The African National Congress’ (ANC) defeat in critical municipalities during the local elections held on August 3 has revealed cracks in South Africa’s ruling political party and has highlighted the diminishing influence of President Jacob Zuma, according to the Atlantic Council’s Chloë McGrath.
“The results of this municipal election have certainly created significant shockwaves for the ANC. Losing control over two major municipalities will definitely be a profound wake-up call for the party, as will slipping below the 60 percent mark for the first time since it came to power,” said McGrath.
“The losses suffered by the ANC will shore up the case of anti-Zuma contingents within the party—some of whom even called for his resignation earlier in the year,” she added.
The ANC, it’s main opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the newly-founded Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party competed for municipal seats and mayoral positions in the recent elections. The ANC lost key battleground municipalities to its main opposition—particularly Nelson Mandela Bay, which encompasses Port Elizabeth, and Tshwane, home to the administrative capital Pretoria, both of which have historically voted for ANC leadership. However, the ANC is still leading national polls and has won every national election since Nelson Mandela was elected president in 1994 following the end of apartheid.
South Africa will hold its next general election in 2019.
Corruption scandals and protracted unemployment have eroded the reputation of President Jacob Zuma and the ANC—of which Zuma is the leader. Zuma’s power and his party’s political influence are seemingly declining on the national level.
“The corruption allegations against President Zuma, most notably the scandal surrounding his luxury homestead Nkandla, have played a pivotal role in these municipal elections. Corruption allegations against Zuma are not new—in fact they predate his presidency—going back as far as the early 1990s,” said McGrath.
South Africa has been reeling from economic shocks borne out of the country’s 2009 recession; the value of the rand has been halved over the past five years. Staggering unemployment and increased inequality between wealthy and impoverished communities define South Africa’s current economic climate and in turn, have driven the campaign platforms of the country’s political parties. The ruling ANC party entered the municipal election season touting a platform to address the core issues stemming out of the economic crisis, but these proposed policies were seen as incoherent in the eyes of the voting public.
The ANC’s failure to address such challenges has opened the door for its main opposition parties to strengthen their own campaign platforms.
“The DA’s convincing win in the Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane municipalities, and the close competition they provided to the ANC in Johannesburg—with the help of the EFF—definitely signals that the DA is setting itself up well for the national elections in 2019. In order for their gains to be protected, it will be necessary for the DA’s policies to both stimulate economic growth while acting to reduce inequality,” said McGrath.
“The South African electorate is clearly tired of the enrichment of elite outsiders, and has an appetite for change—but that DA will need to deliver on its promises to reinforce the confidence of its new voters, and to attract further voters in the next election,” she added.
The Atlantic Council’s Chloë McGrath spoke in an interview with the New Atlanticist’s Mitch Hulse. Here are excerpts from our interview:
Q: To what extent have South Africa’s economic crisis and corruption allegations against President Jacob Zuma influenced these municipal elections?
McGrath: The corruption allegations against President Zuma, most notably the scandal surrounding his luxury homestead Nkandla, have played a pivotal role in these municipal elections. Corruption allegations against Zuma are not new—in fact they predate his presidency—going back as far as the early 1990s. In 2009, a court decision to drop 783 corruption charges against Zuma cleared the way for him to run for president, but recently a high court overturned the decision, and the charges are now effectively reinstated. This dealt a major blow to the ANC just a few weeks before the country went to the polls, affirming public distrust of the president and further exacerbating frustration over his apparent inability to turn the economy around.
The Constitutional Court’s ruling in March this year found that President Zuma had “failed to uphold the Constitution” when he disregarded the recommendations made in the Public Prosecutor’s report on the upgrades to his private homestead, Nkandla. The president is now mandated to pay back the sum of ZAR 78 million, as determined by the national treasury, within 45 days, and we have yet to see whether this will actually happen. Public outrage over Nkandla took an amusing turn when President Zuma returned to Nkandla to cast his ballot last Wednesday—the election results have shown that he lost miserably in his home area where the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won the majority.
Q: While the DA has largely framed their campaign as an alternative to Zuma, many voters have indicated they are looking to the DA in hopes they can improve South Africa’s stagnant economy. Has the DA proposed policies that can successfully do so? Do you see the DA as having a sustainable political platform for upcoming elections at the national level? Does Mmusi Maimane’s nomination indicate a shift in the racial makeup of the post-apartheid DA?
McGrath: The DA has proposed several policies for how they intend to stimulate the South African economy to pull it out of the current downward spiral. Much of the DA’s appeal has been because of their record of clean governance and improved local service delivery, and so they tend to mobilize voters around these two issues. But there has been significant attention paid to devising immediate steps necessary to stimulate the economy. Although the South African economy was slow to recover from the global financial crisis, the DA asserts that the blame for the current stagnation is largely due to internal constraints and factors, of which their key concerns are the electricity supply problem, a volatile and over regulated labor market, and low investor confidence that they ascribe to the poor political leadership of the ANC. The DA’s proposed solutions to these problems would have the potential to stimulate improvement, at least in the interim, but it is not certain how politically feasible some of their suggestions are in the long term. Additionally, there needs to be a focus on job creation for the largely unskilled workforce that makes up a significant proportion of the country’s unemployed population. Until there is mass job creation that takes into realistically takes into account the lack of skills in the work force, many citizens will remain in the informal sector or indefinitely unemployed.
The DA’s convincing win in the Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane municipalities, and the close competition they provided to the ANC in Johannesburg—with the help of the EFF—definitely signals that the DA is setting itself up well for the national elections in 2019. In order for their gains to be protected, it will be necessary for the DA’s policies to both stimulate economic growth while acting to reduce inequality. The South African electorate is clearly tired of the enrichment of elite outsiders, and has an appetite for change—but that DA will need to deliver on its promises to reinforce the confidence of its new voters, and to attract further voters in the next election.
Mmusi Maimane’s election as the DA’s first black leader in 2015 was horribly overdue. But yes, you could say that this development indicates that the DA has taken seriously the allegations concerning its historically white support base. There has been a lot of transformation in the party, but some people are still skeptical about whether Maimane will be a puppet of Helen Zille and other white party executives – so it’s going to be important for him to clearly set himself apart as a strong leader who is not merely bent into the shape of the party. But Maimane’s mark on the party has already begun to mature – and this election is proof of the evolving nature of the party’s mass appeal and its credibility with the electorate.
Q: Opposition parties to the ANC have called the mayoral elections a referendum on Jacob Zuma’s leadership of the country. South Africa will hold general elections in 2019. What do the results mean for Zuma’s political control both in the country and in the ANC itself? Is Zuma’s administration on its way out?
McGrath: The results of this municipal election have certainly created significant shockwaves for the ANC. Losing control over two major municipalities will definitely be a profound wake-up call for the party, as will slipping below the 60 percent mark for the first time since it came to power. President Zuma is currently serving his second of two terms in office, so he will not be able to contest the next election. He is unpopular with voters and even unpopular within his own party. The losses suffered by the ANC will shore up the case of anti-Zuma contingents within the party—some of whom even called for his resignation earlier in the year. Zuma’s successor in the party has yet to be determined, but the two favored candidates are his ex-wife and current head of the AU, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and current deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa, a union-leader who has the support of COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. The ANC needs some serious introspection—and since Zuma’s tenure will come to a natural end in 2019, the end of his time in power is not sufficient to signal whether the party has taken the lessons of this election cycle to heart. The real proof will come in whatever changes, if any, they will make to their governance approach, as well as whether there will be a serious clamp down on corruption or cronyism. Nominating Zuma’s successor from outside of ruling party elite would be a clear indicator of change, but it is highly unlikely that this will take place.
All this being said, the ANC still secured 53.91 percent of the national vote, and the party’s liberation struggle credentials still appeal to the majority of South Africans who trust the brand.
Q: It’s likely that coalition governments will have to be formed in many parts of the country. To what extent will the Economic Freedom Fighters control the balance of power between the DA and the ANC? What will a coalition government look like since the DA has said that they will not partner with the ANC?
McGrath: The conclusive results on the municipal elections have ushered in an era of precarious power sharing. While the DA has unsurprisingly secured a majority in the city of Cape Town, they do not have above 50 percent in Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay so they will be required to enter into a coalition with other parties. The EFF came in third in this election—securing just over eight percent of the vote nationwide in what has been their first local election—and all eyes are turned on these two parties as the coalition talks get underway. The radical leftist EFF is diametrically opposed to the DA on many policy issues, yet the two parties do share a common distaste of ANC power. The EFF has been very clear that it will not enter into a coalition with the ANC, and it is yet to be determined whether a deal will be reached with the DA. When asked about coalition possibilities, the EFF said that although the opposition parties failed to gain over 50 percent of the vote in the major municipalities, one thing was clear from the voters: the choice to turn against the ANC. Thus the EFF has indicated that to enter into an ANC coalition would be to disregard this clear message from the electorate, and that would be detrimental for EFF reputation. After the DA officially obtained the majority in Tshwane, Mmusi Maimane has said that he would be willing to partner with the EFF despite the insults directed at him by the party. In my opinion, an EFF coalition with the DA would be good for both parties, and although fraught with potential obstacles, has the ability to strengthen democratic practice in the country. The DA is aware that its victory is in part due to the EFF attracting votes that would ordinarily go to the ANC, and acknowledges that the real work of governance now begins as the party look ahead to delivering on campaign promises.
Q: While it seems that the Democratic Alliance is gaining influence in urban ANC strongholds, rural voters continue to largely vote for the ANC. Do you foresee an intensified divide between urban and rural communities in the future? How will this influence future elections in South Africa?
McGrath: There is definitely an intensified divide between the urban and rural communities in South Africa, but what is interesting is that South Africa’s urbanization is further ahead than many African countries, so the urban concentration of voters is quite significant. Rural voters are in some ways more insulated from the failures of the ANC, and more likely to cling to liberation credentials and nostalgic allegiances than are urban voters who generally have more access to the media and critical debate, as well as failures of service delivery in high density areas. This election, it seems like the ANC has been increasingly relegated to the rural vote and will need to readjust its strategies to counter the negative impression that the party has among urban voters. In order to have a shot at taking over leadership at a national level, the DA and the EFF will have to refocus their efforts to appeal to rural communities and the grassroots more broadly—which will not be an easy task—but will be necessary for the opposition to convincingly dislodge the ANC from power.
Chloë McGrath is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.
Mitch Hulse is an editorial assistant at the Atlantic Council.
Julia Goldman and Meghan Rowley, interns at the Atlantic Council, contributed to this report.
Image: Democratic Alliance leader Mmusi Maimane gestures as he speaks to members of the media at the result center in Pretoria, South Africa, on August 4, 2016. (Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko)