There is nothing about today’s Belarus that suggests a country on the verge of change. Instead, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka looks more secure than ever in the position he has occupied since 1994. Nevertheless, European policymakers would be well-advised to begin preparing for a post-Lukashenka Belarus now, in order to have the necessary plans in place when the moment of transition eventually arrives.
There are many factors capable triggering a transfer of power in Belarus, including Lukashenka’s personal health, a sudden crisis within the Belarusian elite, or instability in Russia. All lie beyond the control of Western governments, but Europe can at least make sure it is in a position to shape events as they unfold.
A recent survey conducted by independent Belarusian research group The Center for New Ideas found that 60 percent of Belarusian and foreign experts believe a political transition will take place in Belarus before 2035. While this does not indicate widespread expectation of imminent change, it does underline that the issue of a post-Lukashenka Belarus is already on the political radar for many informed observers.
Almost three-quarters of respondents predicted a controlled transition in Minsk leading to a top-down transfer of power, but many also suggested that this process could conceivably spiral out of control. In other words, a smooth handover from Lukashenka to an anointed successor cannot be taken for granted.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine will inevitably loom large over Europe’s future strategy toward Belarus. Crucially, Russia’s war against Ukraine has also significantly altered how many Belarusians perceive Russia. This shift in perceptions will impact any future post-Lukashenka transition.
Prior to the full-scale invasion, most Belarusians viewed their country’s relationship with Russia primarily in terms of economic and cultural integration. The two countries were linked by cheap energy, a shared Soviet past, open borders, and the Russian language. For many, this made Belarusian dependence on Moscow feel familiar and relatively uncontroversial.
Following the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, this dependence took on a completely different dimension. Russian troops used Belarus to launch the initial attack on Ukraine, while Russian missiles were launched at Ukrainian cities from Belarusian soil. The invasion confirmed that Belarus was now an integral part of Russia’s military infrastructure, effectively surrendering a significant portion of the country’s sovereignty.
This does not mean that Belarusian society has suddenly become anti-Russian or pro-Western. Russia remains an important partner and a key reference point for large numbers of Belarusians. However, the invasion has exposed the potential costs of integration with Russia. It is now clear that close bilateral ties create very real risks of being dragged into Russia’s wars.
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Research conducted by Chatham House in the second half of 2025 highlighted the complex nature of Belarusian attitudes toward Russia. The invasion of Ukraine has served to amplify existing tensions, with many Belarusians conflicted by a desire to maintain close ties with Russia and the need to prevent any further loss of sovereignty. This can be expressed in the simple question: Will the future of Belarus be decided in Minsk or Moscow?
The issue of sovereignty remains important for many Belarusians and could become a rallying point capable of uniting the country. European policymakers should take this into account and adopt a broad approach toward Belarus that seeks to build an understanding of the key factors that will shape the future Belarusian state. In addition to maintaining cooperation with the exiled Belarusian democratic opposition, this means identifying different factions within the state apparatus, while also exploring the issues that could potentially impact elite behavior during and after Lukashenka’s departure.
Russia will almost certainly attempt to closely manage any succession process in Minsk, with the goal of maintaining or strengthening its influence. Europe cannot prevent the Kremlin from interfering, but it can plan its own strategy in advance. Effective preparations should include multiple policy tracks to reflect a range of different scenarios, including a transition controlled by the current Belarusian regime or imposed by Russia.
The most important element of any plan should be the provision of a viable economic and political alternative for Belarus. It is not enough for Europe to promise support if Belarus embraces democracy. European policy must outline what this support would look like in practice. A convincing support agenda would include investments, infrastructure projects, education, institutional support, mobility, and access to European markets. This would address concerns throughout Belarusian society and among potential future elites that a truly sovereign Belarus can be economically viable without becoming a Russian protectorate.
There is every chance that Lukashenka will remain in power for another decade or more, but Europe gains nothing from waiting until the succession crisis eventually arrives. In 2020, when a deeply flawed presidential election sparked nationwide protects that threatened to topple the Lukashenka regime, Europe’s response was largely improvised and proved no match for Russia’s far more forceful intervention.
The end of the Lukashenka era could be the next big chance for meaningful change in Belarus. But that window of opportunity will not stay open for long, nor will it automatically yield a democratic outcome. When the moment finally comes, Russia will have a detailed plan in place, as will the current Belarusian elite. European policymakers should already be working to make sure they are also prepared.
Viktar Baranau is a Belarusian journalist based in Poland.
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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.
The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.
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Image: Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko attends a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of State in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. September 1, 2026. (Sputnik/Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool via REUTERS)