Submission to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee Inquiry

9 September, 2010

 “Worn down, doubly decimated, but undisputed masters of the hour, the French nation peered into the future in thankful wonder and haunting dread. Where then was that SECURITY without which all that had been gained seemed valueless, and life itself, even amid the rejoicings of victory, was almost unendurable? The mortal need was Security”.

Winston Churchill on the French after World War One.[i]

Grand strategy is the organisation of large means in pursuit of large uncertain ends over medium to long time frames. Such strategy is informed by history, identity and the credibility of the national narrative both domestically and internationally. Since the creation of the national debt in the eighteenth century as a way of financing war the strategic concept that emerges from such strategy has traditionally represented a balance between what must be done and what can be afforded given the severity of any given threat. A successful strategic concept thus depends on sound political leadership and strategic judgement for without such leadership such strategy tends to become a Treasury-led bureaucratic process of governance. Given the radical shift underway in the global power balance such a good governance approach to security may no longer be sufficient. However, given the atomistic structure and cultural imperatives of Whitehall it will still likely take a great shock before the conditions for genuine cross-department thinking and action are created. Therefore, it is vital that strategy is led by the Prime Minister and seen to be so, possibly through a small (and inner) Security Cabinet which informs fundamental decisions of state that go to the first duty of government – the security of the citizen. However, the UK lacks a consistent and sustained approach to strategy and it is thus hard for London to establish a framework for strategy that incorporates prioritisation, inter-agency response integration, risk awareness and management, response leadership and accountability. Moreover, ‘grand’ strategy has recently been too narrowly and heavily focused on counter-terrorism and Afghanistan. Rather, all possible risks and threats, both internal and external, must be considered and assessed for which knowledge and insight will be vital (in addition to intelligence). Today, affordability is the driving force of grand strategy and defence is a case in point.   Demonstrating the value of defence investment in peace, i.e. proving value for money is akin to proving a negative. If war does not happen to what extent is it due to defence investment? Since time immemorial British governments have grappled with this question and by and large managed to balance strategy and affordability. However, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is essentially misguided because it considers strategy through the wrong end of the strategy telescope because it takes the financial crisis as an absolute rather than a phase to be weathered prior to the return to sound strategy.

1.      Britain need a National Security Strategy (NSS) worthy of the name supported by a suitably authoritative National Security Council (NSC) that offers a radical new Whole of Government approach will enable sound armed forces to underpin a necessarily activist foreign and security policy built on a properly funded diplomatic and aid effort. 

2.      Critical will be a Security Minister and/or a National Security Advisor of real political stature as part of an inner Security Cabinet and who is focussed solely on that brief. 

3.      The NSC will not dominate the power ministries (DfID, FCO, Home Office and MOD) but must be able to undertake the ‘political entreprenueurship’ to give the NSS traction across Whitehall. 

4.      Critical will be a National Security Strategy that has real planning traction. Thereafter, much will depend on the extent to which the National Security Council (NSC) with the backing of No 10 a) can bring together the power ministries in pursuit of national strategy; and b) rise above a mainly bureaucratic, internal approach to reinforce stated political aims with outside expertise. 

5.      A much tighter strategic relationship is needed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office and DiFD. First, the FCO needs to become far more adept at exporting the British strategic message by better promoting the strategic stabilisation/prevention concept to partners and allies and in so doing build a new diplomatic and political consensus. Second, far greater efforts are needed on the part of British diplomacy to communicate British strategic resolve, as well as openness to new partners. Third, the FCO must play its full diplomatic role by helping to create the security space upon which stabilisation and reconstruction relies. Fourth, the UK must develop an integrated Strategic Communications strategy; connecting across government, the United Kingdom (including Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, London, the City and remaining overseas Territories (Falkland Islands / Gibraltar), the economy and inclusive of the BBC. 

6.      Given the scope and nature of change in the world and the crisis in British forces and resources the NSC is the natural focus of a security brains-trust that draws in the best and the brightest from across the country (and beyond) to work alongside those charged with the difficult task of discharging British national strategy. 

7.      Cross-government structures under the NSC/Cabinet Office should ideally include a Strategy Group made up of both officials and non-government experts to build on the Strategic Trends work of DCDC with a specific remit to establish likely forecasts and context for Intelligence and Planning.

8.      A Security Situation Centre could maintain a picture across the UK security landscape incorporating both internal and external threats and linked to a National Intelligence Council. 

9.      A consistent strategic framework is needed across government to establish structure and methodology that incorporates prioritisation, inter-agency response integration, risk awareness and management, response leadership and accountability. 

10. The development of strategic thinking skills must be taught because strategy must properly encompass the scope of change. Effective security and defence education (up to 4/5 star civilian and military level) could be the most effective way supported by a Strategy Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre which promotes a Whole of Government approach. Much more could be made of the existing defence education structures (Royal College of Defence Studies and UK Defence Academy) to offer high-level security and strategy training and simulations to senior practitioners and politicians, possibly in conjunction with the National School of Government.

11. It may be useful to establish a special strategy group of fast track civil servants (not unlike the French énarques) who are trained from the beginning of their career in cross-government strategic planning and mobility. 

12. In the near term it might be useful to start a programme of simulations and exercises using the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and/or RCDS across the security functions of government that adapts the kind of work being undertaken in NATO under the banner of Project Comprehensive Fusion (which is building on Exercise ARRCADE FUSION) and which specifically seeks to develop strategic civil-civil and civil-military working relations

13. In an uncertain strategic environment applied knowledge and the insight that emerges from analysis and experience provides the context for actionable intelligence. Indeed, compared with the United States there is very little reach back to think-tanks and other academic institutions that could challenge and support the often budget-led assumptions that emerge from what passes for strategic reviews. Therefore, whilst the American model has its detractors the US model could prove illuminating. 

14. A security audit is needed to test affordability and to release money for investment in a functioning NSC. For the United Kingdom affordability is the key to effective grand strategy and it is clear that any new security structure will need at the very least to impose no increase to the overall security investment given the parameters of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). Given the sheer scale of growth in security investment over the past decade it is highly unlikely that such investments have struck a balance between efficiency and effectiveness.

Grand strategy is the organisation of large means in pursuit of large uncertain ends over medium to long timeframes and involves the political calculation of what is vital and essential to national security given the relative power and position of a state. Such strategy is normally the preserve of second rank powers which retain strategic ambition and yet are relatively short on forces and resources and which need to maximise effect and influence in complex and changing environments. The United Kingdom is strange for a great power in that London effectively abandoned classical grand strategy after the 1956 Suez Crisis. Indeed, whilst the French decided never again to be dependent on US grand strategy the British decided to embrace it. Thereafter, British strategy has by and large been defined by US interests and the British reaction to it. However, the growing influence of the European Union in British foreign and security policy has created a most unhealthy dichotomy which makes British grand ‘strategy’ at its most simplistic the search for the middle ground between the US world view and the French and German European view. Consequently, with the US increasingly focused on Asia-Pacific and the EU ever more parochial such middle ground is fast disappearing. Therefore, if the United Kingdom is to influence vital change and protect itself against the consequences of unwanted events a more activist grand strategy will be needed. Britain is more an engineer than an architect of the international system. However, the sheer pace and change of power in the global power balance would suggest that for a system to survive that is in the British interest more than mere good governance is now required, hence the need for grand strategy. Such strategy would necessarily exploit two traditional British strengths; the balancing of power and the leverage of the strategic interests of others in pursuit of the grand British strategic interest – a stable, trading, open, reasonably secure state-centric international system. ‘Balance’ is everything in grand strategy and in spite of the great defence depression engendered by the Strategic Defence and Security Review (Strategic Pretence and Impecunity Review?) Britain must look beyond the short-term (and genuinely so). Britain is too rich and powerful to hide from strategic change and too weak to dominate which places particular emphasis on a clever and innovative balancing of ends and means. Strategy operationalises power and structure follows power. Therefore, only a National Security Strategy (NSS) worthy of the name supported by a suitably authoritative National Security Council (NSC) that offers a radical new Whole of Government approach will enable sound armed forces to underpin a necessarily activist foreign and security policy built on a properly funded diplomatic and aid effort. Critical will be a Security Minister and/or a National Security Advisor of real political stature. The NSC is unlikely to be in a position to dominate the power ministries (DfID, FCO, Home Office and MOD) but should be able to undertake the ‘political entreprenueurship’ to give the NSS traction across Whitehall. The alternative is stark; a Treasury-led version of the 1920s Ten Year Rule by which the British will effectively contract out of influencing and shaping the environment and focus rather on the bureaucratic management of decline. Grand strategy is after all ultimately about influence and Britain is at a grand strategic crossroads.

Q1: What do we mean by “strategy” or “grand strategy” in relation to the foreign, defence and security functions of government in the modern world?

Evidence: According to The Economist in 2007 the British Gross Domestic Product was $2.7tr (world rank: 5), Britain had 6% of world trade (world rank: 5) and British foreign direct investment was $224bn (world rank: 2).

Strategy or grand strategy is the organisation of large means in pursuit of often large uncertain ends. It concerns the generation, application and organisation of power, resources and forces. At its core is strategic judgement which is first and foremost established on a firm grip by government of the position of a state in the power hierarchy of states, the type of state it leads (trading, self-sustaining, educated, uneducated etc), the physical nature and position of a state (land-locked, long sea border, island) and the tools available to influence others. Grand strategy enables a state through the organisation of all national means (security policy, of which defence policy is a part) to secure its vital, essential and general interests, defend itself and to live at peace with itself and others in (preferably) mutual prosperity. Such strategy is informed by history, identity and the credibility of the national narrative both domestically and internationally. National strategy (grand strategy) operationalises and informs security policy but comes before (not after) defence policy which can only be crafted after over-arching national security aims and objectives have been established. Grand strategy is thus a function of national intent, the relative power and influence of others (allies, partners, and adversaries) and the inevitable friction in the strategic environment. If power is relative, strategy is relative to power.

Q2: Who holds the UK “strategic concept” and how is it being brought to bear on the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Evidence: The UK national debt is now over £900bn or the equivalent of £15,000 per person in the United Kingdom. It is forecast to become £1.1trillion, over 30% of GDP. Between 1920 and 1955 the average was 130% of GDP. (www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_chart.html)

A strategic concept is the what, the where, the how and the why of national strategy and concerns ultimately the shape and nature of action. A strategic concept enshrines the first principle and purpose of a state – the security of the citizen. However, a strategic concept also concerns the ‘how much’ of national action. Since the creation of the national debt in the eighteenth century as a way of financing war the strategic concept has traditionally represented a balance between what must be done and what can be afforded given the nature of the threat.  Indeed, it is for that reason the Prime Minister is also the First Secretary to the Treasury. Today, in the absence of any existential threat the level of the national debt can be said to be relatively high in historical terms at over 30% GDP. However, between 1920 and 1955 the average was 130% of GDP as both World Wars One and Two had to be afforded together with the Great Depression that place in the inter-bellum.

Q3: Do the different government departments (e.g. No. 10, Cabinet Office, FCO, MoD, Treasury) understand and support the same UK strategy?

The evidence would suggest that departments of state understand and support UK national strategy only nominally.  That is hardly surprising as supporting strategy requires understanding, communication and accountability, in addition to being tasked. Moreover, the focus hitherto on inputs rather than outputs has led to the National Security Strategy (NSS) being only one of a raft of initiatives that tended to generate heat rather than light. Moreover, the most notable cross-government ‘experiment’, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan developed as a consequence of a) American strategy; and b) a decidedly bottom-up approach which emphasised co-operation in the theatre of operations. Therefore, much depends on the political leadership’s determination to ensure that the national strategic concept both reflects the contemporary political mission and the pursuit of structural and enduring British interests. The past decade has too often reflected the confusion of values with interests. Of course, to some extent interests must reflect values but a demonstrable and practical link between the British national interest and the security of the British tax payer must be central to a strategic concept. Equally, without political leadership strategy too often becomes a bureaucratic process of Treasury-led governance.  

In the past when a clear and present existential threat to the country was apparent the UK incurred far more debt in pursuit of security than is the case today. However, whilst the strategic environment contains many risks and not a few threats there is at present no existential threat such as that posed in the past by Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. Consequently, in such an environment ‘strategy’ becomes an issue of choice and discretion and in the absence of a clear political lead (and a weak Cabinet Office) the four main foreign and security policy ministries (DfiD, FCO, Home Office and MOD) lead mini-strategies that emphasise fragmentation in national strategy. The Overseas Development Act (ODA effectively established a DfiD foreign policy of its own, the FCO desperately under-funded leads a depressed diplomatic corps much of it Europe-focussed, whilst the US-centric MOD has been trying to keep up with an activist defence-led American grand strategy on British resources and to all intents and purposes has been fighting a war whilst the rest of Whitehall has remained doggedly at peace. The Home Office, with its focus on social cohesion, policing and counter-terrorism views security from a very domestic perspective. The intelligence services sit uncomfortably between the ministries, wary of each other and trying to cope with the consequences of over-rapid expansion.

Critical will be a National Security Strategy that has real planning traction. Thereafter, much will depend on the extent to which the National Security Council (NSC) with the backing of No 10 a) can bring together the power ministries in pursuit of national strategy; and b) rise above a mainly bureaucratic, internal approach to reinforce stated political aims with outside expertise. Indeed, in the past British grand strategy (such as it has ever existed) has been controlled too tightly by Mandarins. Moreover, such exercises to date have tended to reflect the political concern of the moment and the assuaging of public opinion and have consequently generated little synergy across government (nor guidance) that has led to real planning traction within government. With no disrespect to the current incumbents the Security Minister and/or a National Security Advisor of real political stature focussed solely on that brief. Indeed, because the NSC is unlikely to be in a position to dominate the power ministries it must be able to undertake the ‘political entreprenueurship’ to give the NSS traction across Whitehall.

Q4: What capacity exists for cross-departmental thinking? How should government develop and maintain the capacity for strategic thinking?

Quotation: “In a period of crisis there is a balance to be struck between taking all measures necessary to provide adequate military defence, and taking steps which could themselves accelerate deterioration into conflict. The Government’s crisis management machinery must be capable of this balancing act. It must cope with situations which could vary from tension drawn out over months to developments measured in hours. It must be able to offer Ministers a range of options for resolving the crisis. It must be able to bring together and assess rapidly information from a wide variety of diplomatic, political, economic, military and intelligence sources”. PDGS http://www.pdgs.org.ar/Archivo/omd-crisis.htm

The key word phrase is ‘cross-departmental thinking’. During crises there is an effective system for crisis management which serves the Cabinet through the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) considers the political and strategic implications of actionable intelligence. However, in normal times there is marked degree of stove-piping with ministries too often competing with each other over budgets etc than really looking to establish cross-departmental approaches. Indeed, one of the many problems faced by the Comprehensive Approach (systematic civil-military co-operation) is that whilst field officers of various ministries (and governments) tend to make things work in the field during operations cohesion at the strategic level has proven to be very difficult. This has been exacerbated over the past ten years by cultural and political differences between the ministries, most notably DfID and the MOD. 

Equally, there are some efforts to create more synergy. There are many inter-departmental committees across Whitehall and the number of postings between ministries is increasing. However, there is very little structured high-level strategic thought or collaboration across Whitehall with the specific and sustained objective of generating a high-level cross-Whitehall strategic picture that properly considers the position, role and interests of the United Kingdom in a changing strategic environment. 

Where attempts have been made to develop a cross-department culture that would support such thinking, such as the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, the Conflict Pools, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit and its successor the Stabilisation Unit, the level of leadership has made it hard to get ministries to properly support such efforts. This atomistic approach to government is reinforced by funding arrangements by the Treasury which tends to promote a culture of competition rather than co-operation by ministries that see themselves as separate orbs in an essentially anarchic realm.

This tendency towards competition is reinforced by the culture of the British civil service. Understandably resistant to and suspicious of les grands dessins so favoured by the French, strategy has come to mean good governance, management and managing reduction which reflects the fact that for some two hundred years Britain has been the status quo power. The mission therefore has been to stop dangerous change rather than as a matter of principle foster constructive systemic change. Britain is more an engineer than an architect of the international system. However, the sheer pace and change of power in the global power balance would suggest that for a system to survive that is in the British interest more than mere good governance is now required, hence the need for grand strategy. Sadly, given the atomistic structure and cultural imperatives of the government it will likely take a great shock before the conditions for genuine cross-department thinking to achieve critical national security goals are created.

Q5: What frameworks or institutions exist or should be created to ensure that strategic thinking takes places and its conclusions are available to the Prime Minister and Cabinet?

As the turf-battles in the US attest a more presidential approach to security leadership by government does not necessarily lead to more strategic synergy across government. Given the scope and nature of change in the world and the crisis in British forces and resources the NSC is the natural focus of a security brains-trust that draws in the best and the brightest from across the country (and beyond) to work alongside those charged with the difficult task of discharging British national strategy. As such, any such grouping must be in a position to challenge Whitehall conventions as much as seek creative solutions to the essential British security dilemma of the age – how to leverage influence and effect to close the gap between what British security demands and what it can afford, as well as prepare for a future that given the friction in the world is almost certainly going to be dangerous. Additionally, cross-government structures under the NSC/Cabinet Office should ideally include a Strategy Group made up of both officials and non-government experts to build on the Strategic Trends work of DCDC with a specific remit to establish likely forecasts and context for Intelligence and Planning. A Security Situation Centre could maintain a picture across the UK security landscape incorporating both internal and external threats and linked to a National Intelligence Council. Certainly, the seniority and influence of the Security Minister would need to be strengthened to be at least on a par with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence. 

Ultimately, it is vital that the Prime Minister is seen to lead such thinking by investing real political capital, possibly through a small (and inner) Security Cabinet which would inform fundamental decisions of state that go to the top (and first duty) of government – the security of the citizen. To that end, any such structure (and supporting national security strategies) must satisfy consistently and address continually five critical questions:

1.      Does strategy offer the prospect for developing a more integrated response

2.      Does strategy adequately provide for mechanisms to recognise and raise awareness of

the early signs of new threats or hazards?

3.      Does strategy recognise and seek to address any deficiencies in risk analysis and risk

4.      Does strategy contain a clearly thought out method of prioritisation?

5.      Does strategy offer an adequate leadership model?[1]

Q6: How is UK strategy challenged and revised in response to events, changing risk assessments and new threats?

Quotation: ‘The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine wider international political stability. They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation’. The UK National Security Strategy.

Every British and Western government has faced a profound challenge over the past ten years in that almost all the ‘events’ that have occurred have been very hard to anticipate, (as had American responses to them). In essence, in an attempt to maintain the Special Relationship with the US the UK was in 2001 forced suddenly to switch from a primarily European-focused security and defence effort to a global-reach effort. Consequently, whilst the 1998 Strategic Defence Review hinted at such possibilities no-one in London could have foreseen the sudden demands on British armed forces (in particular) that were made. Therefore, since 1998 British strategic analysis has been endeavouring to catch up with change that is probably as rapid and as uncertain as at any time in the past century through a series of DfID, FCO or MOD white papers or ‘new chapters’ which in the absence of an overarching grand strategic framework has tended to emphasise contending strategies and partial responses. In other words, the British have been ‘muddling through’, by simply trying to doing more of the same better. Some moments of strategic transition do not favour such an adjustment approach.

Clearly, some events can never be foreseen (or the reaction to them of key partners which is a key factor in British grand strategy). Where there has been particular fault is not so much in an inability to make strategic judgements to deal with likely shocks, but rather the inconsistent and often seemingly unconnected flow of defence reviews, security strategies and development acts together with how best to deal with the relationship between internal and external security that any Whole of Government approach must necessarily consider. 

In the absence of a consistent strategic framework across government it is hard to establish structure and methodology that incorporates prioritisation, inter-agency response integration, risk awareness and management, response leadership and accountability. Rather, ‘grand strategy’ has in fact been heavily focused on a counter-terrorism strategy and the role of Britain in Afghanistan in relation to that. This has made consideration of the implausible but possible impossible which after all is also the purpose of grand strategy. Certainly, the confluence of energy competition, regimes legitimised by economic growth rather than democracy, the democratisation of weapons of mass destruction and huge illicit capital flows, not to mention weak states and religious fundamentalism, demand that such dangers be considered as part of balanced national strategy.  With the establishment of the NSC the UK thus needs to become far more systematic in the use of both national security strategies and defence reviews and therein properly understand the relationship between strategy and policy. Security policy establishes vital, essential and general interests; strategy operationalises policy, whilst defence policy and strategy are the military components of overall national strategy. Moreover, such an exercise should be carried out at least every four years, quasi-independent of government and inform not justify government choices. The two dangers that emerge from the current and flawed risk assessment and ‘strategy’ process is either an obsession with fighting the last ‘war’ better or a determination to recognise only as much threat as the Treasury thinks the country can afford. 

Q7: How are strategic thinking skills best developed and sustained within the Civil Service?

Quotation: "global warming, flu pandemics, the emergence of rogue states, globalisation and its impact on power balances, global poverty and its impact on population movement, energy security, the proliferation of weapons of destruction and organised crime are all significant security problems, and we shouldn’t exaggerate the threat from international terrorism” Sir Richard Mottram, 2007

The development of strategic thinking skills must be taught because strategy must properly encompass the scope of change.  Indeed, effective strategy identifies which tools and structures should lead to prevent, and which to deal with consequences. The Civil Service rightly prides itself on detail. However, implementing grand strategy requires the ability to generate a big strategic picture that can be shared across government and implemented down the command chain – both civil and military, national, regional and local. Effective security and defence education (up to 4/5 star civilian and military level) could be the most effective way supported by a Strategy Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre which promotes a Whole of Government approach. Strangely, whilst military officers are given education and training at every level of command below the general rank, it is assumed that grand strategy is understood once promoted to 2-star rank and beyond. The same would appear to apply to the Civil Service. Britain’s radical idea in 1960 was the move away from a conscript military and the professionalisation of the armed forces, the radical organisational idea needed in 2010 is a genuine Whole of Government structure from strategy to implementation focussed on output performance rather than simply input measurement and underpinned by knowledge and access to it. Much more could be made of the existing defence education structures (Royal College of Defence Studies and UK Defence Academy) to offer high-level security and strategy training and simulations to senior practitioners and politicians, possibly in conjunction with the National School of Government. Put simply, it can no longer be assumed that politicians charged with onerous security responsibilities of state can suddenly and magically develop the expertise that effective strategic decision-making in a complex environment so patently requires. That is the essence of strategic judgement and it must be informed judgement.

Q8: Should non-government experts and others be included in the government’s strategy-making process?

In an uncertain strategic environment applied knowledge and the insight that emerges from analysis and experience provides the context for actionable intelligence. Indeed, compared with the United States there is very little reach back to think-tanks and other academic institutions that could challenge and support the often budget-led assumptions that emerge from what passes for strategic reviews. Therefore, whilst the American model has its detractors the US model could prove illuminating. Think tanks in Washington are staffed with those temporarily out of government and those with real expertise. Thus, analytical excellence and experience work side by side on a daily basis helping to challenge and inform policy and planning. This modus operandi contrasts with the recent experience of London which has seen government employ huge numbers of political or special advisors, the vast majority of whom enjoy either very narrow expertise or were charged with maintaining ideological momentum. Very little outside expertise can be said to really influence British national strategy.

Q9: How should the strategy be communicated across government and departmental objectives made consistent with it?

At the very least a much tighter relationship is needed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office and DiFD. First, the FCO needs to become far more adept at exporting the British strategic message by better promoting the strategic stabilisation/prevention concept to partners and allies and in so doing build a new diplomatic and political consensus. Second, far greater efforts are needed on the part of British diplomacy to communicate British strategic resolve, as well as openness to new partners. Third, the FCO must play its full diplomatic role by helping to create the security space upon which stabilisation and reconstruction relies. Fourth, the UK must develop an integrated Strategic Communications strategy; connecting across government, the United Kingdom (including Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, London, the City and remaining overseas Territories (Falkland Islands / Gibraltar), the economy and inclusive of the BBC. These are all key to the stabilisation and prevention message. Once a strategic narrative has been crafted for external and public consumption it will be easier to then organise bureaucracies behind it. Communication is ultimately about leadership and thus must be jealously guarded by the political leadership to prevent it being ‘finessed’ too much by senior civil servants with more parochial ambitions.

Q10: How can departments work more collaboratively and co-ordinate strategy development more closely?

Evidence: The 2010 defence budget is less than half that of 1979 and less than a third that of 1986. At roughly £30bn per annum it is also 25% less than it was in 2000 prior to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Author’s own research

As the evidence presented above attests the first requirement is to establish a reasonable link between the scale of the security challenges, its affordability and the resources so allocated. Having assessed the scale and nature of challenges then decisions can be made as to the tools needed to deal with them and where to place those tools. Certainly, for the United Kingdom to maximise influence ministries are going to have to become far more ‘joint’ to use the military jargon, and be very clear about their place and responsibilities under national security strategy. The work being undertaken by the British-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to operationalise the Comprehensive Approach could offer a way forward. First, a distinction will need to be made between the strategic function of government and the roles of ministries therein (that is by and large already in place but needs to be more clearly enunciated). Second, the normal delivery functions of ministries need to be maintained. Third (however), it may be useful to establish a special strategy group of fast track civil servants (not unlike the French énarques) who are trained from the beginning of their career in cross-government strategic planning and mobility. 

Such an approach would of course take time and thus it might also be useful in the near term to start a programme of simulations and exercises using the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and/or RCDS across the security functions of government that adapts the kind of work being undertaken in NATO under the banner of Project Comprehensive Fusion (which is building on Exercise ARRCADE FUSION) and which specifically seeks to develop strategic civil-civil and civil-military working relations. In effect, government would create a deployable group of strategy experts to advise and lead within government. However, to do so would require of government a systematic approach at the highest levels to generate all elements and partnerships vital to the successful generation and conduct of complex strategy reliant on complex civilian and military partnerships. 

Q11: How can reduced resources be appropriately targeted to support delivery of the objectives identified by the strategy?

Evidence: Defence spending since 1997 has increased by 11%. The US has increased its defence expenditure by 109%, China by 247%, Russia by 67% and Australia by 56%. Since 1997 the British have increased expenditure on health by £45.1bn (147%), whilst on education by £35bn (75%), whilst overseas aid now at 0.7% GDP[ii] (1/3 of the Defence Budget) has increased in real terms by 215% whilst the intelligence services have seen a fourfold increase since 2001. Defence spending since 1997 has increased only by 11% which is less than historical inflation over the same period. Author’s own research.

For the United Kingdom affordability is the key to effective grand strategy and it is clear that any new security structure will need at the very least to impose no increase to the overall security investment given the parameters of the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). Equally, the above figures would suggest some room exists for a reallocation of expenditures. Indeed, such large and relatively rapid increases in expenditure that have taken place over the past decade driven as they have been by an input culture are rarely efficient. Thus, the challenge for the government will be to establish strategy that balances efficiency with effectiveness. However, using the defence budget to help fund such a structure would be ill-advised due to the sheer exhaustion of a defence force and bureaucracy that for ten years at least has been operating well beyond defence planning assumptions. 

It is worth dwelling on the defence dilemma for a moment as strategically credible armed forces are the bedrock upon which grand strategy is ultimately established. Demonstrating the value of defence investment in peace – the mantra of Value for Money for example – is indeed akin to proving a negative – if war does not happen to what extent is it due to defence investment? Since time immemorial British governments have grappled with this question and just about managed to balance strategy and affordability. However, the response to the current financial crisis threatens to break that linkage, perhaps for the first time in perhaps four hundred years.

Between 1979 and 1986 the British defence budget increased in absolute terms for a range of factors such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Euromissiles crisis. Moreover, in 1982 Britain also fought a short war against Argentina to recover the Falkland Islands. Equally, the then incumbent government under Margaret Thatcher believed that relatively strong British armed forces were a vital tool of British influence. However, over the period 1986 to 2010 the defence budget as a function of gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 5% to 2.1% and yet over the same period the tasks and scope and intensity of operations climbed markedly. In fact, having stripped out historical inflation and allowing for Defence Cost Inflation[iii] the 2010 defence budget is less than half that of 1979 and less than a third that of 1986. At roughly £30bn per annum in cash terms, it is also 25% less than it was in 2000 prior to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, successive British governments over recent times have made a conscious decision to ask a lot more from the British armed forces for a lot less investment.

This ‘do more with less’ syndrome has been apparent since before the end of the Cold War. Since 1981 there have been four separate defence reviews all employing various euphemistic titles to cut cost. The New Management Strategy of the late 1980s; the Peace Dividend 1990 and Options for Change incorporated with the 1994 Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which sought to make sense of the role of armed forces in the post-Cold War world and the 2002 SDR New Chapter. Only the SDR tried to consider the size and shape of the armed forces in relation to strategic and structural change in the world, but its findings and proposals were then starved of funding year on year thereafter and it effectively described the wrong world. In effect, the ends became the means.   

Between 1979 and 1986 Britain did manage to maintain a performance advantage over potential adversaries that also helped the British to exert significant influence over both allies and adversaries. In the jargon of the day Britain ‘punched above its weight’ which was achieved mainly by aligning British grand strategy closely with that of the US. These forces proved reasonably effective during the 1991 Iraq War, as well as during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and Sierra Leone in 2000. However, as the first decade of the twenty-first century has unfolded the reserve of effectiveness, competency and prestige of British armed forces has dissipated as the investment, size and use have become unbalanced, mainly due to following an activist post 9/11 American grand strategy on British resources and mismatched / imbalanced capabilities. 

The supporting figures bear this out. Between 1979 and 1992 British defence expenditure remained ahead of defence and historical inflation and saw balanced investment in both the teeth (front-line) and tail (research, procurement, development, education and logistics tails). However, by 2000 the military performance advantage was in steep decline and by 2010 it had effectively been exhausted. Consequently, the gap between forces and resources left British armed forces fielding many force structures affordable at 5% GDP, but no longer affordable at 3.5%, let alone the 2.1% expended in 2010. In effect, the British concentrated on maintaining capability at the expense of scale and strategic performance was thus sacrificed to maintain operational performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) would appear to be compounding these mistakes because it considers strategy through the wrong end of the strategy telescope because it takes the financial crisis as an absolute rather than a phase to be weathered prior to the return to sound strategy. As such it employs the language of a great defence depression to justify the budget rather than the need, similar to that of the Great Depression of the 1930s that to all intents and purpose destroyed any level of ambition. Indeed, by creating a narrative of effective decline it highlighted the bureaucratic management of decline rather than the political leadership of strategy, which should always be front and centre in British defence policy. Specifically, the SDSR is based upon existing operational analysis models designed to balance between existing force structures and capabilities and emphasise precision (intervention) over mass (stabilisation); not to devise new strategic designs. The SDSR is thus run by the MoD simply to achieve the 20% salami-cuts required to meet the Comprehensive Spending Review; not to enable strategic thinking. The final SDSR decisions will likely then be given to a newly formed and critically understaffed National Security Council, formed at the 5 Star level and required also to deliver on National Security Strategy. 

Q12: Do other countries do strategy better?

Quotation: “Our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home. We must grow our economy and reduce our deficit…Simply put, w must see American innovation as a foundation of American power…We must also build and integrate the capabilities that can advance our interests, and the interests we share with other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented”. President Barack Obama, US National Security Strategy, May 2010

Not really, although some think they do –most notably the Americans and the French. The problem is to grip the nature of uncertainty and avoid the wrong call which will result in over-investment on inappropriate structures and forces. However, where both Paris and Washington are more effective than the British is the use of the process of grand strategy making to shape the agenda to which others react and to see such strategy-making as a continual process to inform both leaders and practitioners. The Americans produce a National Security Strategy every four years by law and with it a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which promotes a continual process of re-evaluation and re-invention. The French produce regular Livres Blanc and Loi des Programmations. Where both the Americans and French differ from the British is the extent to which a) outsiders are involved; and b) the time given to ministers to consider strategic implications. Indeed, it is a mark of British muddled thinking that a new National Security Strategy will come after the SDSR (given the recent change of government) demonstrating the degree to which in the UK the defence policy cart comes before the strategic horse. 

This contrasts with Paris. In a speech in June 2008 President Sarkozy established the parameters of contemporary French grand strategy when he said “…the changing world forces us to prepare certain shifts. In short, I believe the time has come to give French diplomacy a ‘doctrine’. This must not prevent pragmatism in the conduct of affairs. A doctrine means a clear-cut vision of the world, and of the long-term objectives and interests we defend. It’s a set of values which guide our action. It’s what gives us meaning and coherence over time. It’s the pre-requisite for our independence”.[2] Indeed, the Sarkozy Doctrine (i.e. the parameters for the organisation of large French means in pursuit of French ends) reflects (and informs) similar statements made by the new British Government as it tries to establish a pragmatic foreign and security policy in an age of austerity in which the generation of influence through institutions (EU, UN, NATO, OSCE) remain critical to French grand strategy. 

At a declaratory level the stated ambitions of French foreign and security policy are effectively those of the British. France seeks to ensure the security and independence of France and the French. Paris has world-wide interests and thus global responsibilities. Paris stresses that French security interests cannot be separated from the rest of Europe, “and our partners who share our destiny and values”. Co-operation is vital in the face of new threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and what President Sarkozy has called ‘ecological disorder’. Finally, the Sarkozy the promotion of French economic and commercial interests in as globalised world will be central to French foreign policy.

For British grand strategy to be worthy of the name the centre of gravity of British national strategy must thus be the successful shaping of the strategic environment in accordance with British national interests: nothing more, nothing less. Traditionally, the British have been rightly suspicious of radical prescriptions for international relations and thus understandably nervous of ‘grand’ strategies and the ‘grands dessins’ that have sometimes been favoured on the other sides of both the Atlantic and the Channel. Indeed, the role of ‘balancer’ is deeply embedded in the British strategic mind. Lord Palmerston’s famous dictum that nations had neither permanent friends nor enemies, only permanent interests might have been uttered at the height of nineteenth century British imperial power but still to an extent holds true today, albeit in a far more nuanced manner. 

The strength of Britain’s partnerships and alliances will ebb and flow with the political and strategic requirements of Britain and its partners at any given time. Indeed, that is political reality. However, the opportunity afforded by victories gained in both World War Two and the Cold War still have political traction but only if Britain has the vision, the will and the commitment to seize the opportunity. Unfortunately, too much of the effort of government today suggests repeated attempts to re-label impotence in an attempt to mask the pace and extent of self-imposed relative decline from the British people. Whilst it is certainly the case that the emergence of China, India and others on the world stage is leading to a new balance of power, neither the West nor Britain are in terminal decline. However, unless the despond of defeatism that seems to affect and afflict much of Europe is overcome decline could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy and Britain must act to stop it. Indeed, the zero sum game and with it the idea that if power rises on one part of the planet it must be definition decline elsewhere, is a compelling and neat academic treatise. Unfortunately, it is wrong. There is no automatic reason why an increase in the power of China, India et al should automatically lead to a loss of Western power. Power and its wielding are subject to many factors.