Voters in Germany will head to the polls on February 23 at a precarious moment for the transatlantic alliance. US President Donald Trump is back in the White House, Germany’s economy continues to lag behind those of its peers, energy prices are high, and the war in Ukraine continues to rage. The next German government will have no shortage of issues to confront head on. Although a more forward-leaning security and defense posture might not be at the forefront of voters’ minds, the next chancellor should make this a priority given that it will in part determine the health of the US-German relationship for at least the next four years.
Indeed, if German leaders need an impetus for action, they should look no further than Washington. In the US capital, Berlin has been dealt a tough hand politically. For years, it has been targeted (mostly by the right) as the poster child of a bad ally. Last October, US Vice President JD Vance said that NATO’s problem is that Germany doesn’t spend enough. More recently, billionaire and Trump adviser Elon Musk’s bizarre support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has led to a series of tweets in which he says they’re the only party that can save Germany. Beyond this, because of the transactional approach that the Trump administration will surely take toward Europe, the next German government simply won’t have the luxury of time to carve out a new role for itself within the European Union (EU), NATO, or as a “good” ally of the United States. It must instead lead, not just because of pressure from Washington, but for its own sake.
Where should the next government start?
First on the docket must be Ukraine. Kyiv needs more equipment to keep fighting, and fast; it is struggling on the battlefield, with Russia slowly but surely continuing to gain ground. Given Trump’s desire to bring about an end to the fighting, it’s unclear if Kyiv will see the same type of support from the United States that it saw during the Biden administration. In fact, it’s probably safe to say that it won’t. Europe must take a leading role for Ukraine’s long-term security, first with more financial, military, and humanitarian assistance, and second with talk around Europe’s engagement in the outcomes of negotiations.
Germany needs to be creative on negotiations as well. Trump will want to take on the role of “primary negotiator” in any talks that might take place, but if Germany isn’t willing to put real skin in the game, then it will risk being left out of critical decision making. Coming to the table without a real offer of support or trying to explain why certain actions just aren’t feasible in Germany will be seen as weak. It will simply feed into the administration’s rhetoric of “feckless Europeans.” In fact, German leaders would be wise to take the phrase Führung aus der Mitte, or “lead from the middle,” permanently out of their vocabulary.
Instead, the next German government will have to determine how to help secure Ukraine’s long-term security and enforce any peace, potentially by sending German troops to Ukraine and supporting other European forces in a meaningful capacity. If the option of “boots on the ground” becomes a reality, Germany must be there. It will be unacceptable for Berlin to sit on the sidelines.
The new government should immediately announce further military aid to Ukraine, including a new package that has so far failed to come from this government. This will help Ukraine in the short term, and it will help the West come to the table for potential negotiations from a place of strength rather than weakness.
The turning point: Take two
Beyond Ukraine, Berlin will also need to deliver on the faltering Zeitenwende. The sea change in Germany’s defense policy promised by Chancellor Olaf Scholz was a laudable initial effort that was applauded from Washington. But it quickly sputtered out and has failed to deliver in a way that experts hoped or expected. Sustained defense spending is on shaky ground once the one hundred billion euro “special fund” runs out in 2027. Procurement to refurbish Berlin’s military capabilities is too slow, and the lack of real political will at the highest levels has so far doomed attempts to breathe fresh life into the effort.
Germany’s defense transformation also struggles with the general public. While it’s true that leaders and analysts alike perhaps assigned a wider meaning to the Zeitenwende than Scholz anticipated, the current government had a major messaging problem in selling its ideas to a broad audience beyond the so-called “Berlin bubble.” Most of the country understands the threat Russia poses, and polls last year showed that Germans remain broadly supportive of Ukraine and for increased defense spending. But still, a recent poll found that 55 percent of the country opposed prioritizing defense spending over social spending.
However, politicians must not be tempted to hide behind public attitudes, especially in a country with a complex relationship with its military. Perhaps the most important lesson from the Zeitenwende is the power of political will. The public can be convinced with clear-eyed and consistent speeches, statements, and engagement that defense spending, arming Ukraine, and deterring Russian aggression on the European continent makes them safer.
Break it off?
But Germany needs more than just defense spending. Germany continues to confront the consequences of decades of absent or under-investment in various sectors within the country. According to the International Monetary Fund, “Over the medium term, Germany faces rising spending pressures from aging and defense, as well as a need to expand public investment in transport, energy, communications, and other infrastructure.”
To do this, Germany must figure out how to relax its fiscal rules to accommodate higher spending and more sustained long-term investment. The oft-cited “debt brake” should be first on the list. The debt brake was written into the German Constitution in 2009 by the Merkel government, and it requires that the country’s budget deficit does not exceed 0.35 percent of structural gross domestic product (GDP). This rule has helped Germany maintain a debt-to-GDP ratio around 60 percent, which is well below the eurozone average. At the same time, it has also reduced the government’s ability to invest in infrastructure and encourage economic growth.
Reforming the debt brake will be difficult. The next German parliament will need a two-thirds majority to reform the rules, which will be tough given that it’s unlikely any potential coalition will have this majority. There are some creative ways to get around this, but relaxing the debt brake rules should be a priority for everyone, as it will be key for Germany to unlock its potential during the Trump era and beyond.
On the defense side, the German Armed Forces need increased and ongoing investments into the production of ammunition and artillery shells, for example. The next government should also embrace institutional changes to shape more productive decision making. A national security council, for example, would go a long way in helping Germany streamline its defense decision making. Although this isn’t a new idea by any means, it hasn’t gotten the traction it deserves, as the idea is often dismissed as too difficult or unrealistic given how the German government works. But now is the time for Germany to challenge its own self-imposed limitations, for its own sake and not just to placate critics in Washington.
None of these efforts will be cheap, and German politicians will need to expend serious political capital selling these ideas. That effort will become even more difficult in areas where far-right and far-left politicians have spread anti-NATO and anti-EU messages throughout the population. But given the political realities facing the transatlantic partners, it’s beyond time Germany steps up and plays the leadership role everyone wants it to play. If not, it will be sidelined, seen as irrelevant, and this moment will have been squandered.
Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
James Batchik is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Further reading
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Image: Soldiers of the Guard Battalion of the German Armed Forces, photographed during a reception with military honors in the courtyard of the Federal Chancellery in Berlin, 04 11 2024 Berlin Germany Copyright: xKiraxHofmannx