Contrary to regimes in other Arab states in the Levant and the Gulf, the Egyptian government has never undermined Arab identity by spreading ideas of a dichotomy between Sunni and Shiite, of a conflict between Sunni-dominated areas and those living in the Shiite crescent, or of a conflict between Arabs and non-Arabs living in the region. The Egyptian government has never approached regional conflicts and crises along sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal lines. It has never marginalized the national ties which hold the community together in the “nation state” in favor of sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal loyalties.

Contrary to the regimes in other Arab states in the Levant and the Gulf, the Egyptian government has never sought to cast its domestic tyranny in a sectarian, ideological, or tribal light or to legitimize its authoritarian ways by stirring up hatred in society along sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal lines. The Egyptian government has never monopolized the resources and wealth of the state and society on sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal bases.  Rather, such monopolization in Egypt has been and continues to be engaged in unremittingly by the institutions of the state and by the economic, financial, and administrative elite allied with them, irrespective of their fragmented identities.

Historically, these positions adopted by the Egyptian government go back to the establishment of the modern state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and until now they have not experienced any major upheavals.  Socially, the absence of severe fragmentation among the population, like that present in Arab countries in the Levant and the Gulf, has allowed the Egyptian government to avoid focusing its authoritarian practices along sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal lines.  Culturally, the makeup of Egyptian society – which has embraced religious diversity (Islamic, Christian, and Jewish) and, to a more limited extent, sectarian and ideological diversity (Sunni and Shiite) with a considerable amount of tolerance and respect for differences – has protected Egyptian society from the spread of extremism and the rejection of the “other” and prevented the authorities from widely using this diversity as a justification for its authoritarianism. 

Granted, there has always been an element of misuse of diversity. For example, Egyptian Jews were forcibly displaced in the 1950s, the “Believer President,” Anwar Sadat, ignored sectarian tensions and the incitement against Coptic Christians in the 1970s, and the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak utilized the religious right as a “scarecrow” to ensure the support of Copts for his rule by frightening them about what democracy would mean for Christians in Egypt.  Nevertheless, overall the Egyptian government has refused to advance sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal loyalties over Egyptian national identity.  In the same way, the Egyptian government has refused to target specific groups with its authoritarian practices or to allow certain factions to monopolize power and wealth based on any distinction, other than the dichotomy between loyalty to the authorities and affiliation to the economic, financial, and administrative elites allied with them, or opposing the authorities – an act by which one subjects oneself to the wrath of the state.

Theoretically, these positions should qualify the Egyptian government to take on a fundamental role in salvaging what remains of the nation state in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where sectarian, ideological, racial, and tribal forces have become sworn enemies.  Egypt’s positions should also qualify it to oppose the involvement of Arab regimes in the Levant and the Gulf in approaching and framing regional conflicts and crises along sectarian, ideological, racial, and tribal lines.  Such divisive approaches threaten to bring about the collapse of some of these states and societies and their disintegration into areas controlled by certain sects, ideological schools, racial groups, or tribes and bordered by sprawling refugee camps.  Even as the sectarianism of Nouri al-Maliki is met by the sectarianism of the regional funders of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the sectarianism of Bashar al-Assad and his regional supporters, Iran and Hezbollah, is met by the sectarianism of many of the armed opposition movements and their regional funders in the Gulf and Lebanon.  The Egyptian authorities should be able to take regional action in the Arab Levant and the Gulf, based on the established conviction (even if some aspects and implications of this conviction have been in contradiction with each other over the past decades, and particularly in recent years) shared by many Egyptians that Egypt’s national security is closely linked to the situations in other Arab countries.

However, the Egyptian authorities lack the most important element for succeeding in their efforts to salvage what remains of the nation state and confront the fierce onslaught of sectarianism, ideological intolerance, racial divisions, and tribalism.  This is because Egypt has not set an example for democratic governance, respect for rights and freedoms, holistic societal development, social justice, or scientific advances.  Although the Egyptian government has never used its authoritarian practices to target specific groups in particular or advanced sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal loyalties to the detriment of national identity, the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian state has not changed and its democratic transitions have floundered.  Moreover, the national identity which binds Egyptians together is currently in dire need of reawakening its conscience and sense of humanity in order to overcome the current crisis in the country and the accumulation of injustices and violations.  And although the Egyptian government has never retreated from the idea of the modern nation-state based on common citizenship, the rejection of discrimination, and the impartial stance of the state towards diversity in society, its unrelenting authoritarianism since the 1950s has emptied the idea of the modern nation-state of meaning and reduced citizenship only to those who demonstrate loyalty to the authorities.  This authoritarianism has also eliminated the right of citizens to freely choose their government, undermined citizens’ rights, and violated the condition of equality irrespective of religious identity, political convictions, or economic or social status.

The Egyptian authorities should certainly champion salvaging what remains of the nation state in Arab countries.  Indeed, the threat of collapse is not limited to Arab countries in the Levant and the Gulf.  It is also very present in Sudan, which has already split, and in Libya, which neighbors the West. However, the Egyptian government must also realize that success in this endeavor depends upon producing a positive example of a nation state at home.  Objectively speaking (and this is not just based on arbitrary rants from the writer who tires his readers daily with his discussion of democracy), the components for establishing such a positive example are democracy, respect for rights and freedoms, countering growing injustices through justice and the rule of law, overcoming polarization and internal conflicts by constructing conditions for peace domestically, and addressing deteriorated social and economic conditions through sustainable development and social justice.  The Egyptian authorities should also recognize that citizens in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen, as well as in Sudan and Libya, are searching for an alternative for the forces of extremism, whether sectarian, ideological, racial, or tribal.  Yet even after their prolonged suffering, such citizens are not finding a suitable alternative in the idea of the nation state, as they do not wish to be controlled by an authoritarian ruler or system of rule or to live in a state in which citizenship rights are enjoyed only by those who are loyal to and support the ruler, either overtly or implicitly through their silence, or by those who accept being excluded from public life without objection. The Egyptian authorities must further realize that Egypt’s regional alliances have now linked the country to regimes whose policies and practices in Arab countries are defined by sectarian, ideological, racial, and tribal loyalties.  This is a further dilemma which must be overcome if the Egyptian authorities wish to succeed in salvaging what remains of the nation state in the Arab region.

Amr Hamzawy joined the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo in 2011, where he continues to serve today. He is a former member of parliament, former member of the National Salvation Front, and founder of the Freedom Egypt Party. 

This article originally appeared in Shorouk