On November 29, Beijing appointed Xiao Junzheng as its new ambassador to Israel, signaling an effort to repair relations strained by its contentious response to the October 7, 2023, attacks. After three decades of fostering ties with Israel, China remains eager to access Israeli innovation and markets while projecting itself as an objective “friend to all” and a “responsible major power.” Xiao now faces the critical challenge of restoring trust and ensuring that Beijing’s actions align with its professed commitment to neutrality and balanced diplomacy.
Cai Run, China’s outgoing ambassador to Israel, was summoned from Portugal after his predecessor’s untimely death in May 2020. Tragedy continued to define his tenure, as he grappled with two wars, a global pandemic, and the pressures of great power competition. He proved highly effective on the economic front. Under his stewardship, bilateral trade peaked at $21 billion in 2022, and Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) dominated the market, with 71 percent of EVs sold in Israel coming from Chinese brands this year. He ensured the continuation of direct flights and secured the presence of twenty thousand Chinese workers in Israel during the COVID-19 pandemic and after the October 7, 2023, attacks.
However, Cai, a party member first and a diplomat second, toed the party line when navigating the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was evident in his silence during the 2021 Gaza war and his two tone-deaf addresses to the Israeli public since October 7, 2023. During Cai’s tenure, Israeli attitudes toward China fell to the lowest point in a decade, even before the eruption of the war. Following October 7, 2023, 30 percent of Israelis reported more negative opinions toward Beijing, with more than half viewing China as “unfriendly” or “hostile” to Israel.
Xiao arrives in Tel Aviv after serving as ambassador to Greece, a European Union member state and, like Israel, home to a strategically important Chinese-operated port. Xiao brings an additional dimension to the role, with extensive regional expertise, including key postings in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, as well as several roles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on the Middle East and North Africa.
Xiao’s experience was evident in his first outreach to the Israeli public. Late last month, Xiao authored an op-ed in the widely circulated newspaper Israel Hayom, and he issued a statement through the embassy. In these communications, he subtly addressed the geopolitical challenges, practicing nuance while abiding by the party line.
In the article, Xiao extended an olive branch by emphasizing shared strategic considerations based on economic collaboration and innovation, despite cultural and ideological differences. “As long as China and Israel advance bilateral ties from a strategic and long-term perspective,” he wrote, “there will surely be a brighter future for China-Israel relations.”
Xiao can find like-minded pragmatists in the current government. Over the past decade, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who previously served as the transportation minister and the foreign minister, have both facilitated major Chinese infrastructure projects in Israel. Netanyahu was scheduled to visit Beijing in late October 2023, and had it not been for the war, he would likely have advanced several major projects.
Economic cooperation may still be possible, but trust is indispensable.
Despite the pragmatism and goodwill, realpolitik considerations are at hand. Since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War, the Chinese government, in both words and actions, proved to be a vocal critic of Israel and an ally of its most bitter enemies.
This approach began on October 7, 2023, the day Hamas terrorists murdered 1,180 people in Israel, kidnapped another 251, and raped and tortured many others. While many nations condemned Hamas, China has not done so thus far. It did, however, condemn Israeli attacks on targets across the Middle East. Unprecedentedly, it even sent a representative to the International Criminal Court in the Hague to legitimize Hamas terrorism as “an inalienable right well founded in international law.” It did not, however, issue similar condemnations when Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Iran attacked Israel.
Instead, China maintained its warm relations with Iran, the lead sponsor of Hamas and Hezbollah. It continued its mediation efforts between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which had been on the brink of normalizing ties with Israel before the war.
Furthermore, China strategically harmed Israel when it worked to normalize Hamas’s continued rule in the Gaza Strip. This approach took center stage during the “Beijing Declaration” of July 2024, the concluding document of a “reconciliation” summit between fourteen Palestinian factions, including some who committed atrocious acts of terrorism.
The Chinese mediation efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia and between the Palestinian factions are only the most recent demonstrations of China’s growing aspiration to play a larger role in the region.
Indeed, China has used its growing influence to undermine US relationships in the region. As Israel is a strong ally of the United States, Chinese analysts told the authors that Beijing would continue to “use Israel as a stick to beat the US.” Much as it did with Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s propaganda arms have been exploiting the tragic war to wage a disinformation campaign against the United States, which it blamed for “fanning the flames.”
While these efforts are in many cases contrary to Israeli national interests, maintaining a stable relationship with China is in Israel’s interest. China is its third-largest trading partner. But Israel is not the only one benefitting from this relationship. Israel is a source of advanced technologies for China, especially at a time when doors in the West are closing to Beijing. Moreover, the Israeli market, although small in size, serves as a testing ground for many Chinese companies before they enter the Western market, as the Israeli one shares similar standards and preferences.
Xiao should recognize that both countries must take tangible steps to rebuild trust if they seek to “resume exchanges in all aspects as soon as possible as the situation eases,” as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Katz in October. This requires genuine engagement with Israelis, particularly those who have encountered closed doors and deaf ears since last October.
Economic cooperation may still be possible, but trust is indispensable. Continuing to harm Israel in global arenas, providing diplomatic and rhetorical support to its enemies, or exploiting it for Beijing’s competition with Washington will severely limit the potential for shared economic and regional interests.
The outcome of the ongoing wars across the region is sure to shape China’s Middle East policy, especially its relations with Israel. A second Trump administration and the United States’ approach to Iran, as well as an escalation in the US-China trade war, will further complicate things. At the same time, as China makes significant strides in technological modernization, Israel’s global standing, security environment, and appeal as a “start-up nation” have diminished as some companies have left the country. In this volatile landscape, China’s incentives to prioritize relations with Israel are likely to wane, adding to Xiao’s challenges.
Finally, it is deeply troubling that Xiao, like his predecessors, chooses to deny the unprecedented wave of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionist demonization and disinformation propagated by China’s party-state media, diplomats, online influencers, and academia. This is an issue that cannot be ignored. Facing it head-on is crucial to protect bilateral ties going forward, but there’s a larger concern, too; when a state representing one-fifth of humanity, armed with the world’s most sophisticated propaganda machine, vilifies Jews, it jeopardizes the very lives of Jewish people everywhere.
Tuvia Gering is a cyber threat intelligence analyst at Planet Nine and a nonresident fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Glazer Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
Ofir Dayan is a researcher at the Glazer Israel-China Policy Center at the Israeli Institute of National Security Studies (INSS).
Further reading
Thu, Apr 25, 2024
Why Taiwan stands with Israel
New Atlanticist By Tuvia Gering
In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors.
Thu, Jan 11, 2024
China’s bid for a new Middle East meets reality
New Atlanticist By Tuvia Gering
The October 7 Hamas terror attack on Israel has put China’s story about it setting off a “wave of reconciliation” in the Middle East to the test.
Thu, Dec 14, 2023
China is fixed on discrediting the US on Gaza War. But this policy lacks credibility and will likely fail.
MENASource By Ahmed Aboudouh
It should be clearly understood that, as long as Israel continues to kill Palestinian civilians in Gaza, China will use the eroding effect this has on the US’s credibility
Image: Chinese and Israeli flags are seen on a table during a signing ceremony marking a launch by Tel Aviv University and Beijing's Tsinghua University of a $300 million joint centre for innovative research and education, in Tel Aviv May 20, 2014. China's purchase, announced on Thursday, of a controlling stake in Israel's largest food maker reflects a broader surge in Chinese investment in an economy largely tethered to Western markets. Picture taken May 20, 2014. REUTERS/Baz Ratner