After months of signaling and speculation, the Trump administration started on February 12 to roll out its strategy for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. This included a call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, a Trump call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and a major statement by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.
Critics decried Trump’s call with Putin, which, in Trump’s own social media post, had an effusive tone not merited by Russia’s war against Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure and sabotage against the United States and its allies. That the call with Putin preceded the call with Zelenskyy suggests some Trump administration favoritism for Russia. But Trump’s style usually includes a warm tone directed at counterparts, especially authoritarian ones. That can change fast. And the call with Zelenskyy also seemed to be warm, at least in the Ukrainian readout. The two calls signaled the beginning of negotiations, but not their substance. Hopefully, any Trump meeting with Putin, an adversary, will take place only along with a parallel meeting with Zelenskyy, a friend.
We will learn more in the coming days as top administration officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, descend on the Munich Security Conference. Vance’s scheduled meeting with Zelenskyy, in particular, will be closely watched. But Hegseth’s comments to his counterparts at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels were revealing.
Hegseth made three substantive statements that raised immediate objections from Ukrainians and many of Ukraine’s friends. He:
- called restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders established in 1991 “unrealistic”;
- asserted that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not a “realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement”; and
- said that while robust postwar security guarantees for Ukraine are needed, these must be backed by European and (unspecified) non-European troops, not US troops deployed to Ukraine, and not part of a NATO mission.
Critics, including Ukrainians, quickly decried Hegseth’s statements as representing undeserved unilateral concessions to Russia that undermined US negotiating leverage before any talks began. These concerns are understandable, but a closer reading of Hegseth’s remarks supports a more nuanced and possibly stronger approach from the Trump administration.
Restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders is not in fact achievable through military means in the near term. Ukraine’s leaders and most of Ukraine’s friends have acknowledged as much. Hegseth seemed to be suggesting that the immediate US objective is a cease-fire in place, something that has been clear for some time. Hegseth, happily, did not push Ukraine to cede territory. Neither did he suggest that the United States is prepared to recognize Russia’s occupation of about 20 percent of the country. This is not a pleasant message, but if it means simply a recognition of the need for a cease-fire and not a surrender to Russia’s demands, it is consistent with a reasonable cease-fire to end the fighting.
Second, there is no universe in which Russia will agree to NATO membership for Ukraine in a negotiation. That is what Hegseth said, and saying so is not the same as saying that Ukraine will never become a NATO member. Closing the door for Ukraine’s NATO membership would be an unrequited concession to Russia, weakening the US position for no good reason. But that is not yet the administration’s position and hopefully will not become its position.
Third, it has been clear for some time that the United States would not put boots on the ground in Ukraine and that European countries would have to stand up a force to back up a cease-fire. It has also been clear that the Europeans would insist on US backup, including military backup, if their forces in Ukraine were under attack from Russia. Such backup could include air power and other means that would not cross Hegseth’s redline of deploying US troops inside Ukraine. Hegseth threw the ball to the Europeans in public, but that was coming in any case.
The administration’s emerging Ukraine strategy could still be the basis for a decent outcome if the United States resists recognition of Russian illegal aggression against Ukraine, if it keeps NATO membership for Ukraine on the table and refuses to negotiate it with Russia, and if the United States and Europe can work out a military plan to support a backup force inside Ukraine. A robust cease-fire that preserves a “free” Ukraine independent from Russian occupation, this era’s version of West Germany, could become a strategic defeat for Putin and a success for Ukraine, Europe, and the free world.
Hegseth spoke of the need to be realistic. Ukraine recovering its Russian-occupied territories may not be realistic in the short run. Likewise, for many years, it was not realistic to imagine the Baltic countries regaining their independence from Moscow, German reunification, or an end to the Iron Curtain. But all three happened. So can Ukraine’s restoration, if Ukraine’s friends remain committed and persistent.
The Trump team’s rollout of its Ukraine strategy had its failings, but it is not as bad as some fear. At least not yet.
Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.
Further reading
Mon, Feb 10, 2025
Now is Europe’s moment for decisive action on Ukraine
New Atlanticist By Léonie Allard, Ian Brzezinski
Make Trump an offer he can’t refuse: European allies should propose deploying troops in Ukraine.
Tue, Jan 21, 2025
Donald Trump’s promise of strong US leadership should begin with Ukraine
UkraineAlert By
By resolutely backing Ukraine, President Trump can prevent the slide toward World War III and reestablish US leadership in a world threatened by Putin's Axis of Autocrats, writes former Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
Tue, Jan 14, 2025
No peace without security: Ukraine needs guarantees against new Russian invasion
UkraineAlert By Peter Dickinson
Ukraine is ready to make territorial concessions but insists that any peace deal must include credible long-term security guarantees to prevent a new Russian invasion, writes Peter Dickinson.
Image: Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy meet at Trump Tower in New York City, U.S., September 27, 2024. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton/File Photo