Just before the turn of the year, Saudi and Turkish officials engaged in a flurry of talks on defense cooperation. In one such conversation—which included Turkish defense industry representatives—Saudi Arabia reportedly indicated it intends to buy one hundred Turkish KAAN fighter jets. 

But with Saudi Arabia previously keen on acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, what has steered Riyadh toward Turkish technology?

Securing an upgrade

The KAAN is a Turkish fifth-generation, multi-role, stealth fighter aircraft developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and BAE Systems, which is based in London.

The project to develop the aircraft began in 2010, with the aim of replacing Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet and boosting Turkey’s autonomy, self-dependency, and overall military and national power. The urgency to develop this aircraft increased after Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019. The KAAN made its maiden flight in February 2024.

Riyadh has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets since 2017; however, the United States has not committed to the sale, and the situation has been prolonged. Riyadh is likely also feeling unsure about its ability to secure an F-35 deal considering the experiences of its neighbors. For example, while the Trump administration signed a multi-billion-dollar deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for F-35s in 2021 (as a reward for Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel in 2020), the UAE suspended talks over concerns with the Biden administration’s terms, citing “sovereign operational restrictions” and “technical requirements,” among other reasons. While some reports indicated that the UAE hopes to revive the deal with the incoming Trump administration, a UAE official said that Abu Dhabi does not expect to resume talks. 

Moreover, Saudi Arabia could be worried about its ability to secure the F-35 deal because the United States often prioritizes Israel, aiming to maintain its qualitative military edge over all regional powers. Additionally, such equipment typically comes with numerous strings attached to it, and the US Congress frequently impedes the sale of advanced military assets to other nations, including allies and partners. These factors have prompted some countries and regional powers to seek advanced weapons elsewhere, even though US military equipment is technologically superior.

As conveyed in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 for the kingdom, Riyadh aims not only to purchase weapons but also to produce them, pursuing the necessary know-how and technology transfer to build its own defense industry. Regarding fighter jets, Saudi Arabia requested to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a collaborative effort among Britain, Italy, and Japan to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Mitsubishi F-2. The new jet is expected to be airborne by 2040. 

While the United Kingdom and Italy support Saudi Arabia’s request to join GCAP, Japan has reportedly firmly opposed Riyadh’s membership in the project. Thus, the partnership has not yet been extended to Saudi Arabia. And on December 13—over a year after Saudi Arabia first submitted its request to join GCAP—BAE Systems, Italy’s Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement reached an agreement on the venture, with each holding a 33.3 percent share in the new joint company developing the jet. 

Riyadh’s extensive ties with China and amicable relations with Russia could explain why Japan would oppose Saudi Arabia’s inclusion. Accepting Saudi Arabia as a partner could raise questions regarding who has the authority to sell or block the sale of fighter jets to certain nations (including, for example, China and Russia). Furthermore, Japan’s opposition could be attributed to its concerns that incorporating Saudi Arabia would ultimately slow progress and delay timelines due to Riyadh’s need for technology transfers—especially given that Saudi Arabia currently lacks the necessary infrastructure and human resources for this project.

Although news about Saudi Arabia’s consideration of the Turkish KAAN first emerged last October, the finalization of the GCAP project may explain the resurgence of Saudi interest in the KAAN just a few days later. For the Saudis, timing is crucial. Unlike the GCAP, the Turkish jet has already taken to the air. Mass production is expected to begin in 2028, meaning that the KAAN project is likely at least ten years ahead of the GCAP. Even once the KAAN is operational, it is still possible to make updates to the jet incorporating sixth-generation technology, making it better aligned with Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of timelines and requirements.

Furthermore, the KAAN could appeal to Saudi Arabia because of uncertainty about Riyadh’s ability to acquire a GCAP jet should it remain excluded from the project. Japan’s opposition to Saudi Arabia’s involvement currently suggests that in the future, Tokyo could veto an attempt by Saudi Arabia to purchase the jet. Waiting over fifteen years to acquire new fighter jets only to face a potential veto would be an unwise move, especially considering two factors. First, Saudi Arabia’s ties with China are expected to strengthen if current trends persist, suggesting that a veto would become more likely. Second, it would be unwise because of Saudi Arabia’s desire to quickly establish a localized defense industry, diversify its military purchases, and acquire advanced fighter jets. In contrast to the GCAP countries, Turkey is already open to exporting the jet to allies and partners, including to Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Ukraine; the head of TAI predicts his company will deliver roughly 150 aircraft to such partner countries.

The thirty-thousand-foot view

By signaling its intention to acquire one hundred KAAN fighter jets, Saudi Arabia appears to be strengthening its strategic partnerships and elevating its geopolitical standing in the Middle East. This approach is particularly significant in light of shifting regional security dynamics, in which the need for a robust and independent defense posture has become increasingly critical. Through the diversification of its defense procurement strategies—and, ultimately, through enhancing its military capabilities, strengthening its deterrence, and fostering new strategic partnerships—Saudi Arabia is not only enhancing its military readiness but also asserting its influence in evolving regional geopolitics.

Moreover, by pursuing fighter jet acquisitions from Turkey, Saudi Arabia is strategically positioning itself to reduce its reliance on Western military hardware, including US military equipment. This shift is driven by complex political dynamics, especially with US restrictions on the sale of advanced fighters such as the F-35 and Washington’s prioritization of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

From 2015 to 2020, the Saudi Arabia-Turkey relationship experienced fluctuations due to unfavorable regional developments and differing ideological agendas. However, those factors began to shift after the normalization of ties following the Gulf Cooperation Council’s al-Ula declaration in 2021, marking the beginning of an unprecedented era of regional de-escalation and normalization efforts.

A notable indication of the evolving nature of defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is Riyadh’s procurement of the Turkish Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle. While the exact value of the agreement has not been disclosed, it has been estimated at over three billion dollars. Baykar’s chief executive officer said it was “the biggest defense and aviation export contract” in Turkey’s history. If the KAAN deal is realized, it would represent a significant advancement that would cement the transformation of defense and security cooperation between Riyadh and Ankara.

Saudi Arabia is not only a global financial power but also one of the largest arms purchasers in the world. From the Turkish perspective, the Saudi purchase would provide a lucrative source of funding to expand the production line, helping expedite production and reduce the cost per unit (currently exceeding one hundred million dollars). This would be a double win for Riyadh because it would not only acquire the KAAN with no strings attached to the deal but also have an opportunity to request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia, expediting the expansion of its local defense industry.

For some time, Ankara has been seeking potential partners to join its flagship defense industry program. In July 2023, Azerbaijan became a partner in the development of the KAAN. Under the partnership, Baku’s financial resources from its oil and gas reserves help Turkey with the costs of production. Meanwhile, joint production creates job opportunities in Azerbaijan, facilitates technology transfer, and will help Baku replace its aging fighter jets with more modern ones.

Pakistan has also expressed interest in joining the KAAN program, and the two countries are reportedly in advanced discussions about such a possibility. On August 2, 2023, Turkish Deputy Defence Minister Celal Sami Tüfekçi revealed that nearly two hundred Pakistanis were already involved in the development of the KAAN. A nuclear power with a competent military, Pakistan boasts one of the largest air forces in the world. Like Turkey, Pakistan is seeking to replace its fourth-generation F-16 fighter jets with a fifth-generation alternative.

Additionally, there are reports that Russia and Ukraine have approached Turkey with joint production proposals. Malaysia has also been named as a potential partner for Turkey.

Ankara has created a trilateral mechanism that aims to elevate cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan with a specific focus on political, economic, and defense and military ties. Similarly, Ankara has been working on cementing another trilateral mechanism—this one between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—for coordinating defense cooperation, boosting defense trade, facilitating technology transfer, and localizing the defense industry. The first meeting of the latter trilateral arrangement was held in Riyadh in August 2023, and several rounds of discussion have since taken place. In addition, there are various forms of bilateral defense cooperation shared between Turkey and Pakistan and also Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: For example, Pakistan has deployed troops to Saudi Arabia for various reasons, and the two countries conduct military exercises regularly. 

For all these reasons, it makes sense that Saudi Arabia would have its eye on KAAN jets. But ultimately, whether the Saudis will acquire KAAN jets hinges on several factors, including the jet’s operational readiness and strategic value (gauged after its development is complete), the robustness of Saudi Arabia’s defense infrastructure, and evolving geopolitical dynamics within the region, which significantly influence defense collaborations. In addition, the Saudis typically take a long time to finalize such deals. Even if they do reach a decision, there is uncertainty regarding their commitment to it, especially if disagreements arise on other issues. In such cases, Riyadh tends to respond by halting or canceling all aspects of cooperation—political, economic, defense, and security—rather than engaging in dialogue to address the specific disagreement. 

Thus, as regional powers navigate these complexities, they will likely need to take time before fully recalibrating their defense postures in response to a KAAN purchase. But this waiting period may provide opportunities for such regional powers and Saudi Arabia to work together to assess their strategic interests and align their defense strategies accordingly.

Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Image: Official image released by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) shows the Turkish fifth-generation warplane TAI Kaan (Ruler or King of Kings) taking off in the early hours on Wednesday Feb 21, 2024 and stayed in the air briefly before returning to an air base in north Ankara, Turkey. On 21 February 2024, the TAI TF Kaan National Combat Aircraft (MMU - Milli Muharip Uçak) completed its maiden flight, lasting 11 minutes. The new fighter, formerly known as the TF-X, was accompanied by a Turkish Air Force (TurAF) F-16D Fighting Falcon. It is the defense industry milestone as the country's first indigenously developed fighter jet completed its first flight, part of the country's efforts to upgrade its air force and curb external dependency.