for flexible commitments by allowing states to maintain discretion for secure operations, reinforce allied collaboration through shared cybersecurity programs to protect NATO’s MAVs from enemy cyberattacks, and support operational transparency by enhancing international norms of trust. The Arctic Council doesn’t generally focus on Arctic security concerns. However, the council does work to balance the interests of many state, nongovernmental, and industrial stakeholders to protect scientific research and the Arctic environment. Given the threat MAVs pose to the environment and international cooperation for scientific research, it would likely provide the best base for negotiations and discussions to formalize an agreement for the future of MAVs in the Arctic.
Some individual Arctic states already have regulations regarding MAVs. For example, Russia has implemented a federal law permitting the experimental operation of autonomous vehicles. Additionally, Canada has introduced a law to regulate the production of these kinds of ships to promote the protection of the natural Arctic environment. Arctic states should pool their existing national regulations around MAVs and apply them across borders. States should also increase human oversight of their acting MAVs, better define MAVs by understanding the ones that are being used and developed, and ensure that there are international emergency protocols so as to maintain peace and safety for the region.
Regulation surrounding MAVs in the Arctic has a long way to go. From a lack of clarity over the definition of MAVs to challenges surrounding international cooperation, international regulatory frameworks are difficult to create and implement, especially in the current geopolitical climate. Nevertheless, MAVs are creating a new world for geopolitical competition and influence in the Arctic. As Danish sailboats patrol the surface and US submarines patrol the seabed, the international community must meet in the middle to protect the region as advances in MAV technology continue to accelerate.
Svetlana Greene is a senior at Wellesley College with a focus on Arctic-Transatlantic Security as well as a former young global professional at the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
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Image: Danish military personnel stand next to a Saildrone Voyager unmanned surface vehicle moored at the marina in Koge, Denmark, June 16, 2025. REUTERS/ Tom Little
