October represented a political earthquake for Libya. It began with the October 6 ouster of the longtime speaker of the House of Representatives in Benghazi, Agilah Saleh, a fixture in Libya’s political scene for more than a decade. Then on October 20, the House of Representatives, in a dramatic shift in position, unanimously approved the controversial 2019 maritime demarcation agreement between Tripoli and Ankara.
The development removes a longstanding obstacle to complete normalization between Ankara and Benghazi, a relationship that has been on ice since Turkey’s military intervention in 2019 against the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) offensive to capture Tripoli. The vote also carries considerable geopolitical implications in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly for Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. And it could be one piece of the puzzle in reuniting a country that has been split for a decade and a half.
The sequence is not a coincidence. Saleh, a longtime ally of Egypt who had aspiration to become Libya’s president, long opposed the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal, as did Cairo. But this shift is about more than the personalities involved.
Since 2014, Saleh and LAAF General Commander Khalifa Haftar have depended on each other to maintain their influence and relevance. Each of them brought something the other lacked. Haftar accumulated military and territorial power. Saleh controlled parliamentary authority and the legitimacy that comes with it both domestically and internationally. This power dynamic produced mutual dependence without necessarily achieving full trust or a cooperative relationship at all times.
But the environment that sustained their relationship for over a decade is changing. A new center of power has emerged around Saddam Haftar, Khalifa’s son and the deputy general commander of the LAAF, whose ascent to power is reshaping Libya’s internal politics and external relationships alike.
This is when Saleh became expendable. On October 6, 104 House members voted to unseat him. This effort succeeded where others failed because it was backed by Saddam Haftar.
This is more consequential than just a parliamentary leadership dispute. It represents a new approach to Libya’s divided domestic politics and foreign relations.
The geopolitical consequences
The Libya-Turkey maritime deal has been one of the most consequential and contentious flashpoints in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In 2019, Turkey introduced a military cooperation agreement with the then-Tripoli-based Government of National Accord as it was beating back an offensive conducted by the LAAF, in exchange for a maritime demarcation agreement between Tripoli and Ankara. Turkey considers this agreement to be a central pillar of a strategy to protect its claims and maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean against Greece and Cyprus. (Greece and Cyprus, on their part, contest this maritime deal and the claims underlying it.)
However, for years, the House of Representatives in Benghazi refused to endorse the Libya-Turkey deal. This was a natural position for Saleh and the House to take as eastern Libya chose to reinforce its broader alignment with Egypt and other regional actors concerned with Turkey’s ambitions and expansion into Libya and beyond. Now that’s all changed.
The October 20 vote raises important questions about the future of Benghazi’s traditional regional alignments and the way it manages its foreign relationships. For Cairo, closer Benghazi-Ankara ties and the ratification of the maritime deal complicate Egypt’s regional calculations and its Eastern Mediterranean relations and alliances. For Benghazi, rapprochement with Ankara and accommodation of its Eastern Mediterranean claims may help secure what it has been seeking since the fall of the Qaddafi regime: Turkish support for a political and security settlement that could unify Libya’s divided institutions and bring Benghazi’s power centers into Tripoli’s security and political establishment.
Therefore, the agreement should not be understood as a rejection of traditional alliances, but rather as an attempt to expand Libya’s diplomatic options and diversify its foreign relationships. If managed effectively and coherently, this deal can help secure the cooperation necessary to smooth over the country’s divisions after many years of conflicts, failed political processes, and international mediation.
The Saddam factor
Saddam Haftar’s growing influence is central to understanding what has been happening in eastern Libya.
He has been accumulating forms of power that have previously been distributed among different actors: military might, political influence, access to resources, and diplomatic recognition. Since 2023, his influence has extended into state-building efforts including infrastructure developments, humanitarian initiatives and disaster responses, and more recently overseeing the LAAF’s vision 2030 for military transformation and modernization. This reflects Saddam Haftar’s vision for governance legitimacy through practical delivery.
Furthermore, 2026 saw him engage senior political leaders across competing international camps, from France to Russia, Greece, Qatar, and Niger. His June meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was particularly significant, as the two men discussed, according to the US readout, “ongoing Libyan-led efforts to unify the country’s military, economic, and political institutions.”
The younger Haftar is increasingly positioning Benghazi as a strategically autonomous actor, capable of maintaining productive relationships with competing powers without becoming exclusively dependent on any of them. His growing engagement with Turkey is perhaps the clearest demonstration of this approach. Ankara helped defeat the LAAF’s 2019 offensive to capture Tripoli. Yet the former foes have developed a relationship encompassing diplomacy, defense cooperation, and economic investment.
This reflects a pragmatic willingness to distinguish past military confrontation from present strategic interests for both parties. It also points to a departure from the political default setting that has characterized much of Libya’s post-2011 history, in which relationships were mostly defined by established alliances, ideologies, and longstanding rivalries.
Benghazi’s strategic considerations
Benghazi’s strategic objectives include reunifying the homeland, restoring state authority over the entire country, safeguarding territorial integrity, securing borders, and establishing national institutions and authorities capable of governing across the country. External partnerships and relations are increasingly judged by their contribution to those objectives.
In practice, that means cooperation with Russia does not stop engagement and increasing cooperation with Washington or the West. Strategic relations with Egypt and the UAE do not prevent closer cooperation with Turkey. Similarly, disagreements with European neighbors and partners do not exclude diplomatic engagement on areas of mutual benefit and interest.
These seemingly contradictory relationships can coexist when understood through Benghazi’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. However, the challenge for Benghazi at this moment is to turn this diplomatic flexibility and pragmatism into strategic gains.
For example, the recent 4+4 agreement, brokered at the UN and backed by the United States, as well as the United States’ own efforts for unification in Libya, offer a potential path toward the unification of national institutions. But the success of these efforts depends on the support of external actors, some of whom fear that a change in the balance of power could negatively impact their own interests in Libya. Recently, this has been particularly true of both Egypt and Europe, and this is why they feel they are now out of sync with Benghazi.
On the other side, Turkey occupies a privileged position. Its political and security relationships in western Libya provide Ankara with leverage and influence over actors whose buy-in will be necessary for any future national settlement, be it through the US or UN tracks.
From Benghazi’s perspective, securing Turkish support could help push forward the long-awaited unification of Libya’s sovereign institutions and executive authority. Turkey has the means and leverage required to facilitate negotiated agreements on security arrangements and integration of the military institutions in Benghazi and Tripoli, which would eventually result in eastern authorities entering Tripoli. This would secure what the 2019 war and subsequent UN-facilitated dialogue both failed to achieve.
Conversations with political and security interlocutors in Benghazi suggest an expectation that now that Ankara has secured its prize through the maritime agreement, it will put its full weight behind Libyan reunification—and soon.
Positioning Libya for the future
There are also long-term economic and geopolitical calculations at play for Benghazi as it eyes unification of the country under a single authority.
Across the Eastern Mediterranean, states have spent years negotiating their own bilateral maritime delimitation deals and cooperation to advance and secure their strategic interests in the region. In August 2020, Greece and Egypt signed a partial delimitation of their exclusive economic zone. In 2022, Egypt’s presidential decree No. 595 drew a western maritime boundary north of the land border. (Both Tripoli and Benghazi protested it.) Greece has leased out areas south of Crete that Libya claims as part of its exclusive economic zone in a May 2025 submission to the UN. Several nations formed the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2020 to organize regional cooperation and energy resources in the region, but without the participation of Libya and Turkey.
Libya was seen as too paralyzed and divided to block those moves. That has now changed. From Benghazi’s perspective, the maritime agreement isn’t about appeasing Turkey by giving it a concession, it is also about strengthening Libya’s position in a region where other states have already made their own consequential moves that affect their economic and geopolitical interests. A unified Libyan state would be better positioned to negotiate maritime arrangements, develop much-needed offshore resources, and engage Egypt and Europe from a position of greater institutional and diplomatic strength.
A more autonomous Libya
The significance of Saddam Haftar’s efforts to unify the country’s competing power centers cannot be understated.
Since 2014, Saleh and his contemporaries have exceptionally navigated Libya’s divided politics, where competing institutions and external alliances created opportunities to obstruct progress and preserve the status quo when it suited them. The emerging political project requires something different: the ability to negotiate across divisions, effectively manage foreign relationships, and translate diplomatic and political opportunities into a unified state.
The ratification of the maritime deal with Turkey is the first test of that approach.
Mohamed Eljarh is a Libyan researcher and policy analyst specializing in security, geopolitics, and regional affairs.
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Image: Secretary Marco Rubio meets with Libyan National Army Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., June 29, 2026. At left is Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett, via Flickr)