This article is part of a series published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security exploring the nexus between US security and economic interests across Africa. The previous edition can be read here.
For three decades, US administrations primarily viewed Somalia as a counterterrorism problem. That instinct was necessary and understandable, given that al-Shabaab remains among al-Qaeda’s most capable affiliates and that Islamic State-Somalia (ISIS-S) has grown increasingly relevant to transnational jihadist networks. Moreover, the memory of October 1993, when eighteen US service members were killed by Somali militia fighters in the Battle of Mogadishu, still shapes American perceptions.
But Somalia is much more than a hub for terrorism and a source of instability—it’s also a potential geostrategic asset. Sitting astride the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the country occupies a critical position along global trade routes. And as instability and conflict continue to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and the wider region, its strategic importance for logistics, energy, and security is likely to grow.
Against this backdrop, Somalia may be one of the most overlooked medium and long-term investment opportunities in Africa—and a place where US defense investments can help create the conditions for both counterterrorism gains and private-sector growth. That does not mean abandoning the work already underway to degrade jihadist networks; it means recognizing that a more stable Somalia could also generate significant strategic returns if Washington plays its cards right.
Washington already has a foothold
Others have already started to notice and are moving to capitalize on the opportunity. Turkey, for instance, has spent years building influence in Somalia through military training, port and airport investments, maritime cooperation, and—just recently—offshore energy exploration. Its first overseas deep-sea drilling mission off the Somali coast shows how Ankara is trying to integrate security, diplomacy, and commercial ambition.
Washington does not need to copy the Turkish model, but it should recognize that security investments can also open political and commercial space. The US has a complicated history in Somalia, but it also boasts a more positive track record there than is often acknowledged. In fact, its engagement in Somalia has been one of the more notable examples of layered US investments in Africa, spanning both civilian and military efforts.
The Danab Brigade, a US-trained elite unit of the Somali National Army, is regarded as the centerpiece of these efforts. But it’s far from the only channel of engagement. US civilian assistance, intelligence sharing, coordinated drone operations, and anti-piracy missions have all played important supporting roles alongside military training efforts.
Beyond these existing efforts, however, the US should develop a clearer strategic framework in which security assistance is tied to broader political and economic objectives.
US engagement needs a clearer purpose
In Somalia, the question for the US is not whether to stay, but to what end. Sustained counterterrorism operations remain necessary because al-Shabaab and ISIS-S are adaptive, regionally embedded, and increasingly transnational threats that must be contained. Yet without clearly defining the political and economic outcomes it hopes to achieve, Washington will struggle to translate tactical gains into lasting strategic outcomes.
The US should therefore continue targeted operations against urgent terrorist threats, while increasingly asking which activities help secure priority geographies, protect maritime corridors, build internal accountability and resilience, and create space for investment. This shift is especially important because the maritime chokepoints that Somalia sits astride—from the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal—account for 12 to 15 percent of global trade and 30 percent of the world’s container traffic.
With Iran-backed Houthi activity disrupting these major trade arteries, driving up shipping costs and forcing rerouting around South Africa, security cooperation with Somalia should no longer be considered purely about terrorism. Instead, it should be integrated into a more comprehensive Red Sea strategy. Washington’s recent lifting of sanctions against Eritrea underscores that the US has already begun to operationalize this approach, increasingly treating the Horn’s shoreline states as part of a single maritime theatre.
Untapped assets and unrealized potential
Somalia has underexplored offshore oil and gas potential, mineral prospects, ports, fisheries, logistics corridors, and eventually tourism assets. Northern Somalia, including Somaliland, may also prove attractive for future mineral exploration, although far more geological work is needed. Authorities in Somaliland have pursued international partnerships in the energy and minerals sectors, and officials have highlighted potential opportunities related to battery-mineral supply chains.
These opportunities should not be overstated, as Somalia remains fragile, violent, and politically fragmented, particularly amid an ongoing electoral cycle and constitutional disputes that continue to test the country’s federal framework and complicate the investment environment.
But frontier markets become more investable when security efforts focus on specific geographies, assets, and corridors. That is where AFRICOM should recalibrate. Rather than attempting to professionalize the entire Somali security sector, US assistance should prioritize areas where three conditions converge: terrorist threats, cooperative local partners, and economic potential. Jubaland in southern Somalia, Puntland in the northeast, and Somaliland in the northwest each present different political challenges, but in all three cases this overlap exists.
Invest where security and economics converge
In practical terms, this means continuing targeted counterterrorism cooperation against al-Shabaab and ISIS-S, expanding maritime domain awareness with Puntland and Somaliland, supporting coastal surveillance and port security—and, over time, considering Danab-like formations where US security and economic interests align.
This approach acknowledges a basic reality: US resources are finite, congressional attention is limited, and assistance should be concentrated where it advances clearly defined interests.
The question of Somaliland remains particularly sensitive. While some international actors like Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have shown growing interest in the territory due to its relative stability and strategic location near the Bab al-Mandeb, neighboring states and the African Union have traditionally favored preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity because they believe recognition of Somaliland might catalyze secessionist movements in other countries.
Regardless of the ultimate status question, the US can deepen commercial engagement, maritime cooperation, private-sector dialogue, and technical exchanges with Somaliland while maintaining support for broader regional stability.
A strategy, not just a campaign
Besides defense and military cooperation, the Trump administration should use diplomacy to limit the extent to which Somalia becomes an arena for proxy competition. Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran all have interests in the Horn and the Red Sea. Some bring investment and security cooperation; others export rivalries that can further destabilize the region.
The US should welcome burden-sharing, including Turkey’s willingness to protect its investments in south-central Somalia. But it should also press partners not to turn Somalia’s ports, Federal Member States, security forces, regional militia, or political disputes into proxy arenas.
Counterterrorism has anchored US Somalia policy for more than three decades and remains necessary. Terrorism will not disappear because Washington adopts an economic lens. But if US engagement is defined solely by the threats it seeks to contain, it will miss critical strategic and commercial opportunities. Somalia’s status as an unconventional investment destination is precisely what makes it interesting.
The US strategy for Somalia must protect Americans, secure vital maritime corridors, reduce proxy competition, and align defense activity with the economic future that others already see.
Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council. Note: Valar has been contracted to provide professional services in Somalia.
Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command.
The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.
The GeoStrategy Initiative, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leverages strategy development and long-range foresight to serve as the preeminent thought-leader and convener for policy-relevant analysis and solutions to understand a complex and unpredictable world. Through its work, the initiative strives to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system in order to foster peace, prosperity, and freedom for decades to come.
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Image: The Turkish drilling vessel Cagri Bey docks near Mogadishu port on April 10, 2026. Source: REUTERS/Feisal Omar.