Twenty questions (and expert answers) about the next phase of an Israel-Hamas deal
On Monday, in the first part of a cease-fire deal brokered by the White House, Hamas released all twenty living hostages that it still held following its October 7, 2023, terrorist attack, while Israel released nearly two thousand Palestinian prisoners, paused strikes, and began to pull back Israeli forces within Gaza. “A big burden has been lifted, but the job IS NOT DONE,” US President Donald Trump posted on social media on Tuesday. “Phase Two begins right NOW!!!”
So what should this next phase include? Who or what might play the spoiler in further peace-building efforts? And what moves should we expect from the different sides and stakeholders? To better understand what could come next, Atlantic Council experts answer twenty pressing questions below.
1. Will Hamas return deceased hostages to Israel?
The question of Hamas’s ability to return deceased hostages still in Gaza not only concerns the human aspect of returning their bodies and bringing closure to their families, but also the future of phase two of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
If Hamas fails to return all the bodies and Israelis do not sense that Hamas is doing everything in its power to return them, an already fragile level of trust between the parties will be further damaged. It will complicate the capacity to implement the following stages of the deal. In fact, we are already seeing this dynamic play out in the deal’s opening days.
It is certainly possible that Hamas has lost contact with the areas where it buried the bodies, due to the aggressive Israeli military campaign waged in the Gaza Strip. Yet the central question is not whether all the bodies will be returned—and I certainly hope that all affected families will have a grave to visit—but rather Hamas’s willingness to help. Will Hamas go to great lengths to find all of them as a means of trust-building with Israel and the mediators, in a way that will show a deep willingness to lead to an end to the war and comply with the terms of the deal? We don’t yet know the answer.
—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served for twenty-five years in Israel Defense Intelligence.
2. Will Israeli forces exit Gaza?
When it comes to the question of whether the Trump-brokered cease-fire deal will progress out of “phase one” into a full Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from Gaza, caution is in order.
First, although the Trump plan calls for a timed phasing of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, elements in the plan are clear “yes or no” conditions. These include critical matters such as the verification of Hamas’s disarmament, the establishment of international security forces, and an alternative governance structure for Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on October 10 that “in the second phase of the deal, Hamas will be disarmed, and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized. It will happen either diplomatically, according to the Trump plan, or militarily, by us.”
Second, Israel’s security requirements will override any political concerns regarding US dissatisfaction with its adherence to any withdrawal timeline. Elements number thirteen and sixteen of the comprehensive plan indicate that Israel has the latitude to maintain IDF presence in Gaza to ensure that Hamas’s military capability is eliminated and that the group cannot be reconstituted. In addition to disarmament requirements, Israeli security officials have repeatedly insisted on the importance of maintaining geographic control over strategic areas inside Gaza. For example, Israeli officials previously insisted that Israel will not withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor despite terms indicating that Israeli will eventually need depart the security buffer zone. This almost nine-mile buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border remains under Israeli control, and it is likely to continue to represent an obstacle to Israel withdrawing from the strip. Third, Gaza’s political vacuum must be filled with a competent governing authority. The Palestinian Authority is not trusted by Israel to manage this task, nor does it have the capacity to govern, secure, and oversee the rebuilding of Gaza.
Finally, even if the above conditions are all met, Netanyahu’s political coalition remains a formidable constraint. Netanyahu leads a government dependent on far-right parties that vehemently oppose any withdrawal. Senior Israeli officials, through the Israeli press, have emphasized that the cease-fire creates only “a ‘reduction in fire,’ not a full cease-fire,” and that the IDF will remain “deep inside Gaza.” An Israeli official described the deal’s novelty as allowing Israel to “get all the hostages, stay in Gaza, and keep negotiating.” This framing suggests that Israel already sees the cease-fire as a net benefit for the country, with both the release of hostages and the preservation of an ongoing presence as key achievements. Consequently, the most realistic projection for phase two is partial, tactical Israeli redeployments within Gaza. These movements will include reducing troop presence in some areas while maintaining control over strategic corridors, buffer zones, and border areas, instead of the complete exit that phase two formally stipulates. After what Israel experienced on October 7, it is unwilling to do anything less. The full withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces from Gaza will depend on the US administration’s ability to oversee the implementation of Trump’s plan.
—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
3. What are Gaza’s humanitarian needs—and will they be met?
Much of Gaza is destroyed, Israel is still occupying half of the strip, and the vast majority of the population is displaced. Gazans, therefore, need everything from food and nutrient packages to bring famine under control to resources such as baby incubators for hospitals and parts to repair water and sewage lines. Additionally, winter is approaching, and the population needs tents and other winterization items.
While a cease-fire deal earlier this year permitted food entry in sufficient quantities, it did not permit shelter items. Medical evacuations also need to be permitted to surge, and countries need to step up and agree to accept cases. Road- and rubble-clearing machinery is needed to open more routes for aid trucks, and the trucks themselves need spare parts so that more vehicles can be put back on the roads. The humanitarian organizations on the ground in Gaza know how to get the job done, but that’s if and only if they are allowed to do so. And that is very much up to Israel and the Trump administration continuing to turn the pressure screws.
Israel controls how many trucks are permitted to enter Gaza and the routes that the humanitarian community can use to access pick-up points. These routes, especially the main one that goes through Rafah to the Kerem Shalom crossing, have historically been nicknamed “looter alley.” As humanitarians have long stated, and as a recent Sky News investigation revealed, looting along these routes has been carried out by gangs that Israel has armed. So another big question is whether Israel will force these gangs to stand down. Desperate Palestinian civilians also have looted convoys. Allowing sufficient aid into Gaza will eliminate both these dynamics, as civilians will no longer be as desperate, and the aid that the armed gangs sell on the market will no longer have financial value. In other words, the scarcity that creates looting will be eliminated.
—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.
4. Will Hamas renounce political power and disarm?
Hamas will try to maintain a significant political role in postwar Gaza, and it will resist proposals to totally disarm. The group’s acceptance of the cease-fire and return of hostages represents pragmatism, not moderation.
Hamas apparently agreed to the cease-fire and return of all remaining hostages under heavy pressure from regional states ready for the war to end. The group also recognized that the leverage it had gained from holding the hostages was declining significantly. Israel’s military operations were taking a heavy toll, and Israel had a green light from the United States to continue its assaults on Hamas positions in Gaza City if the group did not agree to exchange the hostages for Israel’s Palestinian prisoners. And Palestinian civilians in Gaza, after two years of being displaced from their homes and experiencing dire humanitarian conditions, were increasingly demanding an end to the war, risking Hamas being blamed by Gazans for refusing Trump’s plan for peace.
But even as it signed onto the cease-fire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange that mark the first phase of the US peace plan, Hamas has registered its opposition to key terms of phase two: that it disarm and end its role in the governance of Gaza. The group also objects to the plan’s call for an international security force to police Gaza, arguing that postwar security and governance should be handled by Palestinians. And the group quickly backed up its rhetoric with action, placing uniformed Hamas police on the streets as the cease-fire went into effect, and the Israeli military withdrew from parts of Gaza.
Hamas may try to deflect pressure for its full disarmament and removal from governance in Gaza by offering partial measures and securing the backing of key regional states. In negotiations earlier this year, Hamas leaders signaled some flexibility on these issues, saying they would consider giving up the group’s heavy weapons, such as rockets and missiles, and were willing to have some senior Hamas officials leave Gaza. Hamas also will likely try to enlist support from Egypt, which has advocated that the group have a voice in future Palestinian governance in Gaza, and Turkey, whose leaders call the group a legitimate resistance movement and oppose Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Egypt has announced plans to convene a Palestinian national dialogue on the future of Gaza in which Hamas will take part, allowing the group to exercise significant influence over the postwar debate.
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.
5. What’s next for the Abraham Accords?
US experts on the Middle East are trained by experience to be pessimists. After all, given the nature of the region, a reflexive fatalism generally allows one to appear prescient. But this tendency can also blind us from recognizing truly positive developments when they occur. The Gaza cease-fire agreement, which reflects Hamas’s defeat (but not destruction), is one such development. The US decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities was another, as was the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus, and so were the Israeli military and covert action successes against Hezbollah. And all these geostrategic earthquakes followed the most important positive change in the region in the last decade, the announcement and expansion of the Abraham Accords—a development that at the time I called a strategic victory for everyone except Iran.
So, what’s next for the Abraham Accords? The conventional wisdom today among US experts is typically pessimistic, that any further movement on the integration of Israel into its wider region has been set back immeasurably by the horrors that Israel has inflicted upon the Palestinian people in Gaza, including tens of thousands of innocents who were used as pawns and shields by Hamas. There is obviously a degree of truth to this conclusion. The images of real Palestinian suffering at Israeli hands that dominated social media across the Arab and Muslim worlds for the last two years will not be forgotten anytime soon. Indeed, the prevention of any further expansion of the Abraham Accords, especially to Saudi Arabia, was almost certainly a major driver of Hamas’s decision to murder and kidnap Israeli innocents, and thus intentionally trigger so much destruction upon the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, this conventional wisdom is wrong. Indeed, this is the time for newfound optimism. Depending on what diplomatic steps follow the recent agreement, it wouldn’t be surprising if the Abraham Accords are expanded again even before the end of Trump’s second term. This is certainly a priority for the White House, and the events of the last few weeks demonstrate how much that still matters within the region. Much of this hinges on whether the agreement’s first phase can be followed by others—building along the path laid by the intentionally vague twenty-step plan that is now on the table—and thus whether Trump, Arab leaders, and the Israeli and Palestinian peoples can relaunch a legitimate peace process that leads toward a two-state solution.
This is the real opportunity ahead of us, a once-in-several-generations opportunity that has been won from the blood and pain of Israelis and Palestinians, and the remarkable Israeli military victories over Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, all critically assisted by Washington across two administrations. The opportunity is to remake the region geopolitically, economically, and militarily into one in which the Iran-led so-called “Axis of Resistance” is defeated both ideologically and physically, and the Middle East is at peace, prosperous, and finally inclusive of Israel. It would be a historic tragedy if those who took so many risks in wartime fail now to have the courage to take the diplomatic risks necessary to secure a lasting peace.
—William F. Wechsler is the senior director for Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council. His last position in the US government was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.
6. Will Israel agree to a Palestinian state?
Trump’s twenty-point plan contains political kryptonite for Netanyahu in one provision: the call for discussions on a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. This was surely an element Trump forced Netanyahu to swallow. Ahead of the 2026 Israeli elections, Netanyahu likely will argue that the conditions for Palestinian Authority reforms and reconstruction in Gaza have not been met. But he will also likely go further, asking Israeli voters who they trust to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state—him, with his long record of opposition to that outcome, or less experienced rivals. The argument may have salience with some voters he needs to win back, as many Israelis after October 7, 2023, are not open to the prospect of a Palestinian state, although it is unclear if converting those voters would be enough. That theme in Israeli political discourse could also depress the enthusiasm of Arab states to play their part in the day-after in Gaza—from reconstruction funding, to stabilization forces, to supporting Palestinian Authority reforms and Gaza governance.
—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.
7. What’s coming next in the West Bank?
October 7 and the war that followed shifted public attention away from a sharp rise in Israeli settler and IDF attacks on Palestinian people and property in recent years. With a cease-fire now allowing for the broader redeployment of Israeli forces, that trend is likely to continue.
Already in 2025, the United Nations has documented 180 Palestinian deaths linked to settler and military violence, and the IDF has bolstered its presence in the West Bank significantly in recent weeks in advance of the Jewish holidays. Levels of violence are likely to rise as the security situation there becomes even more unstable.
This instability will be fueled by renewed Palestinian and international attention on the long-expired and corrupt mandate of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Trump’s long-term peace plan envisions a role for the Palestinian Authority in both the governance and security of Gaza, but only after key reforms addressing these issues are undertaken. Netanyahu, however, opposes such an expanded role for the Palestinian Authority. As Abbas continues to benefit from his long-extended time in office, he and Netanyahu may find themselves unlikely allies in stymieing any move to greater Palestinian Authority legitimacy even as violence continues to spike.
—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.
8. What’s the future of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship?
During Trump’s speech before the Knesset on Monday, he had a surprising request for the Israeli president, regarding the corruption case hanging over Netanyahu: “Why don’t you give him a pardon?”
Netanyahu was already going to be relatively indebted to Trump, but the US president’s support is even more important now politically, even a pardon is unlikely anytime soon. While a permanent cessation of the war is likely to eventually thaw some of the hostility that Jerusalem is facing from much of the international community, Netanyahu’s reliance on US support has only grown since the beginning of Trump’s second term. Netanyahu’s popularity in Israel is diminished. And while the hostages coming home may give him a bump in support, a large swath of the population will never stop blaming him for October 7 and its aftermath—as Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser, experienced firsthand.
At the same time, Trump—who will relish the lavish praise Israelis across the ideological and political spectrum are giving him—will likely recognize that his leverage with Netanyahu is at an all-time high as the future of the US-Israel bilateral relationship is in flux. For example, the ten-year US-Israel memorandum of understanding will expire in 2028, and negotiations on a new one will have to begin long before then. They will do so at a time when Trump’s “Make America Great Again” wing of the Republican Party increasingly aligns with the left of the Democratic Party in its skepticism of support to Israel.
Given Trump and Netanyahu’s relationship today, Jerusalem may need to be more deferential to Washington’s preferences in the coming months. But history has repeatedly demonstrated that if the United States and Israel aren’t aligned on a policy, then the Israelis are unlikely to simply defer to Washington’s preferences. And if that happens, the mirage of today’s unbreakable relationship between Trump and Netanyahu could end up evaporating quicky, just as it did at the end of the president’s first term.
—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
9. How will the far-right in Israel react?
Elated over the release of the hostages from Gaza, Israelis nonetheless are torn over the parameters of the bargain that has won their freedom. Nowhere is that dilemma felt more intensely than among the ranks of Religious Zionism (RZ) and Jewish Power (JP), the two far-right partners to Netanyahu’s government, which were most ideologically invested in the prime minister’s promise of “total victory.”
In the days since the cease-fire took effect, the IDF has withdrawn from approximately half of the Gaza Strip, where armed Hamas operatives have redeployed prominently to the streets. Those developments alone—without consideration of additional Israeli concessions yet to come—already stand in direct contravention to red lines set by RZ and JP, whose leaders are telegraphing that their days in the Netanyahu coalition may be numbered.
But those threats belie a complex political reality confronting those two parties, which are both in danger of shrinking sizably when Israelis next go to the polls. RZ and JP apparently have resolved to keep their powder dry and remain in the coalition for the time being. Resigning against the backdrop of captives being reunited with their families would be a losing strategy. It could also prove to be in vain. With details and timelines of the agreement’s subsequent phases still amorphous, and the possibility that negotiations could thus run aground, RZ and JP have cause to wait and see whether their hopes of resuming the war until Hamas is totally eradicated might materialize after all.
Conversely, plenty of triggers could accelerate their departure and a collapse of the government. There are a few possible scenarios that could send RZ and JP running for the exits, including a formal declaration that the war has ended—something that the United States and other mediators are proclaiming openly, despite Israel not acknowledging this—and any degree of tolerance demonstrated for renewed attacks against Israel.
All that said, many of the cards remain in Netanyahu’s hands. The prospect of snap elections—far from certain, but possible if Netanyahu decides to try and capitalize on the deal—would make any ultimatum by RZ and JP moot. In that case, ironically, the far right could then find itself embedded within a caretaker government but stripped of its leverage.
—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administrations of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.
10. Will an international security force for Gaza be created?
The current Trump plan is based on a plan by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, which calls for the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) to be supported by an International Security Force (ISF) of troops from Arab, Muslim, and other nations. GITA and ISF need to provide security and reconstruction under a common command structure, which it looks like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair will lead. If Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons, as seems likely, GITA and the ISF should take over the parts of Gaza where Hamas is not present. Hamas will try to force out the ISF, so the ISF will need to have the backbone to stand its ground and resist Hamas’s destructive efforts. Security and reconstruction are linked: where there is no security, there will be no reconstruction.
—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.
11. Who will be involved in the postwar governance of Gaza?
The Gaza International Transitional Authority will be overseen by a “Board of Peace” that Trump will chair. Heads of state or other very senior international figures want to join the board. This board will set policy guidance for GITA, with Blair playing a leading role. Expect to see Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries involved. But the key question is, who will contribute troops to the International Security Force?
—Thomas S. Warrick
12. Will the Palestinian Authority be involved in Gaza?
Yes, eventually. The current violence among the remnants of Hamas and other gangs in Gaza is a stark reminder that there must be a clear and strong Palestinian hand in charge in the strip. The continued violent jockeying for power only deepens the disaster for Gazans.
Hamas agreed to a Palestinian Authority (PA) role, and it will not stop fighting any Palestinian faction it sees as being backed by Israel. As imperfect as the PA is, it does have credibility as a governing body and is best placed to attract wide support among Gazans. Both credibility and support would only be strengthened if PA officials and the international community take seriously the efforts to reform the PA that the Trump peace plan demands. Good governance standards must be enforced among a reinvigorated PA.
Though Palestinian leadership elections haven’t been held in years, the PA would be the strongest partner to help organize them. Elections are critical to build trust and sustain credibility in the long-term process.
—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a distinguished fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip.
13. What role will Arab states play in Gaza going forward?
Determining the role of Arab states in the subsequent stages of Trump’s peace plan is challenging, given the plan’s lack of a comprehensive framework beyond phase one. Arab nations, as well as Turkey, are anticipated to contribute to an international stabilization force focused on monitoring cease-fires, ensuring security, training a new Palestinian police force, and establishing local law and order. While these states have expressed support for such a force, most have not publicly committed troops yet, likely opting for financial and diplomatic assistance instead.
In addition to security efforts, Arab states are expected to play a crucial diplomatic role in overseeing Gaza’s new governance structure. Their economic contributions will also be vital. But substantial financial support is unlikely without guarantees regarding Israel’s future actions, its illegal settlements, and the establishment of Palestinian statehood. Addressing these issues is essential to resolving the root causes of the conflict. At this stage, it is important to remain cautious and maintain modest optimism. The effectiveness of Arab states in this process, their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future, will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next phase, which will determine their level of involvement and influence in shaping Gaza’s future.
—Ali Bakir, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
14. What role will Turkey play in Gaza going forward?
Ankara has been a key supporter of Trump’s drive for a lasting cease-fire in Gaza, the return of Israeli hostages, an Israeli military withdrawal, and a path toward Hamas’s demilitarization and removal from power in the strip. Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın has been a central player in multilateral negotiations, and Turkish observers are set to join those from Egypt, Qatar, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates in a cease-fire monitoring organization, the Civil-Military Coordination Center. Deep mistrust and antagonism between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Netanyahu may limit the scope of Turkey’s role in what comes next, but for stabilization to succeed in Gaza, Turkish assets—including construction capabilities, working relationships with the Palestinians and Arab states, and experience in aid and relief operations—must play a role.
There have been previous instances of Erdoğan and Netanyahu setting aside their mutual antagonism to pursue a modus vivendi, and the current trade and diplomatic cutoff between Jerusalem and Ankara could unwind if both sides move pragmatically. This will require Trump to make good on his April 7 offer to help “work it out” between the two countries. The ruling parties in both countries see one another as threats and competitors in the region, but there is no path or profit for either in sustained confrontation. In Gaza, as in Syria, the elements are present for a constructive if wary coexistence that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.
15. How is Iran viewing these developments—and will it try to intervene?
The official response to the Gaza cease-fire and peace plan was given on social media by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s foreign policy advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati: “The beginning of the ceasefire in #Gaza may be behind the scenes the end of a ceasefire elsewhere. #Iraq_Yemen_Lebanon.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also mentioned the cease-fire as a positive step, while explaining that Iran could not accept Egypt’s invitation to the peace summit chaired by Trump in Sharm el-Sheikh. He said it was not possible for Iran to engage with the United States while it threatened to strike Iran again. Clearly, the US decision to refuse visas for the Iranian delegation to attend the United Nations General Assembly last month and the snapback of UN sanctions promoted by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany also factored into the decision.
More broadly, the regime and its supporters have presented the peace agreement as a victory for Hamas and the resistance network of Iran’s allies and proxies.
Among the Iranian population, there is a wide range of views, including calls from the reformist camp to engage with the United States and accept the Egyptian invitation. Some suggest that there is an opportunity to restart negotiations with Washington around the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions. In fact, that also seems to be in Trump’s mind as he has started to look beyond the present cease-fire for a wider regional settlement.
Some Iranians are also critical of Hamas, questioning why Iran ever supported the terrorist group. Hamas has been described as ungrateful and blamed for bringing death and destruction to Iran, and the region, through the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that Hamas did not thank Iran in its statement on the cease-fire, while mentioning Arab countries that helped mediate.
At this point, it seems likely the Iranian regime will focus on rebuilding its own facilities destroyed by Israeli attacks and its posture against Israel. This could include the rebuilding of Tehran’s air defense systems, cracking down on internal dissent, seeking out so-called Israeli spies, and gradually looking for ways to reinforce allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The wiser voices in Tehran may also call for relaunched negotiations with the United States and look to capitalize on Iran’s newfound integration into the wider Arab and Islamic community facilitated by Israel’s Gaza campaign, as well as its attacks on Qatar, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.
—Nicholas Hopton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as British ambassador to Libya (2019–2021), Iran (2015–2018), Qatar (2013–2015), and Yemen (2012–2013).
16. How is Hezbollah in Lebanon reacting?
Hezbollah has yet to explicitly comment on Hamas’s decision to accept the Gaza cease-fire terms. However, Hezbollah’s general statements on the end of the Gaza war tend to validate the necessity of ongoing resistance narratives against Israel, which fits into its efforts to retain its weapons as the Lebanese government moves to disarm Hezbollah and bring all arms under the control of the state.
Hezbollah has generally abided by the November 2024 cease-fire that ended thirteen months of conflict in Lebanon, although Israel continues to stage near-daily air strikes mainly against Hezbollah personnel and facilities. There is much speculation in Lebanon that if the cease-fire holds in Gaza, it could allow Israel to pay more attention to its northern front in Lebanon, possibly expanding and escalating its attacks against Hezbollah. The end of the conflict in Gaza may also refocus international attention on the goal of disarming Hezbollah, which could place further pressure on the Lebanese government and raise tensions in the country in the weeks and months ahead.
—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.
17. How are the Houthis in Yemen reacting?
The current Israel–Hamas truce is not regarded by the Houthis as an optimal outcome, as they see it merely as a tactical maneuver by Israel. At a deeper level, the truce undermines their broader ambitions, eroding the regional relevance and political momentum they gained through Red Sea hostilities and attacks on Israel. Not to mention, the Houthis have become the strongest member of the Iran-linked “Axis of Resistance.”
Ideologically, the Houthis are unlikely to refrain from their war against Israel in the future. Their cause is deeply rooted in a doctrine encapsulated by their slogan: “Death to Israel.” It is also a political necessity. The Palestinian cause is the Houthis’ key entry into this fight as part of the Axis of Resistance. Consequently, they will seek to monitor and exploit any loophole in the current cease-fire or future events as justification to resume hostilities. So, what happens next is still an open case.
From Israel’s perspective, the Houthis continue to be a long-term threat that transcends the Gaza conflict. Israel, thus, intends to eliminate that threat. Expect their confrontation to persist, at least for the foreseeable future.
—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
18. How do Iraqi militias view the cease-fire and what is the impact on Iraq?
Iraq’s Iran-aligned militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, have issued statements welcoming the cease-fire and condemning Israel. But the groups had already taken steps to divorce their own actions from the fighting in Gaza, largely halting strikes against the United States and Israel long before the end of the Gaza conflict and release of the hostages. October 7 and Israel’s war in Gaza prompted nearly two hundred strikes by Iraqi militias against US bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as repeated efforts by the militias to strike Israel.
For many of these militias, Israel’s war in Gaza was an opportunity to put pressure on the US military presence in Iraq, but launching kinetic strikes was also necessary to demonstrate their solidarity with the Axis of Resistance. However, none of these groups—unlike the Houthis in Yemen—have a strong ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, and so the combination of US strikes, the threat of Israeli retaliation, pressure from the Iraqi government, and Iranian guidance effectively halted militia strikes in 2024.
While Iraq’s militias remain linked to and are supported by Tehran, many of the groups are increasingly becoming political and economic actors with their own domestic interests. Right now, that means a focus on Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary election rather than the next phase of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire agreement. For the Iraqi government, the cease-fire is a welcome development that eliminates one potential source of instability. The post-October 7 period has shown that Iraq’s stability is highly vulnerable to regional developments—whether from the war in Gaza or any escalation between Israel and Iran.
—Victoria J. Taylor is the director of the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
19. Does an end to hostilities affect cases at the International Criminal Court?
The end of attacks on Gaza does not change the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) jurisdiction over the situation in the State of Palestine, nor the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) mandate to investigate—but it may impact the OTP’s investigation. If investigators can access Gaza, or if victims and witnesses are able to leave Gaza, then they may be able to access more evidence. However, the OTP has reportedly declined to apply for new arrest warrants for Israeli officials over fear of additional US sanctions. Such concerns may continue to delay progress.
That said, the OTP’s investigation is not just into Israeli officials. The OTP applied for arrest warrants for three Hamas leaders in May 2024. Israeli forces killed two before the Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants in November 2024 and killed one after. Increased access to evidence in Gaza and a more stable situation may allow the OTP to more swiftly build cases against surviving Hamas perpetrators.
Regardless, ending attacks on Gaza better allows states and international bodies to document the harms committed there, to hold both Israeli and Hamas leaders accountable, and to support Palestinians as they build transitional justice processes.
—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
20. How will Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years impact a potential new Memorandum of Understanding with the US?
With the current US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding set to expire in 2028, Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years will inform a new agreement, requiring an alignment between operational realities and strategic commitments. US policymakers will insist the assistance strengthens Israel’s legitimate sovereign security needs while reducing risks of unintended civilian harm. The US Congress will likely press the statutory mandate to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, but it will also likely attach enhanced civilian protection protocols and cooperative training.
Operational lessons—counter–unmanned aerial systems, missile defense integration, subterranean countermeasures, precision strike coordination, and intelligence fusion—will drive joint investment priorities and industrial cooperation, creating opportunities to engender accelerated technology transfer and co-development. Similar to the transfers associated with the Abraham Accords in 2020, diplomatic sensitivity will require calibrating public messaging and managing allied concerns, ensuring that the capabilities provided do not exacerbate regional escalation. Success will rest on candid US‑Israeli dialogue bolstered by the ongoing senior bilateral Joint Political Military Group, and a forward‑looking commitment to interoperability and innovation, producing an agreement that supports an Israel at peace with its neighbors. The new Memorandum of Understanding should signal to regional partners and adversaries that deterrence is durable and cooperation remains central to shared security.
—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.
Further reading
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MENASource By
As the Trump administration pushes for “commerce, not chaos” in the region, the Abraham Accords ideology is the most powerful tool to achieve that goal.
Image: Palestinians, who were displaced to the southern part of Gaza at Israel's order during the war, make their way along a road as they return to the north after a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza went into effect, in the central Gaza Strip, October 10, 2025. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa
