Western partners have leveraged significant economic pressure against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. While energy-related sanctions are in place, energy security concerns have restricted how far Western governments, including the United States, are willing and able to go. On January 20, President Trump declared a national energy emergency, stressing the need for a “reliable, diversified, and affordable supply of energy to drive [US] manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, and defense industries.”

One critical challenge for the United States in the energy security space is the sourcing of enriched uranium that fuels nuclear reactors across the country, vital for the energy transition away from fossil fuels. The United States has consistently depended on Russia for enrichment services. At the same time, the US enrichment capacity, once thriving, has dwindled, giving way to foreign imports. Nearly seventy-three percent of enriched uranium in 2023 originated abroad. Such reliance on a handful of foreign sources, and especially adversarial countries, introduces severe supply vulnerabilities. With the global demand for enriched uranium expected to rise, the United States should regain its status as a large uranium enricher capable of satisfying its domestic demand.

Russia has a consistent track record of weaponizing energy dependence to coerce other countries. Approximately twenty-seven percent of the enriched uranium used in the United States comes from Russia, which is responsible for around forty-four percent of global enrichment capacity. Although the Biden administration banned Russian uranium imports by signing the H.R.1042, Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act into law, effective August 2024, the Act permits US firms to procure nuclear fuel from Russia’s state-run nuclear energy firm, Rosatom, under a waiver program until alternative suppliers are secured. These waivers, however, can only be granted until 2028 and are designed to give US energy providers sufficient time to adjust to the new conditions.

In response, in November 2024, Moscow announced “tit-for-tat” restrictions on uranium exports to the United States. According to the new rules, exemptions might be made under one-off licenses issued by the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control. While it is unclear whether such licenses will be granted, this move yet again showcases the risks of relying on external fuel sources.

The pursuit of indigenous enrichment capacity is not motivated by market dynamics or elevated prices. The current price of enrichment services (measured in separative work units) is significantly lower than at any point between 2006 and 2019. Instead, the drive stems from vulnerabilities associated with overreliance on a handful of suppliers. Such concentration of supply may become vulnerable to disruptions caused by malign actors or market shocks.

Building resilient enriched uranium supply chains is a critical policy to prevent future weaponization and disruptions by malign actors. It requires more than simply halting imports from Russia. The United States should pursue a strategic policy to meet its own nuclear fuel needs while helping establish resilient and transparent supply chains to other nations. The Sapporo 5—a coalition of like-minded countries comprising Canada, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—has pledged to collaborate on securing a reliable nuclear fuel supply chain. Achieving this objective will require a sustained increase in allied financing across all stages of the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment.

A growing bipartisan consensus in the United States supports strengthening domestic uranium enrichment programs, even if allies and partners temporarily fill the gaps. Until recently, the United States lacked domestically owned uranium enrichment facilities. To address this, around $3.4 billion has been mobilized to jumpstart domestic enrichment efforts. These funds will benefit domestic enrichers and support firms at other fuel cycle stages, including mining.

The goal of building domestic uranium enrichment capacity to safeguard from disruptions should remain a priority. Despite the optimistic outlook, the jury is still out on whether these efforts are sustained in the long run. Such investments cannot have immediate results and require a strategic vision. Additionally, the nuclear fuel cycle, by design, is hard to sustain competitively without close public-private collaboration. Public-private partnerships and long-term demand signals to service providers are essential to building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain.

Mikael Pir-Budagyan was a Young Global Professional with the Economic Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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Image: Distribution Warehouse Interior With Radioactive Waste Barrels On Racks