Transcript of the lunch keynote from the NATO Beyond Afghanistan conference held September 27, 2010.
NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN:
A CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
IN A POST-ISAF WORLD
LUNCH KEYNOTE SPEAKER
INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR:
FREDERICK KEMPE,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
SPEAKER:
ROBERT KAGAN,
SENIOR FELLOW,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
12:30 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
FREDERICK KEMPE: All right, this is the double-digestion part of the program where you get to digest your sandwich and Bob Kagan at the same time. Bob has a lot of things in his bio that I’m going to read some of, but let’s just say he’s one of the top thinkers, one of the best writers I know and a good friend.
We got to know each other a little bit better when he was in Brussels, and discovering Mars and Venus and then attending one conference after another. And I have promised that I will make no mention of planets or any of the godchildren of Mars or Venus, as they have showed themselves in Afghanistan.
Expert and frequent commentator on U.S. national security, foreign policy, U.S.-European relations, and he writes a monthly column that we all look at in the Washington Post, and contributing editor to the Weekly Standard and The Republic.
Spent 13 years before going to Brookings as a senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1984 to 1988 he served as a member of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, as principal speech writer for Secretary of State George Schulz, which I didn’t know that before and now I understand, because I never thought of him as that articulate of a person but –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KEMPE: Just joking. Sorry, Secretary Schultz – and as deputy for policy in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.
Prolific author on U.S. foreign policy. The most recent book is “The Return of History and the End of Dreams;” previous book, “Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century.” And he has been the winner of the 2008 Lepgold Prize and a 2007 finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize. And “Paradise and Power” was the one that grew out of Mars and Venus, I believe, right?
MR. : That would be Gottschalt (ph).
MR. KEMPE: That was the Gottschalt. And he’s often been named one of Foreign Policy Magazine’s Top 100 Global Thinkers, so let me put him in front of the other 99 here in the audience. (Laughter, applause.)
ROBERT KAGAN: Thanks very much, Fred, and thanks for having me here at the Atlantic Council at this great meeting. I see a lot of friends out in the audience and in all directions. It’s a real pleasure to be with you again after I left Europe. It’s good to have Europe come here now and then.
I gather you’ve been mulling over the issue of NATO in Afghanistan and what comes next. And I’m told it hasn’t been the cheeriest of discussions; I don’t know why. I think things are going to go great in Afghanistan. Don’t worry about it. Everything will turn out as long as we stick with it. I’m supposed to, I think, look ahead beyond Afghanistan, and that’s what I’m going to do.
I guess what I’d like to start by saying is that people, I remember, thought that Afghanistan would be a test of NATO, or has been a test of NATO, and if so, I think that’s quite unfortunate. It’s the wrong test for NATO, in my opinion.
I remember, I guess it was in the ’90s they had this phrase, out of area or out of business. I understand why that view took hold. It was based on a paradigm or a sense of what the world looked like after the end of the Cold War, and that sense was that basically, well, Europe’s fine. Everything in Europe is okay. Maybe we could take the Balkan problem – great power, competition; that’s over. It’s going to be mostly about economics and then it’s going to be mostly about these messy places out there in the world.
And then of course September 11th comes along and this idea that the problem is messy – problems out there, which includes terrorism and al-Qaida and other things like that, that that’s going to be the big focus, not the kind of traditional issues that we’ve had to deal with over the centuries – drove this idea that, therefore, for NATO to stay relevant, it needs to do things like Afghanistan and whatever other Afghanistans may lie ahead.
So the first problem is that it was premised on a notion that I think is mistaken. I think it’s a mistake to believe – and I think we now have ample evidence that it was a mistake to believe that more traditional kinds of great-power issues – great-power competition, great-power ambition, geopolitics as we once understood it – it was a mistake to believe that that was all gone and now it was just dealing with the messy areas.
And unfortunately, it was a mistake, in my view, to put Europe up to a test which I think Europe had neither the desire nor really the capability of meeting. And to some extent, I just want to – let me just say, I both appreciate and value Europe’s contribution, its willingness – the willingness of the European countries to contribute in Afghanistan. It was a noble effort.
It was a great sign of solidarity after 9/11 when NATO cited its Article 5 obligations to come to the aid of the United States in that situation, but that doesn’t mean that, in my view, that is what NATO can or should be about. I don’t think it’s any secret, certainly not to this audience, that the appetite for military action in Europe is not high. In fact, I would argue it’s lower than when I thought it was really low when I wrote about Mars and Venus to begin with.
I would say Europe was positively belligerent then compared to where it is now, partly because of the economic crisis, partly for other and deeper reasons. European defense budgets are declining. I’m sure you’ve already spoken about this. I’m not even sure Europe could even participate in Afghanistan again the way it already has if it had to do so now.
And, of course, as sort of a deeper psychological phenomenon, Europe is not really committed to this kind of military action in response to problems. I suppose that should be no secret to you either. And German presidents have to resign if they suggest that Europe might have – that Germany might have those kinds of traditional interests. Europe sees itself in a very different fashion.
So, as I say, it’s extremely unfortunate that this somehow became the test of NATO at a time when Europe was less and less inclined to want to carry out this kind of activity. And the difficulties in Afghanistan, I just want to make clear, I blame primarily on the United States.
It was really for the United States to deal with that military problem. It was great and useful and important to have other countries involved for a variety of reasons, but the success in Afghanistan was going to rest or fail on the basis of American actions and America simply didn’t fight that war – hasn’t, up until now, fought that war very effectively.
And so if there is ultimately a problem in Afghanistan, it is not primarily a European problem. It’s primarily an American problem, and yet it has put all this strain on the trans-Atlantic relationship and raised questions and has columnists writing about the irrelevance of NATO.
Now, the problem is we’re generally faced with a kind of binary – we have been faced with a kind of binary approach to all this, which is that either NATO does effectively engaged in these out-of-area activities like Afghanistan, or it is irrelevant.
In my view, that is not the choice. In my view, NATO – and not just NATO but the trans-Atlantic relationship in general, remains highly relevant, but it remains relevant in the area where it can and has done the most good historically, which is Europe and its environs.
I believe it was entirely premature for us all collectively to decide that Europe was no longer the highest priority for the trans-Atlantic relationship and particularly for NATO, and that somehow we had to find other priorities elsewhere.
The fact is that there has been, A, unfinished business in Europe, unfinished business in the Balkans, unfinished business on the periphery, which are, in my view, vitally important and continue to be vitally important. And there was also the promise of Europe in Europe’s near neighborhood that has gone unfulfilled.
Now, in the Clinton years they used to talk about something called “Europe, whole and free.” In my view, that is not only an acceptable mission for NATO but should be still the primary mission for NATO, for the EU and for the United States, but it is a mission that we have dropped off of, it seems to me, or at least not paid as much attention to as we might.
There was a time when some of the smartest Europeans, and I think one of the smartest European strategists I know, Robert Cooper, put very well that the EU’s foreign policy lay in expansion. And I always felt, as an American, that the greatest strategic benefit that Europe could offer, both to the world and to the United States, was enlargement, was to bring the values and the stability of the European way to the very unstable and, in many cases lacking those values, neighborhood, whether it be in Turkey or in Eastern Europe or in that new neighborhood, or what Russia calls its “near abroad,” whether it’s Ukraine or Georgia or what have you.
That was, at one time, where Europe was headed, but of course we’ve seen how, in recent years, going back, I suppose – I would say a turning point was with the French rejection of the European constitution when there was really a turning away, when there was all this indigestion about EU enlargement, that even taking in the countries that had been taken in was now considered by many to have been a mistake, or at least something that needed to be digested for many years to come, and so that effort slowed down.
So on the one hand, NATO’s focus was taken away from the more near issues in Europe. On the other hand, Europe – what had been Europe’s evolving strategy of enlargement was stalled, if not perhaps permanently but certainly for some time to come. And then, finally – and related to all of this – was the fact that, to some extent, Europe itself has begun to return to a more traditional kind of great power behavior, particularly, and most obviously, in the case of Russia.
Russia, it seems to me, poses issues for Europe, not least – and I think, again, this is something that – it seems like a very old-fashioned concept but I think it’s very real – not least because it is increasingly an authoritarian, autocratic regime with the interests of autocratic regimes. And one of those interests is in protecting its own rule, and another interest is in having neighbors that in no way pose a threat to its rule, and that means not having democratic neighbors.
I don’t think there’s any question that Russia today – that Putin’s policy is to not necessarily to support democratic neighbors, and in many cases to support those who might undermine them even through democratic methods.
And beyond that, there is the simple fact that Russia, I think, is a very traditional kind of great power. Europe may be a 21st century post-power entity; Russia is very much, in my view, a 19th century style of great power with a 19th century great-power sense of having been done wrong, of grievances, and what the traditional geopolitical types would have called a sense of dissatisfaction.
It’s a dissatisfied power. It wants to reorganize its neighborhood in way that more closely approximates the kind of sphere of influence that it had in the past, not necessarily the Soviet Union in a formal way but in terms of Russia’s traditional sphere of interest.
And that poses a challenge to both the United States and Europe because Russia’s near abroad, which it would like to bring under its sway, obviously happens to be many of the same countries that Europe regards as its new neighborhood and that the United States and Europe collectively believe is part of what they mean when we talk about Europe, whole and free.
And so those challenges exist, and I would have to say that we are not handling them well as a trans-Atlantic community. Partly this is because Europe itself is divided – divided between East and West, divided nation to nation. The promise of European unity on foreign policy – I don’t need to tell this audience – has not been fulfilled. In fact, I would say it has gotten worse over the last 10 years in terms of really finding European unity on some of these issues.
I notice that the French defense minister recently, worried about European defense spending – which I agree – but his concern, as he expressed it, was that they’re worried that Europe would become the pawn of the United States or China. I think Europe ought to be more worried about becoming the pawn of Russia, at least when it comes to issues of energy dependence, at least when it comes to Russia’s ability to play one European country off against another, the enormous influence of Russian money in some of the most important nations in Europe.
Obviously Europe is stronger than Russia – Russia is not the old Soviet Union – but Europe doesn’t behave like it’s stronger than Russia, and the United States and Europe together don’t behave like they have the capacity to shape Europe the way they would like it to be shaped.
That, it seems to me, ought to be what NATO’s challenge is for the years to come. Will there be occasions that arise where NATO allies may fight next to one another in non-European theaters – I can imagine such situations – or perhaps engage in peacekeeping?
But for us to be setting that as the standard for NATO is a mistake in two ways: one, because it is asking of Europeans that the Europeans do not want to give. And I’m not talking only about European officials; I’m talking specifically about European peoples who show no indication of wanting to play that kind of role.
So not only would we be focused on the wrong thing but we lose our focus on the right thing. I would like to see the United States show more leadership than it has shown hitherto. I don’t think we any longer need to worry about whether the United States is dividing Europe or playing one part of Europe against another part of Europe.
The problem right now, it seems to me, in the trans-Atlantic community is a dearth of political leadership on all sides, and political leadership directed at what have always been the core objectives of NATO and should remain the core objectives of NATO, which is a Europe whole and free.
Let me just conclude by saying, that can be the most important strategic reality of the 21st century still, the notion that the only thing that matters today is China’s rise and India’s rise and Russian behavior is ludicrous. There was nothing stronger than the unified trans-Atlantic community in the 21st century.
And if you look at what the real issues, it seems to me, that are going to dominate the 21st century, and as important as terrorism is, as worrisome as al-Qaida is, as difficult as Afghanistan is, this 21st century is going to be shaped by the large forces of history, by the powers that wield great power, and by the ideologies that shape humankind.
And now, it seems to me, more than ever, it’s necessary for the United States and Europe to pull together to support those principles in a place that matters a lot, which is the Eurasian region that has always meant so much to us. And, on that, I’m looking forward to taking your questions. Thanks very much. (Applause.)
MR. KEMPE: As usual, Bob, you’ve given us absolutely nothing to talk about. (Laughter.) Very provocative, very interesting notions. The way you closed about the large forces of history; we are experiencing the most dramatic power shift from West to East since the 18th century. We don’t really know what that means but it certainly means that the U.S. and Europe have to work more effectively together to continue to ensure that our common values – rule of law, democracy, free markets – survive in this new world. So, all of that is agreed.
But, interesting notion, mistake, Afghanistan – mistake to have made that the NATO mission that was testing Europe or NATO. Out of area, out of business is sort of a false way of looking at things; a call for a post-NATO, after NATO, return to one’s knitting, but the knitting is much different now than it was during the Cold War.
So, let me start with that. What does that mean, in essence, if, after Afghanistan, NATO would return to looking to a Europe, whole and free, as its primary mission? What does that mean particularly if you see Russia as the potential challenge? What does it mean for military deployments? What does it mean one does together?
MR. KAGAN: Well, obviously it means a number of things, some of which, you know, this administration and the past administration have begun to try to address. It does mean greater attention to Article 5 commitments that people once thought were not very important one way or another, because there are nations to do feel worried, at the very least, about what Russia’s intentions are.
And, I mean, I should stop to say for one second, I don’t think I mentioned the word “Georgia,” but Georgia looms large in this discussion because whatever one thinks about who fired the first shot or who was responsible in the sort of proximate cause – and those kinds of things, as we know from World War I, can be debated for eternity, the bottom line is that one sovereign nation has taken control of and occupied what most of the rest of the world regards as the territory of another sovereign nation, which was something I think we didn’t expect and was a kind of – I won’t say it was a watershed but it certainly was a wake-up call and certainly shaped the perceptions of many nations on Russia’s border, which has raised the question of whether you actually need to provide security to these countries.
So that’s one thing. There is obviously a military dimension to that, and I think that, you know, the next trans-Atlantic peacekeeping mission I’d like to see is one that is occurring in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a means of getting Russian forces out of there and part of a mission which can protect those peoples that Russia feels, or claims to feel, need to be protected but without having Russia in an occupying position. That would be a very useful use of European-American forces if that could come to pass.
MR. KEMPE: Though more likely OSCE, U.N. –
MR. KAGAN: Or OSCE, whatever –
MR. KEMPE: Certainly not NATO.
MR. KAGAN: I’ll take anything we can get, but it is up – it is not up to the OSCE at the end of the day, or the U.N.; it’s up to the Europeans and the Americans to press for that kind of solution, regardless of who winds up on the ground.
Then there are things like how much do we care about what direction Ukraine is heading in? I was not happy when the general response to Russia signing a multi-decade deal to keep its ports – to keep its military – its naval facilities in Ukraine was greeted by sort of a shrug by the United States and most of Europe. It wouldn’t have been, I think, 10 years earlier.
But there is this sort of resignation that some of these countries are necessarily going to fall under Russia’s sway. I think it’s the job of the trans-Atlantic community to see that they don’t, that they are able to operate in a free environment, both at home and in terms of their foreign policy choices.
And there are other obvious issues that arise like that, but I think it would be – just to begin by saying that the mission is, in fact, Europe, whole and free. You don’t hear too much of that anymore. In fact, I find, in talking to both Americans and Europeans, there’s a little bit of reluctance to define exactly what Europe is now. It didn’t used to be so difficult.
MR. KEMPE: One more question from me and then I’ll go straight to the audience. Let me just play devil’s advocate here a little bit. If Europe and the U.S. together can’t succeed at what they’ve set out for themselves in Afghanistan, I would almost argue that by doing better in Afghanistan, it gives what you’re calling for a better chance than to do worse, and that the two are – it’s not either/or; it’s walking and chewing gum at the same time.
And, in fact, I would have some concern if Europe thinks its only mission is Europe and is not looking externally. I mean, we’ve been wanting to work with Europe on the world stage, and in this new world we need to, and we need to work more closely not less closely. And in a way you’re saying, no, let’s not do that; let’s ramp back; let’s set our ambitions lower and look back at Europe partly because we just don’t think Europe can be helpful to us on the world stage.
MR. KAGAN: You know, I don’t think that focusing on the peace and security and democratic inclinations of Europe is lower than anything. Look, the most important strategic shift that’s occurred in the world has been, in fact, the peaceful security of Europe. That may be the most important event that’s occurred in the last X number of centuries. So, it’s nothing to be sneezed at.
And I certainly wouldn’t place victory over the Taliban at a higher level than I would a Europe whole and free, but, yes, I think it’s absurd for us to pretend that Europe is going to be engaging in military ventures far from its borders without the wherewithal to do it and without the desire to do it. And it doesn’t make a lot of sense for Americans to ask Europeans to do something that most Europeans don’t want to do.
There are many ways for Europe to play a global role in a lot of different areas: their role with the United Nations, their role as one of the world’s largest economies, their role as a kind of, you know, moral chorus when they choose to find their voice. These things are not insignificant.
MR. KEMPE: Or a larger political and economic role in Afghanistan, even if not a military role.
MR. KAGAN: Sure, but I just think we’ve really developed a little bit of a tunnel vision on Afghanistan when there is a big world out there that needs to be dealt with, and if you ask yourself, what is the role of Europe in this larger world in which you have big players like Russia and China and India, it is not to prove itself a helpful second fiddle to the United States and Afghanistan.
MR. KEMPE: Quick question, quick answer. One of the next out-of-area missions that NATO could be called upon to do will be quite different than Afghanistan, which is Middle East as a peacekeeping force in a U.S.-Israel peace agreement. Secretary-General Rasmussen seems to have some interest and others have interest in this. Would you say, according to your argument, don’t go there; this is distracting?
MR. KAGAN: You know, a lot of it depends on political will, and I can imagine there being a great deal more political will in Europe for playing that kind of role than there has been for playing any kind of real role in Afghanistan. There isn’t a lot of political support for that, but there could be in the Middle East.
But then you would get to the question of capabilities, and while I would love to see, in theory, a NATO force take on that role, in practice, any foreign – any Western soldier operating for any – walking kids across the street or training people how to run, you know – is going to be target number one –
MR. KEMPE: Absolutely.
MR. KAGAN: – for terrorists, which means that you’re going to have a big force protection role as well. I know how the Americans would conduct that kind of activity. You would have a lot of people running around trying to do good things and a lot more people running around trying to protect the people trying to do good things.
I don’t know how Germans would handle that mission. I don’t know how other European countries might handle that mission. And, again, if you get into one of these situations where you can’t even tell – as in the case of the German public – you can’t even tell the German public that you’re engaged in something that might have to do with combat and everything has to be a disinterested peacekeeping operation, when the fighting starts, you better be prepared to tell those people that there has to be fighting too.
So, you know, again, I don’t rule it out. I’m not trying to say, please never get involved anywhere else in the world, but I would like the United States at least to stop making the test for whether Europe is relevant to the United States, how much it’s helping us in what is fundamentally our fight in Afghanistan.
MR. KEMPE: Very clear point.
Let’s start here and then I’ll get as many people in as I can. And do, for the record, please identify yourself.
Q: Edgar Buckley from Thales and formerly from NATO.
Bob, I agreed with what you said about the need for – NATO not being disqualified if we don’t succeed as an alliance in Afghanistan, but I also agreed with what Fred said, that we can do both. And then, coming on to his question, I’m not sure whether you are advocating a new more – I won’t say aggressive but more assertive approach towards Russia, because looking back, when we made progress in this great change in Europe, we did so through rapprochement with Russia.
It was when we had good relations with Russia that we felt able to enlarge NATO with confidence and it was the right thing to do. So, I’m thinking that to get what you want, a Europe whole and free, maybe that’s the approach and not necessarily loads and loads of Article 5 preparations close to their borders.
And just one last point. I’m not sure that whole and free for Europe is actually the mission. The mission is security. Whole and free is a part of it but, you know, we’re in Afghanistan for our security as well.
MR. KEMPE: And let me put one sentence on top of it. In the end, would not a Europe whole and free demand that Russia become part of that and perhaps even become a member of NATO?
MR. KAGAN: Well, a certain kind of Russia but not a Russia that currently –
MR. KEMPE: Right.
MR. KAGAN: – is in existence. And your point is well taken on what we accomplished when we had friendly relations with Russia. The problem is, is that, as you know very well, to the Russians these days, there is a narrative of us taking advantage. They don’t look back fondly on those days of good relations; they look back – or at least Putin has convinced everyone to look back on those days as the great sellout to a predatory West. They don’t have any positive feelings about that.
So, unfortunately, we’re not dealing with that Russia anymore. If we were dealing with that Russia, then we wouldn’t be having these problems. What we’re dealing with now is a Russia that feels all that was a mistake, that enlargement was bad for Russia, and that anything that Russia can do to try to create a two-tier NATO where some NATO countries can have U.S. and other kinds of military capacities but others can’t, a Russia that really would like to roll back some of what we consider to be all the positives of the 1990s, that’s the Russia that we’re dealing with today.
And so, my goal is not in any way to take a more assertive posture toward Russia, but I would say we can’t become – I don’t think we should buy the Russian narrative such that we have to then, in a way, pull back from what previously had been our goals, and that’s what I think we have been in danger of doing.
And let me just say, since Russia has come up – and I didn’t want to talk for an hour up there – Russia has choices. And I think that we in NATO have presented Russia with some very clear and, to my mind, very reasonable choices. It doesn’t make any sense when I look at Russia and they’ve got China on one flank and they have everything that they have in Central Asia on their other flank, and they have the internal difficulties they have, that somehow they’ve decided their greatest strategic problem is NATO.
That’s the most absurd thing in the world, and I’m willing to go so far as to accredit a little bit of Russian paranoia – and we know the whole history of, you know, everything that Russia – but, come on; some of that is a put on as well. Some of that is a – (audio break) – by Putin to stir up the kind of predatory Western nations and what have you, which is also an old Russian tradition.
We shouldn’t really – we need to be careful not to succumb to that. The NATO has made very reasonable offers to Russia on missile defense, on how to resolve the Georgia dispute in a way that meets its claimed concerns, on how to negotiate – there is an ongoing NATO-Russia council which I know that Secretary-General Rasmussen is very committed to and evidently committed to, right, and yet Sergey Lavrov just gave a bit tirade about how NATO is once again trying to push Russia around and not let us do what we need to do to protect our own interests.
And, meanwhile, Russia has a choice domestically. It has a choice between a modernizing direction and another kind of direction. How do we encourage that choice? Well, partly by making it clear that the other direction won’t work for them, you know, that the kind of hyper-nationalist, aggrieved Russia that fears NATO and needs to push back, that is not the successful path to modernization.
So, I’ll end by saying, on the one hand, yes, we should be reaching out to Russia, as we have been. On the other hand, let’s not be naïve that Russia doesn’t – that this particular Putin’s Russia doesn’t have a game of its own which does need to be resisted.
MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Bob.
I’ve got lots of people with questions and I’ve written you down in the order –
MR. KAGAN: And I’ll try to give shorter answers. Sorry. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: – but I’m going to show priority to former defense ministers of allied countries. How’s that? So, let me get the two of you to go first – Boyko and Jans (ph).
Q: Boyko Noev, former Bulgarian government. Thanks to the Atlantic Council. I agree with most of your analysis. I would only argue about treating Europe as a single entity and as a single player. There are big differences, as you know.
On your comment about leadership, this has often come up in the debates that we have here and elsewhere. Do you think leadership can be fostered or do you think lack of leadership should be taken as a given and the question should be resolved with other analysis? Thank you.
MR. KEMPE: And let me pick up Jans.
Q: Jans Pascal (ph), European Parliament. I agree with you that we should not lose sight of the traditional things, you know, NATO was conceived for, and this sort of return to this core, basic functions is very important. But, at the same time, time has passed in between.
I mean, if the husband has left his wife back home and he is now coming back home and he discovers that she has an affair with a neighbor – which is, you know, something that did not exist 10 years ago – how does he sort out? How can he convince the wife? For he says that, hey, listen, the neighbor is not that good, then –
MR. KAGAN: I’ll need a program to know who the wife is and who the – who is the wife cheating with and – (laughter).
Q: I won’t tell you that –
MR. KAGAN: Okay. (Chuckles.)
Q: – because I’m working where I’m working.
MR. KEMPE: I’m still waiting for you to tackle that one with the –
MR. KAGAN: I have no experience with any of that. I don’t know anything about it. (Laughter.)
Well, first of all, on the question of single Europe, I agree, obviously, that Europe is, in a way – well, I don’t know if it’s more fractured than it once was but it certainly has multiple interests which have been tugging at each other.
Now, I actually think that obviously the main tug has been between the East and the West, and especially on issues like Russia where I think that, unfortunately, the West has been – and that includes Germany – has been taking the lead in rapprochement and reset, what have you, along with the United States, which has caused some anxiety in the East.
And I think that it’s unfortunate that there hasn’t been greater concern for the East’s views on these things in Western capitals, and the tendency is to say either grow up, be quiet; we’re the leaders of this relationship; you’re too paranoid, et cetera, et cetera, and I think that is not appropriate behavior for the new EU.
I also think – and maybe this is going to sound strange a little; I’m not sure it does anymore – that the United States ought to be helpful in this regard. The United States ought to act – can, I think – you know, we don’t have the odious, monstrous George W. Bush as president anymore trying to do Europe in. We have a president who may not be as concerned about Europe as we would like, but I think, at the very least, this president can play a useful role, and Europe shouldn’t be unhappy about that, it seems to me. So, that would be one.
Now, you get to the question of should we take lack of good leadership as a norm? Lack of good leadership is the norm, I agree. That is normally the way it is, but the United States at least, and Europe at some very critical times and the United States throughout at least some portions of the last few decades, has been able to show some decent leadership.
So I don’t think we should let ourselves off the hook quite that easily and just say good leadership is a thing of the past. But I do think that even leaders, after all who are mostly politicians, they need to have some sense of what the vision should be. And I think, look, let’s face it, ever since the end of the Cold War, we’ve all been sort of adrift in trying to understand what matters now, what the big issues are, what should we be focused on?
And then 9/11 came along and now I think it created a misleading focus on one very important and dangerous but nevertheless narrow set of issues. So I would like – to some extent maybe what we need is a better intellectual leadership in terms of understanding how this all – how all the pieces fit together.
And, partly, it does – I hate to say go back. You know, everybody says, oh, you want to go back; you don’t realize times have changed. I realize times have changed but sometimes we overstate the change, and that’s – in fact, I would say, since, again, the end of the Cold War, we’ve overstated all kinds of change.
We all remember the end of history – and I don’t mean to make fun of Frank’s argument, but we all felt that way to some extent. Everything was different now. Well, some things are different and a lot of things stayed the same. And what I’m trying to argue is, in the world we’re living in, these old issues like common values, like the very important strategic reality of a trans-Atlantic relationship, are still of genuine enduring value.
And we may make a mistake in thinking things have changed so much that that’s not what matters anymore; what matters is fighting ragtag groups of guerillas in Afghanistan. Oh, come on, things haven’t changed that much.
So, I guess I would say, you know, if you take the longue durée, if you take the longer view of all these things, you see there’s a lot more continuity, and we need to have a strategy that addresses that continuity as well as the change.
MR. KEMPE: I’ll restrain myself.
MR. KAGAN: Contain yourself. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: Arnaud and Harlan.
Q: Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. With the departure of the Dutch from Afghanistan last month and the Canadians leaving next year, leaving the Brits and the U.S. to do whatever kinetic operation is necessary, what, to your way of thinking, would be a plausible, feasible way out of Afghanistan?
MR. KAGAN: Well, you really have the wrong Kagan up here to answer that question, but the other Kagan is in Afghanistan right now, so he can’t answer for me.
Look, I think, based on my vast knowledge of what’s going on in Afghanistan – which is not, in fact, vast – I predict that we will, over the next few months, see some progress. I think we’re already seeing progress. We’re so fixated on the decisions that Obama made a year ago that we can barely pay attention to what’s going on now.
I have a fair amount of confidence in Petraeus’s ability to assess a situation, make up for the mostly intellectual shortfalls that we’ve had in Afghanistan over the years and make some progress. I think it’s highly unfortunate that many Europeans and the Canadians are pulling out, although I’m sympathetic. I don’t think it will make a material difference. I think at the end of the day the progress will depend largely on what the Americans do.
And I would say if we’re sitting here next year and things look as grim as they do now, then I would be more willing to sort of answer your question in a how do we cut our losses and get out? I believe we will be sitting here a year from now and things will look better than they do now, and –
MR. KEMPE: Which is the way out because you would be –
MR. KAGAN: Well, right.
MR. KEMPE: – you would be starting to transfer. Is that –
MR. KAGAN: Right. I mean, the way out – as in all these cases, the only way out is forward. It is a great illusion to imagine that there is a backward way out. For one thing, I think people don’t have enough imagination about what that looks like – withdrawing, losing. It isn’t going to be pretty.
And I don’t even think we can sustain withdrawal. Put it that way. You want to talk about being able to sustain commitment? I doubt we can sustain withdrawal, that things will happen that we will find intolerable and we’ll, one way or another, be fighting our way back in again. So, I think the only way out is forward and I think we will make forward progress.
MR. KEMPE: Harlan?
Q: Harlan Ullman from the Atlantic Council. Unfortunately, you cannot ignore Afghanistan, whether you’re right or wrong. You cannot ignore the huge tensions that are going on within the alliance between East and West, sort of Article 5 consensus, all these kinds of things. And you can’t ignore the fact that neither the strategic experts group or, likely, the strategic concept is going to be anything else except underwhelming.
In other words, making the case for NATO has been something that’s been very elusive. Quite frankly, where you may be right about whole and free, to me that has absolutely no compelling argument to it that’s going to get countries on both sides of the Atlantic to say, gee, that’s really a great idea; why don’t I think about that and support it?
So, supposing your idea, however valid for Europe whole and free, does not pass the “Napoleon’s corporal” test and it cannot really be the underpinnings. What is your alternative?
MR. KAGAN: I have to go from my alternative that’s not good to another one that I make up that’s even worse, but okay. I’m having a very – I was supposed to be the pessimist about this relationship, you know. You people have all overtaken me. (Laughter.)
MR. : You should have been at the first – (inaudible, off mike). (Laughter.)
MR. KAGAN: “Europe, whole and free” is a phrase. I don’t mean to – telling Europeans that it is appropriate for Europeans to focus on Europe I think is something that can sell. Now, the harder part is, by “Europe” we mean something outside your own country. That may be a harder sell. That is a core EU problem, whether there really is any – (audio break) – of Europe, let alone a Europe that includes people in the East. So I accept that these are all obstacles.
You know, we’ve tried all the other – it’s not for lack of trying that two administrations, or maybe even three administrations, have tried to come up with the things that continue to bind us together and that hasn’t been compelling. We were bound together to some extent by the Balkans because Europeans cared about the Balkans and Americans thought that they ought to care because the Europeans cared. Okay, fine. That was a perfectly reasonable basis.
And then NATO enlargement, until the Russians started getting unhappy about it, was a nice sort of vague – and EU enlargement. These were kind of binding elements. But, look, terrorism has not been a binding element. Americans think it binds Europeans and Americans but Europeans don’t have the same reaction to terrorism that the United States does. I daresay Afghanistan is not a binding issue.
And so it’s not for lack of trying. I guess I would say that – and I don’t want to be, you know, sanguine that this problem can be solved. I mean, nobody has mentioned, you know, Germany’s problem as having any foreign policy. And you might say that without a Germany, what is Europe? And I think Germany needs to find itself in a way that it has yet to find itself.
So, I can come up with even as many objections to my approach as you have, but if you ask me, what makes more sense – put it this way – to focus Europe’s attention on military activities 3,000 miles away in countries they don’t care about or to focus Europe’s attention on Europe, I would say that at least is a better bet.
If you have an even better binding agreement that will bring Europe and the trans-Atlantic community together, I’m all ears. Maybe I’m being – maybe I’m just nostalgic. Maybe I’m idealistic, but I do think – in a world – so you’ve got me – you know, I’m trying to think out loud.
In a world where Europeans are worried about China’s rise, where they’re worried about falling behind, I would say it’s plausible that a United States-European relationship which seeks once again to elevate the role of – (audio break) – that maybe that would appeal, as long as the French aren’t concerned about becoming America’s – (audio break) – all the time.
MR. KEMPE: I also find myself – as you say, you’re hearing Boyko’s voice because Denmark isn’t Germany and Spain is nothing, but that would be –
MR. KAGAN: Well, maybe we could just get rid of the whole Europe concept.
MR. KEMPE: – but especially on NATO and security-type issues.
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
MR. KEMPE: But that’s another conversation.
Damon?
Q: Thank you. Terrific talk, Bob. I just wanted to sort of play out – one of the compelling reasons the United States has turned its European partners in Iraq outside of the NATO framework, or in Afghanistan within the alliance framework, is because it’s so compelling politically for the United States to operate with friends overseas when it’s using force.
It’s a political imperative that we not fight alone. Sure, we care about the military capabilities, the resources, but political legitimacy is a huge element of that. And so, what is the corollary, what’s the implication of what you’ve laid out here?
If we shouldn’t be dragging our European allies – our closest allies with whom we have the closest military cooperation – into combat operations with us around the globe, what are the implications for what that means for the United States when it does find itself in a situation where it decides it needs to use force?
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
Q: Are we looking to develop alternative partners on a more global basis, or does this mean acting more unilaterally – more by ourselves than just taking the hits for it?
MR. KAGAN: Yeah. Well, it’s a very good question, and it is a problem. I do think that the United States, probably in the future, will look for regional partners to deal with problems in those regions. Certainly no one is thinking that Europeans should play some kind of military strategic role in East Asia, for instance. There are strong military powers in East Asia that the United States does have alliances with and does partner with.
So we’re really – we’re really only talking about these kinds of in-between areas like Central Asia and perhaps the Middle East, where, again, the United States also has those kinds of partners.
Now, then the question becomes psychological because, look, let’s face it; when the Europeans came with the United States to Iraq in ’91, the United States provided 90 to 95 percent of the firepower. When the Europeans and the United States went together in the Balkans, in Kosovo the United States provided 90 percent of the power.
So then we’re really talking, to some extent, about a psychological question, and that’s where we get into – now we’re back to the old problem – is Europe willing to grant its moral authority and legitimacy to military actions that the United States takes that the Europeans don’t want to participate in militarily?
I mean, that’s where things broke down over Iraq, and that is what has been a great temptation for Europeans, not wanting to participate themselves but also not liking to see the United States participate, doing it alone, has withheld that legitimacy, which can play back into the American political system.
Now, I mean, in the past I’ve suggested that we need to have some kind of bargain between the United States and Europe where the United States is willing to let Europe have a significant say in when the United States uses force, in return for which Europe is willing to take the risk sometimes of providing legitimacy for that force when they agree.
But, again, has it helped? I mean, this is a question: Has it helped? I mean, this is a question. Has it helped trans-Atlantic – has Afghanistan aided trans-Atlantic solidarity in real terms? I’m not sure it has.
Now, if it all turns out well, it probably can. If it doesn’t turn out well, it probably won’t have. So, it may be a false prescription to suggest that we pull the Europeans with us every step of the way and that somehow this leads to sort of greater harmony in the relationship. I’m not sure that that’s necessarily true.
As for the American people, sometimes they feel the need for legitimacy from Europe; sometimes they don’t. It isn’t in every case that Americans are like that. Americans are pretty much convinced of their own legitimacy when they get themselves worked up over something. But there will be occasions where that is an issue, and that’s where I think we need to come up with some kind of reasonable bargain.
MR. KEMPE: Frank, did I see you had a – no? I probably just – Ian? No. Let me throw in a question, then, off this and then I’ll – after my question let me pass on to Julie Finley, and we’re getting pretty close to the end.
Let’s take a look a little bit more deeply at the relationship with Russia. What would be a trans-Atlantic policy toward today’s Russia – and this gets to Jans’ point that it is a different Russia and it has a different set of motivations, certainly globally, economically interconnected in a way that the Soviet Union wasn’t ever, in this way, as dependent on Western markets, as I said.
There’s a whole set of other things that makes it quite different, including what’s gone on in Abkhazia, Ossetia and the different situation in Ukraine, and also now quite a different situation in Poland, where Poland is actually pursing its own reset policy. So, within all this, what is a trans-Atlantic policy towards Russia that would actually unify the U.S. and Europe and Europe?
So that would be my question. And, Julie, why don’t you throw in one here too as well?
Q: Julie Finley, former ambassador to the OSCE. First of all, as I go around this country, there is a selling job needing to be done, because most people I talk to think Europe is whole and free, number one. But my question is, how can you see – do you see NATO going to solve some unrest in Kazakhstan? Under what circumstances are you comfortable with NATO in Kyrgyzstan?
MR. KAGAN: I’m uncomfortable with anybody in Kyrgyzstan. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: Meaning part of Eurasia which – meaning part of Eurasia which was part of the place that you said NATO could get involved.
Q: Well, they have Kazakhstan –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KAGAN: Well, Kazakhstan is way out there, isn’t it? Am I right? Isn’t that like not in Europe per se?
Q: But it is part of –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KEMPE: Partnership for Peace.
MR. KAGAN: Well, everybody is in Partnership for Peace. (Laughter.) Yeah. No, I’m not trying to belittle the question.
MR. KEMPE: Yeah.
MR. KAGAN: Although, you know, how would you feel about NATO forces in Costa Rica and how – I mean, there is a kind of – in theory, NATO could be anywhere. In practice, I guess I would have to say – I’m trying to think of a scenario that has us in troops – in a country that borders both China and Russia and has NATO forces in it. I guess I can imagine it, but I have a hard time imagining it exactly, how you would wind up deploying NATO troops in Kazakhstan.
And I don’t think you could ever get away with deploying NATO qay (ph) – NATO in Kyrgyzstan. It would obviously have to be as part of some other organization that the Russians could possibly feel comfortable with.
I don’t dismiss, out of hand, any of these. In theory, if Europe genuinely has the political desire to get involved and leaders are willing to sell to their people the need to get involved and they meet a reasonable response, then the question becomes one of capabilities, and then we can have, you know, a sort of typical 90-10 split in terms of the action, if we can still maintain the 10 percent of it.
But it’s the first part of that equation that I’m dubious about, and that’s why I’m skeptical of this kind of operation because I just don’t think European publics support it, but I’m willing to entertain it in principle that it could possibly happen.
And now I’ve forgotten the other part of the question.
MR. KEMPE: What policy toward this new Russia –
MR. KAGAN: Oh, toward –
MR. KEMPE: – could one have that actually binds the trans-Atlantic relationship and binds Europe rather than divides it –
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
MR. KEMPE: – recognizing that Estonians, Poles, Germans, U.S. are all in somewhat different places on that.
MR. KAGAN: Well, you know, I think there are – if you look at what has become the consensus position over the past year on Georgia, for instance, there’s a lot more NATO unity than you might expect on an issue like that.
And, by the way, I mean, the Poles are engaged in a reset. The day the Poles decide that they are completely trusting of the Russians, I will really begin – I’ll rip up everything I ever learned about geopolitics and I’ll start all over again learning. But the Poles can – you know, fine. (Laughter.) But I think that there can be more of a consensus than there has been.
Now, let me just – now I’ll do a little bit of predicting. In my view, on the U.S. side, the reset has already hit its high-water mark. I think it’s all downhill from here. The last Iran sanctions are the best Iran sanctions we’re going to get out of Russia. Now Russia is going to be – is already actively working against further sanctions, including sanctions that Russia isn’t even being asked to undertake. That’s the first thing.
I personally hope the START treaty is passed but I’m worried that it won’t pass, which will give the Russians another grievance, which will give them an excuse to be more obstreperous than they’ve already been. And I think, in terms of Russian domestic politics, we’re heading towards Putin announcing his run for the presidency, which means the Medvedev fantasy is going to come to an end.
And so, I think things are going to get harder with Russia, which I think there’s going to be a reset of the American reset, and I think this will have an impact on European policies as well. When the Americans take a tougher line toward the Russians than the Poles, I will find that to be an amusing moment. It may happen, actually, because the Poles may be out of sync with where the Americans are at the moment, but I don’t think it will be that difficult, under those circumstances, to have an increasingly united European position.
Now, the big issue, of course, are not the Poles. The big issue are the Germans, who believe that they uniquely understand Russia, uniquely understand how to have the proper relationship with Russia, and uniquely have their political system highly infiltrated by business deals with Russia.
So, Germany is going to be the issue, but I don’t believe that Germany will really fight a European consensus on some key issues that may come up in dealing with Russia, so I’m more optimistic about a consensus on Russia than has existed so far.
MR. : The Germans never fight, so where do you find that? (Laughter.)
MR. KAGAN: Fair enough. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: I’m looking at my clock and I think we’ve run out of time. Bob, this has been absolutely terrific – many things to chew on here, including the possibility of a reset of the American reset. And I think what you’ve pointed us to very strongly, which, in the parts of the opening sessions I attended, wasn’t touched on as strongly, is the – in the aftermath of Afghanistan or even as Afghanistan gets going, how do you refocus the alliance on the challenges of its home ground?
And then, on top of that, how do you refocus it in such a way that it’s actually useful, acceptable, works? I mean, my own personal view – and either you can leave me with this or I’ll give you 30 more seconds to answer this – is we can either do both Afghanistan and Europe, whole and free, or we can do neither, because if we don’t have the staying power in Afghanistan, if we can’t work together there, I think the crisis of confidence would be great.
So, even if you’re right that we shouldn’t have gone there, I don’t see this as an either/or. I see it more as a either do both or can’t do either.
MR. KAGAN: Well, I should probably just leave you with that since you’re the boss of the organization here, so – (laughter).
MR. KEMPE: But I wouldn’t expect you to do that, so, please answer that.
MR. KAGAN: Well, first of all, I thought I was supposed to talk about post-Afghanistan and NATO –
MR. KEMPE: Right, yes. Right.
MR. KAGAN: – not that we’ll never get out of Afghanistan, NATO.
MR. KEMPE: But there are two posts. One could be a disastrous post-Afghanistan and one could be a –
MR. KAGAN: Right.
MR. KEMPE: – a better post-Afghanistan.
MR. KAGAN: And when the disaster occurs, I will do my best to make sure that people understand that the disaster was primarily a failure of American military strategy, not a failure of the NATO alliance –
MR. KEMPE: Right.
MR. KAGAN: – because it really will not have been a failure of the NATO alliance.
MR. KEMPE: And so you’re basically telling us all here, don’t make this a test. If it succeeds, great, it can help us; if it doesn’t succeed –
MR. KAGAN: Surely it will be more fun just to blame the Americans for screwing up Afghanistan than taking it on the entire alliance, and in this case it will be true. (Laughter.)
MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Bob Kagan. (Applause.)
(END)
NATO BEYOND AFGHANISTAN:
A CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
IN A POST-ISAF WORLD
LUNCH KEYNOTE SPEAKER
INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR:
FREDERICK KEMPE,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
SPEAKER:
ROBERT KAGAN,
SENIOR FELLOW,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
12:30 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
FREDERICK KEMPE: All right, this is the double-digestion part of the program where you get to digest your sandwich and Bob Kagan at the same time. Bob has a lot of things in his bio that I’m going to read some of, but let’s just say he’s one of the top thinkers, one of the best writers I know and a good friend.
We got to know each other a little bit better when he was in Brussels, and discovering Mars and Venus and then attending one conference after another. And I have promised that I will make no mention of planets or any of the godchildren of Mars or Venus, as they have showed themselves in Afghanistan.
Expert and frequent commentator on U.S. national security, foreign policy, U.S.-European relations, and he writes a monthly column that we all look at in the Washington Post, and contributing editor to the Weekly Standard and The Republic.
Spent 13 years before going to Brookings as a senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1984 to 1988 he served as a member of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, as principal speech writer for Secretary of State George Schulz, which I didn’t know that before and now I understand, because I never thought of him as that articulate of a person but –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KEMPE: Just joking. Sorry, Secretary Schultz – and as deputy for policy in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.
Prolific author on U.S. foreign policy. The most recent book is “The Return of History and the End of Dreams;” previous book, “Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century.” And he has been the winner of the 2008 Lepgold Prize and a 2007 finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize. And “Paradise and Power” was the one that grew out of Mars and Venus, I believe, right?
MR. : That would be Gottschalt (ph).
MR. KEMPE: That was the Gottschalt. And he’s often been named one of Foreign Policy Magazine’s Top 100 Global Thinkers, so let me put him in front of the other 99 here in the audience. (Laughter, applause.)
ROBERT KAGAN: Thanks very much, Fred, and thanks for having me here at the Atlantic Council at this great meeting. I see a lot of friends out in the audience and in all directions. It’s a real pleasure to be with you again after I left Europe. It’s good to have Europe come here now and then.
I gather you’ve been mulling over the issue of NATO in Afghanistan and what comes next. And I’m told it hasn’t been the cheeriest of discussions; I don’t know why. I think things are going to go great in Afghanistan. Don’t worry about it. Everything will turn out as long as we stick with it. I’m supposed to, I think, look ahead beyond Afghanistan, and that’s what I’m going to do.
I guess what I’d like to start by saying is that people, I remember, thought that Afghanistan would be a test of NATO, or has been a test of NATO, and if so, I think that’s quite unfortunate. It’s the wrong test for NATO, in my opinion.
I remember, I guess it was in the ’90s they had this phrase, out of area or out of business. I understand why that view took hold. It was based on a paradigm or a sense of what the world looked like after the end of the Cold War, and that sense was that basically, well, Europe’s fine. Everything in Europe is okay. Maybe we could take the Balkan problem – great power, competition; that’s over. It’s going to be mostly about economics and then it’s going to be mostly about these messy places out there in the world.
And then of course September 11th comes along and this idea that the problem is messy – problems out there, which includes terrorism and al-Qaida and other things like that, that that’s going to be the big focus, not the kind of traditional issues that we’ve had to deal with over the centuries – drove this idea that, therefore, for NATO to stay relevant, it needs to do things like Afghanistan and whatever other Afghanistans may lie ahead.
So the first problem is that it was premised on a notion that I think is mistaken. I think it’s a mistake to believe – and I think we now have ample evidence that it was a mistake to believe that more traditional kinds of great-power issues – great-power competition, great-power ambition, geopolitics as we once understood it – it was a mistake to believe that that was all gone and now it was just dealing with the messy areas.
And unfortunately, it was a mistake, in my view, to put Europe up to a test which I think Europe had neither the desire nor really the capability of meeting. And to some extent, I just want to – let me just say, I both appreciate and value Europe’s contribution, its willingness – the willingness of the European countries to contribute in Afghanistan. It was a noble effort.
It was a great sign of solidarity after 9/11 when NATO cited its Article 5 obligations to come to the aid of the United States in that situation, but that doesn’t mean that, in my view, that is what NATO can or should be about. I don’t think it’s any secret, certainly not to this audience, that the appetite for military action in Europe is not high. In fact, I would argue it’s lower than when I thought it was really low when I wrote about Mars and Venus to begin with.
I would say Europe was positively belligerent then compared to where it is now, partly because of the economic crisis, partly for other and deeper reasons. European defense budgets are declining. I’m sure you’ve already spoken about this. I’m not even sure Europe could even participate in Afghanistan again the way it already has if it had to do so now.
And, of course, as sort of a deeper psychological phenomenon, Europe is not really committed to this kind of military action in response to problems. I suppose that should be no secret to you either. And German presidents have to resign if they suggest that Europe might have – that Germany might have those kinds of traditional interests. Europe sees itself in a very different fashion.
So, as I say, it’s extremely unfortunate that this somehow became the test of NATO at a time when Europe was less and less inclined to want to carry out this kind of activity. And the difficulties in Afghanistan, I just want to make clear, I blame primarily on the United States.
It was really for the United States to deal with that military problem. It was great and useful and important to have other countries involved for a variety of reasons, but the success in Afghanistan was going to rest or fail on the basis of American actions and America simply didn’t fight that war – hasn’t, up until now, fought that war very effectively.
And so if there is ultimately a problem in Afghanistan, it is not primarily a European problem. It’s primarily an American problem, and yet it has put all this strain on the trans-Atlantic relationship and raised questions and has columnists writing about the irrelevance of NATO.
Now, the problem is we’re generally faced with a kind of binary – we have been faced with a kind of binary approach to all this, which is that either NATO does effectively engaged in these out-of-area activities like Afghanistan, or it is irrelevant.
In my view, that is not the choice. In my view, NATO – and not just NATO but the trans-Atlantic relationship in general, remains highly relevant, but it remains relevant in the area where it can and has done the most good historically, which is Europe and its environs.
I believe it was entirely premature for us all collectively to decide that Europe was no longer the highest priority for the trans-Atlantic relationship and particularly for NATO, and that somehow we had to find other priorities elsewhere.
The fact is that there has been, A, unfinished business in Europe, unfinished business in the Balkans, unfinished business on the periphery, which are, in my view, vitally important and continue to be vitally important. And there was also the promise of Europe in Europe’s near neighborhood that has gone unfulfilled.
Now, in the Clinton years they used to talk about something called “Europe, whole and free.” In my view, that is not only an acceptable mission for NATO but should be still the primary mission for NATO, for the EU and for the United States, but it is a mission that we have dropped off of, it seems to me, or at least not paid as much attention to as we might.
There was a time when some of the smartest Europeans, and I think one of the smartest European strategists I know, Robert Cooper, put very well that the EU’s foreign policy lay in expansion. And I always felt, as an American, that the greatest strategic benefit that Europe could offer, both to the world and to the United States, was enlargement, was to bring the values and the stability of the European way to the very unstable and, in many cases lacking those values, neighborhood, whether it be in Turkey or in Eastern Europe or in that new neighborhood, or what Russia calls its “near abroad,” whether it’s Ukraine or Georgia or what have you.
That was, at one time, where Europe was headed, but of course we’ve seen how, in recent years, going back, I suppose – I would say a turning point was with the French rejection of the European constitution when there was really a turning away, when there was all this indigestion about EU enlargement, that even taking in the countries that had been taken in was now considered by many to have been a mistake, or at least something that needed to be digested for many years to come, and so that effort slowed down.
So on the one hand, NATO’s focus was taken away from the more near issues in Europe. On the other hand, Europe – what had been Europe’s evolving strategy of enlargement was stalled, if not perhaps permanently but certainly for some time to come. And then, finally – and related to all of this – was the fact that, to some extent, Europe itself has begun to return to a more traditional kind of great power behavior, particularly, and most obviously, in the case of Russia.
Russia, it seems to me, poses issues for Europe, not least – and I think, again, this is something that – it seems like a very old-fashioned concept but I think it’s very real – not least because it is increasingly an authoritarian, autocratic regime with the interests of autocratic regimes. And one of those interests is in protecting its own rule, and another interest is in having neighbors that in no way pose a threat to its rule, and that means not having democratic neighbors.
I don’t think there’s any question that Russia today – that Putin’s policy is to not necessarily to support democratic neighbors, and in many cases to support those who might undermine them even through democratic methods.
And beyond that, there is the simple fact that Russia, I think, is a very traditional kind of great power. Europe may be a 21st century post-power entity; Russia is very much, in my view, a 19th century style of great power with a 19th century great-power sense of having been done wrong, of grievances, and what the traditional geopolitical types would have called a sense of dissatisfaction.
It’s a dissatisfied power. It wants to reorganize its neighborhood in way that more closely approximates the kind of sphere of influence that it had in the past, not necessarily the Soviet Union in a formal way but in terms of Russia’s traditional sphere of interest.
And that poses a challenge to both the United States and Europe because Russia’s near abroad, which it would like to bring under its sway, obviously happens to be many of the same countries that Europe regards as its new neighborhood and that the United States and Europe collectively believe is part of what they mean when we talk about Europe, whole and free.
And so those challenges exist, and I would have to say that we are not handling them well as a trans-Atlantic community. Partly this is because Europe itself is divided – divided between East and West, divided nation to nation. The promise of European unity on foreign policy – I don’t need to tell this audience – has not been fulfilled. In fact, I would say it has gotten worse over the last 10 years in terms of really finding European unity on some of these issues.
I notice that the French defense minister recently, worried about European defense spending – which I agree – but his concern, as he expressed it, was that they’re worried that Europe would become the pawn of the United States or China. I think Europe ought to be more worried about becoming the pawn of Russia, at least when it comes to issues of energy dependence, at least when it comes to Russia’s ability to play one European country off against another, the enormous influence of Russian money in some of the most important nations in Europe.
Obviously Europe is stronger than Russia – Russia is not the old Soviet Union – but Europe doesn’t behave like it’s stronger than Russia, and the United States and Europe together don’t behave like they have the capacity to shape Europe the way they would like it to be shaped.
That, it seems to me, ought to be what NATO’s challenge is for the years to come. Will there be occasions that arise where NATO allies may fight next to one another in non-European theaters – I can imagine such situations – or perhaps engage in peacekeeping?
But for us to be setting that as the standard for NATO is a mistake in two ways: one, because it is asking of Europeans that the Europeans do not want to give. And I’m not talking only about European officials; I’m talking specifically about European peoples who show no indication of wanting to play that kind of role.
So not only would we be focused on the wrong thing but we lose our focus on the right thing. I would like to see the United States show more leadership than it has shown hitherto. I don’t think we any longer need to worry about whether the United States is dividing Europe or playing one part of Europe against another part of Europe.
The problem right now, it seems to me, in the trans-Atlantic community is a dearth of political leadership on all sides, and political leadership directed at what have always been the core objectives of NATO and should remain the core objectives of NATO, which is a Europe whole and free.
Let me just conclude by saying, that can be the most important strategic reality of the 21st century still, the notion that the only thing that matters today is China’s rise and India’s rise and Russian behavior is ludicrous. There was nothing stronger than the unified trans-Atlantic community in the 21st century.
And if you look at what the real issues, it seems to me, that are going to dominate the 21st century, and as important as terrorism is, as worrisome as al-Qaida is, as difficult as Afghanistan is, this 21st century is going to be shaped by the large forces of history, by the powers that wield great power, and by the ideologies that shape humankind.
And now, it seems to me, more than ever, it’s necessary for the United States and Europe to pull together to support those principles in a place that matters a lot, which is the Eurasian region that has always meant so much to us. And, on that, I’m looking forward to taking your questions. Thanks very much. (Applause.)
MR. KEMPE: As usual, Bob, you’ve given us absolutely nothing to talk about. (Laughter.) Very provocative, very interesting notions. The way you closed about the large forces of history; we are experiencing the most dramatic power shift from West to East since the 18th century. We don’t really know what that means but it certainly means that the U.S. and Europe have to work more effectively together to continue to ensure that our common values – rule of law, democracy, free markets – survive in this new world. So, all of that is agreed.
But, interesting notion, mistake, Afghanistan – mistake to have made that the NATO mission that was testing Europe or NATO. Out of area, out of business is sort of a false way of looking at things; a call for a post-NATO, after NATO, return to one’s knitting, but the knitting is much different now than it was during the Cold War.
So, let me start with that. What does that mean, in essence, if, after Afghanistan, NATO would return to looking to a Europe, whole and free, as its primary mission? What does that mean particularly if you see Russia as the potential challenge? What does it mean for military deployments? What does it mean one does together?
MR. KAGAN: Well, obviously it means a number of things, some of which, you know, this administration and the past administration have begun to try to address. It does mean greater attention to Article 5 commitments that people once thought were not very important one way or another, because there are nations to do feel worried, at the very least, about what Russia’s intentions are.
And, I mean, I should stop to say for one second, I don’t think I mentioned the word “Georgia,” but Georgia looms large in this discussion because whatever one thinks about who fired the first shot or who was responsible in the sort of proximate cause – and those kinds of things, as we know from World War I, can be debated for eternity, the bottom line is that one sovereign nation has taken control of and occupied what most of the rest of the world regards as the territory of another sovereign nation, which was something I think we didn’t expect and was a kind of – I won’t say it was a watershed but it certainly was a wake-up call and certainly shaped the perceptions of many nations on Russia’s border, which has raised the question of whether you actually need to provide security to these countries.
So that’s one thing. There is obviously a military dimension to that, and I think that, you know, the next trans-Atlantic peacekeeping mission I’d like to see is one that is occurring in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a means of getting Russian forces out of there and part of a mission which can protect those peoples that Russia feels, or claims to feel, need to be protected but without having Russia in an occupying position. That would be a very useful use of European-American forces if that could come to pass.
MR. KEMPE: Though more likely OSCE, U.N. –
MR. KAGAN: Or OSCE, whatever –
MR. KEMPE: Certainly not NATO.
MR. KAGAN: I’ll take anything we can get, but it is up – it is not up to the OSCE at the end of the day, or the U.N.; it’s up to the Europeans and the Americans to press for that kind of solution, regardless of who winds up on the ground.
Then there are things like how much do we care about what direction Ukraine is heading in? I was not happy when the general response to Russia signing a multi-decade deal to keep its ports – to keep its military – its naval facilities in Ukraine was greeted by sort of a shrug by the United States and most of Europe. It wouldn’t have been, I think, 10 years earlier.
But there is this sort of resignation that some of these countries are necessarily going to fall under Russia’s sway. I think it’s the job of the trans-Atlantic community to see that they don’t, that they are able to operate in a free environment, both at home and in terms of their foreign policy choices.
And there are other obvious issues that arise like that, but I think it would be – just to begin by saying that the mission is, in fact, Europe, whole and free. You don’t hear too much of that anymore. In fact, I find, in talking to both Americans and Europeans, there’s a little bit of reluctance to define exactly what Europe is now. It didn’t used to be so difficult.
MR. KEMPE: One more question from me and then I’ll go straight to the audience. Let me just play devil’s advocate here a little bit. If Europe and the U.S. together can’t succeed at what they’ve set out for themselves in Afghanistan, I would almost argue that by doing better in Afghanistan, it gives what you’re calling for a better chance than to do worse, and that the two are – it’s not either/or; it’s walking and chewing gum at the same time.
And, in fact, I would have some concern if Europe thinks its only mission is Europe and is not looking externally. I mean, we’ve been wanting to work with Europe on the world stage, and in this new world we need to, and we need to work more closely not less closely. And in a way you’re saying, no, let’s not do that; let’s ramp back; let’s set our ambitions lower and look back at Europe partly because we just don’t think Europe can be helpful to us on the world stage.
MR. KAGAN: You know, I don’t think that focusing on the peace and security and democratic inclinations of Europe is lower than anything. Look, the most important strategic shift that’s occurred in the world has been, in fact, the peaceful security of Europe. That may be the most important event that’s occurred in the last X number of centuries. So, it’s nothing to be sneezed at.
And I certainly wouldn’t place victory over the Taliban at a higher level than I would a Europe whole and free, but, yes, I think it’s absurd for us to pretend that Europe is going to be engaging in military ventures far from its borders without the wherewithal to do it and without the desire to do it. And it doesn’t make a lot of sense for Americans to ask Europeans to do something that most Europeans don’t want to do.
There are many ways for Europe to play a global role in a lot of different areas: their role with the United Nations, their role as one of the world’s largest economies, their role as a kind of, you know, moral chorus when they choose to find their voice. These things are not insignificant.
MR. KEMPE: Or a larger political and economic role in Afghanistan, even if not a military role.
MR. KAGAN: Sure, but I just think we’ve really developed a little bit of a tunnel vision on Afghanistan when there is a big world out there that needs to be dealt with, and if you ask yourself, what is the role of Europe in this larger world in which you have big players like Russia and China and India, it is not to prove itself a helpful second fiddle to the United States and Afghanistan.
MR. KEMPE: Quick question, quick answer. One of the next out-of-area missions that NATO could be called upon to do will be quite different than Afghanistan, which is Middle East as a peacekeeping force in a U.S.-Israel peace agreement. Secretary-General Rasmussen seems to have some interest and others have interest in this. Would you say, according to your argument, don’t go there; this is distracting?
MR. KAGAN: You know, a lot of it depends on political will, and I can imagine there being a great deal more political will in Europe for playing that kind of role than there has been for playing any kind of real role in Afghanistan. There isn’t a lot of political support for that, but there could be in the Middle East.
But then you would get to the question of capabilities, and while I would love to see, in theory, a NATO force take on that role, in practice, any foreign – any Western soldier operating for any – walking kids across the street or training people how to run, you know – is going to be target number one –
MR. KEMPE: Absolutely.
MR. KAGAN: – for terrorists, which means that you’re going to have a big force protection role as well. I know how the Americans would conduct that kind of activity. You would have a lot of people running around trying to do good things and a lot more people running around trying to protect the people trying to do good things.
I don’t know how Germans would handle that mission. I don’t know how other European countries might handle that mission. And, again, if you get into one of these situations where you can’t even tell – as in the case of the German public – you can’t even tell the German public that you’re engaged in something that might have to do with combat and everything has to be a disinterested peacekeeping operation, when the fighting starts, you better be prepared to tell those people that there has to be fighting too.
So, you know, again, I don’t rule it out. I’m not trying to say, please never get involved anywhere else in the world, but I would like the United States at least to stop making the test for whether Europe is relevant to the United States, how much it’s helping us in what is fundamentally our fight in Afghanistan.
MR. KEMPE: Very clear point.
Let’s start here and then I’ll get as many people in as I can. And do, for the record, please identify yourself.
Q: Edgar Buckley from Thales and formerly from NATO.
Bob, I agreed with what you said about the need for – NATO not being disqualified if we don’t succeed as an alliance in Afghanistan, but I also agreed with what Fred said, that we can do both. And then, coming on to his question, I’m not sure whether you are advocating a new more – I won’t say aggressive but more assertive approach towards Russia, because looking back, when we made progress in this great change in Europe, we did so through rapprochement with Russia.
It was when we had good relations with Russia that we felt able to enlarge NATO with confidence and it was the right thing to do. So, I’m thinking that to get what you want, a Europe whole and free, maybe that’s the approach and not necessarily loads and loads of Article 5 preparations close to their borders.
And just one last point. I’m not sure that whole and free for Europe is actually the mission. The mission is security. Whole and free is a part of it but, you know, we’re in Afghanistan for our security as well.
MR. KEMPE: And let me put one sentence on top of it. In the end, would not a Europe whole and free demand that Russia become part of that and perhaps even become a member of NATO?
MR. KAGAN: Well, a certain kind of Russia but not a Russia that currently –
MR. KEMPE: Right.
MR. KAGAN: – is in existence. And your point is well taken on what we accomplished when we had friendly relations with Russia. The problem is, is that, as you know very well, to the Russians these days, there is a narrative of us taking advantage. They don’t look back fondly on those days of good relations; they look back – or at least Putin has convinced everyone to look back on those days as the great sellout to a predatory West. They don’t have any positive feelings about that.
So, unfortunately, we’re not dealing with that Russia anymore. If we were dealing with that Russia, then we wouldn’t be having these problems. What we’re dealing with now is a Russia that feels all that was a mistake, that enlargement was bad for Russia, and that anything that Russia can do to try to create a two-tier NATO where some NATO countries can have U.S. and other kinds of military capacities but others can’t, a Russia that really would like to roll back some of what we consider to be all the positives of the 1990s, that’s the Russia that we’re dealing with today.
And so, my goal is not in any way to take a more assertive posture toward Russia, but I would say we can’t become – I don’t think we should buy the Russian narrative such that we have to then, in a way, pull back from what previously had been our goals, and that’s what I think we have been in danger of doing.
And let me just say, since Russia has come up – and I didn’t want to talk for an hour up there – Russia has choices. And I think that we in NATO have presented Russia with some very clear and, to my mind, very reasonable choices. It doesn’t make any sense when I look at Russia and they’ve got China on one flank and they have everything that they have in Central Asia on their other flank, and they have the internal difficulties they have, that somehow they’ve decided their greatest strategic problem is NATO.
That’s the most absurd thing in the world, and I’m willing to go so far as to accredit a little bit of Russian paranoia – and we know the whole history of, you know, everything that Russia – but, come on; some of that is a put on as well. Some of that is a – (audio break) – by Putin to stir up the kind of predatory Western nations and what have you, which is also an old Russian tradition.
We shouldn’t really – we need to be careful not to succumb to that. The NATO has made very reasonable offers to Russia on missile defense, on how to resolve the Georgia dispute in a way that meets its claimed concerns, on how to negotiate – there is an ongoing NATO-Russia council which I know that Secretary-General Rasmussen is very committed to and evidently committed to, right, and yet Sergey Lavrov just gave a bit tirade about how NATO is once again trying to push Russia around and not let us do what we need to do to protect our own interests.
And, meanwhile, Russia has a choice domestically. It has a choice between a modernizing direction and another kind of direction. How do we encourage that choice? Well, partly by making it clear that the other direction won’t work for them, you know, that the kind of hyper-nationalist, aggrieved Russia that fears NATO and needs to push back, that is not the successful path to modernization.
So, I’ll end by saying, on the one hand, yes, we should be reaching out to Russia, as we have been. On the other hand, let’s not be naïve that Russia doesn’t – that this particular Putin’s Russia doesn’t have a game of its own which does need to be resisted.
MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Bob.
I’ve got lots of people with questions and I’ve written you down in the order –
MR. KAGAN: And I’ll try to give shorter answers. Sorry. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: – but I’m going to show priority to former defense ministers of allied countries. How’s that? So, let me get the two of you to go first – Boyko and Jans (ph).
Q: Boyko Noev, former Bulgarian government. Thanks to the Atlantic Council. I agree with most of your analysis. I would only argue about treating Europe as a single entity and as a single player. There are big differences, as you know.
On your comment about leadership, this has often come up in the debates that we have here and elsewhere. Do you think leadership can be fostered or do you think lack of leadership should be taken as a given and the question should be resolved with other analysis? Thank you.
MR. KEMPE: And let me pick up Jans.
Q: Jans Pascal (ph), European Parliament. I agree with you that we should not lose sight of the traditional things, you know, NATO was conceived for, and this sort of return to this core, basic functions is very important. But, at the same time, time has passed in between.
I mean, if the husband has left his wife back home and he is now coming back home and he discovers that she has an affair with a neighbor – which is, you know, something that did not exist 10 years ago – how does he sort out? How can he convince the wife? For he says that, hey, listen, the neighbor is not that good, then –
MR. KAGAN: I’ll need a program to know who the wife is and who the – who is the wife cheating with and – (laughter).
Q: I won’t tell you that –
MR. KAGAN: Okay. (Chuckles.)
Q: – because I’m working where I’m working.
MR. KEMPE: I’m still waiting for you to tackle that one with the –
MR. KAGAN: I have no experience with any of that. I don’t know anything about it. (Laughter.)
Well, first of all, on the question of single Europe, I agree, obviously, that Europe is, in a way – well, I don’t know if it’s more fractured than it once was but it certainly has multiple interests which have been tugging at each other.
Now, I actually think that obviously the main tug has been between the East and the West, and especially on issues like Russia where I think that, unfortunately, the West has been – and that includes Germany – has been taking the lead in rapprochement and reset, what have you, along with the United States, which has caused some anxiety in the East.
And I think that it’s unfortunate that there hasn’t been greater concern for the East’s views on these things in Western capitals, and the tendency is to say either grow up, be quiet; we’re the leaders of this relationship; you’re too paranoid, et cetera, et cetera, and I think that is not appropriate behavior for the new EU.
I also think – and maybe this is going to sound strange a little; I’m not sure it does anymore – that the United States ought to be helpful in this regard. The United States ought to act – can, I think – you know, we don’t have the odious, monstrous George W. Bush as president anymore trying to do Europe in. We have a president who may not be as concerned about Europe as we would like, but I think, at the very least, this president can play a useful role, and Europe shouldn’t be unhappy about that, it seems to me. So, that would be one.
Now, you get to the question of should we take lack of good leadership as a norm? Lack of good leadership is the norm, I agree. That is normally the way it is, but the United States at least, and Europe at some very critical times and the United States throughout at least some portions of the last few decades, has been able to show some decent leadership.
So I don’t think we should let ourselves off the hook quite that easily and just say good leadership is a thing of the past. But I do think that even leaders, after all who are mostly politicians, they need to have some sense of what the vision should be. And I think, look, let’s face it, ever since the end of the Cold War, we’ve all been sort of adrift in trying to understand what matters now, what the big issues are, what should we be focused on?
And then 9/11 came along and now I think it created a misleading focus on one very important and dangerous but nevertheless narrow set of issues. So I would like – to some extent maybe what we need is a better intellectual leadership in terms of understanding how this all – how all the pieces fit together.
And, partly, it does – I hate to say go back. You know, everybody says, oh, you want to go back; you don’t realize times have changed. I realize times have changed but sometimes we overstate the change, and that’s – in fact, I would say, since, again, the end of the Cold War, we’ve overstated all kinds of change.
We all remember the end of history – and I don’t mean to make fun of Frank’s argument, but we all felt that way to some extent. Everything was different now. Well, some things are different and a lot of things stayed the same. And what I’m trying to argue is, in the world we’re living in, these old issues like common values, like the very important strategic reality of a trans-Atlantic relationship, are still of genuine enduring value.
And we may make a mistake in thinking things have changed so much that that’s not what matters anymore; what matters is fighting ragtag groups of guerillas in Afghanistan. Oh, come on, things haven’t changed that much.
So, I guess I would say, you know, if you take the longue durée, if you take the longer view of all these things, you see there’s a lot more continuity, and we need to have a strategy that addresses that continuity as well as the change.
MR. KEMPE: I’ll restrain myself.
MR. KAGAN: Contain yourself. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: Arnaud and Harlan.
Q: Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. With the departure of the Dutch from Afghanistan last month and the Canadians leaving next year, leaving the Brits and the U.S. to do whatever kinetic operation is necessary, what, to your way of thinking, would be a plausible, feasible way out of Afghanistan?
MR. KAGAN: Well, you really have the wrong Kagan up here to answer that question, but the other Kagan is in Afghanistan right now, so he can’t answer for me.
Look, I think, based on my vast knowledge of what’s going on in Afghanistan – which is not, in fact, vast – I predict that we will, over the next few months, see some progress. I think we’re already seeing progress. We’re so fixated on the decisions that Obama made a year ago that we can barely pay attention to what’s going on now.
I have a fair amount of confidence in Petraeus’s ability to assess a situation, make up for the mostly intellectual shortfalls that we’ve had in Afghanistan over the years and make some progress. I think it’s highly unfortunate that many Europeans and the Canadians are pulling out, although I’m sympathetic. I don’t think it will make a material difference. I think at the end of the day the progress will depend largely on what the Americans do.
And I would say if we’re sitting here next year and things look as grim as they do now, then I would be more willing to sort of answer your question in a how do we cut our losses and get out? I believe we will be sitting here a year from now and things will look better than they do now, and –
MR. KEMPE: Which is the way out because you would be –
MR. KAGAN: Well, right.
MR. KEMPE: – you would be starting to transfer. Is that –
MR. KAGAN: Right. I mean, the way out – as in all these cases, the only way out is forward. It is a great illusion to imagine that there is a backward way out. For one thing, I think people don’t have enough imagination about what that looks like – withdrawing, losing. It isn’t going to be pretty.
And I don’t even think we can sustain withdrawal. Put it that way. You want to talk about being able to sustain commitment? I doubt we can sustain withdrawal, that things will happen that we will find intolerable and we’ll, one way or another, be fighting our way back in again. So, I think the only way out is forward and I think we will make forward progress.
MR. KEMPE: Harlan?
Q: Harlan Ullman from the Atlantic Council. Unfortunately, you cannot ignore Afghanistan, whether you’re right or wrong. You cannot ignore the huge tensions that are going on within the alliance between East and West, sort of Article 5 consensus, all these kinds of things. And you can’t ignore the fact that neither the strategic experts group or, likely, the strategic concept is going to be anything else except underwhelming.
In other words, making the case for NATO has been something that’s been very elusive. Quite frankly, where you may be right about whole and free, to me that has absolutely no compelling argument to it that’s going to get countries on both sides of the Atlantic to say, gee, that’s really a great idea; why don’t I think about that and support it?
So, supposing your idea, however valid for Europe whole and free, does not pass the “Napoleon’s corporal” test and it cannot really be the underpinnings. What is your alternative?
MR. KAGAN: I have to go from my alternative that’s not good to another one that I make up that’s even worse, but okay. I’m having a very – I was supposed to be the pessimist about this relationship, you know. You people have all overtaken me. (Laughter.)
MR. : You should have been at the first – (inaudible, off mike). (Laughter.)
MR. KAGAN: “Europe, whole and free” is a phrase. I don’t mean to – telling Europeans that it is appropriate for Europeans to focus on Europe I think is something that can sell. Now, the harder part is, by “Europe” we mean something outside your own country. That may be a harder sell. That is a core EU problem, whether there really is any – (audio break) – of Europe, let alone a Europe that includes people in the East. So I accept that these are all obstacles.
You know, we’ve tried all the other – it’s not for lack of trying that two administrations, or maybe even three administrations, have tried to come up with the things that continue to bind us together and that hasn’t been compelling. We were bound together to some extent by the Balkans because Europeans cared about the Balkans and Americans thought that they ought to care because the Europeans cared. Okay, fine. That was a perfectly reasonable basis.
And then NATO enlargement, until the Russians started getting unhappy about it, was a nice sort of vague – and EU enlargement. These were kind of binding elements. But, look, terrorism has not been a binding element. Americans think it binds Europeans and Americans but Europeans don’t have the same reaction to terrorism that the United States does. I daresay Afghanistan is not a binding issue.
And so it’s not for lack of trying. I guess I would say that – and I don’t want to be, you know, sanguine that this problem can be solved. I mean, nobody has mentioned, you know, Germany’s problem as having any foreign policy. And you might say that without a Germany, what is Europe? And I think Germany needs to find itself in a way that it has yet to find itself.
So, I can come up with even as many objections to my approach as you have, but if you ask me, what makes more sense – put it this way – to focus Europe’s attention on military activities 3,000 miles away in countries they don’t care about or to focus Europe’s attention on Europe, I would say that at least is a better bet.
If you have an even better binding agreement that will bring Europe and the trans-Atlantic community together, I’m all ears. Maybe I’m being – maybe I’m just nostalgic. Maybe I’m idealistic, but I do think – in a world – so you’ve got me – you know, I’m trying to think out loud.
In a world where Europeans are worried about China’s rise, where they’re worried about falling behind, I would say it’s plausible that a United States-European relationship which seeks once again to elevate the role of – (audio break) – that maybe that would appeal, as long as the French aren’t concerned about becoming America’s – (audio break) – all the time.
MR. KEMPE: I also find myself – as you say, you’re hearing Boyko’s voice because Denmark isn’t Germany and Spain is nothing, but that would be –
MR. KAGAN: Well, maybe we could just get rid of the whole Europe concept.
MR. KEMPE: – but especially on NATO and security-type issues.
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
MR. KEMPE: But that’s another conversation.
Damon?
Q: Thank you. Terrific talk, Bob. I just wanted to sort of play out – one of the compelling reasons the United States has turned its European partners in Iraq outside of the NATO framework, or in Afghanistan within the alliance framework, is because it’s so compelling politically for the United States to operate with friends overseas when it’s using force.
It’s a political imperative that we not fight alone. Sure, we care about the military capabilities, the resources, but political legitimacy is a huge element of that. And so, what is the corollary, what’s the implication of what you’ve laid out here?
If we shouldn’t be dragging our European allies – our closest allies with whom we have the closest military cooperation – into combat operations with us around the globe, what are the implications for what that means for the United States when it does find itself in a situation where it decides it needs to use force?
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
Q: Are we looking to develop alternative partners on a more global basis, or does this mean acting more unilaterally – more by ourselves than just taking the hits for it?
MR. KAGAN: Yeah. Well, it’s a very good question, and it is a problem. I do think that the United States, probably in the future, will look for regional partners to deal with problems in those regions. Certainly no one is thinking that Europeans should play some kind of military strategic role in East Asia, for instance. There are strong military powers in East Asia that the United States does have alliances with and does partner with.
So we’re really – we’re really only talking about these kinds of in-between areas like Central Asia and perhaps the Middle East, where, again, the United States also has those kinds of partners.
Now, then the question becomes psychological because, look, let’s face it; when the Europeans came with the United States to Iraq in ’91, the United States provided 90 to 95 percent of the firepower. When the Europeans and the United States went together in the Balkans, in Kosovo the United States provided 90 percent of the power.
So then we’re really talking, to some extent, about a psychological question, and that’s where we get into – now we’re back to the old problem – is Europe willing to grant its moral authority and legitimacy to military actions that the United States takes that the Europeans don’t want to participate in militarily?
I mean, that’s where things broke down over Iraq, and that is what has been a great temptation for Europeans, not wanting to participate themselves but also not liking to see the United States participate, doing it alone, has withheld that legitimacy, which can play back into the American political system.
Now, I mean, in the past I’ve suggested that we need to have some kind of bargain between the United States and Europe where the United States is willing to let Europe have a significant say in when the United States uses force, in return for which Europe is willing to take the risk sometimes of providing legitimacy for that force when they agree.
But, again, has it helped? I mean, this is a question: Has it helped? I mean, this is a question. Has it helped trans-Atlantic – has Afghanistan aided trans-Atlantic solidarity in real terms? I’m not sure it has.
Now, if it all turns out well, it probably can. If it doesn’t turn out well, it probably won’t have. So, it may be a false prescription to suggest that we pull the Europeans with us every step of the way and that somehow this leads to sort of greater harmony in the relationship. I’m not sure that that’s necessarily true.
As for the American people, sometimes they feel the need for legitimacy from Europe; sometimes they don’t. It isn’t in every case that Americans are like that. Americans are pretty much convinced of their own legitimacy when they get themselves worked up over something. But there will be occasions where that is an issue, and that’s where I think we need to come up with some kind of reasonable bargain.
MR. KEMPE: Frank, did I see you had a – no? I probably just – Ian? No. Let me throw in a question, then, off this and then I’ll – after my question let me pass on to Julie Finley, and we’re getting pretty close to the end.
Let’s take a look a little bit more deeply at the relationship with Russia. What would be a trans-Atlantic policy toward today’s Russia – and this gets to Jans’ point that it is a different Russia and it has a different set of motivations, certainly globally, economically interconnected in a way that the Soviet Union wasn’t ever, in this way, as dependent on Western markets, as I said.
There’s a whole set of other things that makes it quite different, including what’s gone on in Abkhazia, Ossetia and the different situation in Ukraine, and also now quite a different situation in Poland, where Poland is actually pursing its own reset policy. So, within all this, what is a trans-Atlantic policy towards Russia that would actually unify the U.S. and Europe and Europe?
So that would be my question. And, Julie, why don’t you throw in one here too as well?
Q: Julie Finley, former ambassador to the OSCE. First of all, as I go around this country, there is a selling job needing to be done, because most people I talk to think Europe is whole and free, number one. But my question is, how can you see – do you see NATO going to solve some unrest in Kazakhstan? Under what circumstances are you comfortable with NATO in Kyrgyzstan?
MR. KAGAN: I’m uncomfortable with anybody in Kyrgyzstan. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: Meaning part of Eurasia which – meaning part of Eurasia which was part of the place that you said NATO could get involved.
Q: Well, they have Kazakhstan –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KAGAN: Well, Kazakhstan is way out there, isn’t it? Am I right? Isn’t that like not in Europe per se?
Q: But it is part of –
(Cross talk.)
MR. KEMPE: Partnership for Peace.
MR. KAGAN: Well, everybody is in Partnership for Peace. (Laughter.) Yeah. No, I’m not trying to belittle the question.
MR. KEMPE: Yeah.
MR. KAGAN: Although, you know, how would you feel about NATO forces in Costa Rica and how – I mean, there is a kind of – in theory, NATO could be anywhere. In practice, I guess I would have to say – I’m trying to think of a scenario that has us in troops – in a country that borders both China and Russia and has NATO forces in it. I guess I can imagine it, but I have a hard time imagining it exactly, how you would wind up deploying NATO troops in Kazakhstan.
And I don’t think you could ever get away with deploying NATO qay (ph) – NATO in Kyrgyzstan. It would obviously have to be as part of some other organization that the Russians could possibly feel comfortable with.
I don’t dismiss, out of hand, any of these. In theory, if Europe genuinely has the political desire to get involved and leaders are willing to sell to their people the need to get involved and they meet a reasonable response, then the question becomes one of capabilities, and then we can have, you know, a sort of typical 90-10 split in terms of the action, if we can still maintain the 10 percent of it.
But it’s the first part of that equation that I’m dubious about, and that’s why I’m skeptical of this kind of operation because I just don’t think European publics support it, but I’m willing to entertain it in principle that it could possibly happen.
And now I’ve forgotten the other part of the question.
MR. KEMPE: What policy toward this new Russia –
MR. KAGAN: Oh, toward –
MR. KEMPE: – could one have that actually binds the trans-Atlantic relationship and binds Europe rather than divides it –
MR. KAGAN: Yeah.
MR. KEMPE: – recognizing that Estonians, Poles, Germans, U.S. are all in somewhat different places on that.
MR. KAGAN: Well, you know, I think there are – if you look at what has become the consensus position over the past year on Georgia, for instance, there’s a lot more NATO unity than you might expect on an issue like that.
And, by the way, I mean, the Poles are engaged in a reset. The day the Poles decide that they are completely trusting of the Russians, I will really begin – I’ll rip up everything I ever learned about geopolitics and I’ll start all over again learning. But the Poles can – you know, fine. (Laughter.) But I think that there can be more of a consensus than there has been.
Now, let me just – now I’ll do a little bit of predicting. In my view, on the U.S. side, the reset has already hit its high-water mark. I think it’s all downhill from here. The last Iran sanctions are the best Iran sanctions we’re going to get out of Russia. Now Russia is going to be – is already actively working against further sanctions, including sanctions that Russia isn’t even being asked to undertake. That’s the first thing.
I personally hope the START treaty is passed but I’m worried that it won’t pass, which will give the Russians another grievance, which will give them an excuse to be more obstreperous than they’ve already been. And I think, in terms of Russian domestic politics, we’re heading towards Putin announcing his run for the presidency, which means the Medvedev fantasy is going to come to an end.
And so, I think things are going to get harder with Russia, which I think there’s going to be a reset of the American reset, and I think this will have an impact on European policies as well. When the Americans take a tougher line toward the Russians than the Poles, I will find that to be an amusing moment. It may happen, actually, because the Poles may be out of sync with where the Americans are at the moment, but I don’t think it will be that difficult, under those circumstances, to have an increasingly united European position.
Now, the big issue, of course, are not the Poles. The big issue are the Germans, who believe that they uniquely understand Russia, uniquely understand how to have the proper relationship with Russia, and uniquely have their political system highly infiltrated by business deals with Russia.
So, Germany is going to be the issue, but I don’t believe that Germany will really fight a European consensus on some key issues that may come up in dealing with Russia, so I’m more optimistic about a consensus on Russia than has existed so far.
MR. : The Germans never fight, so where do you find that? (Laughter.)
MR. KAGAN: Fair enough. (Chuckles.)
MR. KEMPE: I’m looking at my clock and I think we’ve run out of time. Bob, this has been absolutely terrific – many things to chew on here, including the possibility of a reset of the American reset. And I think what you’ve pointed us to very strongly, which, in the parts of the opening sessions I attended, wasn’t touched on as strongly, is the – in the aftermath of Afghanistan or even as Afghanistan gets going, how do you refocus the alliance on the challenges of its home ground?
And then, on top of that, how do you refocus it in such a way that it’s actually useful, acceptable, works? I mean, my own personal view – and either you can leave me with this or I’ll give you 30 more seconds to answer this – is we can either do both Afghanistan and Europe, whole and free, or we can do neither, because if we don’t have the staying power in Afghanistan, if we can’t work together there, I think the crisis of confidence would be great.
So, even if you’re right that we shouldn’t have gone there, I don’t see this as an either/or. I see it more as a either do both or can’t do either.
MR. KAGAN: Well, I should probably just leave you with that since you’re the boss of the organization here, so – (laughter).
MR. KEMPE: But I wouldn’t expect you to do that, so, please answer that.
MR. KAGAN: Well, first of all, I thought I was supposed to talk about post-Afghanistan and NATO –
MR. KEMPE: Right, yes. Right.
MR. KAGAN: – not that we’ll never get out of Afghanistan, NATO.
MR. KEMPE: But there are two posts. One could be a disastrous post-Afghanistan and one could be a –
MR. KAGAN: Right.
MR. KEMPE: – a better post-Afghanistan.
MR. KAGAN: And when the disaster occurs, I will do my best to make sure that people understand that the disaster was primarily a failure of American military strategy, not a failure of the NATO alliance –
MR. KEMPE: Right.
MR. KAGAN: – because it really will not have been a failure of the NATO alliance.
MR. KEMPE: And so you’re basically telling us all here, don’t make this a test. If it succeeds, great, it can help us; if it doesn’t succeed –
MR. KAGAN: Surely it will be more fun just to blame the Americans for screwing up Afghanistan than taking it on the entire alliance, and in this case it will be true. (Laughter.)
MR. KEMPE: Thank you, Bob Kagan. (Applause.)
(END)