The tiger has pounced. Right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who calls himself “El Tigre,” won Colombia’s presidential runoff election on Sunday, narrowly besting left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda. “Tonight marks the beginning of a new story for the nation,” de la Espriella told his supporters, adding that “tonight a new era begins, a change of order.” For more on what the incoming president means for Colombia, the wider region, and Bogotá’s relationship with Washington, we turned to our experts.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Jason Marczak: Expect closer alignment with the US
Kristie Pellecchia Loiacono: De la Espriella’s win should spark a return of foreign investment
Sergio Guzmán: De la Espriella’s narrow win means he will have to build new coalitions
Expect closer alignment with the US
Colombian voters rejected a continuation of the Petro presidency, and, with that, Abelardo de la Espriella is president-elect. Winning by a razor-thin margin, the political outsider won not only the presidency but also his first elected office in a campaign that emphasized security, business-friendly policies, and what will be a welcome return to the historically close relationship with the United States.
Sunday’s electoral map is a familiar one from previous right-left spits, with de la Espriella largely winning the country’s Andean center and Cepeda taking the coasts and the outer edges (though de la Espriella did make inroads in both on the coasts and in Bogotá). Despite polls showing de la Espriella surging late, he won by less than one percentage point—the closest presidential election in Colombia’s history. The markets will naturally watch the president-elect’s cabinet picks to see if they follow the form of his pick for vice president, the technocrat José Manuel Restrepo.
Rebuilding deep US-Colombia ties—significantly strained during the Petro administration—will be a top priority in areas such as security and intelligence cooperation to root out criminal groups. Expect new joint efforts to go after the illegal armed groups that regularly cross the Colombia-Venezuela border, with this past week’s US strike on the leader of Tren de Aragua in Venezuela a preview of the results possible with ramped-up cooperation. The National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC) dissidents, and other transnational groups will all be on the president-elect’s radar—and he will find a willing partner in Washington to help uproot them.
Outgoing President Gustavo Petro also actively sought to move Colombia closer to China on the economic front. The incoming government will bring a more skeptical approach toward Beijing, especially when it comes to investment in critical infrastructure. At the same time, it will seek to accelerate US investment and commerce. Petro embraced China as a US alternative, while de la Espriella will return to the natural affinity with the United States while having to maintain a pragmatic approach to China.
Election nights often bring surprises, but two consistencies on Sunday are worth noting. De la Espriella pulled off a victory (although narrower than anticipated) that reflected his expected win according to pre-election polls. And, characteristically, Petro took to tweeting out conspiracy theories once it became clear that his candidate, Cepeda, had lost despite the strong backing from the presidency.
—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
De la Espriella’s win should spark a return of foreign investment
The election of de la Espriella and, notably, his Vice President José Manuel Restrepo, should mark the return of capital into Colombia due to more visibility on security, sound fiscal and investment policies, and a renewed relationship with the United States that could bolster security and curb instability.
In 2020, Colombia became one of four members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Latin America and enjoyed investment-grade bond ratings. This distinction provided access to significant sources of global capital, and it gave Colombia newfound visibility with investors that were ready to improve the country’s infrastructure, expand exports, and deepen its expanding tourism ecosystem.
The Petro administration’s persistent deficits, public spending, suspension of the fiscal rule, tax-revenue shortfalls, proposed reforms to stable systems including healthcare and pensions, permissive policies that allowed coca production to skyrocket and empowered narco-terrorists, and weakened security gave investors serious pause. Petro’s abrupt changes to oil and gas production, a major source of tax revenue, confused investors and exacerbated fiscal challenges. In 2025, the International Monetary Fund suspended Colombia’s $9.8 billion line of credit over fiscal concerns, and the country was downgraded to high-yield by two of the three major credit rating agencies, effectively cutting off entire pockets of capital.
As a result, Colombian foreign direct investment dropped consistently under Petro, and by 2025 was down 33 percent from 2022. The Colombian peso also had a wild ride, hitting an all-time high of 5,118 per US dollar and then rallying in 2026 (hitting a low of 3,440 per US dollar), providing additional challenges to investors.
To bring back investment, de la Espriella must execute his plans for security. To improve tax revenues and provide visibility into investment policies, the country should establish a coherent energy strategy. Restrepo is trusted by the international finance and business community, and he is known for his pragmatism. Their assumption into office will be a welcome change.
—Kristie Pellecchia Loiacono served as a member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force and she is the founder and a principal at Pellecchia International. She led the Western Hemisphere portfolio for the US International Development Finance Corporation during the first Trump administration.
De la Espriella’s narrow win means he will have to build new coalitions
De la Espriella has emerged as the winner of Colombia’s 2026 presidential election, securing 12.9 million votes in a historically competitive second round. However, his narrow 0.94 percent margin (under 250,000 votes) over Cepeda has triggered unprecedented institutional uncertainty. Cepeda is contesting the preliminary results and demanding a full tally, which will likely end in a recount, opening a tense transition period.
Despite left-wing claims of irregularities, the electoral authority’s historical precision makes a reversal highly unlikely, and de la Espriella has already received early backing from international allies such as US President Donald Trump. De la Espriella’s narrow lead does not guarantee a mandate and suggests he will have to tone down some of his more incendiary rhetoric and potentially water down a part of his ambitious agenda to succeed. Once in office, de la Espriella will face severe governance hurdles; lacking automatic legislative majorities, his party must build coalitions with traditional moderates to advance a radical, pro-business economic shock plan that includes cutting the state apparatus by 40 percent, resuming fracking, and eliminating some taxes. His preferred strategy of governing via unilateral executive decrees and states of exception poses structural risks to Colombia’s checks and balances, setting up future legal battles with the Constitutional Court and the State Council. Furthermore, de la Espriella’s promises to purge public bureaucracy and penalize the outgoing administration threaten to paralyze state agencies and provoke sustained social mobilization led by Petro’s base.
Internationally, de la Espriella will likely seek tighter security cooperation with the United States, potentially aligning Colombia with Washington’s “Shield of the Americas.” It is very likely that de la Espriella will be pressured to distance Colombia from China during his presidency, though that is also likely to have effects on infrastructure investment in Colombia and other issues. It is also unclear if the United States will supplement its financial and economic support to Colombia to make up for the potential loss of Chinese business. Ultimately, the incoming president’s term promises a high-friction environment balancing market-friendly reforms against severe institutional confrontation, judicial resistance, and deep social polarization.
—Sergio Guzmán is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and is the co-founder and director of Colombia Risk Analysis.